Maritime Powers Object to Suez Canal Blockade
(August 1951)
In the course of the Security Council debate, a majority
of delegates supported the Israeli case on the basis of the 1888
Constantinople Convention — and an interpretation of the 1949
Israel-Egypt armistice agreement. Excerpts from the speeches of the
representatives of the United Kingdom, France, United States and Brazil
follow:
Sir Gladwyn Jebb (United Kingdom)
Egypt claims that there is a state of war and that it is
therefore entitled to exercise belligerent rights. It is not necessary, in
our view, for the Council to pronounce on this. Even if it were
self-evident that a state of war existed — which is by no means the case,
of course this would in itself afford no justification for the maintenance
of the restrictions at the present time and in the light of the present
situation. What matters is not whether there is some technical basis for
the restrictions but whether it is reasonable, just and equitable that they
should be maintained. This is the principle on which the draft Resolution
before the Council has been formulated, and it is oil this issue that we
consider that the Council should pronounce.
If the problem is approached in this way, I do not
myself think that there can be much doubt about the decision which the
Council should take. The draft Resolution refers to the attitude which the
Council has adopted in the past and to the pronounceinents of United
Nations authorities such as Mr. Bunche and General Riley. I dealt with
these points at some length in my statement of 1 August, and I would only
say now that the conclusion seems to me, at least, to be inescapable.
The armistice agreement was meant not to bring about
merely a temporary pause in the fighting, but to put a definitive end to
hostilities and to guard against their renewal. When the agreement was
endorsed by the Council [S/1376] it was our definite understanding that it
would mark the end of the restrictions which had been imposed on both
sides. The restrictions on shipping in the Suez Canal should therefore have
been lifted when the armistice agreement was signed, and they have become
more unreasonable and more anachronistic with each month that has passed
since then.
Paragraphs 5, 6, 7 and 8 of the draft Resolution deal,
as representatives will see, with the question of belligerent rights. For
the reasons which I have already stated, the draft Resolution does not
attempt to say whether or not Egypt can technically claim to be entitled to
belligerent rights. What the draft Resolution does say is that, in the
light of the armistice agreement and of what has taken place since it was
signed, the maintenance of the present restrictions is unjustified and
unreasonable and must be held to constitute an abuse of any rights which
Egypt may claim to possess. If it could be shown that these measures are
essential for the defence of Egypt, we might well be prepared to take a
different view. But Egypt is not being attacked and is not under any
imminent threat of attack, and we therefore cannot agree that these
measures are necessary for the self-defence or self-preservation of
Egypt...
Mr. Lacoste (France)
... According to the French Government, there are three
main aspects to this case: the first, which is fundamental, concerns the
general principles of international law and, within their framework, the
international status of the Suez Canal; another concerns the implementation
of the General Armistice Agreement entered into by Egypt and Israel at
Rhodes on 24 February 1949; a third concerns the effects of the
restrictions imposed by the Egyptian Government at Suez: that is to say,
the general effects, and in particular the economic effects, upon other
Powers.
Whichever of these main aspects of the question the
Council considers, it is obvious that a solution is absolutely essential.
The great principles of international law must be respected; the Convention
of Constantinople must be implemented; the armistice agreement between
Israel and Egypt, which is one of the cornerstones of tile maintenance of
peace and security in the Near East, must be effectively observed by the
signatories; the endless difficulties affecting other States as a result of
the restrictions imposed by the Egyptian Government upon the free passage
of ships through the Suez Canal must be removed.
It has been questioned whether Egypt and Israel were
actually in a state of war according to international law at the time when
their forces were fighting in tile Negev. Furthermore, since the fighting
has in effect ceased and an armistice of a specifically permanent character
has been concluded, the French Government considers that there is no legal
basis upon which one of the parties may exercise in respect of the other
the traditional rights of belligerents rights to which only belligerents
are entitled involving visit, search and seizure...
Mr. Warren R. Austin (United States)
... The United States is firmly of the opinion that the
restrictions which Egypt is exercising over ships passing through the Suez
Canal are inconsistent with the spirit and intent of the armistice
agreement. My Government believes that the imposition of these restrictions
and their maintenance for so long a period after the signing of the
armistice agreement is a retrogression from what both parties committed
themselves to — namely, the establishment of permanent peace in the
Palestine area. No other significance of these restrictions appears
possible. The result of this hostile act is tile engendering of hostility
in return, which places in jeopardy the peace and stability of that area
This is properly the concern of this Council and requires our action lest
the Situation worsen...
Mr. Muniz (Brazil)
... The representative of Egypt, dealing with the
specific question submitted to the Security Council, has contended that the
armistice being a mere temporary suspension of hostilities, the state of
war continues to exist and therefore Egypt is entitled to impose
restrictions affecting Israel trade. Without any disregard for the reasons
set forth by the representative of Egypt and for the authorities lie cited
in favour of his point of view, I must say that the Council should not
allow the thesis of the existence of a state of war between Israel and the
other signatories of the General Armistice Agreements of 1949 to justify
the resort to hostile acts by any of the parties. According to the terms of
article II, paragraph 2, of the agreement between Israel and Egypt of 24
February 1949, both parties pledged themselves to abstain from "any
warlike or hostile act" against each other.
Furthermore, the purpose of the agreement is explained
in article I as follows: "With a view to promoting the return to
permanent peace in Palestine". Article XII, paragraph 2, of the
agreement defines very clearly the character and duration of the agreement:
"This agreement, having been negotiated and
concluded in pursuance of the resolution of the Security Council of 16
November 1948 calling for the establishment of an armistice in order to
eliminate the threat to the peace in Palestine and to facilitate the
transition from the present truce to permanent peace in Palestine, shall
remain in force until a peaceful settlement between the Parties is
achieved, except as provided in paragraph 3 of this Article."
Therefore, during the intermediary phase between the
cessation of hostilities and the definite peaceful settlement, the parties
are bound to refrain from acts likely to endanger the achievement of the
ultimate purpose of the armistice. The representatives of both Israel and
the United Kingdom have quoted statements by General Riley and Mr. Bunche
to the effect that the measures adopted by the Egyptian Government relating
to navigation on the Suez Canal are contrary to the spirit of the armistice
agreement. Should we accept the Egyptian thesis, we would be bound to
recognize any measures of reprisal adopted by the Israel Government. It is
obvious that, in the exchange of hostile acts that would follow, we could
hardly expect to lay the foundations of a definite solution to the
Palestine question.
The General Armistice Agreement of 24 February 1949
suspended military operations between Egypt and Israel as an important step
towards reaching a final peace between the belligerents. Although the
armistice constitutes a temporary suspension of hostilities, it is
self-evident that, as long as it lasts, the parties are barred from the
exercise of any acts which might bring about the resumption of the armed
conflict. It is the essence of the amnesties to be a step leading to
permanent peace. The armistice agreements of 1949 were a hard-fought
conquest by the United Nations which raised great hopes in the capacity of
the international Organization to maintain peace and security. To allow
punitive actions by one of the parties against the other would certainly
create a situation leading to the resumption of the military operations and
would annul the great efforts which were exerted by the United Nations in
bringing about the suspension of hostilities...
Sources: Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs |