F O R D ' S R E S E A R C H E F F O R T S I N
A S S E S S I N G T H E A C T I V I T I E S O F I T S
S U B S I D I A R Y I N N A Z I G E R M A N Y 5
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Fo r d ' s R e s e a r c h E f f o r t s i n As s e s s i n g t h e Ac t i v i t i e s o f i t s S u b s i d i a r y i n Na z i G e r m a n y 6
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At the turn of the millennium," globalization" is the
new catchphrase for describing the central forces of the
world's economy, polities, and social structure. With
globalization comes a new vocabulary, including terms
such as "civil society," "nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs)," "global contagion," and "protocols." The
public became familiar with these terms through media
reports of the street demonstrations that stretched from
the World Trade Organization (WTO) meeting in Seattle
in 1999 to the Group of Eight (G8) summit in Genoa
in 2001.

In addition, the decision-making p r o c e s s e s t h at
influence the agenda of world affairs, the key actors in
that decision-making, the core values that dominate the
process of decision-making, and the major issues for
d e l i b e r ation and action have all been altere d
p re c i p i t o u s ly by the forces of globalizat i o n . T h e
governments of the world, even those of the strongest
countries, no longer hold a monopoly on power.
I n t e rn ational conventions have replaced nat i o n a l
treaties in importance. Many global organizations have
s i g n i fi c a n t ly expanded their effo rts to deal with
e c o n o m i c, s o c i a l , m e d i c a l , and env i ro n m e n t a l
problems common to humanity.

Powerful mu l t i l ateral org a n i z ations have been
created or emerged, including the United Nations
(UN), International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank,
and W TO. Their membership is composed of
governments. But also of growing importance are
NGOs that often focus on issues of the redistribution of
wealth and of social justice. Although not elected,
many NGOs have established themselves as the credible
representatives of public concerns. Finally, the number
and importance of multinational corporations has never
been greater.

Despite their proliferation and expanded mantle of
responsibility, corporations have become the subject of
more critical scrutiny than ever. Major corporations
have been accorded a new stature far beyond their
traditional primary economic purpose in at least four
areas:

� As agents of pro g re s s i ve social and economic
change in their role as employers, particularly in
relation to issues of wages and working conditions.

� As sources of monetary compensation for historic
injustices or development projects.

S i m o n R e i c h C o m m e n t a r y
F O R D ' S R E S E A R C H E F F O R T S I N
A S S E S S I N G T H E A C T I V I T I E S O F I T S
S U B S I D I A R Y I N N A Z I G E R M A N Y
By

Simon Reich Professor of the Graduate School of
Public and International Affairs
Department of Political Science
University of Pittsburgh 7
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� As cat a lysts of economic growth in the
underdeveloped world.

� As conduits for dealing with the environmental
impact of trade, investment, and finance.

The meeting of leaders drawn from the largest
governments and major corporations of the world
hosted annually by the World Economic Forum of
Geneva, Switzerland, attests to a growing belief that
even the most powerful governments cannot address
these fundamental issues alone. The private sector has
an unprecedented role to play in addressing dimensions
of social and economic problems. 1

While national legislatures retain many of their
traditional roles associated with taxation, security, and
welfare, an increasing number of the crucial decisions
affecting the health, safety, and prosperity of the world's
citizens are decided by international convention, by
international organizations, and by dynamic market
forces in which the world's corporations play a central
ro l e. P ro bl e m at i c a l ly, while gove rnments re m a i n
a c c o u n t able to their electorat e s , the forces that
influence the we l fa re of citizens are incre a s i n g ly
beyond the control of those electorates. Multinational
corporations are largely seen as partially filling that
vacuum as a new source of power, given their capacity
to transcend national boundaries. Yet, unlike (at least)
democratic governments, corporations are not elected
and are considered sheltered from accountability to the
general publ i c. This gap between power and
a c c o u n t ability has generated widespread concern s
among both governments and citizens about whether
c o rp o r ations will accept their role as agents of
democratic, peaceful, and prosperous change.

Certainly, new and evolving issues abound, often
intersecting and blurring the traditional distinctions
between politics and economics, or between military
and social affairs. Examples of these issues include drug

interdiction and other forms of transnational crime �
such as money laundering and illegal immigration,
with its relationship to poverty � and a heightened
awa reness of ethnic conflict and the need fo r
p reve n t at i ve interve n t i o n . T h e re is a grow i n g
appreciation among policy makers and analysts that the
roots of many of these security problems are economic.
The term" human security," which is applied by the UN
to a host of pro blems concerning economic
d evelopment and personal safe t y, reflects such
recognition.

What are the emerging core values accompanying
the spread of globalization? A theme that runs through
the agenda generated by international institutions such
as the UN and many NGOs in responding to the forces
of globalization is a focus on the benefits of democracy
and of the need to ensure human rights be guaranteed
for the citizenry by governments in all corners of the
globe. One aspect of this emphasis is a respect for the
rights of those who either have suffe red histori c
injustices or are suffering contemporary ones at the
hands of governments and corporations alike. These
injustices take many forms, and include the claims of
indigenous peoples who have had their land
confiscated in the age of imperialism; the demands for
decent working conditions by lab o rers subject to
sweatshop rules; and the claims of victims who suffered
the denial of their economic, political, and human
rights as forced and slave laborers during the Nazi
period. In many of these instances, groups seeking
compensation for the denial of their rights have sought
public support for their claims and financial redress
through the court system, often the American court
system for technical reasons.

It is clearly in this latter context of redressing
inequities and injustices that the purpose and substance
of Ford's report resides. For although governments
have often been the target for those petitioning for
either financial compensation (such as the land claims
of the indigenous peoples of Australia) or an apology
by way of recognition of the past suffering (for
e x a m p l e, in the case of A f ri c a n -A m e ricans whose
ancestors were enslaved), multinational corporations
have moved to a central position in many disputes.
Indeed, the term "corporate social responsibility" has

Fo r d ' s R e s e a r c h E f f o r t s i n A s s e s s i n g t h e A c t i v i t i e s o f i t s S u b s i d i a r y i n Na z i G e r m a n y
1 Ford in this context is a prime example of such a corporation.
Its response to suggestions that it may have played a complicit
role in a historic injustice regarding the use of forced and slave
labor provides a very public forum for evaluating how the
company is viewed as a corporate citizen. For my purposes,
the term "slave labor" here is exclusively applied to the use of
c o n c e n t r ation camp victims. " Forced lab o r " re fers to
conscripted civilians from occupied countries. 8
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been coined in the last decade to reflect the important
role that mu l t i n ational corp o r ations play in these
situations.

What does the term" corporate social responsibility"
mean? It encapsulates the central role of multinational
corporations in accepting responsibility for the impact
of their actions on society and the environment, as well
as addressing problems across a variety of issues in
which claimants call for redress. The latter role implies
t h at corp o r ations respond to demands such as
c o m p e n s ation for South A f rican wo r kers who
contracted asbestosis as a result of hazardous workplace
conditions or for former forced and slave laborers put
to work in factories in Nazi Germany.

In essence, "corporate social responsibility" asserts
that major corporations have more dimensions to their
role than pure ly the economic one of sat i s f y i n g
stockholder demands. Through their behavior, they
may also choose to contribute to maintaining political
s t ab i l i t y, p roviding public we l fa re serv i c e s , a n d
a d d ressing a series of social and deve l o p m e n t a l
problems across the globe. In many of the world's
poorer countries, multinational corporations have a
greater capacity to administer educational and medical
services, feed and clothe populations, and ensure that
rights are respected than do the governments who at
least nominally rule those countries.

The notion and underlying code of ethics generally
described as "corporate social responsibility" attempts
to imbue corp o r ations with three core va l u e s :
" t r a n s p a re n c y," " a c c o u n t ab i l i t y," and " i n t e g ri t y."
Collectively, they lie at the heart of what is more
commonly described as "good governance." Why these
three? Well, they are values consistent with democratic
g ove rn m e n t . " Tr a n s p a re n c y " focuses on what
corporations do in terms of their employment and
social practices, why they take the actions they do, and
how these policies are implemented. Corporations
invoking the concept of "accountability" attempt to
defuse accusations that they stand outside the
jurisdiction of national and international legislative
b o d i e s. R at h e r, " a c c o u n t ab i l i t y " suggests that
corporations are subject to more than the interests of
their major shareholders; they are also subject to the
rules of law and are answerable to the court of public

opinion. Finally, "integrity" is invoked as an appeal to
ethical conduct that extends beyond the immediate
s e l f -i n t e rest of any company to a broader set of
enlightened va l u e s , p a rt i c u l a r ly in areas of
environmental degradation and labor practices.

It is only in the context of this rather extended
introduction that one can understand the significance
of the report entitled Research Findings About Ford-Werke
Under the Nazi Regime. Faced with a series of
crucial questions regarding the historical injustices
endured by forced and slave laborers in Nazi Germany,
the management of Ford Motor Company chose to
respond effectively and credibly to a series of concerns
initially raised by a documentary aired by the British
B roadcasting Corp o r ation in Feb ru a ry 1998. T h e
questions raised by the BBC's documentary, and a rather
m o re accusat o ry article that subsequently wa s
published in the Washington Post, concerned:

� the relationship between Ford's American parent
fi rm and the Nazi gove rnment in Germ a ny
between 1933 and 1945;

� the re l ationship between Fo r d 's Germ a n
subsidiary, Ford-Werke, and the Nazi government
during the same period;

� the issue of whether forced and slave laborers were
used at the Ford-Werke plant in Cologne, and, if
so, whether Ford Motor Company officials in
Dearborn cooperated in and were complicit in
their use; and

� whether Ford or its subsidiary benefi t e d
financially from the company's wartime activities
in Nazi Germany.

My book The Fruits of Fascism: Postwar Prosperity in
Historical Perspective (Cornell University Press, 1990) did,
in part, attempt to address these very questions posed
by the media. As a comparat i ve study of the
g ove rn m e n t s ' t re atment of domestic and fo re i g n
automobile producers in Great Britain and Germany,
the book sought to determine how and why the auto
industries in these two countries, which looked so
similar in 1929, were so profoundly different in the
postwar period. What were these differences? By far
the most important factor in this divergence was that

S i mo n R e i c h Co mme n t a r y 9
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while the two American producers � Ford and General
Motors � dominated production in both countries in
the prewar peri o d , t h ey shrank in importance in
Germany in the postwar period while remaining robust
and dominant in Great Britain.

There were some important differences between the
American firms in the two countries in the prewar
period. Although Ford was the larger producer of the
two in Great Britain, it was General Motors that played
the much larger role in Germany, dwarfing Ford's
production there. Indeed, Ford accounted for less than
2 percent of all American investment in Germany in the
prewar period. Yet collectively the subsidiaries of the
two companies accounted for approximately half of all
German production in the 1930s. They were not
overtaken in volume by the German firms until after
1945.

I sought to account for this striking difference in the
fate of American firms in Great Britain and Germany in
the postwar period, and to consider the implications
for the postwar pattern of development in the two
countries. I concluded that the difference was in how
the fi rms had been tre ated by the two nat i o n a l
governments in the 1930s and 1940s. While Ford and
General Motors were assisted by a policy of national
t re atment in Gre at Britain that often, in effe c t ,
privileged them as producers, these same two firms
suffered from consistent, explicit discrimination at the
hands of the German government. That pattern of
discrimination originated in Germany in 1933.

Furthermore, my own study found that Ford-Werke
was consistently treated much worse than General
Motors' Opel subsidiary. Ford-Werke's small size made
it relatively unimportant in terms of Nazi strategic
thinking and thus it was far more disposable. I argue
that Ford-Werke was persistently treated as an outsider:
bullied, manipulated, and denied the material resources
a l l o c ated to other fi rm s. I n d e e d , g ove rn m e n t
re g u l ations thre atened Fo r d -We r ke 's existence.
Alarmed by its slumping sales in Germany, the Ford
parent firm in Dearborn tried to improve the business
prospects for Ford-Werke by placating the excessive
demands of the Nazi government. But the German

s u b s i d i a ry remained an isolated and marg i n a l i z e d
producer � despite Hitler's knowledge of Henry Ford's
sponsorship of anti-Semitic publications, his personal
admiration for Ford himself, and his adaptation of the
mass production techniques in Germany that Ford had
made fa m o u s. Fo r d -We r ke 's linkages with the
Dearborn headquarters became increasingly attenuated
during the course of the decade of the 1930s � and
nonexistent by the outbreak of the war in the Pacific
Theater in 1941.

Of course, this analysis is the work of one solitary
scholar seeking access to documents dispersed across at
least two continents. It was as comprehensive a study
as circumstances allowe d , but its findings we re
certainly not definitive. In an attempt to answer the
questions raised by the BBC, Washington Post, and others,
Ford Motor Company in this report offers a response
that is far more thorough.

Ford Motor Company officials reacted to this public
s c ru t i ny by promising an exhaustive and
u n c o m p romising assessment regarding accusat i o n s
about profiteering, collaboration, and the use of forced
and slave lab o r, resisting the public clamor fo r
immediate answers. They decided that the report
(Research Findings About Ford-Werke Under the Nazi
Regime) was to be purely descriptive in addressing
these claims, not interpretative or even a historical
narrative, allowing interested readers to draw their own
conclusions. Ford appointed an investigative team of
45 people, made up of historians and professional
archivists of the highest caliber. This staff eventually
compiled over 98,000 pages of documentation. As part
of that process, I was hired as a consultant to assist in
l o c ating mat e ri a l s , to read and comment on the
research team's findings, and to ensure that the report
was an accurate reflection of the materials collected.
My role has therefore been as an informed and critical
outsider, rather than an intrinsic member of Ford's
effort. Consistent with the principles of "corporate
social responsibility," part of my role has been to ensure
that Ford's efforts in addressing these questions were
credible, demonstrating the virtues of accountability,
transparency, and integrity in collecting and collating
materials and describing what happened. I believe that

Fo r d ' s R e s e a r c h E f f o r t s i n As s e s s i n g t h e Ac t i v i t i e s o f i t s S u b s i d i a r y i n Na z i G e r m a n y 10
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the outstanding effo rt of a dedicated staff of
professionals has yielded a report that offers honest
answers to the sensitive questions raised by the media.

My conclusions regarding Ford's actions in Germany
during the Nazi period are clear and beyond reasonable
dispute, based on the data collected and presented in
the report. They are as follows:

� The management at Ford's German subsidiary
acted with growing autonomy from its American
parent firm. American executives were often ill-informed
about activities in Germany, as they were
denied information by their German employees �
a practice that extended to greater areas of policy
over time. Ford's American management did try to
influence policy in Germany where possible, but
with decreasing effe c t . Fo r d 's Germ a n
management focused its efforts on gaining the
acceptance of the Nazi government in order to
c o n t i nue to do business in Germ a ny, bu t
fo u n d e red in this re g a r d . Ford remained a
marginal producer in terms of both volume and
strategic significance to the German war effort.

� Short of divestment by the American parent, Ford's
German managers had little choice but to try to
address Nazi demands. After 1933, government
re g u l ations and re s t rictions on pro d u c t i o n
consistently reduced the company's capacity to act
autonomously. As commercial passenger vehicle
production was slowly eradicated, government
contracts became the sole source of business.
Without those contracts, predominantly for trucks
in Ford-Werke's case, Ford would have lost all of its
German investment as the subsidiary withered due
to a lack of a market.

� Slave laborers were used at Ford-Werke's Cologne
plant in 1944 and 1945. The best available
evidence suggests that they totaled a maximum of
65 over time. P risoners of war and fo r c e d
laborers, mostly from Eastern Europe and the
Soviet Union, but also a number from France and
Italy, were also used. But according to the copious
data collected regarding communications between
the parent and its subsidiary, the parent company

in Dearborn had no knowledge of, and thus no
control over, these activities. The record reveals
that communication between the American parent
and the German subsidiary ceased by November
of 1941, before the use of forced or slave labor
began. There is no evidence that executives at
Fo r d 's other European subsidiaries acted as
intermediaries between the U. S. parent and its
German subsidiary at any time between 1941 and
1945.

� Financial records analyzed by Pricewaterhouse-Coopers
suggest little evidence that Ford-Werke
made profits during the war. The analysis reveals
that modest profit figures were recorded during
the first few years of the war, but these were wiped
out by enormous losses in the last two years.
Indeed, the actions of the Nazi government, a
postwar claims commission, and the Congress of
the U. S . g ove rnment all provide evidence to
s u p p o rt the view that there we re signifi c a n t
damages inflicted upon Ford-Werke. Each of these
bodies awarded modest compensation to Ford or
Ford-Werke, representing a small fraction of Ford's
claims.

No historical record can ever be adjudged as
definitive. There is always the possibility that new
materials may be located and we will have to reconsider
our assessment of Ford and Ford-Werke's role in the
events that took place in Germany between 1933 and
1945.

Using the information available to me, I have studied
the issues raised by the media reports of 1998, and
believe the following with regard to Ford's response:

� The evidence provided by the data suggests that
there was no complicity on the part of Ford's
D e a r b o rn management in assisting the Nazi
government's wartime effort.

� Ford Motor Company has done eve ry t h i n g
re a s o n ably possible to address the concern s
originally raised by the media. The investigation
that was the basis of the Ford-Werke report has
taken 3 1 �2 years to complete. It has been conducted

S i mo n R e i c h Co mme n t a r y 11
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at great cost and effort, with the compilation of an
exhaustive and comprehensive report.

� In an effort to provide complete "transparency" on
the matter, Ford has decided to make available all
documentation collected and compiled to the
general public. All materials will be indexed and
described in detail in a database for easy access.

These actions, in my opinion, all reflect the extent
and credibility of Ford's effort. They are consistent with
the core values of "corporate social responsibility"
d e s c ribed prev i o u s ly : " t r a n s p a re n c y " in both the
generation and reporting of Ford's wartime activities,
"accountability" to those with legitimate concerns
about the abuse of forced and slave laborers and
possible profiteering, and "integrity" in the way that
the company has addressed the issue by sparing no

e f fo rt , including using external experts in their
respective fields to ensure that a system of checks and
balances remained in effect.

No study is ever foolproof. But I am as confident as
I can be that Ford has performed with due diligence in
l o c ating and compiling mat e ri a l s , and accurat e ly
reflecting their content in the report, Research Findings
About Ford-Werke Under the Nazi Regime. It is a
c re d i ble example of a company accepting and
implementing the code of " c o rp o r ate social
responsibility" regarding a most delicate issue. I invite
you to read the report and draw your own conclusions.

Simon Reich
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania
November 2001

Fo r d ' s R e s e a r c h E f f o r t s i n As s e s s i n g t h e Ac t i v i t i e s o f i t s S u b s i d i a r y i n Na z i G e r m a n y 12
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Prepared by
Ford Motor Company Archives

December 2001

R E S E A R C H F I N D I N G S A B O U T
F O R D -W E R K E
U N D E R T H E N A Z I R E G I M E

Published by Ford Motor Company Copyright 2001 All Rights Reserved 13
13 Page 14 15
II
R e s e a r c h F i n d i n g s A b o u t Fo r d -We r k e U n d e r t h e Na z i R e g i m e 14
14 Page 15 16
Report Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i
1. Introduction/ Project Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.1. Report Content . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1
1.2. Origins of Project . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2
1.3. Project Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Historical Background of Ford Motor Company and Ford-Wer ke . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.1. Establishment of Ford Motor Company . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5
2.2. International Expansion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5
2.3. Establishment of Ford-Werke . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6
2.4. Ford-Werke Board and Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6
2.5. Ford's Changing Relationship with Ford-Werke . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13
2.6. Ford's Response to the Threat of War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .14
3. Nazi Economic Policies and Controls Over the Automoti ve Industry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17
3.1. Nazi Regulation of Economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17
3.2. Nazi Controls Over the German Automotive Industry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .18
3.3. Status of Ford-Werke Plant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19
4. German Industrial Mobilization and Preparations for War, 1936-1939 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .23
4.1. Four-Year Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .23
4.2. Ford-Werke and German Military Mobilization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .24
5. Ford-Wer ke in the German Wartime Econom y, 1939-1945 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .29
5.1. Outbreak of War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .29
5.2. Robert Schmidt's Appointment as Wehrwirtschaftsf�hrer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .30
5.3. Government Oversight of Production . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .31
5.4. German Government Custodianship of Ford-Werke . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .32

III

R e s e a r c h F i n d i n g s Ab o u t Fo r d -We r k e U n d e r t h e Na z i R e g i m e
T A B L E O F C O N T E N T S 15
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IV
6. Military Production at Ford-Wer ke . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .35
6.1. Production Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .35
6.2. Start of Truck Production, 1939 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .36
6.3. 1940 Production . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .36
6.4. 1941 Production . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .37
6.5. 1942 Production . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .38
6.6. 1943 Production . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .39
6.7. 1944 and Early 1945 Production . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .40
6.8. Relocation of Plant Equipment, 1944-1945 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .40
6.9. Arendt Plant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .41
6.10. Repair Facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .42
7. Foreign and Forced Labor at Ford-Wer ke . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
7.1. Overview of Foreign and Forced Labor in Germany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .45
7.2. Overview of Foreign and Forced Labor at Ford-Werke . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .48
7.3. Number of Foreign and Forced Workers at Ford-Werke . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .51
7.4. Obtaining Foreign and Forced Workers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .53
7.5. Compensation for Foreign and Forced Workers at Ford-Werke . . . . . . . . . . . . .54
7.6. Conditions for Foreign and Forced Workers at Ford-Werke . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .57
7.6.1. Working Hours and Tasks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .57
7.6.2. Housing Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .58
7.6.3. Supervision and Control of Foreign and Forced Workers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .59
7.6.4. Living Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .62
7.6.5. Food . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .64
7.6.6. Medical Treatment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .65
7.7. Slave Labor from the Buchenwald Concentration Camp . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .67
7.8. Liberation at End of War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .71

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8. Ford-Werke's Relationship with Other Ford Facilities in Occupied Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
8.1. Ford of France . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .73
8.2. Ford of Belgium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .76
8.3. Ford of Holland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .78
8.4. Other Ford Facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .79
9. Impact of the War on Communications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
9.1. U. S. Government Regulations Governing Communications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .85
9.2. Direct Communications Between Ford and Ford-Werke, 1939-1941 . . . . . . . . .85
9.3. Communications Between Ford and Ford of France, 1939-1941 . . . . . . . . . . . .87
9.4. Communications with Ford Subsidiaries in Neutral Countries, 1939-1941 . . . .88
9.5. Communications Between Ford and Ford of France, 1942-1944 . . . . . . . . . . . .88
9.6. Ford-Werke Communications with Neutral Countries, 1942-1944 . . . . . . . . . .90
9.7. Ford Communications with Neutral Countries, 1942-1944 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .90
9.8. Restoration of Communications with Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .91
10. End-of-War and Postwar Military Go vernment Supervision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
10.1. Initial Period of U. S. Military Control, March-June 1945 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .93
10.2. British Military Government Control of Ford-Werke . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .94
10.3. Production During the Military Occupation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .95
10.4. Military Government Investigations of the Plant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .98
10.5. Denazification at Ford-Werke . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .99
10.6. Decontrol of Ford-Werke . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .101
10.7. Rehiring of Robert Schmidt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .102
11. War Damage to Ford-Wer ke . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .105
11.1. Damage Between 1939 and Autumn 1944 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .105
11.2. Damage Between Autumn 1944 and March 1945 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .105
11.3. Postwar Assessment of Damages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .106
11.4. War Damage Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .107

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VI
12. Financial Overview of Ford-Wer ke . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .111
12.1. Brief Financial History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .111
12.2. Balance Sheet Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .112
12.3. Results of Operations/ Net Income . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .113
12.4. Capital Structure and Dividend Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .115
13. Disposition of Research Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .119
Appendix A Investment of U. S. Companies in Germany, 1943 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .121
Appendix B Board of Directors � Ford-Werke, 1925-1953 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .123
Appendix C Ford's Contributions to the Allied War Effort, 1939-1945 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .125
Appendix D Numbers of Workers at Ford-Werke, January 1941-December 1944 . . . . . . . .127
Appendix E War Damage Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .131
Appendix F Ford-Werke Balance Sheets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .133
Appendix G Ford-Werke Results of Operations, 1933-1953 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .135
Appendix H Glossary of Repository Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .139
Appendix I Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .141

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i
R E P O R T S U M M A R Y
Introduction/ Project Background
This report summarizes information from a 3 1 �2 -year
research project conducted by Ford Motor Company
(" Ford") into the World War II activities of its German
s u b s i d i a ry, Fo r d -We r ke AG (" Fo r d -We r ke " [ Fo r d -Works]).
The project was launched in January 1998
following an inquiry from the British Broadcasting
Corporation (BBC) regarding the use of forced labor at
Ford-Werke during World War II. On March 4, 1998,
attorneys filed a class action lawsuit against Ford. The
suit has since been dismissed.

Ford instituted the research project in an effort to
locate documents that would shed new light on the
historical facts. More than 45 archivists, historians,
researchers and translators were involved in the effort
to collect and study documents from three countries
and two continents. Research was conducted on
records held by the company and on records held by
more than 30 public and private repositories in the
United States, Germany and Great Britain. The project
yielded more than 98,000 pages of source material.

Historical Background of Ford Motor
Company and Ford-Werke

Henry Ford founded Ford Motor Company in 1903
and was its president from 1906 to 1919, and 1943 to
1945. Ford-Werke was incorporated as Ford Motor

C o m p a ny A k t i e n g e s e l l s chaft (AG) [joint-stock
company] on January 5, 1925, in Berlin. A plant was
built along the Rhine River in Cologne and opened in
1931. Ford's direct and indirect ownership stake
fluctuated widely from 1925 through the early postwar
period.

At the start of World War II, 250 American firms
owned more than $450 million in assets in Germany.
Ten of those firms owned 58.5 percent of the total.
Ranked 16th by investment holdings, Ford held 1.9
percent of the total American investment. A chart
showing the top 59 firms is attached as Appendix A,
Investment of U. S. Companies in Germany, 1943.

Although Ford owned a majority interest in Ford-Werke,
the Dearborn company's control over Ford-Werke's
operations was constrained by Nazi policies
aimed at limiting fo reign influences in Germ a n
businesses. The board meeting in April 1938 was the
last one attended by an American or British member
until after the war. On May 15, 1942, the Nazi
government, through a court order, declared Ford-Werke
enemy property, appointed a custodian and
replaced the board of directors with a board of advisors.
H e i n ri ch A l b e rt , a fo rmer German diplomat and
prominent lawyer whose clients included major U. S.
corporations doing business in Germany, was chairman
of the board of directors from 1937 through 19
19 Page 20 21
ii
R e s e a r c h F i n d i n g s Ab o u t Fo r d -We r k e U n d e r t h e Na z i R e g i m e
in exchange for licenses to buy crude rubber from Ford
subsidiaries. German tire manufacturers got the rubber
and the German government got 30 percent of the tires.
Under later, broader agreements, Ford shipped other
raw materials to Ford-Werke in exchange for parts.
Some of the raw materials were distributed throughout
Germany under government order. The allocation of
raw materials to Ford-Werke was tied to the expansion
of exports.

At the German government's urging, and with Ford's
approval, Ford-Werke and a supplier produced troop
carriers for the German military in Berlin. To meet
government demands, Ford-Werke imported partially
assembled U. S.-built trucks from Ford for assembly in
Cologne in late 1938. The trucks were used in the
invasion and occupation of Czechoslovakia.

Ford-Wer ke in the German Wartime
Economy, 1939-1945

After war broke out in September 1939, commercial
transactions between the United States and Germany
were difficult. Ford and Ford-Werke had problems
c o m mu n i c at i n g. In June 1941, the Germ a n
government froze all U. S. assets in Germany. A postwar
U. S. military investigation concluded that American
influence over Ford-Werke decreased after the outbreak
of war and ceased altogether in December 1941 with
U. S. entry into the war.

As part of the wartime economy, Ford-Werke and its
o p e r ations fell under the control of the Germ a n
armaments ministry and other government agencies.
In April 1941, the German government appointed
Robert Schmidt, co-manager of Ford-Werke, to the
position of Wehrwirtschaftsf�hrer, one of the economic
leaders who coordinated army needs with industry. A
German Army Inspection Office was established at the
plant.

Soon after the United States entered the war in
December 1941, Ford-Werke was directly regulated by
the Reich Commissioner for the Treatment of Enemy
Property. On May 15, 1942, the Superior Court in
Cologne declared Fo r d -We r ke to be under enemy
influence and appointed Schmidt, a German who had
been a key manager at Ford-Werke since 1926, as

May 15, 1942, when he became chairman of the board
of advisors through the end of the war. A list of all
board members of Ford-Werke from 1925 through
1953 is attached as Appendix B, Board of Directors �
Ford-Werke, 1925-1953.

Henry Ford remained opposed to war, except in
direct defense of the United States, even after World War
II began in Europe. However, in 1940, Ford Motor
Company accepted a U. S. government contract to build
aircraft engines, and Ford engineers assisted with
design of the jeep. In March 1941, construction of
Ford's Willow Run plant began. By early 1942, Ford
was a major contributor to the Allied war effort. And
by early 1944,Willow Run was the leading producer of
heavy bombers for the U. S. military. See Appendix C,
Ford's Contributions to the Allied War Effort, 1939-
1945.

Nazi Economic Policies and Controls
Over the Automoti ve Industry

In 1933, Adolf Hitler's Nazi government instituted
measures to extend its influence throughout German
society. The regime promoted German self-sufficiency
in raw materials and military production. Economic
controls increased, particularly on foreign trade and
currency transactions. In 1935, binding regulations
required that automotive parts sold in Germany be
German-made using German raw materials, and that
they be standardized. Government policies regulated
the industry, allocating and distributing raw materials
based on approved production. Ford-Werke resisted
standardization and rationalization, and its production
initially fell.

German Industrial Mobilization and
Preparations for War, 1936-1939

In 1936, the Nazi government imposed the Four-Year
Plan to make the economy self-sufficient. The
underlying motive was military buildup. During the
implementation of the Four-Year Plan, German firms
with foreign connections were used to import raw
materials in barter for exports. Ford and Ford-Werke
entered an agreement with the German government in
1936, whereby Ford-Werke exported vehicles and parts 20
20 Page 21 22
Ford-Werke sent mechanics and skilled workers to the
Eastern frontlines to train soldiers in vehicle repair.
Several independent Ford-Werke dealers were involved
with their own repair shops set up and run by the army
as quasi-military operations near Eastern combat zones.
Jewish laborers were employed in at least one of these
repair shops.

Foreign and Forced Labor at Ford-Wer ke
Overview -Germany
From 1939 to 1945, millions of non-Germans were
registered to work, usually forcibly, in factories, farms,
mines and construction sites throughout the German
Reich, as military conscription worsened an existing
labor shortage. Most industrial companies in Germany
applied for and used foreign workers during this time.
The foreign work force comprised several different
groups. The overall treatment of the various groups was
determined by Nazi ideology and practice that placed
foreigners on a scale according to race, nationality and
gender. The foreign work force included: laborers
recruited from German allies, who were paid and
treated better than any other group of foreign workers;
prisoners of war (POWs), who received only token
wages; forced workers (civilians) taken from occupied
territory in Western and Eastern Europe, the latter
receiving lower wages and worse treatment than their
Western counterparts; Italian Military Internees sent to
Germany after Italy's surrender in September 1943; and
concentration camp inmates who worked unpaid, as
slave laborers.

Large-scale use of foreign workers started almost
immediately after the war began in September 1939
and was expanded after Germany occupied Western
Europe in the spring of 1940. Extensive recruitment in
the occupied territories of the Soviet Union began in
early 1942, and evolved into a more coercive system.
Forced workers were distributed to industries that
requested workers through government labor offices.
Eastern workers were subject to additional regulations
enforced by guards and the Gestapo, and lived in
separate camps surrounded by barbed wire. Their
wages we re lower than for We s t e rn and Germ a n
workers, and they had to pay extra taxes. Their food
rations were poor. Italian POWs sent to Germany after

iii

R e p o r t S u mma r y
custodian. Schmidt was required to submit reports to
the Reich Commissioner and to get approval for major
business decisions. He was forbidden to have any
contact with " e n e my stockholders or their
i n t e rm e d i a ri e s " without ap p roval from the Reich
C o m m i s s i o n e r, a Nazi official vested with bro a d
authority over businesses whose controlling interests
were based in countries at war with Germany. (The
R e i ch Commissioner named Heinri ch A l b e rt as
chairman of the board of advisors, the body which by
government order replaced the board of directors.)

Military Production at Ford-Wer ke
At the beginning of the war, Ford-Werke was one of
the four largest automotive firms in Germany and
manufactured cars, trucks, vans, tractors and other
vehicles. During the war, Ford-Werke produced three-ton
trucks, a half-track personnel carrier, spare parts
and engines, and provided vehicle repair and
reconditioning serv i c e s. F rom September 1939
through early 1945, Ford-Werke produced between
87,000 and 92,000 vehicles, mostly for the German
army, accounting for about one-third of Germany's
wartime military truck production. From 1938 to the
end of the war, the Nazi government determined the
type and number of vehicles to be produced by Ford-Werke
and other manufacturers. By 1940, passenger
car production was prohibited. Ford-Werke gradually
switched to trucks and, after February 1941, produced
only military vehicles and parts for Ford subsidiaries in
occupied Euro p e. In March 1943, S chmidt wa s
assigned by the armaments ministry to coordinate
military production at Ford subsidiaries in all Axis
territories in Europe. Ford-Werke production peaked in
1943. Operations were hampered in late 1944 due to
supply shortages, dispersal and war damage.

Ford-Werke had ties to other government military
contracts. In late 1939, the German authorities asked
Schmidt to establish a new firm to manufacture war
mat�riel. Without Ford's prior approval, he and Albert
joined with a supplier to manu fa c t u re military
equipment in a separate facility using machinery and
equipment from Ford-Werke. Schmidt described it as a
s t r ategy to permit Fo r d -We r ke to continu e
manufacturing vehicles rather than war mat�riel. Also, 21
21 Page 22 23
iv
the autumn of 1943 we re often tre ated as poorly as
Russian wo r ke r s. In mid-1943, the SS began to send
s l ave lab o rers from concentration camps to sat e l l i t e
c a m p s , or subcamps, at companies throughout Germ a ny
in order to support the war economy. At fi r s t ,
c o n c e n t r ation camp labor was re s t ricted to constru c t i o n
wo r k , bomb clearance and critical war industri e s. I n
August 1944, the automotive industry was permitted to
ap p ly for concentration camp lab o r. The gove rnment set
the rules for pay m e n t , fo o d , h o u s i n g, c l o t h i n g, wo r k i n g
hours and re p o rting pro c e d u re s. The SS guarded the
p ri s o n e r s. Wages we re paid by the companies to the
g ove rn m e n t ; p risoners re c e i ved no wag e s. C o m p a n i e s
could deduct expenses for food and housing.

Overview -Ford-Werke
Wa rtime use of fo reign and forced labor at Fo r d -We
r ke generally fo l l owed the pat t e rn descri b e d .
Fo reigners from Eastern and We s t e rn Euro p e, I t a l i a n
P OWs and men from the Buch e n wald concentrat i o n
camp we re put to work at Fo r d -We r ke. Fo reign wo r ke r s
l i ved in barr a cks adjacent to the plant. The fi r s t
contingent of POWs � between 100 and 200 men,
p o s s i bly Fre n ch � arri ved at Fo r d -We r ke in September
1 9 4 0 . This occurred after Fo r d -We r ke, with an acute
l abor short ag e, was asked by the gove rnment to quick ly
p roduce a large number of specialized motors fo r
b a rg e s. By A p ril 1942, m o re than 300 Eastern civilians
we re working there. The total number of forced lab o re r s
at Fo r d -We r ke is hard to determine for several re a s o n s :
Some records provide general nu m b e r s , others prov i d e
numbers for selected groups or peri o d s , and re c o r d s
d i f fer in describing wo r ke r s. The range shown in Fo r d -We
r ke 's financial records for 1942 through 1944 goes
f rom a low of 314 fo reign wo r kers in A p ril 1942 to a
high of 1, 932 in August 1944. A ch a rt , L abor Trends at
Fo r d -We r ke, s h ows the makeup of the work force fro m
Ja nu a ry 1941 through August 1944. See Section 7.3. o f
the re p o rt . See Appendix D, Numbers of Wo r kers at
Fo r d -We r ke, Ja nu a ry 1941-December 1944, for month-by-
month statistical bre a k d owns for the peri o d .

Compensation for Foreign and Forced Workers
at Ford-Werke

Few records are available regarding compensation.
Po s t war re p o rts and interro g ations of Fo r d -We r ke

managers provide some information, as shown in a
chart, Ford-Werke Wage Schedule During World War II,
in Section 7.5. of the report. French and Italian POWs
initially received less than Western civilian workers and
had 60 percent of their pay deducted and sent to the
POW camp that supplied the prisoners. Both groups
eventually were reclassified as civilian laborers and
received more pay, with deductions of 25 percent.
Western civilian workers were paid about the same as
German workers, minus deductions for those who lived
on the premises. In keeping with government decrees,
Eastern workers at Ford-Werke initially were paid less
than all other workers, with women receiving less than
m e n . Deductions for taxes and living expenses
amounted to over half the pay for Eastern workers. In
the autumn of 1943, E a s t e rn wo r ke r s ' p ay wa s
i n c reased and their deductions re d u c e d . Po s t wa r
financial records from Ford-Werke include references
to monies owed to former foreign workers. As of
December 31, 1945, RM (Reichsmarks) 63,419 in
unclaimed wages and salaries of foreign workers was in
a blocked account at the Deutsche Bank, Cologne, by
order of the military government. During 1947, the
funds were transferred to a special account at the
Deutsche Bank and thereafter do not appear in Ford-Werke's
financial records. (In May 1952, the Allied
High Commission asked the West German government
to accelerate the collection of back pay owed to former
POWs and foreign workers. As determined by the
London Debt Conference, former workers were entitled
to apply for the money that had been placed in financial
institutions.)

Conditions for Foreign and Forced Workers
at Ford-Werke

The average workweek for all workers at Ford-Werke
grew longer as the war continued, from 40 hours a
week to 60 hours or more. Most former forced workers
interviewed in recent years recalled doing manual labor
in pro d u c t i o n ; p o s t war documents indicate that
Germans and foreigners worked together. Some POWs
were sent to work at Ford-Werke supplier companies.
Foreign and forced workers lived in wooden barracks
adjacent to the plant, separated by nationality and
supervised by plant guards and the Gestapo. The
Eastern workers' camp was surrounded by barbed wire.

R e s e a r c h F i n d i n g s A b o u t Fo r d -We r k e U n d e r t h e Na z i R e g i m e 22
22 Page 23 24
Some Western workers were allowed vacation time.
Plant guards administered punishments, i n c l u d i n g
house arrest, and foremen delivered punishments on
the plant floor. Some arrests were made by German
authorities, and there are indications that male and
female forced lab o rers from Fo r d -We r ke we re
imprisoned in the Gestapo prison in Cologne.

Food was pre p a red in kitchens according to
nationality. Denazification files indicate that Russian
workers and their children received poor food rations.
Several foreign workers remembered that food was in
short supply. Three physicians, several nurses and a
dentist were responsible for medical needs in a medical
barracks that included an operating room and separate
men's and women's infirmaries. An air raid shelter was
available for foreign and forced laborers. The foreign
workers' camp sustained air raid damage in October
1944. The names of about 15 foreigners from Ford-Werke
appear on surviving portions of Cologne death
lists from the war, but without any indication as to the
cause of death.

After the war, the chief physician was accused of
p e r fo rming unwanted ab o rtions on Eastern fo r c e d
laborers. The physician, Dr. Carl Wenzel, estimated
there were 10 abortions on Eastern workers. He said
the women chose ab o rtion because of their
circumstances. He said he initiated improvements in
maternity and nursery facilities. Other medical staff
c o rro b o r ated his stat e m e n t s , as did some fo rm e r
Eastern workers who said he gave good care.

Slave Labor from the Buchenwald Concentration Camp
In August 1944, shortly after concentration camp
labor was made available to the automotive industry, 50
men from Buchenwald arrived at Ford-Werke. At any
given time from August 1944 through February 1945,
about 50 or fewer Buchenwald prisoners worked at
Ford-Werke. Altogether, at least 65 different men were
assigned there at one time or another. Sixteen SS men
guarded the prisoners, who lived in separate barracks
and performed outside work. Work records indicate the
men worked seven days a week, six to 10 hours per day.
A former worker recalled 12-hour days in production.
Five inmates fled during 1944; one died at Ford-Werke.

In Feb ru a ry and March 1945, s h o rt ly befo re the
American army liberated Cologne, 48 Buchenwald
inmates were transferred from the camp, and one fled.

Liberation at End of War
The factory had become a combat zone during the
final fighting in Cologne, and production was limited.
Equipment and materials had been largely dispersed.
American army units found 300 to 500 foreign workers
living in the Ford-Werke factory, primarily in a large
shelter. Foreign workers were sent to nearby displaced-person
camps operated by the U. S. Army.

Ford-Werke's Relationship with Other
Ford Facilities in Occupied Europe

Several Ford subsidiaries in occupied Europe did
business with Ford-Werke during the war. Ford-Werke
coordinated production of Ford vehicles throughout
occupied Europe. Shortly after the Germans overran
Belgium, Holland, Luxembourg and France in 1940,
the Germans appointed Schmidt commissioner for
those properties. After the U. S. entry into the war, these
subsidiaries were placed under the control of the Reich
Commissioner for the Treatment of Enemy Property,
who appointed Ford-Werke personnel as custodians.
Ford-Werke had business ties to subsidiaries in other
occupied countries and established its own subsidiaries
in Austria late in the war. Ford-Werke had some
involvement with Ford operations in countries allied
with Germany early in the war.

Impact of the War on Communications
With the rise of tensions in Europe in the late 1930s,
the U. S. government began examining the economic
activities of U. S. firms and their European subsidiaries.
Monitoring increased after 1940. The U. S. government
investigated correspondence between Ford and Ford of
France, but closed the matter in 1943. No action was
taken. Ford corresponded periodically with its German
subsidiary and with subsidiaries in countries under
German occupation until the U. S. entry into the war in
1941. Direct communications did not resume until
after the war. The final Ford-Werke board meeting
attended by a non-German board member occurred in
April 1938. Ford, Ford of Britain and Ford-Werke

R e p o r t S u mma r y 23
23 Page 24 25
vi
continued to have contact with subsidiaries in neutral
countries. Allied liberation of France in August 1944
opened up some communications with subsidiaries in
occupied Europe. A delegation from Ford of Britain
visited Ford-Werke in May 1945 and drafted a report
on Ford-Werke's activities during the war. The first
known direct postwar communication between Ford
and Ford-Werke was in November 1946.

End-of-War and Postwar Military
Government Supervision

Ford-Werke and other industrial facilities in Cologne
were administered by U. S. military authorities from
March to June 1945. In July 1945, Cologne became
part of the British military occupation zone, and Ford-Werke
was placed under British military government
control. Erhard Vitger, a key manager at the plant before
and during the war and a Dane, was appointed as
custodian. Directors and shareholders had no authority,
and permission had to be sought to transfer stock
ownership and to do repairs. British military officials
determined steel supply quotas, regulated production,
approved prices and determined who received vehicles
produced at the plant. Trade had to be approved by
Allied authorities.

Limited operations resumed in March 1945,
beginning with servicing and repair of U. S. military
vehicles. The plant was authorized to produce new
trucks from existing spare parts, and on May 8, 1945,
V-E Day, produced its first postwar vehicle, a truck for
the U. S. Army. After the British military government
took over, Ford-Werke began repairing and producing
trucks for the British military. Production in 1945 was
limited by scarcity of raw materials and parts, and by
war damag e. In 1946, Fo r d -We r ke incre a s e d
production and began reconditioning motors for the
British. Production dropped in 1947 because of supply
problems, but climbed in 1948 and 1949. A summary
is provided in a chart, Overview of Ford-Werke Postwar
Production, May 1945-1949, in Section 10.3.

I nve s t i g ations at Fo r d -We r ke began immediat e ly
after the Allies occupied Cologne and continued for
months. Military officers reported on conditions and
operations, equipment dispersal, suppliers, operational

needs and the health of foreign workers and refugees.
The U. S. military government undertook an in-depth
investigation, completing an overview on June 21,
1 9 4 5 , and a detailed re p o rt in September 1945.
Military authorities conducted personnel investigations
at Ford-Werke in 1945 and 1946 as part of the
d e n a z i fi c ation effo rt to rid Germ a ny of Nat i o n a l
Socialism. Approximately 40 employees were arrested
by the Allies. Most were released and later re-employed
by Ford-Werke. Among them was Schmidt, who was
cleared in 1947 and returned to work at Ford-Werke in
1950 as a technical adviser, with the support of Ford
executives. He and Vitger served on the management
board until 1958. Both served on the board of
directors. Military government controls were removed
gradually beginning in 1947. On August 8, 1948,
Vitger became general manager. In December 1949,
German courts formally ended the custody order that
had been imposed on Ford-Werke on May 15, 1942, by
the Nazi regime.

War Damage to Ford-Werke
Early in the war, most damage was to parts in
warehouses and materials in transit. In August 1944,
bombs caused some damage. Twice in October 1944,
the plant was targeted by bombs that damaged the
proving grounds and the labor camps. In early March
1945, as the Allies moved into Cologne, artillery shells
d e s t royed the re c re ation hall and shed bu i l d i n g s ,
d a m aged offices and a garag e, and bro ke many
windows in the plant.

Fo r d -We r ke submitted war damage claims of
R M 11,929, 803 to the German gove rnment and
received RM 361,181 for damages in 1941 and 1942.
A 1942 law kept Fo r d -We r ke from collecting
subsequent damages from the German government.
War damage claims were filed after the war with the
U. S. government. In 1965, Ford submitted a claim for
$7,050,052 for losses and damage to Ford-Werke and
its subsidiaries in Austria. The claim was based on
$12,461, 427 in damages (the claim reduced in
keeping with Ford's 56.575 percent ownership of Ford-Werke).
A settlement commission agreed to award Ford
$785,321. An itemized list summarizing the 1965
claim is attached as Appendix E, War Damage Claims.

R e s e a r c h F i n d i n g s A b o u t Fo r d -We r k e U n d e r t h e Na z i R e g i m e 24
24 Page 25 26
Financial Overview of Ford-Werke
Brief Financial History
From the time of its incorporation in 1925, Ford-Werke
experienced periods of prosperity as well as
instability as a result of management decisions and
prevailing economic and political environments. In
1 9 3 3 , Fo r d -We r ke completed a major upgrade to
permit a new line of smaller cars to meet consumer
demand. An earnings deficit forced a reorganization
and change in the capital structure in 1934. An
aggressive global exporting program began during the
1930s. Economic growth resulted in rising demand. In
the late 1930s, Ford-Werke expanded capacity and
i n c reased investment in machines and equipment.
Sales rose from 1940 through 1943, but fell in 1944
and 1945. Balance sheets and results of operations
we re affected by taxe s , g ove rnment controls on
production and prices, war damages and related costs.
Sales and production in 1946 were constrained by
shortages of supplies. In the early 1950s, significant
i nvestments we re made to increase the fa c i l i t y 's
productive capability and reduce per-vehicle costs.

Balance Sheet Information
Currency reform and devaluation instituted by Allied
military authorities in June 1948 is of significance in
reviewing balance sheets. German currency changed
f rom Reichsmarks to Deutsche Marks (DM).
Companies had to devalue monetary assets and
liabilities, but were allowed to revalue inventories,
property, plants and equipment. As a result, Ford-We
r ke 's cash balances, accounts re c e i vable fro m
customers and amounts payable to suppliers, all of
which had increased significantly during the war, were
devalued by 90 percent or more. Most buildings,
machinery, equipment and inventory balances were
revalued at higher amounts. The net result was a
reduction in reserves and other stockholder equity
accounts. In 1950, capital investments were made for
expansion, modernization, reconstruction and repair
from war damage. In 1951 and 1953, additional
expansion was undert a ken to meet demand fo r
p ro d u c t s. Fo r d -We r ke 's assets and liab i l i t i e s , a s
reported in financial statements at key points during the
war and in the postwar period, are presented in
Appendix F, Ford-Werke Balance Sheets.

Results of Operations/ Net Income
A wide array of taxes and controls imposed by the
Nazi regime affected sales, trading income, net income
and production levels from 1939 to 1945. Trading
income was a prominent performance measurement
and was defined as sales less the cost of operations,
excluding salaries and wages. Between 1933 and 1935,
trading income rose as a result of increased sales and
production. After price controls were enacted in 1936,
trading income fell. Changes in taxes and controls,
combined with other changes, resulted in generally
increased trading income after 1939. Net income was
flat in the mid-1930s but grew from 1938 until 1943,
with losses in 1944 and 1945. Ford-Werke income
fluctuation during the years 1933 through 1953 is
shown in a chart, Net Income and Trading Income as a
Percentage of Sales, Ford-Werke, 1933-1953, in Section
12.3. Additional detail is provided in Appendix G,
Ford-Werke Results of Operations, 1933-1953.

Capital Structure and Dividend Analysis
Ford's ownership in Ford-Werke evolved from nearly
100 percent at the outset to varying proportions of
d i rect and/ or indirect ow n e r s h i p. In 1943, a s
permitted by U. S. law, Ford recorded its investment in
Ford-Werke as a total loss by establishing a reserve
account equal to its investment balance (about $8
million). In 1954, Ford restored its investment in Ford-Werke
at about $557,000, the estimated fair value at
the time of recovery (August 8, 1948).

Fo r d -We r ke 's first shareholder dividends we re
payable in March 1930. At the time, Luxembourg was
the only Ford entity with a direct interest in Ford-Werke.
Payments were delayed or incomplete because
Fo r d -We r ke had to request permission from the
German government. The next dividends were declared
in 1938, when Ford controlled, directly and indirectly,
81 percent of Ford-Werke stock. These dividends were
held in a bl o cked account because the Germ a n
government prohibited distribution outside Germany.
Dividends from 1939 through 1943 also were blocked.
No further dividends were declared until 1950. In
1951, blocked dividends from 1938 through 1943
were devalued by 90 percent in the conversion from
R e i chsmarks to Deutsche Marks. Ford used the
resulting funds (about $60,000 in 1951 dollars) to

vii

R e p o r t S u mma r y 25
25 Page 26 27
viii
underwrite part of the cost of acquiring Ford-Werke
stock held by I. G. Farbenindustrie AG (I. G. Farben),
which was being liquidated.

Disposition of Research Findings
E a ch of the 98, 000 pages of source mat e ri a l
collected for this project carries a unique alphanumeric
l abel that specifies the document and pag e, a n d
identifies the repository where the original document
was located. Descriptions of each document have been
entered into a searchable database. The database and
collection are being donated (except where prohibited
by pri vacy laws or re g u l ations of the ori g i n a l
repositories) to Henry Ford Museum & Greenfield
Vi l l ag e, an independent, n o n p ro fit educat i o n a l
institution unaffiliated with Ford Motor Company. At
the museum, the donated collection and database will

be made available to the public at the Benson Ford
R e s e a r ch Center. See Appendix H, G l o s s a ry of
Repository Sources, for a guide to the repository
abb rev i ations used in the document lab e l s. S e e
Appendix I (Bibl i o g r ap hy) for a list of re l eva n t
published sources.

Ford Motor Company 's goal in instituting this
research project was to conduct a deep search for
additional facts to supplement the historical record.
Every effort was made to perform a thorough and
c o m p re h e n s i ve search . As additional info rm at i o n
comes to light, Ford Motor Company will update the
document collection and the database at the Benson
Ford Research Center, an archival repository. The
material collected as a result of this project will provide
a significant resource for understanding the history of
this period and of Ford-Werke under the Nazi regime.

R e s e a r c h F i n d i n g s A b o u t Fo r d -We r k e U n d e r t h e Na z i R e g i m e 26
26 Page 27 28
1
1 During the time period covered by this report, the name of Ford's
subsidiary in Germany changed. It was incorporated in 1925 as
Ford Motor Company Aktiengesellschaft (AG). See Section 2.3.
The name was changed to Ford-Werke Aktiengesellschaft (AG) in
1939 and still is in place today. See Ford-Werke Records, File:
Minutes of General Meetings and Board of Directors Meetings,
1925-1941, Board of Directors Meeting Minutes, June 8, 1939
(FW 0002849); and NARA, RG 407, Entry 368B, Box 1032,
Schneider Report, Exhibit 37, Translation of No. 111 of the
Notarial Register of 1939, July 21, 1939 (NARA 0000126). For
the sake of simplicity and consistency, the German subsidiary will
be referred to as Ford-Werke throughout this report.

2 N at i o n a l s oz ia l i s t i s che Deutsche A r b e i t e rp a rtei (NSDA P )
[National Socialist German Workers' Party] was the official name
of Adolf Hitler's Nazi party. See Louis L. Snyder, Encyclopedia of the
Third Reich (NewYork: Marlowe & Co., 1976), p. 243.

S e c t i o n 1
I N T R O D U C T I O N /
P R O J E C T B A C K G R O U N D

1.1. Report Content
The fo l l owing re p o rt summarizes info rm at i o n
u n c ove red during a compre h e n s i ve, 3 1 �2 -ye a r
investigation by Ford Motor Company (" Ford") into
the World War II activities of its German subsidiary,
Ford-Werke AG (" Ford-Werke" [Ford-Works]). 1 The
research was conducted in three countries and on two
c o n t i n e n t s. M o re than 45 arch i v i s t s , h i s t o ri a n s ,
researchers and translators worked in teams based in
Dearborn, Michigan (where Ford Motor Company is
headquartered), in Washington, D. C., and in Germany.
The team in Germany, based in Hanover, searched
re p o s i t o ries in Germ a ny. Team members fro m
Washington and Dearborn searched repositories in
Great Britain.

This historical inve s t i g ation yielded more than
98,000 pages of source material from more than 30
public and private repositories. The types of documents

located by this research project include Ford Motor
C o m p a ny corre s p o n d e n c e, re p o rts and fi n a n c i a l
re c o r d s ; m i l i t a ry re p o rt s ; Fo r d -We r ke wa rt i m e
c o rre s p o n d e n c e, re p o rts and ledgers; oral history
i n t e rv i ews and interv i ew transcri p t s ; and other
documentary information in both the English and
German languages.

Research focused on the following topics:
� Nazi 2 economic policies and controls over the auto
industry and Ford-Werke.

� German industrial mobilization and preparation
for war.

� Ford-Werke's role in the wartime economy.
� Military production at Ford-Werke.
� The use of foreign and forced labor at Ford-Werke.
� Ford-Werke's relationship with other Ford facilities
in occupied Europe.

� The impact of the war on commu n i c at i o n s
between Ford and Ford-Werke.

� Postwar military government supervision of Ford-Werke. 27
27 Page 28 29
2
R e s e a r c h F i n d i n g s A b o u t Fo r d -We r k e U n d e r t h e Na z i R e g i m e
3 In the case of primary documents, the footnotes generally
provide the following information about the original source: the
abbreviation for the repository (see Appendix H), the collection
(for example, record group or accession), the box number and
the file title. The unique alphanumeric identifier refers to the
specific page or pages cited. Secondary sources are identified
with complete information about the author, title, publisher and
date the first time a source is mentioned. Subsequent citations
include the author's last name and a shortened version of the title.
Page numbers are provided where applicable. Footnotes describe
and refer to other relevant primary or secondary sources, and in
some cases provide additional information pertinent to the text.

4 Elsa Iwanowa et al. v. Ford Motor Company and Ford-Werke AG,
U. S. District Court for the District of New Jersey, Civil Action No.
98-959, March 4,1998.

5 Studies which examine the history of Ford-Werke during this
period include: Allan Nevins and Frank Ernest Hill, Fo r d : Decline and
R e b i rt h ,1 9 3 3 -1 9 6 2 (NewYork: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1962), pp.
273-293; Simon Reich, The Fruits of Fa s c i s m : Po s t war Prosperity in
Historical Pe r s p e c t i ve (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990), pp.
107-146; Mira Wilkins and Frank Ernest Hill, American Business
A b r o a d : Ford on Six Continents (Detroit: Wayne State University Press,
1964), pp. 270-285.

not apply to individuals who served in public roles,
including Ford-Werke management positions.

1.2. Origins of Project
This project was launched in January 1998, when
Ford received an inquiry from the British Broadcasting
Corporation (BBC) regarding the use of forced labor at
Ford-Werke during World War II. Researchers at Ford's
archives searched books and company records to help
the company prepare a response to the inquiry.

On March 4, 1998, attorneys filed a class action
l awsuit against Fo r d . 4 The suit has since been
dismissed. The attorneys represented Elsa Iwanowa, a
Belgian citizen who said she was abducted from Russia
as a teenager by the Nazis during World War II and
forced to perfo rm heavy labor at Fo r d -We r ke in
Cologne, Germany. Some of the claims alleged by the
attorneys contradict published histories about Ford-Werke's
operations in wartime Germany. Among the
inaccuracies suggested by the lawyers' complaint are
the following:

� T h at Fo r d -We r ke was tre ated diffe re n t ly fro m
other American-owned companies in Germany, in
that it was not placed under Nazi control when the
United States entered the war.

� That executives of Ford Motor Company exercised
c o n t rol over Fo r d -We r ke throughout the wa r
years.

� That Ford and Ford-Werke knowingly utilized
u n p a i d , forced labor to generate enorm o u s
profits. 5

On March 4, 1998, Ford commented publicly in
response to a report broadcast by the BBC and the
lawsuit:

"First, it must be said that by anyone's measure

� War damage to Ford-Werke.
� The finances of Ford-Werke during the war.

Documents collected for this project were tracked by
means of an alphanu m e ric labeling system that
indicates the source repository for every document and
gives each page a unique identification number. These
a l p h a nu m e ric document and page identifiers are
included in parentheses in the footnotes, along with
source information. 3 Appendix H includes a glossary of
the repository abbreviations used in the document
i d e n t i fi e r s. A bibl i o g r ap hy of re l evant publ i s h e d
sources is attached as Appendix I. Copies of most of the
research materials collected for this project are being
donated, with a searchable database, to Henry Ford
Museum & Greenfield Village, where they will be
ava i l able to the public through the Benson Fo r d
Research Center. (See Section 13.) In some cases,
materials could not be donated because of privacy laws
or regulations of the individual repositories. To enable
research in these materials, the exact sources have been
recorded in the footnotes and in the database.

Some documents, including many that are cited with
English descriptions or titles, a re in the Germ a n
language. Wherever possible, one or more English
translations also are cited. Monetary amounts are in the
c u r rency presented in the re s e a r ch mat e ri a l s.
Conversions to U. S. dollar values are given if reliable
exchange rate information is available. Throughout this
report, including in the footnotes, the identities of
some individuals have been obscured in accordance
with German privacy laws. These laws stipulate that
private information about any individuals who could
still be alive may not be released. This restriction does 28
28 Page 29 30
3
I n t r o d u c t i o n / P r o j e c t B a c k gr o u n d
6 Elizabeth W. Adkins, a certified archivist, was manager of Ford
Motor Company Archives Services at the time this project was
launched. She has since been named to the position of manager
of the Global Info rm ation Management depart m e n t , w h i ch
includes the Ford Motor Company Archives. She has had 20 years
of experience in managing business archives, and has served in
leadership roles in the Society of American Archivists, the
Academy of Certified Archivists and the International Council on
Archives. She has made presentations and published articles in
the field of business archives.

7 Lawrence Dowler is a librarian, archivist and historian. His 30-
year career includes 16 years at Harvard University and 12 years
at Yale University. He played a leading role in developing and
implementing national standards for describing primary sources.
At Harvard, he led an effort to create a "gateway" to research
resources within the university and beyond, and subsequently
published a book, G at e ways to Know l e d ge (Cambridge, Mass.: M. I. T.
Press, 1997) on these issues. He has published more than 25
other books, chapters and articles. At Yale University, he played a
major role in developing a cataloguing format for machine-readable
descriptions of manuscripts and archives, a format that
became a national standard. He has done consulting work for
leading universities, archives, libraries, foundations, and arts and
cultural institutions. He was retained by Ford Motor Company in
1998 to perform an assessment of the objectives, methods and
results of the research project summarized in this report.

8 Simon Reich holds an appointment as a professor at the Graduate
School of Public and International Affairs and the Department of
Political Science at the University of Pittsburgh. His areas of
expertise include the study of Germany and of international
political economy. He has authored or co-authored several books,
including The Fruits of Fa s c i s m : Po s t war Prosperity in Historical Pe r s p e c t i ve
(Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1990), The Germ a n
P re d i c a m e n t : Memory and Power in the New Europe (Ithaca and London:
Cornell University Press, 1997); and The Myth of the Global
C o rp o rat i o n (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1998). He
has authored articles in nu m e rous journ a l s. In 2001, h e
completed an appointment as the director of research and analysis
at the Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House, in
London, focusing on trends and issues related to corporate social
responsibility. He has received fellowships and grants from the
Council on Foreign Relations, the Sloan Foundation, the Kellogg
Foundation and others. He is a consultant to Ford Motor
Company regarding the research project that is summarized in
this report. His role has been to assist in locating materials, to
read and comment on the research team's findings, and to ensure
that this report is an accurate reflection of the material collected.

records in Cologne were destroyed by two
fires, one during and one after the war.

When we receive the results of this effort, we
will proceed from there."

Ford's manager of Archives Services, Elizabeth W.
Adkins, 6 was asked to plan, organize and implement a
research effort to locate any documents that would shed
additional light on the historical facts. To validate the
t h o roughness and objectivity of its re s e a r ch
methodology, Ford retained a recognized authority on
re s e a r ch methodology, L aw rence Dow l e r, 7 as an
independent adviser. Another expert, Simon Reich, 8 a
political scientist who has independently studied
business history during the Nazi era, was retained to
review and provide guidance on the research findings.

1.3. Project Scope
In addition to investigating the company's privately
held records in the United States, Great Britain and
Germany, the research team searched records at the U. S.
National Archives and Records Administration, the U. S.
Holocaust Memorial Museum, the U. S . L i b r a ry of
Congress, the U. S. Department of Justice, the Public
Record Office and the Imperial War Museum in Great
Britain, several branches of the Federal Archives of
G e rm a ny [Bundesarch i v ] , the Buch e n wald arch i ve s
[ A r chiv der Gedenkstaette Buch e n wa l d ] , re g i o n a l
archives in and around Cologne, and a number of other

this was one of the darkest periods of history
mankind has known.

Over the years, we have relied on the work of a
number of prominent historians who have
researched and described events during World
War II when the Ford Cologne plant was used
to produce trucks for the Nazi government.
Those historians and existing records report
that the plant was under Nazi control during
the war and not returned to Ford control until
after the war by Allied military authorities. The
m a n agement exe c u t i ve committee wa s
disbanded and a custodian was appointed by
the Nazi government.

However, the BBC story recently raised the
issue of forced labor again and cre ated a
renewed awareness of the wartime situation
more than 50 years ago.

Therefore, we have instituted an active and
deeper search of Ford archives in the U. S. to see
if there are additional facts available than those
used by earlier histori a n s. We also are
instituting a similar search in Germany. This
effort is complicated by the fact that many 29
29 Page 30 31
4
p u blic re p o s i t o ri e s. The re s e a r ch has uncove re d
documents that detail business operations and
circumstances at Fo r d -We r ke befo re, d u ring and

immediately following the Nazi era, and which help to
clarify the issues being examined.

R e s e a r c h F i n d i n g s A b o u t Fo r d -We r k e U n d e r t h e Na z i R e g i m e 30
30 Page 31 32
5
9 David L. Lewis, Mike McCarville and Lorin Sorensen, Fo r d : 1903 to
1 9 8 4 (NewYork: Beekman House, circa 1983), pp. 6-12.

1 0 Ford Motor Company News Release, "Presidents of Ford Motor
Company," April 29,1997.

1 1 Lewis, McCarville and Sorensen, Fo r d : 1903 to 1984, pp. 6-12;
FMC, AR-65-92, Box 1, File: Annual Reports -Stockholders'
Relations, Ford Motor Company 1952 Annual Report (FMC
0013783-0013784).

1 2 FMC, AR-71-20, Box 4, Draft of speech by Browning, 1947
(FMC 0011117-00111130) and Box 5, Breech, "The Ford
Spirit: Ford in 1946," May 19, 1953 (FMC 0011131-0011134).

1 3 Wilkins and Hill, American Business A b r o a d, pp. 1,19 and 22-27.

1 4 Wilkins and Hill, American Business A b r o a d, pp. 33 and 53; Floyd
Clymer, H e n r y 's Wonderful Model T, 1 9 0 8 -1 9 2 7 (NewYork: McGraw-Hill
Book Company, Inc., 1955), p. 11.

S e c t i o n 2
H I S T O R I C A L B A C K G R O U N D O F
F O R D M O T O R C O M P A N Y
A N D F O R D -W E R K E

2.1. Establishment of
Ford Motor Compan y

Ford Motor Company was founded in 1903 as an
outgrowth of Henry Ford's design and manufacturing
of motor vehicles, which began in 1896. 9 Henry Ford
was the driving force behind the company and served
as its president from 1906 to 1919 and again from
1943 to 1945. 10 In 1913, Ford's Highland Park,
Michigan, factory first employed the use of a mass-p
roduction assembly line, a modern i z ation often
credited with changing both industrial history and
m o d e rn life. 1 1 As a re s u l t , Ford dominated the
automobile industry through the 1920s, gaining a 45
percent market share by 1925. However, due in part to
i n c reased competition from General Motors and
Chrysler, and in part to the overcentralization of Ford's
management structure, Ford's market share gradually
declined. By 1941, its share was down to 20 percent. 12

2.2. International Expansion
From the company's earliest days, the shareholders
and the Ford family demonstrated a keen interest in
establishing an international presence for Ford and its
p ro d u c t s. On October 15, 1 9 0 3 , s h a re h o l d e r s
instructed the board of directors to "take necessary
steps to obtain foreign business." Ford's first foreign
subsidiary was established in Canada in 1904. By
1 9 0 7 , Ford vehicles we re being sold (mostly as
imports) in the United Kingdom, France, Germany,
B e l g i u m , S p a i n , H o l l a n d , I t a ly, D e n m a r k , S we d e n ,
Austria, Poland, Russia, Australia, Africa, Asia and Latin
America. 13 With the introduction of the Model T in
1908, the company established a "universal car" which
became one of the most popular vehicles of all time,
with a worldwide presence. 14

The real growth for Ford and other A m e ri c a n
companies with investments in Europe came after
World War I. In 1914, the book value of American
direct investment in Europe was $573 million. By 31
31 Page 32 33
6
R e s e a r c h F i n d i n g s Ab o u t Fo r d -We r k e U n d e r t h e Na z i R e g i m e
1 5 Frank Costigliola, Aw k ward Dominion: American Po l i t i c a l ,E c o n o m i c ,a n d
C u l t u ral Relations with Europe, 1 9 1 9 -1 9 3 3 (Ithaca, NewYork: Cornell
University Press, 1984), p. 149.

1 6 NARA, RG 56, Acc. 56-68A-209, Box 38, File: TFR-500, Business
Holdings in Germany of United States Firms, circa 1943 (NARA
0005992-0006838).

1 7 Aktiengesellschaft denotes a joint-stock company.

1 8 Ford-Werke Records, File: Minutes of Board Meetings, No. 6 of
the Notarial Register for 1925 and Articles of Ford Motor
Company Aktiengesellschaft, January 5, 1925 (FW 0004074-
0004085; for English translation, see FW 0004086-0004098).

1 9 Wilkins and Hill, American Business A b r o a d, pp. 139, 204, 206 and
234.
2 0 Sir Percival Perry later became Lord Percival Perry.

2 1 HFM, Acc. 713, Box 11, File: Corporate Structure, European
O p e r at i o n s , P re l i m i n a ry Report , Feb ru a ry 20, 1948 (HFM
0002640-0002642).

2 2 F M C, A R -7 5 -6 2 -6 1 6 , B ox 57, F i l e : I nvestments 1951-52,
Mellema to Edwa r d s , Ja nu a ry 25, 1952 (FMC 0003293-
0 0 0 3 3 0 6 ) ; F M C, A R -7 5 -6 2 -6 1 6 , B ox 23, F i l e : E u ro p e a n
Countries -Investment Ledger, Ford-Werke AG, no date (FMC
0000346-0000350); Coopers & Lybrand Records, Lybrand, Ross
Bros. & Montgomery to Henry Ford II, March 19, 1948 (CL1
0000316-0000318); Wilkins and Hill, American Business A b r o a d,
pp. 193-195.

2 3 FMC, AR-98-213546, Box 2, File: History of Plant -All Aspects,
1925-1946, Ford, 1925-1946, by Erhard Vitger, September 24,
1946, hereafter Vitger Report (FMC 0001967).

2 4 HFM, Acc. 880, Box 7, File: Germany, Notes on interview with
Heinrich Albert, July 26, 1960 (HFM 0000880). Bosch was
general manager and chairman of the board of directors of I. G.
Farben, one of the largest and most powerful firms in Germany.
After Bosch's death in 1940, he was replaced by Carl Krauch,
who had become chairman of I. G. Farben; see Appendix B. On
April 24,1929, I. G. Farben organized a U. S. subsidiary, American
I. G. Chemical Corporation, later known as General Aniline and
Film Corporation. Edsel Ford was a director, but he never
attended any board meetings and resigned in 1941; see NARA,
RG 60, Entry 285B, Box 78, File: General Aniline and Film,
History and Analysis of the Control of General Aniline and Film
Corporation, October 1, 1941 (NARA 0003920-0003928).

1929, that amount had risen to $1.3 billion (total
worldwide American investment increased from $2.7
billion in 1914 to $7.6 billion in 1929). The number
of A m e rican fi rms with service or manu fa c t u ri n g
operations in Europe by 1929 exceeded 1,300. 15 At the
start of World War II, 250 American firms owned more
than $450 million in assets in Germany. Ten of those
firms owned 58.5 percent of the total. Ranked 16th by
investment holdings, Ford held 1.9 percent of the total
American investment. 16 A chart showing the top 59
firms is attached as Appendix A.

2.3. Establishment of Ford-Wer ke
Fo r d -We r ke was incorp o r ated in Berlin as Ford Motor
C o m p a ny A k t i e n g e s e l l s ch a f t 1 7 ( AG) on Ja nu a ry 5, 1 9 2 5 ,
and ori g i n a l ly was headquart e red in Berlin. 1 8 A s s e m bly
of tru cks began in A p ril 1926, fo l l owed by the
m a nu fa c t u re of Model T 's in June 1926. In 1929, Fo r d -We
r ke acquired a 52-acre tract of land on the banks of
the Rhine River in Cologne, and on October 2, 1 9 3 0 ,
H e n ry Ford laid the cornerstone of a new
m a nu fa c t u ring plant there. The plant opened in June

1 9 3 1 , despite economic difficulties thro u g h o u t
G e rm a ny. 1 9

In October 1928, Ford reorganized its European
operations, and Ford-Werke became a subsidiary of
Ford of Britain, which was led by Sir Percival Perry. 20
Ford's stake in the German firm was reduced from a
direct ownership of 99.9 percent to indirect ownership
of 60 percent, through Ford of Britain. 21 After another
reorganization in 1934, Ford-Werke again became a
direct subsidiary of Ford when the American parent
company assumed direct ownership of a majority of
Ford-Werke shares. Although Ford's stake fluctuated
over the years, it retained a majority ownership in Ford-Werke. 22

2.4. Ford-Wer ke Board and
Management

Ford-Werke's board of directors was reconstituted in
1929 as a result of the 1928 restructuring. In addition
to Ford executives Charles Sorensen and Edsel Ford
from the United States, and Sir Percival Perry and Sir
John Davies from Great Britain, the new board included
several German members for the first time. 23 Henry
Ford wanted "the best farmer, the best lawyer, and the
best industrialist" that Perry could find in Germany to
serve on the new board. The farmer chosen was Alwin
S ch u ri g ; the industrialist was Carl Bosch , g e n e r a l
manager of I. G. Farbenindustrie (I. G. Farben). 24 The
l aw yer selected was Heinri ch A l b e rt , who had
represented Ford-Werke on legal matters since the mid-1920s.
Highly regarded as one of Germany's leading
attorneys, Albert served as Germany's ambassador to the
United States immediat e ly after World War I and
represented several other American firms operating in 32
32 Page 33 34
7
Hi s t o r i c a l B a c k g r o u n d o f Fo r d Mo t o r C o mp a n y a n d Fo r d -We rk e
2 5 NARA, RG 260, Economics Division, I. G. Farben Control Office,
Box 107, File: Targets -Industrial, Memo by Schmidt on Albert,
June 22, 1945 (NARA 0006855); HFM, Acc. 65, Box 67, File:
Sorensen Final 67-5, Oral History of Charles Sorensen, January
1953 (HFM 0005529-0005531); NARA, RG 56, Acc. 56-69A-4
7 0 7 , B ox 81, F i l e : I n t e rro g at i o n s , M i s c. , R e p o rt of
interrogation of Albert, September 16, 1945 (NARA 0007168-
0007173). In a postwar memo and attachment, Albert said he
provided legal advice to several large American companies that
were doing business in Germany in the 1930s and tried to
protect their interests during the war. In addition to Ford, his
clients included IBM, Gillette, Woolworth, Chase National Bank,
DuPont and Colgate Palmolive. See WNRC, Acc. 299-68A-0243,
Box 540, File 96/ 4, Memo from Albert, July 16, 1945 (DOJ
0010430-10434). Erhard Vitger, a co-manager of Ford-Werke,
said in a postwar interview that Albert was a man of great
experience and very clever, a diplomat, and that Vitger had
learned a great deal from him. Albert had a law office in Berlin
and stayed there rather than in Cologne. See HFM, Acc. 880, Box
7, File: Germany, Interview with Erhard Vitger, July 15, 1960
(HFM 0000884-0000885). According to historians Mira
Wilkins and Frank Hill, Albert kept himself fully informed about
Fo r d -We r ke and part i c i p ated in negotiations with the
government and industry; see Wilkins and Hill, American Business
A b r o a d, p. 233.

2 6 FMC, AR-98-213546, Box 2, File: History of Plant -All Aspects,
1 9 2 5 -1 9 4 6 , Vitger Report , September 24, 1946 (FMC
0001967); Ford-Werke Records, Board of Directors Meeting
Minutes, June 11, 1937 (FW 0002829).

2 7 FMC, AR-71-20, Box 38, Remarks by Henry Ford II to London
Dealers Meeting, December 21, 1979 (FMC 0013389). In a
postwar memo, Schmidt said Albert had the trust of the
Americans and the Fords; see NARA, RG 407, Entry 368B, Box
1 0 3 2 , R e p o rt on Inve s t i g ation of Fo r d -We r ke, by Henry
Schneider, September 5, 1945, hereafter Schneider Report,
Exhibit 3, Memo by Schmidt on relations between Albert and
himself, August 13, 1945 (NARA 0000051). Historians Mira
Wilkins and Frank Ernest Hill described A l b e rt this way :
"Writing and speaking English with ease, widely traveled in
Europe and the United States, learned in the law, familiar with
the automobile industry, he had unusual talents for shaping
company policy." See Wilkins and Hill, American Business A b r o a d,
pp. 233 and 271. Historian Allan Nevins wrote that, in more
favorable circumstances, Albert might have become a statesman
of eminence; see Nevins' introduction to Wilkins and Hill,
American Business A b r o a d , p p. x i i -x i i i . See Section 5. 4. fo r
information about Albert's arrest and imprisonment in 1944 for
suspected involvement in an assassination attempt against Hitler.
During World War I, before he was associated with Ford

Motor Company, Albert came to the United States as a purchaser
for the German government. In July 1915, he left his briefcase
on a train in NewYork City. It was picked up by a U. S. Secret
Service agent who was following Albert's companion. The
briefcase was full of documents describing German-instigated
sabotage, subsidies of newspapers in America, and plans to
acquire or control chemicals, munitions and other goods. The
U. S. Secretary of State concluded that while the papers offered
no basis for legal action, they revealed activities in violation of
U. S. neutrality laws, and he leaked the contents to the press.
Despite the ensuing controversy, the evidence against Albert was
considered "not convincing," and he was allowed to stay in the
United States. He returned to Germany in February 1917. See
NARA, RG 131, Entry 247, Box 170, File: Germany -General
File Vol. II, Memo from Krauss to O. A. Schmidt and Ball, May
1 1 , 1943 (NARA 0002511-0002514); Johannes Reiling,
D e u t s c h l a n d : S a fe for Democracy? Deutsch-amerikanische Beziehungen aus
dem T � t i g k e i t s b e reich Heinrich F. A l b e rt s, k a i s e rlicher Geheimrat in A m e r i k a ,
erster Staat s s e k ret�r der Reichskanzlei der We i m a rer Republ i k ,R e i c h s m i n i s t e r,
B e t re u rer der Ford-Gesellschaften im Herrschaftsgebiet des Dritten Reiches
1914 bis 1945 (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1997), pp 216-
242; and NARA, RG 56, Acc. 56-69A-4707, Box 81, File:
Interrogations -Miscellaneous, Report of Interrogation of
Heinrich Albert, September 16, 1945 (NARA 0007170). See
also HFM, Acc. 50 -Telegrams, Box 2, File: February 1-10,
1945,Telegram from Donohue to Thompson, February 7,1945
(HFM (0000186); and NARA, RG 260, Box 486, File: Dr.
Heinrich Albert 14 470, Memos from Cassoday and Kagan, May
12 and May 28, 1948 (NARA 0004373).

2 8 HFM, Acc. 507, Box 98, File: Cologne 1934-1935, Albert to
Sorensen, February 8, 1935 (HFM 0004042-0004044); HFM,
Acc. 285, Box 2093, File: 1230, Edsel Ford to Diestel, January 4,
1939 (HFM 0000011); HFM, Acc. 880, Box 7, File: Germany,
Notes on interview with Heinrich Albert, July 26, 1960 (HFM
0000880) and Interview with Erhard Vitger, July 15, 1960
(HFM 0000886-0000888).

2 9 Charles Sorensen, with Samuel T. Williamson, My Fo rty Years with
Fo r d (NewYork: W. W. Norton & Company, 1956), p. 37.
3 0 HFM, Acc. 67, Charles Sorensen Oral Reminiscences (Excerpts),
no date (HFM 0001374-0001375).

Germany in the 1920s and 1930s. 25 He was elected to
the board on March 27, 1930, became chairman of the
board on June 11, 1937, and was the first German to
hold the ch a i rm a n s h i p. 2 6 A l b e rt would play an
important role in shaping the development of Ford-Werke.
Henry Ford II would later refer to him as "the
founding father of Ford Germany." 27 (A list of all board
members from 1925 through 1953 is attached as
Appendix B.)

Edsel Ford, Henry Ford's son and the president of
Ford Motor Company, had served on Ford-Werke's
board since its incorporation, although he did not take
an active part in the business and generally only
attended board meetings when they discussed issues of
special importance. 28 Sorensen, the head of Ford's
worldwide production, was more directly involved
with Ford's overseas operations. As Sorensen recalled in
his memoirs, Edsel Ford "confined himself largely to
administrative work. I was in charge of production and
plant operation." 29 Sorensen visited Europe yearly and
attended most of the board meetings held each year. 30
He also commu n i c ated re g u l a r ly with Fo r d -We r ke
throughout the 1930s on a variety of issues relating to 33
33 Page 34 35
8
R e s e a r c h F i n d i n g s A b o u t Fo r d -We r k e U n d e r t h e Na z i R e g i m e
3 1 See, for example, HFM, Acc. 6, Box 262, File 1930 Berlin, Board
Meeting Minutes, June 27, 1930 (HFM 0006560); HFM, Acc.
38, Box 28, File: Cologne -List C, Sorensen to Albert, February
8, 1935 (HFM 0003623-0003624); and NARA, RG 407, Entry
36BB, Box 1032, Schneider Report, Exhibit 118, Albert to
Sorensen, December 1, 1937 (NARA 0000321). For more on
Ford Motor Company's working relationship with Ford-Werke,
see HFM, Acc. 65, Box 56, File: Roberge -Draft, Reminiscences
of Russell Roberge, 1954-1955 (HFM 0005142-0005200) and
Wilkins and Hill, American Business A b r o a d, p. 110.

3 2 Wilkins and Hill, American Business A b r o a d, pp. 233-236 and 270-
283; see also Section 3 and Section 12.
3 3 Fo r d -We r ke Records, Board of Directors Meeting Minu t e s ,
September 23, 1929 (FW 0002697). Prior to Heine, Ford-Werke
employed two general managers: Hugh Stanley Jenkins
(1925) and George Carlson (1926-1929). See Ford-Werke
Records, Notarial Register Entry No. 89, August 18, 1925 (FW
0002650) and Notarial Register Entry No. 99, March 15, 1926
(FW 0002653-0002655); and Wilkins and Hill, American Business
A b r o a d , p. 233.

3 4 Wilkins and Hill, American Business A b r o a d, pp. 233-235 and 273.
Heine's chief associates agreed later that his appointment had
been a mistake.

3 5 The German authorities' grounds for objecting to Heine were
"his inability, insincerety [sic] both inside and outside of the
Ford Motor Company, and general tendency to maneuver the
business for his personal benefit rather than to build up the
business." They also considered Heine unfit to lead German
workmen because he was born a German, became a naturalized
American and then returned to Germany to earn his fortune and
"overlorded" his position a bit. See FMC, AR-98-213541, Box
1 3 1 , F i l e : S u p p l e m e n t a l -E x c e rpt from Fo r d -C o l o g n e -1 9 3 0 s ,
Diefenbach to Roberge, September 12, 1935 (FMC 0006541-
0006544). In early 1934, Charles Sorensen asked Heine to
become a German citizen. Heine replied that he would be
willing to take such a "far-reaching" step (because the company

apparently considered his citizenship a "serious handicap") only
if he could be assured that his job was secure. See HFM, Acc.
572, Box 16, File: Germany 1930s, Heine to Sorensen, January
22, 1934 (HFM 0006230). In a 1941 statement to the U. S.
Federal Bureau of Investigation, Heine said that other German
automobile concerns had sent a letter to Hitler saying that Heine
escaped to the United States from Germany shortly before World
War I. The letter accused Heine of making ammunition to be
used against his native countrymen. Heine told the FBI that this
letter caused Hitler to blacklist Ford-Werke's products to the
extent that all government institutions were ordered to refrain
from purchasing Ford-Werke vehicles. Heine also told the FBI
t h at his A m e rican citizenship was resented by Germ a n
automotive manufacturers who, as a result, fought Ford-Werke
"at every turn" and eventually took legal action to try to prevent
the company from advertising its vehicles as German products
(See Section 4.2.). See NARA, RG 60, Box 24, File: 146-43-278,
Federal Bureau of Investigation File No. 100-7886, October 16,
1942 (NARA 0007527); and Ford-Werke Records, Ford Motor
Company A/ G Board of Directors Meeting Minutes, September
6, 1933 (FW 0002763-0002764).

3 6 Wilkins and Hill, American Business A b r o a d, p. 271. In a letter to
S o rensen after Heine's depart u re, A l b e rt recounted a
conversation he had had with Commerce Minister Wilhelm
Keppler, Hitler's economic adviser. Keppler said that Heine "had
made a point of affronting all departments concerned," referring
to the party and the authorities. In the same letter, Albert
lamented that Heine had caused problems for the company with
the German public by describing Ford-Werke's vehicles as
"German" when in fact they were not yet made entirely of
German parts. "This misrepresentation will always be cast in our
teeth." See HFM, Acc. 38, Box 33, File: 168-F-1 Jan-Jun, Albert
to Sorensen, January 20, 1936 (HFM 0000457-0000465).

3 7 HFM, Acc. 6, Box 292, File: 1935-Cologne, Bosch et al. to Edsel
Ford, January 22, 1935 (HFM 0000528).

production at the facility, changes in management
personnel and general policy questions. 31

During the 1930s, Ford-Werke faced a number of
business challenges and problems that impacted the
management of the company. Worldwide economic
distress caused by the Great Depression was a factor, as
were the American image of the company in light of
i n c reasing German nationalism and the grow i n g
influence of the Nazi party and ideology. During this
p e riod of economic and political diffi c u l t i e s , t wo
successive Ford-Werke managers were forced out of
their jobs amid questions about their qualifications and
performance. 32

As part of the re s t ru c t u ring of intern at i o n a l
operations in 1928, Ford had emphasized the use of
nationals in the various countries where it did business.
However, Edmund Heine, a German-born naturalized

A m e ri c a n , was appointed Fo r d -We r ke manager in
September 1929. 33 By 1931, when the Cologne plant
was completed, business conditions in Germany were
wo r s e n i n g. An accountant sent from England to
examine the Ford-Werke books in the autumn of 1931
produced a scathing report of waste and inefficiency. In
1933, the company was a deficit operation and was still
fo u n d e ring in 1934. 3 4 M e a n w h i l e, the Germ a n
authorities had made it increasingly clear that Heine
was not acceptable to them. 3 5 A l b e rt and Bosch
recognized problems with Heine's management of the
company and his relations with the government and
public, but had no German candidate to replace him. 36
By early 1935, Albert, Bosch and board members had
sent word to Dearborn that the situation wa s
"unworkable" and Heine was "muddling things." 37 An
auditor sent from Dearborn submitted a stro n g ly
critical report on Ford-Werke operations on May 24,
1935. Among other problems, it described "loose
management and supervision" and indicated that many 34
34 Page 35 36
9
Hi s t o r i c a l B a c k g r o u n d o f Fo r d Mo t o r Co mp a n y a n d Fo r d -We rk e
3 8 HFM, Acc. 415, Box 1, File: Ford-Werke Audit Reports, Audit
Report, May 24,1935 (HFM 0004309).

3 9 Ford-Werke Records, Meeting Minutes, May 28, 1935 (FW
0 0 0 2 8 0 7 -0 0 0 2 8 1 1 ) ; F M C, AR 68-5: 1 -8 , B ox 8, F i l e :
International -Executive Files, Memo on Liebold, circa 1944
(FMC 0014148). In 1942, Heine was convicted of two counts
of espionage in the United States and sentenced to 18 years
i m p risonment for providing the Vo l k swagen We r ke with
information on the American aviation industry. The conviction
on the second count was reversed on appeal in 1945. Heine
testified that he had used public sources for the information, and
the court held that what ever was lawful to be bro a d c a s t
throughout the country was lawful to be sent abroad. See NARA,
RG 60, Box 24, File: 146-43-278, Memo from Assistant Attorney
General to the Attorney General, November 21,1945 and Memo
from Assistant Attorney General to Solicitor General, December
12, 1945 (NARA 0007584-0007598). After his release, Heine
returned to the Detroit area and operated a hardware store. See
HFM, Acc. 65, Box 41, File: Liebold (115) 41-5 Final-Folder 9,
Reminiscences of E. G. Liebold, January 1953 (HFM 0005001).

4 0 HFM, Acc. 507, Box 98, File: Cologne 1934-1935, Albert to
Sorensen, February 8,1935 (HFM 0004034-0004035). As early
as 1933, Perry had begun to warn Edsel Ford and Sorensen that
the Nazis were putting their nominees everywhere under the
flimsiest of excuses. Sorensen pictured the situation in Germany
mu ch the same as in A m e ri c a , w h i ch was experi e n c i n g
numerous difficulties with a new political regime. However,
Perry informed Sorensen that it was extremely difficult to form
an accurate opinion of the political and economic conditions
prevailing in Germany. "Most certainly you cannot judge them
by any analogy or comparison with American conditions." See
HFM, Acc. 572, Box 16, File: Germany 1930s, Perry to Edsel
Fo r d , June 15, 1933 (HFM 0006172-0006173). Pe rry
continued to advise Dearborn that it was desirable to avoid
giving German politicians any opening to interfe re with
economic affairs. See HFM, Acc. 572, Box 16, File: Germany
1930s, Perry to Sorensen, December 19, 1933 (HFM 0006146-
0006147), Sorensen to Perry, January 30,1934 (HFM 0006152-
0006153), Perry to Sorensen, March 13,1934 (HFM 0006155-
0006156), Perry to Sorensen, March 13,1934 (HFM 0006157-
0006158) and Perry to Sorensen, September 4, 1934 (HFM
0006170-0006171).

4 1 HFM, Acc. 507, Box 98, File: Cologne 1934-1935, Albert to
S o re n s e n , Feb ru a ry 11, 1935 (HFM 0004036-0004039).
Diestel's inexperience was noted by the May 1935 audit report
that had faulted Heine's performance. The report said that
Diestel "lacked the essential qualifications for the job." His
business experience had not been along manufacturing lines,
and he had no experience what ever in automotive
manufacturing, sales or service. See HFM, Acc. 415, Box 1, File:
Ford-Werke Audit Reports, Audit Report, May 24, 1935 (HFM
0004310). Some authors have written that Diestel previously
wo r ked for A l b e rt at a German steamship company or
companies. See Wilkins and Hill, American Business A b r o a d , p. 275;
Nevins and Hill, Fo r d : Decline and Rebirt h , 1 9 3 3 -1 9 6 2, p. 96; and
Reiling, D e u t s c h l a n d : S a fe for Democra c y ? , pp. 363-364. Another
author wrote that Diestel knew of A l b e rt through his
connections. See Hanns-Peter Rosellen, Und Trotzdem Vo r w � rt s : Fo r d
in Deutschland 1903-1945 (Frankfurt: Zyklam-Verlag, 1986), p.
115. In a letter to Sorensen in August 1935, however, Albert
expressly stated that he did not know Diestel before discussing
the possibility of his becoming Ford-Werke manager. See HFM,
Acc. 38, Box 28, File: Germany -Cologne -List "F," Albert to
Sorensen, August 23,1935 (HFM 0001938).

4 2 Ford-Werke Records, Board of Directors Meeting Minutes, May
28,1935 (FW 0002808-0002811).
4 3 H F M , A c c. 3 8 , B ox 28, F i l e : Cologne List E, Ohlsen to
Diefenbach, August 19, 1935 (HFM 0003765) and Director of
Hamburg Electricity Works to Ohlsen, August 19, 1935 (HFM
0003766). The dealer forwarded a letter from a director of
Hamburg Electrical Works describing the lineage of Diestel's
mother, whose paternal grandfather was a "Jewish merchant."
The letter said that Diestel had been forced to give up his job at
the Berlin Works when it was discovered that he had claimed
"Arian [sic] descent" when applying for membership in the
Nazi party.

employees were unqualified. 38 Four days later, on May
28, 1935, the Ford-Werke board accepted Heine's
resignation. 39

Albert had always known of Heine's deficiencies, but
he had hesitated to recommend his dismissal because of
the chance that the German gove rnment might
interfere with suggestions of its own as to who should
be the manager of Ford-Werke. 40 As Albert noted in a
letter to Sorensen, it was exceptionally difficult to find
a suitable person. Due to the boom in the German
automobile industry and the antagonism against Ford-Werke
as a foreign company, no "efficient man" would
leave a German automotive firm to join Ford-Werke.

There was no choice but to take an industry outsider,
Albert wrote. He chose Erich Diestel, a lawyer and
former manager of the Berlin Electric Works, because
"the information collected on him is excellent." Albert
and Bosch reasoned that Diestel's lack of automotive
experience would be an advantage because he could
learn Detroit methods and would not try to pursue his
own course. 41 The Ford-Werke board appointed Diestel
as manager on the day Heine's re s i g n ation wa s
accepted. 42

Three months later, E. J. Diefenbach, a Ford employee
who had been sent from Dearborn to help Cologne
with sales, was informed by a Ford dealer in Hamburg
that Diestel "appears to be a Jew." 43 About the same
t i m e, s everal highly placed Nazis ap p ro a ch e d
Diefenbach in an attempt to open a direct line of
communication with Dearborn. Diefenbach bypassed
Albert and wrote a long letter to Dearborn detailing the
Nazis' concerns about business issues at Ford-Werke 35
35 Page 36 37
10
R e s e a r c h F i n d i n g s Ab o u t Fo r d -We r k e U n d e r t h e Na z i R e g i m e
4 4 FMC, AR-98-213541, Box 131, File: Supplemental -Excerpt
from Ford-Cologne -1930s, Diefenbach to Roberge, September
12, 1935 (FMC 0006541-0006544). In his letter, Diefenbach
said Albert was "in a very dangerous position" and the Nazis
would have him in a concentration camp within 48 hours if he
tried to interfere with Diefenbach's attempt to convey the Nazis'
concerns about Ford-Werke directly to Dearborn. See Section
3.3. for more information about Ford-Werke and the German
government during this period.

4 5 Sorensen wrote that he felt that Albert knew "all there is to know
about him [Diestel]" [emphasis Sorensen's]. He called Diefenbach
"a fool" for trying to bypass Albert by writing the letter to
Dearborn after Sorensen had instructed him to deal with Albert.
See FMC, AR-98-213541, Box 131, File: Ford Cologne 1930s -Nazi
Influence, Sorensen to Albert, September 18, 1935 (FMC
0018709). In a postwar oral history intervie w, Roberge said he
did not believe he ever heard Diestel's background discussed at
Dearborn. He said it was very unfortunate, in view of the
attitude of the Nazi party, which had absolute control over
everything in Germany, to find that Diestel did have Jewish
blood, "but as far as I know there was no effort on the part of
anyone at this end to have him dismissed � I don't believe we
realized the extent of the situation in Germany in regard to
people of Jewish ancestry." See HFM, Acc. 65, Box 56, File:
Roberge -Draft, Reminiscences of Russell Roberge, 1954-1955
(HFM 0005173-0005174).

4 6 HFM, Acc. 38, Box 28, File: Cologne List E, Albert to Sorensen,
October 2, 1935 (HFM 0003763-0003764). In a letter to
Sorensen the following day, Albert acknowledged that it must
appear ridiculous to Sorensen that the fact of having a non-Aryan
grandparent could cause so much discussion about Diestel. He
agreed that it was ridiculous, and that they would overcome it
without detriment to the business, but that they had to take such
things seriously in Germany "according to the present mentality
of the people; it will pass." See HFM, Acc. 38, Box 28, File:
Cologne List E, Albert to Sorensen, October 3, 1935 (HFM
0007297-0007298).

4 7 See, for example, HFM, Acc. 38, Box 33, File: 16-F-1 Jan-Jun,
A l b e rt to Sore n s e n , Ja nu a ry 20, 1936 (HFM 0000457-0000465).
One of those matters was a proposed merger
between Ford-Werke and a German firm, Stoewer-Werke, AG.
Although favored by the Nazis, the plan was dropped due to
opposition from Dearborn. Albert wrote in August 1936 that
while the merger was pending, "nobody dared attack us."
However, after the merger was rejected by Dearborn, it seemed
as if Ford-Werke would never get any government business. See
HFM, Acc. 6, Box 97, File: 1935 -Cologne, Albert to Edsel Ford,
August 17, 1936 (HFM 0000542-0000551). For more
information on the impact of the merger failure, see NARA, RG
407, Entry 368B, Box 1032, Schneider Report, Exhibit 99A,
Memo by Bussien on army truck of the Reich War Ministry
Weapons Office, June 15, 1937 (NARA 0000284; for English
t r a n s l at i o n s , see NARA 0000283 and NARA 0005877-
0005878). See also Section 3.3.

4 8 NARA, RG 407, Entry 368B, Box 1032, Schneider Report,
Exhibit 120, Memo by Schmidt on command car, July 26,1945
( NARA 0000326). For more commentary on Diestel's
management style, see HFM, Acc. 65, Box 72, File: Tallberg (214)
Final 72-1, Reminiscences of V. Y. Tallberg, July 1956 (HFM
0004840-0004845) and Box 56, F i l e : R o b e rge -Draft,
Reminiscences of Russell Roberge, 1954-1955 (HFM 0005171).

4 9 HFM, Acc. 38, Box 33, File: Item "D," Sorensen to Albert, June
18,1936 (HFM 0007300).

5 0 HFM, Acc. 38, Box 33, File: January to June -Item "F," Perry to
Sorensen, June 29, 1936 (HFM 0000496-0000497).

and their distrust of Albert. The letter indicated that
Albert had promised the German commerce minister
that a man would be appointed whom the government
could trust. The choice of Diestel � "an inexperienced
man, and particularly a man rated as a Jew" � was "the
last straw" for Albert with the government, Diefenbach
wrote. He indicated that the commerce minister, who
was directly under Hitler, was very much incensed by
Albert's "latest mistake," and the government could not
p revent discri m i n ation against Ford products in
Germany if Diestel were not replaced. 44 Reacting to the
l e t t e r, w h i ch was addressed to Russell Roberg e,
Sorensen reassured Albert that everyone in Dearborn
had been impressed with the way that Diestel had
d evoted himself to the pro blems of the Germ a n
business, and that the Diefenbach correspondence file
was being returned to Germany. "It is a matter that

requires no record here," Sorensen wrote. 45 Albert
emphasized to Sorensen that he would "fight every
effort � to interfere with our private business." That
did not, unfortunately, exclude the possibility that "the
Jewish question" could mat e rialize into real sales
resistance, Albert wrote. 46

In 1936, c o rrespondence indicates incre a s e d
g ove rnment pre s s u re regarding business matters of
Fo r d -We r ke. 4 7 At the same time, it was becoming
ap p a rent to Fo r d -We r ke management that Diestel
sometimes had " p a rticular ideas which did not
coincide with Ford methods and tradition." 4 8 T h e re
we re discussions about replacing Diestel with the
m a n ager of a German fi rm that was being considere d
for a merger with Fo r d -We r ke. 4 9 (See Section 3. 3. fo r
m o re on the proposed merg e r, w h i ch fell through.) In
J u n e, Pe rry wrote to Sorensen that it was a gre at pity
t h at after all the money that had been spent in training
D i e s t e l , it looked as though he would have to go. 5 0 Two
weeks lat e r, in another letter to Sore n s e n , Pe rry noted
t h at it was hard for both of them to pro p e r ly ap p re c i at e
the German situat i o n , but that he was not optimistic.
Pe rry subsequently info rmed Sorensen that A l b e rt had 36
36 Page 37 38
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Hi s t o r i c a l B a c k g r o u n d o f Fo r d Mo t o r Co mp a n y a n d Fo r d -We rk e
5 1 HFM, Acc. 38, Box 33, File: Item No. 3 -Germany 1936, Perry
to Sorensen, July 14, 1936 (HFM 0002861-0002864).
5 2 HStAD, NW 1049/ 76620, Military Government questionnaire
of Schmidt, June 19, 1946 (HSAD 0791).

5 3 HFM, Acc. 415, Box 1, File: Ford-Werke Audit Reports, Audit
Report, May 24,1935 (HFM 0004310).

5 4 HFM, Acc. 38, Box 33, File: Item No. 3 -Germany 1936,
Sorensen to Perry, July 29, 1936 (HFM 0002717). In August
1 9 3 6 , Edsel Ford traveled to Cologne and, according to
Sorensen, calmed Albert down. See HFM, Perry to Sorensen,
August 18,1936 (HFM 0007301) and Sorensen to Per ry, August
31, 1936 (HFM 0007302). As Edsel Ford was leaving to return
to Dearborn, Albert handed him a confidential letter and report.
Albert wrote that anti-Semitism had become an established
national policy in Germany. A new wave of anti-Semitism would
exploit the fact that Diestel had Jewish ancestors; already, it was
i m p o s s i ble for Diestel to attend certain confe rences with
authorities and Nazi party departments. Albert believed that his
attempts to protect Diestel had to be considered a failure. The
assumption had been that the anti-Semitic movement would
diminish, he wrote, but instead it was "on the ascent." Now,
Albert anticipated "increasing pressure" in the future. Albert also
wrote that Diestel was being given too much credit for Ford-Werke's
present success. It was through Dearborn initiatives that
production and sales departments were reorganized and quality
was again "first class." The financial reconstruction of the
company took place before Diestel joined Ford-Werke, Albert
wrote. See HFM, Acc. 6, Box 97, File: 1935-Cologne, Albert to
Edsel Ford, August 17,1936 (HFM 0000542-0000551).

5 5 HFM, Acc, 38, Box 33, File: Germany July-December 1936,
Perry to Sorensen, August 18, 1936 (HFM 0007301). In this
letter, Perry mentioned that the situation was "complicated"
regarding the manager from the company involved in the
merger talks. The man had been discharged by the company in
question, and "it would not be easy for Ford Motor Company
A/ G to hire him, even if he wished to enter the Company's
employ."

5 6 HFM, Acc. 712, Box 5, File: German Pig Iron, Albert to Craig,
September 20, 1937 (HFM 0004692-0004695). In a letter to
Ford executive B. J. Craig, Albert reported that the Ford-Werke
board added Robert Schmidt and Erhard Vitger to the
management structure partly because of Diestel's behavior. The
criticisms levied against Diestel included such things as violating
company policy by making loans to dealers; see HFM, Acc., 38,
Box 38, File: Germany Jan-Jun 1937, Edsel Ford to Diestel, April
2, 1937 (HFM 0001996). For other examples, see HFM, Acc.
38, Box 38, File: Germany Jan-Jun 1937, Craig to Sorensen, May
12, 1937 (HFM 0002018), Memo to Sorensen, May 11, 1937
(HFM 0007251), Pe rry to Diestel, M ay 18, 1937 (HFM
0007252) and Pe rry to Sore n s e n , M ay 18, 1937 (HFM
0007253).

5 7 HFM, Acc. 38, Box 38, File: Germany Jan-Jun 1937, Albert to
Sorensen, February 11, 1937 (HFM 0001994), Diestel to Craig,
April 27,1937 (HFM 0002019-0002020), Albert to Craig, May
6, 1937 (HFM 0002014-0002015). In his May 6, 1937, letter,
Albert complained that neither Dearborn nor Ford-Werke's
board was being kept sufficiently informed by a manager who
was so independent that he had assumed practically all
functions, including those of the board (See Section 4.2.). In a
postwar interview, Erhard Vitger said tha t Albert and Diestel fell
out after Diestel suggested to Dearborn that Albert's salary
should be reduced. Albert was paid by Ford-Werke for his
services as a director and also drew a $40,000-a-year salary from
Dearborn. On a trip to Dearborn in 1936, Diestel had suggested
that Albert should not be paid this salary from Dearborn.
According to Vitger, when Albert learned of this he turned
against Diestel. See HFM, Acc. 880, Box 7, File: Germany,
Interview with Erhard Vitger, July 15, 1960 (HFM 0000885).

been subjected to continuous bombardment by part y
o f ficials about Diestel and had to virt u a l ly promise that
he would make a ch a n g e. Pe rry advised A l b e rt to
dispense with the services of Diestel, " by no means the
right man in the right place 100%." 5 1 A l b e rt 's
suggestion was to designate Robert Schmidt (assistant
m a n ager in ch a rge of purch a s i n g 5 2 ) and Erhard Vi t g e r
(the company 's chief clerk 5 3 ) as co-manag e r s. In a
letter to Pe rry, S o rensen wrote that he was " ve ry mu ch
d i s t u r b e d " by A l b e rt 's attitude toward Diestel, b e c a u s e
he would be spoiling something that was re a l ly
f u n c t i o n i n g. S chmidt was " ab s o l u t e ly incap abl e." A n d
Vi t g e r, though " t h o ro u g h ly re l i able and re s p o n s i bl e,"
was " i n e x p e ri e n c e d ," S o rensen wro t e. In spite of
w h at ever the gove rnment thought of Diestel, " o u r
business is pro s p e ro u s , and we have sold more cars
d u ring the past year than we ever did befo re. W h at eve r
you do, d o n 't let Dr. A l b e rt disturb this. He is
altogether too impressed with the necessity of co-o
p e r ating with the Gove rnment Au t h o ri t i e s." 5 4 Pe rry
w rote back to say that he and Edsel Ford ag reed that a
joint management arrangement with Vitger and

S chmidt would never wo r k . With regard to Diestel,
Pe rry said that A l b e rt had ag reed to "hold his hand"
until a better suggestion for altern at i ve manag e m e n t
could be fo u n d . 5 5

Diestel remained on the job. H oweve r, d u ring 1937
and 1938, his management style and actions drew
c riticism from Sorensen and other exe c u t i ves in
D e a r b o rn as well as Pe rry, A l b e rt and members of the
Fo r d -We r ke board, who reacted to "a certain tendency
on the part of Mr. Diestel � to dictat e." D e a r b o rn
e xe c u t i ves criticized him for disregarding specifi c
m a n agement dire c t i ves and Ford business policies. 5 6
A l b e rt and Diestel each complained to Dearborn ab o u t
g rowing tensions. 5 7 In the summer of 1938, D i e s t e l
was chastised by Sorensen and A l b e rt for separat e 37
37 Page 38 39
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R e s e a r c h F i n d i n g s A b o u t Fo r d -We r k e U n d e r t h e Na z i R e g i m e
5 8 NARA, RG 407, Entry 368B, Box 1032, Schneider Report,
Exhibit 147A, letter from Albert to Diestel, June 18, 1938
( NARA 0000370). Diestel had applied for Fo r d -We r ke
membership in the Reich Automotive Association without board
ap p rova l . On another mat t e r, S o rensen demanded an
e x p l a n ation for Diestel's rev i val of a wood gas generat o r
program that had been ordered to be dropped in Germany; see
HFM, Acc. 38, Box 40, File: Germany Jul-Dec 1938, Sorensen to
Diestel, July 29,1938 (HFM 0007363), Sorensen to Diestel, July
29,1938 (HFM 0007362) and Sorensen to Albert, July 29,1938
(HFM 0007361).

5 9 In a postwar interview with historian Mira Wilkins, Schmidt
recalled that after Albert and Diestel quarreled over various
policy questions, Albert put the issue squarely before Dearborn.
Naturally, Schmidt said, Dearborn chose Diestel as the one who
would leave. Schmidt said that Diestel jeopardized his career by
trying to be everything. Schmidt said Diestel had no idea about
automobiles, but after a short period, he thought he knew
everything. He turned against Albert, who had hired him, and
refused to listen to Vitger and Schmidt. See HFM, Acc. 880, Box
7, File: Germany, Interview with Robert Schmidt, July 18, 1960
(HFM 0000900-000901). In a 1945 memo, Schmidt said that
he and Vitger viewed Albert as more than the board chairman �
they considered him the representative of the shareholders'
majority, i. e., Messers Henry and Edsel Ford and their executives.
"People like Heine and Diestel who thought different [sic] had
to leave the company." See NARA, RG 407, Entry 368B, Box
1032, Schneider Report, Exhibit 3, Memo by Schmidt on
relations between Albert and himself, August 13, 1945 (NARA
0000051).

6 0 At the Dearborn meeting, it was decided that business should be
carried on by Schmidt and Vitger, and that a young engineer
should be found to be groomed to be a third member of the
management board [Vorstand], which was responsible for day-to-
day operations. See HFM, Acc. 6, Box 306, File: 1938 -Cologne,
Albert to Sorensen and Edsel Ford, November 14 and
15,1938 (HFM 0000008) and Memo by Albert, November 15,
1938 (HFM 0000009).

6 1 HFM, Acc. 38, Box 40, File: Germany-Jul-Dec 1938, Diestel to
Sorensen, December 9, 1938 (HFM 0000297); FMC, AR-65-
1500, Box 6, File: Germany 1939-1945 (Sorensen), Albert to
S o re n s e n , December 22, 1938 (FMC 0003179-0003180).
Albert wrote to Sorensen that he did not object to Diestel's wish
to announce that he had reorganized the company and was
resigning after completing this task. Diestel wanted to become
a dealer in Berlin, and it would improve his chances of finding a
new job, Albert wrote. See HFM, Acc. 38, Box. 40, File: Germany
-Jul-Dec 1938, Albert to Sorensen, December 15, 1938 (HFM
0000295-0000296). In a postwar interview, Schmidt recalled
that Diestel stayed in Germany most of the war, until he was put
in charge of a Dutch enterprise by the German authorities.
Schmidt also stated that Diestel was arrested for collaboration
after the war; see HFM, Acc. 880, Box 7, File: Germany, Interview
with Robert Schmidt, July 18, 1960 (HFM 0000900). Another
former Ford-Werke employee said after the war that Diestel was
a manager for Nazi-operated companies in the East. "[ T] hey
knew, he knew his job." See FMC, Interview of A. S., December
1999 (FMC 0018557-0018558). Ford of Britain employee
Thornhill Cooper said in 1960 that Diestel was living in
Hamburg and had a company of his own; see HFM, Acc. 880,
Box 5, File: England, Oral History of Thornhill Cooper, June 27,
1960 (HFM 0000838).

6 2 Ford-Werke Records, File: Minutes of General Meetings and
Board of Directors Meetings, 1925-1941, Board of Directors
Meeting Minutes, June 8, 1939 (FW 0002851); FMC, AR-65-
1500, Box 6, File: Germany 1939-1945 (Sorensen), Albert to
Sorensen, December 22,1938 (FMC 0003179-0003180).

6 3 HFM, Acc. 713, Box 4, File: Cologne Personnel 1946-1948,
Schmidt to Henry Ford II, October 6, 1947 (HFM 0003104).

6 4 Schmidt's denazification file lists his titles as buyer in the
purchase department, 1926-1927; purchase manager, 1928-
1935; assistant manager in charge of purchase, 1935-1937; and
manager in charge of purchase, 1937-1938. See HStAD, NW
1049/ 76620, Military Government questionnaire of Schmidt,
June 19,1946 (HSAD 0791). According to a postwar statement
filed by Schmidt with military authorities, he entered the
company as a buyer in 1926, was head buyer beginning in
1928, purchase manager starting in 1930, assistant manager in
charge of purchase starting in 1933 and manager in charge of
purchase starting in 1935; see NARA, RG 407, Entry 368B, Box
1032, Schneider Report, Exhibit 12, statement by Schmidt, June
22, 1945 (NARA 0000068). Schmidt's postwar statement
indicated that he was born in Berlin and left school to work in
an automobile repair shop. He was in the German army during
World War I and returned to Berlin to work in various repair
shops. He worked as a buyer for hardware, for parts for
agricultural implements and for bicycle manufacture, and was
out of work for nine months before being hired at Ford-Werke.

incidents of violating policies and dire c t i ve s. 5 8
According to Schmidt, Albert issued an ultimatum �
either Diestel or Albert had to leave. 59

In November 1938, Edsel Ford, Sorensen, Perry and
Albert met unofficially in Dearborn to discuss Ford-Werke
and unanimously concluded that it would be in
the interest of the German firm to part company with
Diestel. 60 He was informed that his contract would be
c a n c e l e d . He pre fe rred to resign rather than be
d i s m i s s e d , and he re c e i ved a severance pack ag e
approximately equal to his annual salary. 61

In spite of earlier concerns about such an
arrangement, the board elevated Schmidt and Vitger to
be co-managers, replacing Diestel. 62 Schmidt began his
career with Ford-Werke in 1926 as a buyer. 63 From
1928 until he was made co-manager with Vitger,

Schmidt held several titles, including assistant manager
in charge of purchasing and purchasing manager. 64
Vitger was part of Ford-Werke management from the
beginning. When the German company was created in
1925, the manager of Ford operations in Denmark,
George Carlson, was asked to assume the duties of
managing Ford-Werke, as well. Vitger, who worked for
Carlson at Ford of Denmark, was brought fro m 38
38 Page 39 40
13
Hi s t o r i c a l B a c k g r o u n d o f Fo r d Mo t o r C o mp a n y a n d Fo r d -We rk e
6 5 Wilkins and Hill, American Business A b r o a d , pp. 98 and 139. See
also HFM, A c c. 6 7 , Charles Sorensen Oral Reminiscences
(Excerpts), no date (HFM 0001375).

6 6 FMC, AR-98-213541, BoxV, Oral History of Erhard Vitger by D. B.
Tinnin, April 1987 (HFM 0000565-0000566). In a 1935 audit
report of Ford-Werke done by a Ford employee from Dearborn,
Vitger was described as playing a major role: "Mr. Vitger, Chief
Clerk's position but performing the duties of Office Manager. He
is the best qualified employee in the Plant. Capable, honest and
well informed on all details in conducting the general business
of the Plant." See HFM, Acc. 415, Box 1, File: Ford-Werke Audit
Reports, Audit Report, May 24,1935 (HFM 0004310). See also
Wilkins and Hill, American Business A b r o a d , p. 139.

6 7 Ford-Werke Records, Meeting Minutes, June 11, 1937 (FW
0002831).

6 8 F M C, A R -6 5 -1 5 0 0 , B ox 6, F i l e : G e rm a ny 1939-1945
(Sorensen), Albert to Sorensen, December 22, 1938 (FMC
0003179-0003180).

6 9 NARA, RG 260, Property Division, External Assets Investigation
Section, Box 546, File: Ford Werke AG (Inv), Memo on
conversations with Schmidt, June 13, 1945 (NARA 0003559);
FMC, AR-98-213541, BoxV, Oral History of Erhard Vitger by D. B.
Tinnin, April 1987 (FMC 00000573). "During the war I was
not allowed to enter the factory, only the office," Vitger recalled
in a postwar oral history interview.

7 0 Fo r d -We r ke Records, Business Report for the Year 1941,
N ovember 9, 1942 (FW 0000119-0000121; for English
translation, see FW 0000126-0000127). At the same meeting,
Alfons Streit, head engineer, and Hans L�ckmann, assistant to the
chief executive, were appointed deputy members; see NARA, RG
407, Entry 368B, Box 1032, File: Ford-Werke AG, German
Economic Department Report on German Industrial Complexes
-Ford-Werke, February 1946, hereafter GED Report (NARA
0001567); and BA-L, R 87/ 6205, Schmidt and Albert to Reich
C o m m i s s i o n e r, June 18, 1941 (BAL 1182; for English
translation, see BAL 12929). The June 17, 1941, general
meeting was the last one until December 16,1947; see FMC, AR-9
8 -2 1 3 5 4 1 , B ox 131, F i l e : Cologne Org a n i z ation and
Management, List of Board Members 1925-1943, 1947 (FMC
0000679-0000680); and Ford-Werke Records, Business Report
for the Years 1944,1945 and 1946 (FW 0003729-0003764; for
English translation, see FW 0005403-0005405). See Section
10.6. regarding the first postwar meeting.

7 1 Fo r d -We r ke Records, Resolution of the Superior Court -Cologne,
May 15,1942 (FW 0008375). For English translation,
see FMC, AR 75-63-430, Box 207, File: Germany AG Minutes of
Meetings 1929-1952 (FMC 0003361). For more discussion
about Schmidt's appointment as custodian, see Section 5.4.

7 2 FMC, AR-75-62-616, Box 79, Cologne 1939-1945 Reports -C
u s t o d i a n , no dat e, h e reafter Custodian Report (FMC
0 0 0 1 0 1 7 ) ; W N R C, A c c. 2 9 9 -6 8 A -0 2 4 3 , B ox 536, F i l e :
W17536, Report Regarding the Administration of Ford-Werke
AG, August 1, 1945 (DOJ 0011133-0011152 for English
translation, see DOJ 0011204-0011217); BA-L, R 87/ 6205,
Reich Commissioner to Schmidt and Albert, May 9,1942 (BAL
1246) and Albert to Reich Commissioner, May 14, 1942 (BAL
1247-1248).

Copenhagen to Berlin to be works manager of the new
German operation. 65 In a 1987 interview, Vitger said
that in the early days he handled "everything" because
Carlson was in Berlin only two or three days per
month. 66

On June 11, 1937, Schmidt and Vitger had been
appointed to the management board [Vorstand], which
was responsible for day-to-day operations. 67 When the
two men were named as co-managers in December
1938, Schmidt was given responsibility for production,
technical needs and negotiations with the authorities,
as well as his purchasing duties. Vitger took over all
export sales and employment matters, along with his
existing re s p o n s i b i l i t i e s , w h i ch included fi n a n c i a l
m at t e r s. 6 8 Although Vitger and Schmidt we re
technically equals during the early years of the war, in
practice Schmidt had greater authority, since Vitger was
a Dane and considered a foreigner. 69 On June 17, 1941,
at a general meeting held by the Ford-Werke Board of
Directors, Schmidt was elevated to the chairmanship of
the Vorstand, in addition to his other responsibilities
(See Section 5.2.). 70

When Fo r d -We r ke was placed under Germ a n
g ove rnment control on May 15, 1 9 4 2 , G e rm a n

government officials named Schmidt as custodian of
Ford-Werke, reporting to the Reich Commissioner for
the Treatment of Enemy Property. 71 The board of
directors was replaced by a board of advisors appointed
by the government to assist the custodian in the
administration of the company. Albert was appointed
ch a i rman of this new body, w h i ch , at A l b e rt 's
suggestion, consisted of the German members of the
old board. 72

2.5. Ford's Changing Relationship with
Ford-Wer ke

Political developments in Germany during the 1930s
weakened Ford Motor Company's control over Ford-Werke,
in large part because Nazi policies set out to
limit the influence of fo reign business ow n e r s.
Compulsory automobile parts standards established in
1936 as well as a number of other regulatory measures
taken by the German government ensured a reduced
role for Ford Motor Company in the operation of its 39
39 Page 40 41
14
R e s e a r c h F i n d i n g s A b o u t Fo r d -We r k e U n d e r t h e Na z i R e g i m e
7 3 Simon Reich, The Fruits of Fa s c i s m : Po s t war Prosperity in Historical
Pe r s p e c t i ve (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990), p. 115. See
Sections 3.2. and 3.3. for more information on standardization.

7 4 HFM, Acc. 507, Box 98, File: Cologne 1934-1935, Albert to
Sorensen, February 8, 1935 (HFM 0004042-0004061).
7 5 NARA, RG 407, Entry 368B, Box 1032, Schneider Report,
Exhibit 146A, Meeting Minu t e s , A p ril 20, 1938 (NA R A
0000368-0000369).

7 6 The Taunus marque was developed for the German market; the
Taunus Mountains are near the Rhine River. See FMC, AR-98-
213542, File: Oral Reminiscence Conducted by Mira Wilkins,
Interview with C. W. Hauss, July 21,1960 (FMC 0017377).

7 7 H F M , A c c. 6 5 , B ox 72, F i l e : Ta l l b e rg (214) Final 72-1,
Reminiscences of V. Y. Tallberg, July 1956 (HFM 0004862-
0004864). Tallberg returned to Germany briefly for additional
work on May 15, 1940, but departed again on September 9,
1940; see FMC, AR-65-1500, Box 6, File: Germany 1939-1945
(CE Sorensen), Tallberg to Gnau, July 6, 1940 (FMC 0003139-
0003140).

7 8 F M C, A R -6 5 -1 5 0 0 , B ox 6, F i l e : G e rm a ny 1939-1945
(Sorensen), Albert to Sorensen, November 27, 1939 (FMC
00003161-00003163).

7 9 NARA, RG 226, Microfilm M1499, Reel 263, Department of
Justice, Report on Ford-Werke AG, May 10, 1943 (NARA
0004262).

operations to foreigners, even to members of the board
or shareholders. As a result, Ford-Werke was unable to
call a full meeting of the board. 78

A 1943 U. S. Department of Justice report stated that
even before the outbreak of war in Germany, Ford's
control over policy at Ford-Werke was sometimes
interfered with by the German authorities through
pressure on the Ford-Werke management. The report
suggested that Schmidt, Vitger and Albert remained
loyal to the policies of Ford Motor Company only to the
extent that these policies did not conflict too heavily
with those of the German government. According to
the re p o rt , these three individuals we re initially
committed to Ford's desire not to be involved in
military mobilization, and they had enough influence
with the authorities to be able to hold their ground.
But as the preparations for war reached a fever pitch in
the late 1930s, the management of Ford-Werke seemed
more inclined to carry out the wishes of the German
government and less inclined to uphold Ford policies
that might conflict, according to the Department of
Justice report. 79

2.6. Ford's Response to the
Threat of War

Ford Motor Company's response to political and
military developments in Europe was influenced by
Henry Ford's long-held aversion to war except in the
direct defense of the United States. Before America's
entry into World War I, Henry Ford had chartered a
"Peace Ship" in an attempt to end the conflict. His
personal secretary, Ernest Liebold, recalled in a 1953
interview that Henry Ford was willing to spend his
money and do anything he could, as long as there was
a possibility of ending the war. But when the Peace
Ship venture failed, and the United States entered the
war two years later, Ford Motor Company contributed
helmets, tanks and naval vessels for the American
military. This sequence of events was consistent with

German subsidiary. 73 In a 1935 letter to Sorensen
regarding a change in the German tax law, Albert
warned that if foreigners took "an active part in the
management of the business," Ford-Werke would be
subject to full taxation. He suggested that Sorensen
should refrain from ordering changes to management
s a l a ries and that "in the future such things are
exclusively done through the intermediary of a German
member." Furthermore, he observed that the tax code
allowed Germany to tax German-domiciled companies
that were "subject to a possible decrease of the profit on
account of its direct or indirect economic relations to a
foreign company." In light of these restrictions, Albert
stated, "We have always advised FMC Dearborn not to
give instructions but only advice." 74 (See Section 3.2.
for more information on the status of Ford-Werke in
Nazi Germany.)

The Ford-Werke board meeting held in Cologne on
A p ril 20, 1 9 3 8 , was the last time an A m e ri c a n
(Sorensen) or a British (Perry) board member attended
a meeting until after the war. 75 Valentine Tallberg, chief
engineer, was the last American Ford employee to leave
Germany. He left Germany at the direction of the
American Consul a few days before the war broke out
in September 1939, taking with him three Taunus 76 cars
to work on while in Dearborn. 77 In a letter to Sorensen
dated November 27,1939, Albert advised him that new
government rules and regulations limited the amount
of information he could provide about the company's 40
40 Page 41 42
15
Hi s t o r i c a l B a c k g r o u n d o f Fo r d Mo t o r C o mp a n y a n d Fo r d -We rk e
8 0 HFM, Acc. 65, Box 41, File: Liebold (115) 41-5 Final -Folder 9,
Reminiscences of E. G. Liebold, January 1953 (HFM 0004889-0004894); Ti m e , March 23,1942; Nevins and Hill, Ford: Decline and

Rebirth, 1933-1962, p. 169. Describing this period in My Life and Work, Henry Ford wrote in part: "It is entirely out of keeping
with the principles of our business to disturb the routine of our production unless in an emergency. It is at variance with our
human principles to aid either side in a war in which our country was not involved. These principles had no application,
once the United States entered the war." See Henry Ford, with Samuel Crowther, My Life and Work (Garden City, New York:
Doubleday, Page & Company, 1924), p. 246.
8 1 Nevins and Hill, Ford: Decline and Rebirth, 1933-1962, pp. 168-181.
As Charles Sorensen put it, " � [A] ny mention of the war in Europe and the likelihood of this country's involvement upset

him almost to incoherence." See Sorensen, My Forty Years With Ford, pp. 274-275.

8 2 For example, in May and June 1940, public opinion polls
indicated that nearly two-thirds of Americans wanted to stay out of war, and preferred to avoid aiding Great Britain, if such aid

would risk involvement in the conflict. After Pearl Harbor, a majority of Americans favored declaring war on the Axis
countries. See Otis L. Graham and Meghan Robinson Wander: F ranklin D. R o o s e ve l t , His Life and Ti m e s : An Encyclopedic Vi e w (NewYork,
N. Y.: Da Capo Press, 1990), p. 212; Wayne S. Cole, Roosevelt & the I s o l at i o n i s t s, 1 9 3 2 -1 9 4 5 (Lincoln and London: U n i versity of
Nebraska Press, 1983), pp. 364-365.
8 3 Sorensen, My Forty Years With Ford, pp. 273-276; PRO, AVIA 38/ 724,
Wynne to Self, June 19,1940 (PRO 0000177); Wilkins and Hill, American Business A b r o a d , pp. 316-317; Nevins and Hill, Ford: Decline

and Rebir t h , 1 9 3 3 -1 9 6 2 , pp. 174-177. Sorensen was surprised by Henry Ford's approval of the Rolls-Royce project because of his

earlier declarations against making war supplies for any foreign nation. He said Henry Ford's reversal was triggered by a
"tactless" British press statement to the effect that Ford Motor Company was now supporting the British. Stunned British Air
Ministry officials concluded," Edsel is prevented from executing the scheme by the pacifistic and isolationist outlook of his
father, who sees no inconsistency in allowing his English organizations to make Merlins [Rolls-Royce engines] as they
will be used for the defense of the country in which the works are located." See Wynne to Self (PRO 0000178) and Self to
Rowlands (PRO 0000179). In Germany, Henry Ford's denial of the engines to the British "greatly helped" Ford-Werke avoid
h aving to manu fa c t u re war mat e rial for the Germ a n government. See FMC, AR-65-1500, Box 6, File: Germany
1939-1945 (C. E. Sorensen), Albert to Sorensen, July 11, 1940 (FMC 0003146); and FMC, Acc. 6, Box 321, File: Briefing
Binder -Section R, Albert to Edsel Ford, July 11, 1940 (FMC 0004512).

8 4 HFM, Acc. 38, Box 127, File: Folder F, 1940, Campbell to Perry,
June 27, 1940 (HFM 0007289); Nevins and Hill, Ford: Expansion and Challenge, 1915-1933 (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons,

1957), p. 566.
8 5 Nevins and Hill, Ford: Decline and Rebirth, 1933-1962, pp. 177-180.
In his memoirs, Sorensen recalled that at first, Henry Ford was also opposed to the Pratt & Whitney engine program. But Edsel

Ford was "all for it," and so was Sorensen. Sorensen said he convinced Henry Ford to change his mind by suggesting that the
company could set a new standard in the manufacture of aircraft engines. "In all my years with him I never put so much pressure
on him as to persuade him to take part in the government's military aviation program." See Sorensen, My Forty Years With Ford,
p. 276. Referring to Henry Ford's decision not to build the Rolls-Royce aircraft engines earlier in 1940, a 1942 Ti m e article

engines for England, Henry Ford told the American
press that he was willing to produce war materials for
the U. S. government only, and "for defensive purposes
only." On June 25, Ford Motor Company announced it
would not build the engines. 83 Following a storm of
protest in the British House of Commons and the press,
W. R. Campbell, the head of Ford of Canada, quickly
persuaded Henry Ford to authorize a stat e m e n t
declaring that the decision applied only to the U. S.
c o m p a ny and did not affect Ford subsidiaries in
Canada, England and elsewhere in the British Empire.
Issued by Campbell on behalf of Henry Ford, the
statement said that Ford subsidiaries throughout the
Empire "are using their facilities to the utmost for the
production of military equipment for the defense of the
British Empire. �They are serving their people as they
should do and as I would do if permitted and if
occasion required." 84

In August 1940, Ford Motor Company accepted a
U. S . g ove rnment contract to manu fa c t u re Pratt &
Whitney aircraft engines, and Ford engineers assisted in
developing a final design for the jeep. 85 In March 1941,

Henry Ford's conviction that Americans should avoid
any conflict except to defend the nation. 80 In the late
1930s, Henry Ford refused to believe that another war
was imminent. Even after World War II broke out in
Europe, he did not think that America needed to
become involved. In 1940, he joined the America First
Committee in campaigning against U. S . m i l i t a ry
i nvo l vement ab ro a d . 8 1 (This was one of seve r a l
isolationist groups committed to preventing the United
States from becoming directly involved in the war,
reflecting the widespread isolationism in America prior
to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7,
1941. 82 )

In the spring of 1940, the U. S. government asked
Ford Motor Company to build Rolls-Royce aircraft
engines. Edsel Ford and Charles Sorensen went to
Washington, D. C., to look at the engine and discuss the
proposal, and Sorensen returned enthusiastic about the
project. In May 1940, Henry Ford surprised Sorensen
by agreeing to the engine contract, which called for the
British to get 60 percent of the engines. However, in
June 1940, after a British press report mentioned the 41
41 Page 42 43
16
Ford workers began to clear the ground for the Willow
Run bomber plant near Ypsilanti, Michigan. By early
1944, Willow Run was the leading producer of heavy
bombers for the U. S. military, proving that Ford's mass
production know-how could be used to manufacture
bombers. In 1945,Willow Run produced 70 percent of
all B-24 bombers built that year for the U. S. military. 86
The attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941,
mobilized the entire country behind the war effort.
Ford played a strategically important role in the U. S.

contribution to the Allied victory. By March 1942, Ford
had become such an integral part of the "arsenal of
democracy" that Time magazine's front cover featured
an image of Henry Ford before a huge factory from
which streams of tanks and bombers flowed. "A Mass
Producer," the cover stated. "Out of enormous rooms,
armies will roll and fleets will fly." 87 A list of Ford's
contributions to the Allied war effort is attached as
Appendix C.

R e s e a r c h F i n d i n g s Ab o u t Fo r d -We r k e U n d e r t h e Na z i R e g i m e

credited him with having a "good mechanic's reason: later, grief and headaches in other plants making English-designed
munitions proved what he knew or had guessed � that the British blueprints were informal to the point of helter-skelter,
had to be completely worked over, causing costly rejections, delays, waste." See Time, March 23,1942.

8 6 Nevins and Hill, Fo r d : Decline and Rebirt h ,1 9 3 3 -1 9 6 2 , pp. 223-226;
Irving Brinton Holley, Jr., Buying A i r c ra f t :M at�riel Procurement for the
A rmed Fo r c e s (Washington, D. C.: Center of Military History,
1964), p. 526.

8 7 Civilian Production A g e n c y, Industrial Mobil ization For Wa r
(Washington, D. C.: Civilian Production Agency, 1947), p. 315;
Nevins and Hill, Fo r d : Decline and Rebirt h ,1 9 3 3 -1 9 6 2, pp. 199 and
225-227; Ti m e , March 23, 1942. 42
42 Page 43 44
17
8 8 Jeremy Noakes and Geoffrey Pridham, Documents on Nazism, 1 9 1 9 -1
9 4 5 (NewYork, 1975), pp. 188-195.

8 9 R. J. Overy, War and Economy in the Third Reich (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1994), pp. 1-3.

9 0 O ve ry, War and Economy in the Third Reich, pp. 11-18.
9 1 R e i c h s s t e u e r bl at t , Vol. 42 (August 4, 1936), p. 840 (BAL 12934);
R e i c h s s t e u e r bl at t , Nr. 32 (May 3,1937), pp. 546-547 (BAL 12932-
12933).

S e c t i o n 3
N A Z I E C O N O M I C P O L I C I E S A N D
C O N T R O L S O V E R T H E A U T O M O T I V E
I N D U S T R Y

3.1. Nazi Regulation of Econom y
With the Nazi party's assumption of power in
January 1933, Adolf Hitler's regime instituted a variety
of measures designed to extend its influence across all
aspects of German society. As the Nazi part y
consolidated its hold on Germany, the legality of its
activity was sanctioned with the passing of the Enabling
Law of March 24, 1933, an all-encompassing statute
giving Hitler extensive emergency powers. 88

From the outset, Hitler's policies demanded the
imposition of extensive controls over the German
economy. During the ea rly years of the regime,
Germany faced serious social problems caused by the
worldwide depression, problems which had played a
significant role in Hitler's rise to power. In an effort to
spark an economic recovery, the Nazi government
embarked on a number of ambitious public works
programs aimed at developing the country's industrial
infrastructure. Nazi authorities also carefully regulated
fo reign trade in order to promote German self-s
u f ficiency in critical raw mat e rials and military
production. By the late 1930s, Nazi authorities had
implemented additional re a rmament pro g r a m s

designed to begin the industrial mobilization needed to
build up Germany's military strength. 89

The Nazi government's policies led to an uneasy
relationship with the German business community. On
the one hand, the regime quickly set out to win the
close cooperation of Germany's business leaders, most
of whom were generally supportive of the Nazi party's
overall economic goals. However, the expansion of
government controls during the mid-1930s and the
i n c reased emphasis on military mobilization and
economic self-sufficiency created frictions with some
groups. 90 This was especially true in the case of
companies that had strong intern ational ties,
particularly foreign subsidiaries operating in Germany.
Foreign-owned companies that depended on imports
and capital investments from their home countries were
particularly affected by government decrees regulating
foreign trade and foreign currency transactions. In
August 1936, for example, the German government
implemented measures that strictly regulated financial
transactions with the United States and required all
American companies doing business in Germany to be
represented by a German export firm or bank. 91 43
43 Page 44 45
18
R e s e a r c h F i n d i n g s A b o u t Fo r d -We r k e U n d e r t h e Na z i R e g i m e
9 2 Overy, War and Economy in the Third Reich, pp. 77-79; Snyder,
Encyclopedia of the Third Reich, p. 245.
9 3 Wilkins and Hill, American Business A b r o a d, p. 272.

9 4 Reich, The Fruits of Fa s c i s m, p. 112.
9 5 VDA, Pressearchiv, File: 20,Wirtschaftsgruppe Fahrzeugindustrie
Meeting Minutes, 1935-1938 (GER 01721-01920). All 950
members of the association, formally known as the Reich
Association of the German Automotive Industry [Reichsverband
der deutschen Automobilindustrie, RDA], as well as companies
such as Ford-Werke, which had not formerly been members of
the RDA, were joined together in the WiGruFa.

9 6 VDA, Pressearchiv, File: 22, WiGruFa quarterly progress reports,
February -July 1942 (GER 0001199-0001262).
9 7 In 1937, Ford-Werke General Manager Erich Diestel represented
Fo r d -We r ke on the Wi G ru Fa board of adv i s o r s ; see V DA ,
Pressearchiv, File: 20, WiGruFa Board of Advisors Meeting
Minutes, June 29, 1937 (GER 01779-01791). In September
1940, [Kaj] Meyer represented Ford-Werke at the WiGruFa
board of advisors meeting; see BA-L, R 3101/ 9087, Minutes of
the WiGruFa Board of Advisors Meeting, September 4, 1940
(BAL 6257-6261).

9 8 Reich, The Fruits of Fa s c i s m , p. 107; Reinhold Billstein, Karola
Fings, Anita Kugler and Nicholas Levis, Wo rking for the Enemy : Fo r d ,
G e n e ral Motors, and Forced Labor in Germ a ny during the Second Wo rld Wa r
(NewYork: Berghahn Books, 2000), p. 23.

9 9 Overy, War and Economy in the Third Reich, pp. 81-82.

1 0 0 FMC, AR-98-213541, Box 131, Palumbo, Survey of German
Motor Vehicle Industry, April 15,1948 (FMC 0000906).
1 0 1 For more on Opel during this period, see Reich, The Fruits of
Fa s c i s m , pp. 110-111. Also, in a letter to Charles Sorensen in
early 1936, Albert discussed the competitive issues faced by
Ford-Werke partly because of Opel's influence in Germany.
Opel had always been on good terms with the German
government and the party organizations, Albert wrote. "As a
result, they succeeded in developing into the largest German
motor car factory. Nearly one half of the entire production of
Germany is manufactured by them alone." See HFM, Acc. 38,
Box 33, File: 168-F-1 Jan-Jun, Albert to Sorensen, January 20,
1936 (HFM 0000459 and 0000461).

3.2. Nazi Controls Over the German
Automoti ve Industry

The Hitler regime identified the automotive industry
as playing an essential role in the government's efforts
to revive the German economy. The German state
invested heavily in developing the country's highway
system. The National Socialist Motor Corps, a Nazi
paramilitary organization, sought to associate the Nazi
movement with German society's burgeoning interest
in automotive culture. The Nazi government took steps
to encourage self-sufficiency in German automobile
production by offering consumer tax incentives aimed
at increasing domestic demand for Germ a n -m a d e
vehicles. 92

At the 1934 Berlin Automobile Show, H i t l e r
p e r s o n a l ly ordered the industry to standardize
p roduction so that "all the chief parts of any
manufacturer's car should be interchangeable with
those of all other makes." 93 Furthermore, in 1935, the
German automotive trade association ordered that all
automobile parts sold in Germany be made in Germany,
that all parts come from German raw materials and that
all parts be fully standardized. 94

As part of a broader effort to regulate the German
e c o n o my, the Nazi regime fo rmed an Au t o m o t i ve
I n d u s t ry Economic Group [Wi rt s ch a f t s g ru p p e

Fahrzeugindustrie, WiGruFa] in May 1935. Like similar
groups created for other industries, the WiGruFa acted
as a liaison between the German government and
automobile manufacturers, including Ford-Werke. 95 In
addition to overseeing effo rts to standardize and
r ationalize the automotive industry, the Wi G ru Fa
requested raw materials from the German government
and distributed allocations to its members based on the
contracts each had re c e i ve d . 9 6 Fo r d -We r ke wa s
represented on the WiGruFa board of advisors. 97

In the 1920s and early 1930s, the Germ a n
automobile industry consisted of approximately 150
small producers, and it grew steadily in manufacturing
and output throughout the 1930s. Partially as a result
of Nazi government initiatives, total vehicle production
climbed from 52,000 units in 1932 to 342,000 in
1938. 98 By the late 1930s, Germany was the third-largest
automobile producer in the world, behind the
United States and Great Britain. Until 1938, the largest
sector of the German automobile industry wa s
passenger vehicle pro d u c t i o n , although seve r a l
automobile manufacturers in Germany were producing
vehicles for the German military prior to 1939. 99

From 1932 until 1937, Ford-Werke manufactured
between 4 and 9 percent of Germany's total yearly
motor vehicle production. 100 During this period, Adam
Opel AG, a subsidiary of the U. S.-based General Motors
Corporation, was the largest automobile manufacturer
in Germany. 101 In 1938, the peak year of German
automobile production until after the war, Opel sold a 44
44 Page 45 46
19
Na z i E c o n o mi c Po l i c i e s a n d Co n t r o l s O v e r t h e A u t o m o t i v e I n d u s t r y
1 0 2 Wilkins and Hill, American Business A b r o a d , p. 272.
1 0 3 NARA, RG 226, M1499, Reel 150, Report by Tallberg on
German Motor Vehicle Industry, August 26, 1942 (NARA
0004118).

1 0 4 NARA, RG 407, Entry 368B, Box 1032, File: Ford-Werke AG,
GED Report, February 1946 (NARA 0001562).

1 0 5 Reich, The Fruits of Fa s c i s m, pp. 107-46.

1 0 6 In 1934, Fo r d -We r ke considered a plan to erect a new
m a nu fa c t u ring facility in Hambu rg. G ove rnment offi c i a l s
favored the new location, as it would keep the facility out of the
so-called "danger zone" of vulnerability to foreign powers and
would provide badly needed jobs in Hamburg. However,
Dearborn officials decided against the proposal in August 1934,
telling Hamburg proponents of the plan that Ford considered
the Cologne factory "ideal." For more on the proposal, see
H F M , A c c. 6 , B ox 287, F i l e : 1 3 4 -D ag e n h a m , Keppler to
Fe r d i n a n d , August 9, 1934 (HFM 0000597-0000598),
Negotiations on Ford Factory in Hamburg, September 3, 1934
(HFM 0000588-0000589) and Memo on conference with

re p re s e n t at i ves of Hambu rg, September 4, 1934 (HFM
0000590-0000596). See also HFM, Acc. 572, Box 16, File:
Germany 1930s, Sorensen to Albert, August 2, 1934 (HFM
0006212), Sorensen to Wirtz, August 2,1934 (HFM 0006180-
0 0 0 6 1 8 1 ) , S o rensen to Pe rry, August 22, 1934 (HFM
0006165), Albert to Perry, September 1,1934 (HFM 0006168-
0006169) and Perry to Albert, September 11, 1934 (HFM
0006223-0006224). For more on the issues that developed
between Ford-Werke and the Nazi regime, see FMC, AR-98-
213541, Box 131, File: Supplemental Excerpt from Ford -Cologne
-1930s, Diefenbach to Roberge, September 12, 1935
(FMC 0006541-0006544).

1 0 7 Reich, The Fruits of Fa s c i s m, p. 110.

1 0 8 Reich, The Fruits of Fa s c i s m, pp. 107-46. For more on this subject,
see Carl H. A. Dassbach, Global Enterprises and the Wo rld Economy
( N ew Yo r k : G a r l a n d , 1 9 8 9 ) , p. 2 7 1 . On Fo r d -We r ke 's
reluctance to cooperate with efforts to standardize the German
auto industry, see, in particular, Reich, The Fruits of Fa s c i s m , p.
110.

1 0 9 Reich, The Fruits of Fa s c i s m, p. 112.

total of 136,450 automobiles, almost 40 percent of the
G e rman automobile marke t . Behind Opel was a
German-owned firm, DKW, with 50,340 units sold, or
approximately 15 percent of the market. Ford-Werke
was the third-largest automobile firm in 1938 with a
total of 36,582 vehicles sold, representing just under
11 percent of the German market. German-owned
D a i m l e r-Benz was the fo u rt h -l a rgest pro d u c e r,
capturing approximately 7 percent of the market with
total sales of 25,338 vehicles. 102 Numerous smaller
firms, including Hanomag, Adler and Audi, shared the
remainder of the German automobile market. 103 (See
Appendix A for a table listing 59 U. S. firms according to
each company's percentage of the total of American
investment in Germany. Opel ranked second, with
12.18 percent of the total. Ford-Werke was 16th, with
1.90 percent. The list was compiled in 1943. See also
Section 2.2.)

3.3. Status of Ford-Wer ke Plant
According to a postwar report by Great Britain's
Ministry of Economic Warfare, the Ford-Werke plant in
Cologne was, with the exception of the Opel plant in
R�sselsheim, "the most important and best-equipped
single motor vehicle plant in Continental Europe." 104
Political scientist Simon Reich argues that Ford Motor
Company's status as a multinational corporate entity
initially made it suspect to Nazi government officials,
who viewed Fo r d -We r ke as a " fo re i g n " c o m p a ny
subject to direction from outside Germany. Given the

racial and ethnic xenophobia of Nazi ideology, this
affected Ford-Werke's performance in the first years of
the Hitler regime. 105 Tensions with the government
arose on a variety of issues. One of the first and most
contentious was Ford-Werke's decision not to construct
a new facility in Hamburg as desired by Nazi economic
officials. 106 By 1934, Ford-Werke's production had
fallen to ninth place among German automobile
producers. 107 According to Reich, the company faced
hostility from its competitors and suffe red near-ostracism
at the hands of other German automobile
manufacturers, although Ford-Werke's highly modern
p roduction techniques made it the focus of
competition. In the mid-1930s, the Nazi regime's
s t a n d a r d i z ation program highlighted the conflict
between Ford-Werke, on one hand, and the German
government and the automotive industry groups on the
other. While most German firms cooperated with
government initiatives to standardize the automotive
industry, Ford-Werke resisted, since Ford policies called
for the interch a n g e ability of parts with fo re i g n
suppliers and other Ford subsidiaries beyo n d
Germany's borders. 108

During 1935 and 1936, Ford-Werke came under
increasing pressure from the German government and
the German automotive trade association to conform to
German automobile manufacturing standards, despite
Ford policy. 109 For example, when a 1935 business
re p o rt from the trade association enu m e r ated the 45
45 Page 46 47
20
R e s e a r c h F i n d i n g s A b o u t Fo r d -We r k e U n d e r t h e Na z i R e g i m e
1 1 0 Fo r d -We r ke Records, A l b e rt to Reich Economic Minister,
September 3,1935 (FW 0004315-0004354).
1 1 1 HFM, Acc. 507, Box 98, File: Cologne 1934-1935, Board
Meeting Minutes, April 13, 1935 (HFM 0004116-0004120).
For more information on Ford-Werke's reluctance to cooperate
with efforts to standardize the German auto industry, see Reich,
The Fruits of Fa s c i s m , p. 110.

1 1 2 HFM, Acc. 6, Box 297, File: Subject File -1935 -Ford Motor Co.
-Subsidiaries -Cologne, Albert to Edsel Ford, August 17, 1936
(HFM 0000542-0000551). Also, Erhard Vitger said in a
postwar interview that Ford-Werke was "persona non grata" in
Germany during the 1930s. "Apparently there existed some
ruling � official or unofficial, I would not know � that it was
not permitted to park a Ford car in a public place." See FMC,
AR-98-213541, Box V, Oral History of Erhard Vitger by D. B.
Tinnin, April 1987 (FMC 0000567).

1 1 3 HFM, Acc. 38, Box 28, File: Cologne List F, Albert to Sorensen,
December 6, 1935 (HFM 0001950-0001951).

1 1 4 HFM, Acc. 38, Box 33, File: Jan-Jun, Item F, Brief outline of the
German Norms for Passenger and Truck Engines, May 13, 1936
(HFM 0000499); Reich, The Fruits of Fascism, p. 115.

1 1 5 HFM, Acc. 38, Box 33, File; 168 F-1 Jan-Jun, Item G, Diestel to
Vehicles Industry Trade Gro u p, Ja nu a ry 13, 1936 (HFM
0002803-0002805). Ford-Werke applied for exceptions from
the remaining mandatory standards, see Ford-Werke Records,
Meeting Minutes, February 26,1936 (FW 0002812-0002816).

1 1 6 HFM, Acc. 38, Box 33, File; Item D, Albert to Sorensen, May 20,
1936 (HFM 0002034-0002036).

characteristics of a non-German company, the list
included, among other factors, noncompliance with
G e rman rules concerning the standardization of
automotive parts. In a letter to the Reich Economic
Minister, Albert commented on the inequity of the
s i t u at i o n , d e s c ribing the linking of the Germ a n
character of Fo r d -We r ke vehicles with full
s t a n d a r d i z ation of parts as a "vicious circle."
Discrimination against Ford-Werke based on the firm's
nonconformity to German standards caused sales to
suffer. Poor sales, in turn, made it impossible to
generate the large outlay of capital necessary to achieve
standardization. He suggested, however, that a firm
p romise of automobile orders by the Germ a n
government would enable Ford-Werke to consider the
large investment necessary for standardization. 110

Despite efforts by Albert and others to find an
a c c e p t able solution, Fo r d -We r ke 's difficulties with
standardization continued to affect sales to the German
government and private citizens, as well. In a meeting
with various Ford-Werke and Ford Motor Company
personnel in 1935, Albert discussed the connection
between government contracts and standardization,
using Opel as an example of the benefits of compliance.
He made it clear that the granting of government
contracts was larg e ly dependent on Fo r d -We r ke 's
willingness to standardize. 111 Decrees from the Ministry
of Interior had alre a dy forbidden sales of
nonstandardized vehicles to public officials such as
court bailiffs and post office personnel. By 1936, there

was anxiety among Ford-Werke executives that the
government's attitude toward the firm would affect
sales in the private sector. In a letter to Edsel Ford,
Albert voiced this concern, predicting that in light of
government restrictions on nonstandardized vehicles,
" p ri vate persons may soon larg e ly insist on
standardization and refuse to buy a car which is not
standardized." 112 In December 1935, Albert warned
Sorensen of the likelihood of mandatory standards, a
d evelopment he argued would make Fo r d -We r ke 's
opposition to German standards untenable. 113 In May
1936, Albert's fears were realized, when the German
g ove r nment issued orders compelling Germ a n
automobile manu fa c t u rers to standardize cert a i n
component designs and sizes. 114

Ford-Werke made several attempts to alleviate some
of the difficulties encountered due to the fi rm 's
"foreign" status. Early in 1936, Ford-Werke began to
make concessions to German standards. In a letter to
the Trade Group Vehicles Industry, Ford-Werke General
Manager Erich Diestel voiced Ford-Werke's agreement
"on principle" with German standards and said that
Ford-Werke would be able to adopt two-thirds of the
m a n d at o ry standards imposed by the Germ a n
government. 115 By May 1936, work had begun on the
standardization of Ford-Werke's V-8 engine. 116 Ford-We
r ke also considered acquiring a Germ a n
manufacturing firm, Stoewer-Werke AG, in an effort "to
profit from a possibility offered to remove the well-known
discrimination" of Ford-Werke and its products.
I n i t i a l ly proposed to A l b e rt by Stoewe r-We r ke
management in the summer of 1935, the merger
garnered important governmental advocates such as
Keppler, Hitler's economic adviser, who claimed the
F�hrer himself had taken an interest in the matter.
S o rensen advised against the merger on fi n a n c i a l 46
46 Page 47 48
g ro u n d s , and the plan was abandoned in Au g u s t
1936. 117

In addition to the legal, political and practical
problems stemming from its status as a foreign firm,
Fo r d -We r ke ran into difficulties with the Germ a n
government due to its choice of managers. In the
1930s, Nazi officials were openly hostile to Ford-Werke
in part because of the backgrounds and conduct of two
of the company's general managers during the decade �
Edmund Heine, a German-born, naturalized American
citizen who was seen by the Germans as overbearing
and insincere, and Diestel, who was of Jewish ancestry
and had no experience in the automotive business. 118
(See Section 2.4. for more information on the sequence
of events.)

In some other re s p e c t s , Fo r d -We r ke 's re l ations with
the German gove rnment improved in 1936 and 1937.

N a z i E c o n o mi c Po l i c i e s a n d Co n t r o l s O v e r t h e A u t o m o t i v e I n d u s t r y
1 1 7 Ford-Werke Records, Board Meeting Minutes, May 13, 1936
(FW 00002822-0002823) and Board Meeting Minutes August
10,1936 (FW 0002825); HFM, Acc. 38, Box 33, File: 168-F-1
Jan-Jun, Albert to Sorensen, January 20, 1936. Perry informed
Sorensen that information presented at the directors' meeting
[in June], which initially influenced Sorensen to proceed with
the merger plan while Vitger investigated, apparently was
inaccurate. The business had not operated at a profit for years,
and substantial losses had been incurred; see HFM, Acc. 38, Box
33, File: Item #3 -Germany -1936, Perry to Sorensen, July 14,
1936 (HFM 0002861-0002864).

1 1 8 FMC, AR-98-213541, Box 131, File: Supplemental-Excerpt
Ford-Cologne-1930s, Diefenbach to Roberge, September 12,
1935 (FMC 0006541-0006544).

1 1 9 HFM, Acc. 38, Box 33, File: Jan-Jun, Item F, Diestel to Sorensen,
March 2, 1936 (HFM 0001890-0001891).

1 2 0 FMC, AR-98-213541, Box 131, File: Supplemental-Excerpt
Ford-Cologne-1930s, Diestel to Sorensen, March 3,1937 (FMC
0006536-0006537). On the Stoewer-Werke proposal, see
Ford-Werke Records, Meeting Minutes, August 10, 1936 (FW
0002825); and HFM, Acc. 6, Box 97, File: 1935 -Cologne,
A l b e rt to Edsel Fo r d , August 17, 1936 (HFM 0000542-0000551).

1 2 1 Ford-Werke Records, Business Report for 1937, April 1938, p. 5
(FW 0005331-0005338). See also Reich, The Fruits of Fa s c i s m ,
pp. 115-117.

In 1936, Adolf Hitler chose the Ford exhibit at the
I n t e rn ational Automobile Exhibition in Berlin to
highlight Henry Fo r d 's assembly line methods as a
model for German industry. A few days lat e r, H e rm a n n
G � ri n g, a high-pro file Nazi offi c i a l , bought a Germ a n
Ford Eifel model. 1 1 9 Although the demise of the
S t o ewe r-We r ke deal temporari ly increased tensions with
the German gove rn m e n t , the gove rnment authori z e d
Fo r d -We r ke to increase its domestic production to
24, 000 vehicles in 1937. 1 2 0 T h at same ye a r, N a z i
a u t h o rities fo rm a l ly cert i fied Fo r d -We r ke products as
being of German ori g i n , despite the fact that the
c o m p a ny continued to import ru bber and tires fro m
Ford subsidiaries ab ro a d . The long sought-after
c e rt i fi c ation was an important step; with it, Fo r d -We r ke
became eligible to re c e i ve gove rnment contracts. 1 2 1 47
47 Page 48 49
22
R e s e a r c h F i n d i n g s A b o u t Fo r d -We r k e U n d e r t h e Na z i R e g i m e 48
48 Page 49 50
23
1 2 2 Overy, War and Economy in the Third Reich, pp. 185-188.
1 2 3 Gustav Stopler, G e rman Economy (NewYork: Harcourt Brace and
World, Inc., 1967), p. 143; Overy, War and Economy in the Th i r d
R e i c h, pp. 3-4.

1 2 4 V. R. Berghahn, M o d e rn Germ a ny : S o c i e t y, E c o n o my, and Politics in the
Twentieth Century ( C a m b ri d g e : C a m b ridge University Pre s s ,
1987), pp. 148-149. In the buildup to the war, the government
took further steps to improve Germany's military readiness,
c u l m i n ating in a new National Service Law, enacted on
September 1, 1939. The law allowed the government to take
control of plants and raw materials to increase the capacity of
war industries and conve rt fa c t o ries for war mat e ri a l
production; see Maxine Y. Woolston, The Stru c t u re of the Nazi
E c o n o my (NewYork: Russell & Russell, 1968), p. 52.

1 2 5 Overy, War and Economy in the Third Reich, p. 196; BA-F, RW
19/ 661, Organizational Chart for the General Plenipotentiary
for Automotive Affairs, August 1941 (BAF 0133-0137).

1 2 6 The meeting was held on November 24, 1 9 3 8 , and included
re p re s e n t at i ves from Fo r d -We r ke ; see FMC, A R -9 8 -2 1 3 5 4 1 ,
B ox 131, F i l e : Supplemental -Excerpt Ford -Cologne -1930s,
Memo from Diestel, N ovember 25, 1938 (FMC 0006546).

S e c t i o n 4
G E R M A N I N D U S T R I A L
M O B I L I Z A T I O N A N D P R E P A R A T I O N S
F O R WA R , 1 9 3 6 -1 9 3 9

4.1. Four-Year Plan
In October 1936, the Nazi government announced
the creation of an economic Four-Year Plan under
Hermann G�ring. The plan entailed a series of wide-ranging
measures to regulate core elements of the
German economy. Its principal goals were to promote
the development of key heavy industries needed for
m i l i t a ry re a rmament and to encourage incre a s e d
domestic production of strategic materials such as
rubber, petroleum and iron ore. 122 In line with these
aims, Nazi officials imposed extensive controls over
foreign trade both to protect domestic producers and to
regulate the use of Germany's dwindling reserve of
foreign exchange. Despite control measures dating
back to before the Nazi era, the country's foreign
exchange reserves had largely been depleted by 1934,

severely handicapping Germany's ability to export and
exacerbating the economic crisis during the early
1 9 3 0 s. 1 2 3 While the Fo u r-Year Plan was publ i c ly
described as an effort to bring the German economy
out of depression, historians argue that the underlying
motivation was to begin preparing for Germany's
military mobilization. 124

Recognizing the particular importance of the
automotive industry, the Nazi government imposed a
special set of controls for automobile manufacturers. In
November 1938, Adolph von Schell was designated
Plenipotentiary for Automotive Affairs under the Four-Year
Plan. In this capacity, von Schell headed the newly
created Automotive Office Group, which was charged
with accelerating effo rts to rationalize domestic
production to meet the demands of Germany's military
mobilization. 125 Shortly after von Schell's appointment,
he and G�ring invited representatives from leading
automotive firms to attend a general meeting in Berlin,
where they explained the task of harnessing Germany's
automobile industry to military needs. 126 The central 49
49 Page 50 51
24
R e s e a r c h F i n d i n g s A b o u t Fo r d -We r k e U n d e r t h e Na z i R e g i m e
1 2 7 HFM, Acc. 38, Box 40, File: Germany 1938, Albert to Sorensen,
December 15, 1938 (HFM 0000294); FMC, AR-65-1500, Box 6 , G e rm a ny 1939-1945 (Sore n s e n ) , A l b e rt to Sore n s e n ,

February 2, 1939 (FMC 0003177-0003178). See also Peter K i r ch b e rg, " Ty p i s i e rung in der deutsch e n
Kraftfahrzeugindustrie und der Generalbevollm�chtigte f�r das K r a f t fa h r we s e n . Ein Beitrag zur Pro bl e m at i k
s t a at s m o n o p o l i s t i s cher Kri e g s vo r b e re i t u n g," in Ja h r buch f�r Wirtschaftsgeschichte (1969/ II), p. 132.

1 2 8 PRO, FO 1078/ 52, British Field Information Agency, Technical -Economic
Branch (F. I. A. T.) Report on the German Motor Vehicle Industry during World War II, 1946 (PRO 0000085);

Peter Lessmann, "Ford Paris im Zugriff von Ford K�ln 1943: Das Scheitern des Projeckts eines europ�ischen Automobil-Ko
n z e rns unter deutscher Leitung," in Zeitschrift f�r Unternehmensgeschichte, vol. 38, no. 4 (December 1993), pp. 218-
219.
1 2 9 NARA, RG 407, Entry 368B, Box 1032, Schneider Report,
Exhibit 54, Memo by Schmidt on rubber and raw material agreement, August 3, 1945 (NARA 0000157) and Exhibit 65,

Memo by Schmidt on rubber deal closed in June 1936, August 3,1945 (NARA 0000194).

1 3 0 HFM, Acc. 285, Box 2025, File: Subjects Mr. C. E. Sorensen May
Wish to Discuss at A s n i � res and Cologne, D e p a rt m e n t a l Correspondence with attachments, February 16,1937-May 10,

1937 (HFM 0007454-0007478).
1 3 1 NARA, RG 407, Entry 368B, Box 1032, Schneider Report, Exhibit
74, Memo from Schmidt -raw material agreement, August 6, 1945 (NARA 0000208-0000210), Exhibit 78, Translation, 1937

raw materials agreement (NARA 0000216-0000217).
1 3 2 See HFM, Acc. 285, Box 2025, File: Germany 1937, Board
Meeting June 11, 1937 (HFM 0007489-0007490); HFM, Acc. 285, Box 2025, File: Subjects Mr. C. E. Sorensen May Wish to

discuss at Asni�res and Cologne, Departmental Correspondence with attachments, February 16, 1937-May 10, 1937 (HFM
0007454-0007478).

goal of von Schell's program was to increase domestic
output by reducing the number of models and
standardizing automobile production in close
cooperation with automobile manufacturers. 127 While
these efforts were not fully realized before the outbreak
of the war, von Schell's office continued to have general
oversight in coordinating automobile production with
military requirements until it was eventually subsumed
into the Ministry for Armaments and War Production
under Albert Speer, one of the most powerful officials
in Nazi Germany. 128

4.2. Ford-Wer ke and German Military
Mobilization

Like other companies in Germany, Ford-Werke was
a f fected by the economic programs implemented
during the mid-and late 1930s. In line with the
general provisions of the Fo u r-Year Plan, N a z i
a u t h o rities used German fi rms with fo re i g n
connections as a means of procuring raw materials in a
complex barter system, without straining Germany's
dwindling foreign reserves. In June 1936, Ford-Werke,
Ford Motor Company and the German government
e n t e red into an ag reement whereby Fo r d -We r ke
exported parts and vehicles in exchange for German
government-issued foreign exchange licenses allowing
it to buy crude rubber from other Ford subsidiaries.
Once acquired, the crude rubber was then sold to
G e rman tire manu fa c t u re r s , with the Germ a n

government receiving 30 percent of the tires that were
m a nu fa c t u red using these supplies. 1 2 9 A bro a d e r
agreement was signed in late 1936 to cover the supply
of pig iron, nonferrous metals and rubber for the
following year. Under this new agreement, Ford Motor
C o m p a ny shipped raw mat e rials to Germ a ny in
exchange for parts from Ford-Werke. These shipments
totaled 1.9 million pounds of rubber and 130,000
pounds of copper during the early part of 1937. 130 The
1937 agreement also included a provision, as did
similar agreements signed in 1938 and 1939, that a
portion of the raw materials delivered by Ford Motor
Company had to be provided for use by other German
firms. 131

The amounts of raw materials allocated to Ford-Werke
by government officials under the Four-Year Plan
were tied to the firm's ability to expand its exports. In
1937, for example, Ford-Werke received a production
quota of 32,000 vehicles on the condition that 8,000
vehicles were exported. Some of the foreign exchange
earned from these exports was then used to purchase
raw materials from abroad to make up shortfalls in the
amounts allocated to Fo r d -We r ke by the Germ a n
government. 132 As Robert Schmidt noted in a postwar
report, "The government invented all sorts of means to
push export, both financially and otherwise," and the
automobile industry, including Ford-Werke, was one of
the first targets for these efforts. In a statement to
military investigators after the war, Heinrich Albert said
that the German government told Ford-Werke and
other companies that if they wanted to stay in business
in Germany, they must "facilitate Germany by exports
and import s." Since Fo r d -We r ke 's fo reign sales
territory was confined to areas of Europe not already 50
50 Page 51 52
25
G e r ma n I n d u s t r i a l Mo b i l i z a t i o n a n d P r e p a r a t i o n s f o r Wa r , 1 9 3 6 -1 9 3 9
1 3 3 NARA, RG 407, Entry 368B, Box 1032, Schneider Report,
Exhibit 54, Memo from Schmidt on rubber and raw material agreement, August 3, 1945 (NARA 0000156); NARA, RG 56,

Acc. 56-69A-4707, Box 81, File: Interrogations -Misc., Report on discussion with A l b e rt , September 18, 1945 (NA R A
0007154). In commenting on the need to expand exports, Erich Diestel, the Ford-Werke manager, noted, "According to
present German ideas, an enterprise in Germany is only justified to exist in so far as it submits to the general political
and economical requirements of the State." See HFM, Box 2025, File: Ford Motor Co. -Germany 1937, Board Meeting
6/ 11,1937, Diestel to Sorensen with attached agenda, May 12, 1937 (HFM 0007752).

1 3 4 NARA, RG 407, Entry 368B, Box 1032, Schneider Report,
Exhibit 60C, Perry to Albert, March 10,1937 (NARA 0000171-
0000172).

1 3 5 NARA, RG 407, Entry 368B, Box 1032, Schneider Report,
Exhibit 96, Letter to Sorensen, September 1, 1937 (NARA
0000273) and Exhibit 99A, Memo by Bussien on army truck of
the Reich War Ministry Weapons Office, June 15, 1937 (NARA
0000284; for English translations, see NARA 0000283 and
NARA 0005877-0005878).

1 3 6 NARA, RG 407, Entry 368B, Box 1032, Schneider Report,
Exhibit 96, Draft letter from Diestel to Sorensen, September 1,
1937 (NARA 0000273), Exhibit 105A, Posekel to Schmidt,
August 12,1937 (NARA 0000300; for English translations, see
NARA 0000298-0000299 and NARA 0005933-0005934),
Exhibit 101, Memo by Schmidt on command car, August 2,
1945 (NARA 0000286). In this August 2, 1945, memo,
Schmidt wrote, "From the file it is evident, that Diestel prior to
July 1st 1937 had negotiated with the army and had gone
rather far to commit Ford � much farther than we thought
possible to go."

1 3 7 NARA, RG 407, Entry 368B, Box 1032, Schneider Report,
Exhibit 114A, Schmidt to Diestel, September 2, 1937 (NARA
0000318; for English translations, see NARA 0000272 and
NARA 0005947). Diestel drafted a letter to Sorensen to report
on the "remarkable progress" made in the effort to obtain
orders from the War Ministry. But the letter was never sent. The
head of Ford's purchasing department, who was visiting from
Dearborn, agreed with Schmidt and Vitger that Dearborn should
be fully involved in the decision. To U. S. military investigators
after the war, it was obvious why Diestel's draft was not sent:
"Although mentioning the possibility that Albert or he could go
to the United States to submit details, Diestel boldly expressed
the belief that a meeting at Dearborn was unnecessary � and
suggested that he be given discretion." See Schneider Report,
p. 24, September 5, 1945 (NARA 0000026) and Exhibit 96,
draft letter from Diestel to Sorensen, September 1,1937 (NARA
0000273). In a postwar memo, Schmidt said that Albert
decided to travel to Dearborn for the discussions on account of
Diestel's "shortcomings." "The whole thing seemed far fetched
and proved that Diestel had gone too far regardless of Ford's
ideas and tradition. Now we had to try to swing the pendulum
back far enough to secure the approval of Detroit. Former
experience � the St�wer case, to name one instance � had
taught us, how difficult it was to get a consent from Dearborn."
See Schneider Report, Exhibit 101, Memo by Schmidt on
command car, August 2,1945 (NARA 0000286).

1 3 8 NARA, RG 407, Entry 368B, Box 1032, Schneider Report,
Exhibit 110A, Memo by Schmidt, September 14, 1937 (NARA
0000310; for English translations, see NARA 0000309 and
NARA 00005940-00005941), Exhibit 111A, Ford-Werke to
Army High Command, September 20,1937 (NARA 0000313;

assigned to other European Ford subsidiaries, Ford-We
r ke turned to Ford Motor Company for help.
Despite objections from Ford of Britain and Ford of
France, Ford eventually decided to open other sales
territories to competition from Ford-Werke in 1937. 133
In a letter to Albert, Perry commented on the situation,
pointing out that "The whole world-wide Fo r d
organization � has been trying to help the problems of
Ford Motor Co A/ G [Ford-Werke]; by buying and by
assisting in the disposal of Ford products into
territories which, in the ordinary course of business,
are closed to Germany." 134

The Fo u r-Year Plan's emphasis on expanding
Germany's military output also had an impact on Ford-Werke,
which was seeking to do business with the
government. The proposed merger with Stoewer-Werke
had been part of the strategy to get onto the
German War Office's list of government suppliers.
When the merger fell apart in the summer of 1936 (See
Section 3.3.), the chances of getting government work
appeared doomed, but Ford-Werke enlisted the help of

an employee who was a former army officer, and
reopened government negotiations. As a result, in the
spring of 1937, the War Ministry office asked Albert
and then-manager Erich Diestel if Ford-Werke could
build a special army truck. Following a board meeting
attended by Charles Sorensen, the War Ministry sent
prints of the truck to Ford-Werke and indicated that the
vehicle must be built near Berlin. 135 Negotiations
c o n t i nued through the summer, and gove rn m e n t
representatives toured Ford-Werke in August. Diestel
a u t h o rized a Fo r d -We r ke commitment to the
government Weapon Office to do the work and to
procure a plant in central Germany, a step that Schmidt
later characterized as premature and done without the
k n owledge of the Fo r d -We r ke board ch a i rm a n . 1 3 6
Schmidt, Vitger and a visiting Ford manager convinced
Diestel to discuss the subject in person with Dearborn
b e fo re proceeding furt h e r. Diestel was alre a dy
scheduled to go to Dearborn; Albert decided to follow
him. 137 Before the Dearborn trip, Albert, Diestel, Vitger
and Schmidt drafted a proposal for Albert to submit to
the German military. 138 The Dearborn trip was in
November. Vitger and Schmidt cabled Albert and 51
51 Page 52 53
26
R e s e a r c h F i n d i n g s Ab o u t Fo r d -We r k e U n d e r t h e Na z i R e g i m e
for English translat i o n , see NARA 0000311-0000312 and
NARA 0005942-0005943), Exhibit 112A, Memo by Diestel,
September 24, 1937 (NARA 0000317; for English translation,
see NARA 0000314). According to Schmidt, Albert had much
influence with the Army; see Schneider Report, Exhibit 2,
Memo by Schmidt on Albert, June 22,1945 (NARA 0000049).
When an interrogator wanted to clarify after the war whether
Albert had tried to "play ball" with the Nazi War Ministry, Albert
responded," But I did not say the Nazi Ministry, the Ministry of
Economics � the people were in hopes of getting rid of the
Nazi machine by the War Ministry." See NARA, Report of
Discussions with Mr. Albert on Tuesday, September 18, 1945
(NARA 0007158).

1 3 9 The cable indicated that " h e avy at t a ck s " had been launched on
Fo r d -We r ke by the RDA [ R e i ch s verband der deutsch e n
Au t o m o b i l i n d u s t ri e ], the German automotive trade
a s s o c i at i o n , and had seemingly influenced the Reich Ministry
of Economics. The at t a cks we re part of a longstanding legal
dispute (beginning in October 1932) between the RDA and
Fo r d -We r ke over Fo r d -We r ke 's right to claim that its pro d u c t s
we re Germ a n ; see NA R A , RG 407, E n t ry 368B, B ox 1032,
S chneider Report , Exhibit 117, Vi t g e r / S chmidt to
A l b e rt / D i e s t e l , N ovember 11, 1937 (NARA 0000321); Fo r d -We
r ke Records, Ford Motor Company A/ G Board of Dire c t o r s
Meeting Minu t e s , September 6, 1933 (FW 0002763-0
0 0 2 7 6 5 ) ; and FMC, A R -9 8 -2 1 3 5 4 1 , B ox 92, F i l e : M a n ag e r 's
M o n t h ly Report s , Cologne 1931-1938, M a n ag e r 's Report to
D i re c t o r s , August 1933 (FMC 0006501-0006502). See also
Section 2. 4. Po s t war U. S . m i l i t a ry inve s t i g ators re p o rted that
"This may well have been a step taken by the Germ a n
g ove rnment to press Dearborn for a favo r able decision." S e e
S chneider Report , p. 2 5 , September 5, 1945 (NA R A
0 0 0 0 0 2 7 ) .

1 4 0 NARA, RG 407, Entry 368B, Box 1032, Schneider Report,
Exhibit 119A, Report by Posekel on discussion with Zuckertort,
November 25, 1937 (NARA 0000324; for English translations,
see NARA 0000322-0000323 and NARA 0005948-0005849),
Exhibit 97, Memo on assembly of military trucks, November
2 5 , 1937 (NARA 0000278) and Exhibit 118, A l b e rt to
Sorensen, December 1, 1937 (NARA 0000321). In a postwar
memo, Schmidt wrote, "After Alberts [sic] return we were
informed that the proposal had met with approval. Ambi Budd
was to furnish engeneering [sic] help, to make a number of
part [sic], help with the lay out, and of course furnish the
complete body." See Schneider Report, Exhibit 101, Memo by
Schmidt on command car, August 2, 1945 (NARA 0000287).

1 4 1 NARA, RG 407, Entry 368B, Box 1032, Schneider Report,
Exhibit 122, Sorensen to Albert, December 2, 1937 (NARA
0000331).

1 4 2 FMC, AR-98-213541, Box 131, File: Supplemental-Excerpts
Cologne 1930s, Memo cove ring the orders from the
government, December 7, 1937 (FMC 0006549-0006552).

1 4 3 NA R A , RG 407, E n t ry 368B, B ox 1032, S chneider Report ,
Exhibit 124, A l b e rt to Wi b e l , December 23, 1937 (NA R A
0 0 0 0 3 3 3 ) . The U. S . M i l i t a r y Gove rn m e n t , noting the
telephone and cable commu n i c ations between A l b e rt and
Wibel on this subject, concluded after the war that Wi b e l 's
i nvo l vement may have been due to Sore n s e n 's ab s e n c e. S e e
S chneider Report , p. 2 7 , September 5, 1945 (NARA 0000029).

1 4 4 NA R A , RG 407, E n t ry 368B, B ox 1032, S chneider Report ,
Exhibit 127, S o rensen to A l b e rt , Ja nu a ry 5, 1 9 3 8 ;H F M ,A c c. 3 8 ,
B ox 40, F i l e : G e rm a ny 1938, S o rensen to A l b e rt , Ja nu a ry 17,
1938 (HFM 0006810). S o rensen also wrote to Sir Pe rry asking
for his help because it was now clear that A l b e rt had to go along
with the authorities on the gove rnment pro j e c t ; see HFM, A c c.
3 8 , B ox 85, F i l e : E u ropean Purchase 1938 -Group 2, S o re n s e n
to Pe rry, Ja nu a ry 14, 1938 (HFM 0006792). After Sore n s e n 's
ap p roval "in pri n c i p l e " c able was re c e i ve d , A l b e rt cabl e d
S ch m i d t , who was aboard ship en route to Dearborn ,s t ating that
" a ny attempt to make our product understood would result only
in immediate re s t riction of principle ap p rova l . . . . S u g g e s t

Diestel in Dearborn, saying that it was essential to get
the program under way because the Ministry of
Economics had advised the police not to buy Ford-We
r ke ve h i c l e s. 1 3 9 In the Dearborn discussions,
Sorensen indicated that he wanted Ford-Werke to work
with a German company that would provide technical
expertise. Albert returned to Germany and discussed
the possibility of joining forces with A m b i -B u d d
Presswerk GmbH, a Ford supplier already doing work
for the gove rn m e n t . 1 4 0 S o rensen responded that
Dearborn had no objection but wanted a definite plan
discussed because it was "not clear to us what is the
product they plan on making." However, Sorensen
wrote, Ford-Werke could count on Dearborn for help
with a program for the government. 141

By early December 1937, Ford-Werke had developed
a plan to manufacture military vehicles at a facility in
Berlin in a joint ve n t u re with A m b i -B u d d , a n d
requested Ford's approval. 142 Albert's letter and an
outline of the plan came to the attention of another
Ford executive, A. M. Wibel, and the subject of war

mat�riel arose in telephone conversations between
Wibel and Albert. Albert cabled Wibel to assure him
t h at , " G ove rnmental orders do not concern wa r
material but chassis suitable for ambulances passenger
platform van bodies [sic] these vehicles differing from
ordinary trucks only in that they are specially built for
cross country purposes. ... They will not be used for
military purposes more than any other private car or
truck requisitioned by the government in case of
war." 143 In January 1938, Sorensen told Albert that "in
principle" Dearborn had no objections, but the truck
project was complicated and the details were vague. He
wanted to discuss the plan in person with the
a u t h o ri t i e s. 1 4 4 M e a n w h i l e, while Schmidt was in
Dearborn on other matters, the truck project came up 52
52 Page 53 54
27
G e r ma n I n d u s t r i a l Mo b i l i z a t i o n a n d P r e p a r a t i o n s f o r Wa r , 1 9 3 6 -1 9 3 9
for known reasons care on your part concerning tech n i c a l
questions and to avoid generally eve rything which might
cause re s t rictions on principle ap p rova l ." See Sch n e i d e r
R e p o rt , Exhibit 132A, A l b e rt to Sch m i d t , Ja nu a ry 20, 1 9 3 8
( NARA 0000346; for English translat i o n s , see NARA 0000347
and NARA 0005961).

1 4 5 In a postwar memo, Schmidt said Sorensen's idea was to build
a military body around a standard truck chassis with slight
amendments. He sketched it and promised to convince the
German high command of his idea during his upcoming visit
[April 1938]; see NARA, RG 407, Entry 368B, Box 1032,
Schneider Report, Exhibit 101, Memo by Schmidt on command
car, August 2, 1945 (NARA 0000287-0000288). In February
1938, chief engineer Valentine Tallberg, who was working in
Cologne on assignment from Dearborn, urged Albert to tell
Sorensen that a prototype along the lines of his sketch had
already been developed; see Schneider Report, Exhibit 135A,
Tallberg to Albert, February 16, 1938 (NARA 0000354; for
English translations, see NARA 0000353 and NARA 0005965-
0005966).

1 4 6 NARA, RG 407, Entry 368B, Box 1032, Schneider Report,
Exhibit 137A, Memo by Albert on discussion with Captain
Schmiedel, February 19, 1938 (NARA 0000357; for English
translation, see NARA 0000358). In a memo to Sorensen,
Albert explained that all German manufacturers were obligated
to execute government orders. A refusal to do so would mean
forfeiting the claim of being a German company, with the
additional problem of being seen as having made the claim only
to get the advantages but refusing to shoulder the obligations;
see Schneider Report, Exhibit 107, Albert to Sorensen, February
28,1938 (NARA 0000303).

1 4 7 NARA, RG 407, Entry 368B, Box 1032, Schneider Report,
Exhibit 139A, Diestel to A l b e rt , M a r ch 4, 1938 (NA R A
0000359; for English translations, see NARA 0000361 and
NARA 0005970).

1 4 8 In the cable, Sorensen said to the recipient (Gnau): "Tell EB that
German plans are turning out very satisfactory [sic]." The
words "Mr. Edsel Ford" were handwritten across the top
margin; see HFM, Acc. 38, Box 85, File: European Purchase
1938 -Group 5, Sorensen to Dearborn, April 16, 1938 (HFM
0006808).

1 4 9 Ford-Werke Records, Lease Agreement, September 23, 1938
(FW 0004104-0004107); F M C, A R -9 8 -2 1 3 5 4 1 , B ox 131,
Office of Lord Perry report on Germany Historical Data,
September 19, 1946, hereafter Perry Report, (FMC 0000935);
FMC, AR-98-213541, Box 131, File: Supplemental-Excerpts
Cologne 1930s, Memo cove ring the orders from the
government, December 7, 1937 (FMC 0006549-0006552). A
U. S . g ove rnment official in Berlin re p o rted re c e i v i n g
confidential information that Ford of Germany (Ford-Werke)
had been given a voluntary German government contract for
3,550 trucks to be built near Berlin. Other confidential
i n fo rm ation indicated that the gove rn m e n t 's new metri c
standardization regulation, which had been aimed at Ford-Werke,
was lifted for Ford-Werke, allowing Ford-Werke to
retain its export advantage due to American standards. See
NARA, RG 151, Entry 14, Box 26, File: Foreign Service -Berlin
1938 September, Economic & Trade Notes # 46, September 10,
1938 (NARA 0004988).

1 5 0 NARA, RG 226, Microfilm M1499, Reel 263, Department of
Justice, Report on Ford-Werke AG, May 10, 1943 (NARA
0004264-0004265). In a postwar interview, Russell Roberge,
a Ford executive who handled foreign business matters, recalled
visiting the Berlin plant: "I remember attempting to visit the
plant to find out what it was doing. This was shortly before the
war started. I had a good deal of trouble in getting into the
place. When I did get in, I was not allowed to find out just what
they were doing there. We had no supervision over that
operation because apparently it was something they were
making for the German Army and it was restricted." See HFM,
Acc. 65, Box 56, File: Roberge -Draft, Reminiscences of Russell
Roberge, 1954-1955 (HFM 0005177).

1 5 1 FMC, AR-98-213541, Box 131, Perry Report, September 19,
1946 (FMC 0000935); NARA, RG 226, Microfilm M1499, Reel
263, Department of Justice, Report on Ford-Werke AG, May 10,
1943 (NARA 0004264-0004266). See also NARA, RG 407,

for discussion. Sorensen drew a rough sketch for
Schmidt to take back to Cologne. 145

In February 1938, Albert was advised by the military
that Ford-Werke was to assemble a troop carrier rather
than a truck. Details were to remain confidential and
technical information was not to be sent to the United
States. Albert decided that it was Ford-Werke's duty to
take on the project, but that the final decision could
wait until Sore n s e n 's visit. 1 4 6 Fo r d -We r ke 's board
meeting was scheduled around Sorensen's meeting
with the War Ministry. 147 On April 16, 1938, Sorensen
cabled from Berlin to Dearborn with the message that
the "German plans are turning out very satisfactory
[sic]." 148

Ford-Werke and Ambi-Budd executed an agreement
on September 23, 1938. Ford-Werke would lease
manufacturing facilities from Ambi-Budd at its plant in
B e r l i n -Johannisthal and would supply equipment,
while Ambi-Budd would supply labor and technical
support. The agreement called for the lease of 17,562
square meters (189,036 square feet) of space at the
Berlin plant until October 1941. 149 Access by American
representatives of Ford was heavily restricted, and Ford
m a n agement was not info rmed of the fa c t o ry 's
activities. 150 According to some reports, production
began with passenger cars, but with the outbreak of
war, the plant began manufacturing military vehicles,
including an SPKW [Schwerer Personenkraftwagen]
heavy personnel carrier. 151 The Berlin-Johannisthal
plant produced 1,072 troop carriers in 1940. After
making 765 SPKW vehicles during the first half of
1941, the Berlin assembly plant ceased operations on
June 7, 1941. The agreement between Ford-Werke and
Ambi-Budd expired later that year, and most of the 53
53 Page 54 55
28
R e s e a r c h F i n d i n g s A b o u t Fo r d -We r k e U n d e r t h e Na z i R e g i m e
Entry 368B, Box 1032, File: Ford-Werke AG, GED Report,
February 1946 (NARA 0001562).

1 5 2 FMC, AR-98-213541, Box 131, Perry Report, September 19,
1946 (FMC 0000935); BA-F, RW 21/ 1, War Diary, February-November
1941 (BAF 0790-0794). According to Lord Perry's
report, RM 2 million worth of tool dies were left at the Ambi-Budd
facility, and these dies were still at the Ambi-Budd facility
as of September 1946.

1 5 3 F M C, A R -9 8 -2 1 3 5 4 1 , B ox 92, F i l e : R e p o rts -Intern a l ,
Manager's Report to Directors -Third Quarter 1938, November
11, 1938 (FMC 0007780).

1 5 4 NARA, RG 56, Acc. 56-69A-4707, Box 81, File: Interrogations,
Misc., Report on Discussion with Albert, September 18, 1945
(NARA 0007156). Albert said that the German military wanted
1,500 trucks rather quickly, without saying how they would be
used. The only way Ford-Werke could comply was to get trucks
from the United States.

1 5 5 NARA, RG 260, Economics Division, I. G. Farben Control Office,
Box 24, unlabeled file, Memo on conversation with Vitger, June
11, 1945 (NARA 0006981) and Memo on conversation with
CIC (Counter Intelligence Corps) -Cologne, June 11, 1945
(NARA 0006985); FMC, AR-98-213546, Box 2, File: History of
Plant -All Aspects, 1925-1946, Vitger Report, September 24,
1946 (FMC 0001965). After the war, Schmidt recalled that in
September 1938 another deal was made with Dearborn for
shipment of up to 1,000 additional trucks to Hungary; see
NARA, RG 407, Entry 368B, Box 1032, Schneider Report,

Exhibit 158, Memo by Schmidt on import of trucks, June 26,
1945 (NARA 0000396).

1 5 6 NARA, RG 407, Entry 368B, Box 1032, Schneider Report,
Exhibit 160A, Memo from Diestel on trucks for Germany,
September 14, no year (NARA 0000400; for English
t r a n s l at i o n , see NARA 0000398-0000399), Exhibit 159,
Supplementary memo by Schmidt on trucks, August 12, 1945
(NARA 0000397).

1 5 7 BA -L , R 87/ 6205, S chmidt and A l b e rt to Reich Commissioner,
June 18, 1941 (BAL 1183; for English translat i o n , see BAL
1 2 9 3 0 ) . In the letter, A l b e rt and Schmidt attempted to make
the case for appointing either A l b e rt or Schmidt [rather than
an outsider] as the Nazi gove rn m e n t 's wa rtime tru s t e e, o r
c u s t o d i a n , for Fo r d -We r ke in the event of a possible wa r
b e t ween the United States and Germ a ny. (See Section 5. 4. fo r
m o re info rm ation on the appointment of a custodian.) In
detailing how Fo r d -We r ke had developed into a pure ly
G e rman company, t h ey took credit after the fact for pro c u ri n g
U. S . -built tru cks for the German army : " A l re a dy befo re the
war it [Fo r d -We r ke] helped the army through a bottleneck
d u ring the march into Czech o s l ovakia with large shipments
f rom ab ro a d ." After the wa r, A l b e rt said that he had not
k n own in advance how the imported tru cks we re to be used.
He told U. S .m i l i t a ry inve s t i g ators that he " felt doubl e c ro s s e d "
when he learned they we re used in Czech o s l ova k i a ; see NA R A ,
RG 56, A c c. 5 6 -6 9 A -4 7 0 7 ,B ox 81, F i l e : I n t e rro g at i o n s , M i s c. ,
R e p o rt on Discussion with A l b e rt , September 18, 1 9 4 5
( NARA 0007156).

m a ch i n e ry at the Berlin-Johannisthal plant wa s
returned to Cologne. 152

According to a Fo r d -We r ke manag e r 's re p o rt to
d i re c t o r s , Fo r d -We r ke 's business with the Germ a n
a u t h o rities " d eveloped extraordinari ly " d u ring the third
q u a rter of 1938. 1 5 3 According to A l b e rt , "the demand
could only be sat i s fied by importing a considerabl e
number of A m e rican tru ck s." 1 5 4 Fo l l owing a cabl e
e x change with Dearborn , and negotiations betwe e n
Fo r d -We r ke 's Berlin office and the gove rn m e n t

p u r chasing ag e n c y, Fo r d -We r ke placed an order with
Ford Motor Company for 1, 000 tru ck cabs and
p l at fo rm s. 1 5 5 D e l i ve ry took place between September 19
and October 20, 1 9 3 8 . The tru cks we re assembled in
Cologne and delive red to Wi rt s ch a f t l i che Fo r s ch u n g s
GmbH [Economic Research Company] for the Germ a n
g ove rnment and military. 1 5 6 The tru cks we re used in the
i nvasion and occupation of Czech o s l ova k i a , according to
A l b e rt and Sch m i d t , in a 1941 letter to the Reich
Commissioner for the Tre atment of Enemy Pro p e rt y. 1 5 7 54
54 Page 55 56
29
1 5 8 NARA, RG 56, Acc. 56-69A-4707, Box 81, File: Germany:
Industrial and Economic Development, Memo from Albert,
September 16,1945 (NARA 0007174-0007175).

1 5 9 NARA, RG 131, Entry 247, Box 171, File: General -Germany,
Reich Commissioner for Economics Decree, June 28, 1941, in
Board of Trade for German-American Commerce, Inc., News
Letter, July 31,1941 (NARA 0002471-0002472).

1 6 0 NARA, RG 407, Entry 368B, Box 1032, File: Ford-Werke AG,
GED Report, February 1946 (NARA 0001562).

1 6 1 Berenice A. Carroll, Design for Total Wa r :A rms and Economics in the
Third Reich (The Hague: Mouton, 1968), pp. 111-113.

1 6 2 For an example of reports from these offices referring to
activities at Ford-Werke, see BA-F, RW 19/ 10, Monthly Report
of the Defense Inspection Office VI, January 21, 1936 (BAF
0296-0297); and BA-F, RW 21/ 1, War Diary of the Cologne
Munitions Command, August 29,1939 (BAF 0764).

1 6 3 Carroll, Design for Total Wa r, pp. 111-121.

1 6 4 WNRC, Acc. 299-68A-0243, Box 537, Book 29-II. A-1944 (1),
Streit to Armaments Ministry, January 24,1944 (DOJ 0003484-
0003485).

1 6 5 HFM, Acc. 712, Box 9, File: Correspondence 1939 No. 1, Memo
from Roberge, July 26, 1945 (HFM 0003837-0003841).

S e c t i o n 5
F O R D -W E R K E I N T H E G E R M A N
WA R T I M E E C O N O M Y , 1 9 3 9 -1 9 4 5

5.1. Outbreak of War
With the outbreak of war in 1939, the German
government exercised much tighter control over the
activity of firms owned by neutrals. With a few
e x c e p t i o n s , commercial transactions between the
United States and Germ a ny became incre a s i n g ly
d i f fi c u l t , and Fo r d -We r ke had gre at tro u bl e
communicating with Ford Motor Company. 158 In June
1941, the United States froze all German assets in
America. In response, the Reich Commissioner of
Economics issued a general order freezing all American
p ro p e rty in Germ a ny. 1 5 9 According to a postwa r
investigation by U. S. military authorities, American
influence over the Ford-Werke plant decreased after the
o u t b reak of war in September 1939 and " c e a s e d
altogether in 1941." 160

During the Nazi military buildup, industrial factories
became subject to oversight through a system of
D e fense Inspectorates first put into operation in
1934. 161 Ford-Werke fell under the jurisdiction of the
Cologne Armaments Command of the Reich Ministry
for Rearmament and War Production, which in turn
reported to the Defense Inspector VI based in the city of
M�nster. 162 These local commands and inspectorates
reported to the army offices and Nazi government
agencies that oversaw military production contracts. 163
An Army Inspection Office was established at the Ford-Werke
facility. 164

Ford-Werke's dependence on foreign capital was a
matter of contention between the German government
and Ford-Werke during the early part of the war. 165 In
1939, Ford Motor Company owned a total of 81
percent of Ford-Werke, 75 percent directly and 6 55
55 Page 56 57
30
R e s e a r c h F i n d i n g s Ab o u t Fo r d -We r k e U n d e r t h e Na z i R e g i m e
1 6 6 HFM, Acc. 713, Box 11, File: Corporate Structure-European
Operations, Preliminary Report, February 20, 1948 (HFM
0002640-0002642); Coopers & Lybrand Records, Lybrand,
Ross Bros. & Montgomery to Henry Ford II, March 19, 1948
(CL1 0000316-0000318).

1 6 7 BA-L, R 8119F/ P3334, Secret memo, December 12,1940 (BAL
9128-9129).
1 6 8 NARA, RG 56, Acc. 56-69A-4707, Box 81, File: Germany:
Industrial and Economic Development, Memo from Albert,
September 16,1945 (NARA 0007174-0007175).

1 6 9 Coopers & Lybrand Records, Ly b r a n d , Ross Bro s. &
Montgomery to Henry Ford II, March 19,1948 (CL1 0000316-
0000318).

1 7 0 NARA, RG 56, Acc. 56-69A-4707, Box 81, File: Germany:
Industrial and Economic Development, Memo from Albert,
September 16, 1945 (NARA 0007174-0007175). In this
postwar memo, Albert discussed his strategy in persuading Ford
to increase the share of Germ a n -owned cap i t a l , w h i l e
decreasing the U. S. share. Albert reasoned that by retaining a
smaller majority share, the Americans would still be able to
maintain a firm grip on the control of Ford-Werke, while
somewhat alleviating the German animosity against foreign-owned
companies and gaining some goodwill for Ford-Werke
in Germany.

1 7 1 BA-L, R 8119F/ P3334 Letter from Vitger and Schmidt to Reic h
Economic Minister, February 4, 1941 (BAL 9150-9153).

1 7 2 WNRC, Acc. 299-68A-0243, Box 536, File W17536, Schmidt to
R e i ch Commissioner, August 31, 1942 (DOJ 0011030-
0011031; for English translation, see DOJ 0011035); BA-L, R
87/ 6205, Memo from Reich Commissioner, April 22, 1941
(BAL 1178).

1 7 3 NA R A , RG 407, E n t ry 368B, B ox 1032, S chneider Report ,
Exhibit 1A, A l b e rt , c o py to Sch m i d t , N ovember 25, 1 9 4 1
( NARA 0000047-0000048; for English translat i o n s , see NA R A
0000046-0000047 and NARA 0005816-0005817); NA R A ,
RG 56, A c c. 5 6 -6 9 A -4 7 0 7 , B ox 81, F i l e : G e rm a ny : I n d u s t ri a l
and Economic Deve l o p m e n t , Memo from A l b e rt , S e p t e m b e r
1 6 , 1945 (NARA 0007174-0007175). According to a postwa r
memo by Ford Motor Company exe c u t i ve Russell Roberg e,
A l b e rt , by mentioning these adva n t ag e s , was using " l o g i c a l
reasoning which would appear adva n t ageous to the Germ a n
g ove rn m e n t " to safeguard Ford Motor Company 's majori t y
i n t e rest in Fo r d -We r ke. See HFM A c c. 7 1 2 , B ox 9, F i l e :
C o rrespondence 1939 No. 1 , Memo from Roberg e, J u ly 26,
1945 (HFM 0003837-0003841).

1 7 4 BA-F, RW 20/ 3, Entry in War Diary, Muenster, April 22-28,
1941 (BAF 1168). After the German defeat in 1945, Allied

percent indirectly. 166 In December 1940, Ford-We r ke
e xe c u t i ves began discussing a plan to increase the
c o m p a ny 's stock cap i t a l i z at i o n . 1 6 7 I n i t i a l ly inspired by
Fo r d -We r ke 's need for capital (which A l b e rt lat e r
at t ri buted to delays by the German gove rnment in
p aying for goods and serv i c e s ) , the plan also wa s
intended to benefit Fo r d -We r ke 's position with the
G e rman gove rnment by reducing Ford Motor
C o m p a ny 's stake in the fi rm . 1 6 8 The proposal called fo r
the issuance of RM 12 million in new stock to be sold
t h rough German banks, raising Fo r d -We r ke 's total stock
c ap i t a l i z ation to RM 32 million and decreasing Fo r d 's
ownership stake in Fo r d -We r ke to 55.75 percent (52
percent direct and 3.75 percent indire c t ) . 1 6 9 Fo r d
ap p roved the plan. 1 7 0 In Feb ru a ry 1941, S chmidt and
Vitger presented the plan to the Reich Economic
M i n i s t e r. T h ey cited the pro blems encountered by Fo r d -We
r ke due to the predominance of fo reign capital and
emphasized the potential reduction of fo re i g n
ownership in the proposed re c ap i t a l i z ation plan. 1 7 1 T h e

G e rman gove rnment authorities ap p roved Fo r d 's
c o n t i nued role as majority share h o l d e r, with the
reduced share of ow n e r s h i p. The re c ap i t a l i z at i o n
p roceeded as planned and became effe c t i ve on March
2 4 , 1 9 4 1 . 1 7 2 In late November 1941, just befo re the
United States entered the wa r, A l b e rt drafted a
c o n fidential memo about the adv i s ability of a " c o m p l e t e
G e rm a n i z at i o n ," w h e reby German investors would ow n
all or most of the shares of Fo r d -We r ke. In the memo,
A l b e rt outlined how he had persuaded the Germ a n
a u t h o rities that an A m e rican majori t y, even if only a
small one, was essential for access to Fo r d 's excellent
wo r l dwide sales org a n i z ation and production methods,
and for raw mat e rials and export s. He also argued that
A m e rican majority control would enable Fo r d -We r ke to
e xercise influence over the other European Fo r d
c o m p a n i e s. A l b e rt noted that after he had discussed
these issues with the German authorities prior to Fo r d -We
r ke 's share capital re s t ru c t u ring in March , t h e
a u t h o rities had rejected " G e rm a n i z at i o n " in favor of
c o n t i nued A m e rican majority ownership of 52
p e r c e n t . 1 7 3

5.2. Robert Schmidt' s Appointment as
Wehrwirtschaftsf�hrer

On April 20, 1941, Ford-Werke co-manager Robert
S chmidt was appointed Defense Economic Leader
[Wehrwirtschaftsf�hrer] for the Cologne facility and
for Ford's subsidiaries in occupied Europe. 174 Originally
established in 1936, the Wehrwirtschaftsf�hrer were a
special group of economic leaders thro u g h o u t
Germany charged with coordinating communication 56
56 Page 57 58
31
Fo r d -We r k e i n t h e G e r ma n Wa r t i me E c o n o my, 1 9 3 9 -1 9 4 5
military officials included all those who held the position of
Wehrwirtschaftsf�hrer among those Nazi officials who were to
be arre s t e d . See NA R A , RG 260, Economics Division,
Decartelization Branch, Box 92, File: Industrialists, Leading
I n d u s t ri a l i s t s , Financiers and Economic Figures in Nazi
Germany Who May Be Subject to Prosecution Under Control
Council Law No. 10, August 1, 1946 (NARA 0002984-
0002997). See also PRO, FO 1013/ 1686, Allied Control
Authority Directive No. 24, January 12,1946 (PRO 0000001-
0000018).

1 7 5 Woolston, The Stru c t u re of the Nazi Economy, p. 51. See also D a s
Grosse Lexikon des Dritten Reiches (Beduerftig/ Zentner: Suedwest,
1985), p. 625; BA-F, RW 19/ 1835, Charter for the Organization
of the Military Economic Leader Corps, pp. 182-190, June 22,
1936 (BAF 0056-0070).

1 7 6 BA-L, R 3/ 282, Note on Discussion at Ford on April 10 and 11,
1942 (BAL 0456-0470). Present were representatives of the
Plenipotentiary for Automotive Affairs, the High Command of
the Army, the Reich Finance Ministry, the WiGruFa, the Cologne
Armaments Command, an inspector stationed at Ford-Werke,
and Faber, L�ckmann, Grandi, Balster and Sievers from Ford-Werke.

1 7 7 Lessmann, "Ford Paris im Zugriff von Ford K�ln 1943," pp.
218-219; BA-L, R 3/ 289, Advisory Council Members of the
Automotive Industry Economic Group, March 24, 1943 (BAL

0885-0887). The Automotive Industry Economic Group
(WiGruFa) was also under Speer. Robert Schmidt of Ford-Werke
was a member of the WiGruFa advisory council. The
council was headed by the "Direktor" of BMW. Members
included re p re s e n t at i ves from A m b i -B u d d , Auto Union,
Volkswagen, Adam Opel and Daimler-Benz, in addition to
Ford-Werke.

1 7 8 BA-K, All. Proz. 2/ FC 1818, Interrogation of Schaaf, September
21, 1945 (BAK 0001-0009). In November 1942, Wilhelm
Schaaf of BMW (who in 1943 also took the helm of the
WiGruFa) was appointed head of the Main Committee for
Automobiles.

1 7 9 B A -L , R 3/ 287A, Fo r d -We r ke to Main Committee fo r
Automobiles, January 5, 1943 (BAL 0441). See also PRO, FO
1078/ 52, British F. I. A. T. Report on the German Motor Vehicle
Industry (PRO 0000036).

1 8 0 PRO, FO 1078/ 52, British F. I. A. T. Report on the German Motor
Vehicle Industry (PRO 0000036); B A -L , R 3/ 289, B e r l i n
Representatives of the Motor Vehicle Main Committee, April 15,
1944 (BAL 0889). Alfons von Gusmann of Ford-Werke was on
the Main Committee.

1 8 1 BA-L, R 3101/ 9088, Board of Advisors Meeting Minutes,
November 18, 1942 (BAL 6208-6222).

between the army and the industrial facilities, especially
for strat e g i c, wa r-re l ated manu fa c t u ri n g. T h e s e
o f fi c i a l s , selected from leading bu s i n e s s m e n , we re
required to take the same oath as army officers and
were "held responsible for speeding up work not only
in their own enterp rises but in their distri c t s
generally." 175

5.3. Government Oversight of
Production

O verall planning for production at Fo r d -We r ke
during the first years of the war fell under the control
of Adolph von Schell in his role as the Plenipotentiary
for Automotive Affairs, though von Schell often worked
in close cooperation with the Automotive Industry
Economic Group [WiGruFa]. For example, von Schell
created Change Commissions that were charged with
visiting the companies and trying to assess how to
conserve scarce materials and produce more efficiently.
Such a commission visited Ford-Werke in April 1942,
and was particularly interested in Ford-Werke's three-ton-
truck production. 176

After von Schell was dismissed in 1942, t h e
functions of his office were transferred to the Reich
Ministry of Armament and War Production under the

authority of Albert Speer. 177 In line with steps taken
with other industries, Speer created a Main Committee
for Automobiles to oversee vehicle production and
s e rve as an interm e d i a ry between the automotive
i n d u s t ry and the armed fo r c e s. 1 7 8 Although the
automotive industry developed its own procedures to
standardize operations and rationalize production, the
Main Committee for Automobiles establ i s h e d
production projections for each firm and kept track of
the production numbers. 179 The Main Committee also
compiled labor statistics from reports generated by the
companies and collected information on plant capacity,
dispersal of equipment, machine tools and other related
questions. 180

The Main Committee operated through numerous
special subcommittees that planned and organized
a rmament pro g r a m s , and also we re ch a rged with
keeping raw materials use to a minimum. 181 Ford-Werke
was represented on several of these special
committees, especially in areas directly affecting the
company's manufacturing activities. These included the
Special Committee on Three-ton Trucks, the Special
Committee on Automobile Stru c t u re s , the Special
Committee on Spare Parts and several other similar
groups. Ford-Werke employees Alfons Streit and Alfons
von Gusmann led the Special Maultier [Mule]
C o m m i t t e e. 1 8 2 Also known as a " h a l f -t r a ck ," t h e 57
57 Page 58 59
32
R e s e a r c h F i n d i n g s A b o u t Fo r d -We r k e U n d e r t h e Na z i R e g i m e
1 8 2 BA-L, R 13/ 11, List of company representatives on special
committees, no date (BAL 3004-3005); BA-L, R 3/ 281, List of
Members of Sub-Committees of the Main Committee for
Automobiles (BAL 0443).

1 8 3 Reinhard Frank, Ford at Wa r. In G e rman Tru cks & Cars in Wo rld War II,
Vol. VIII. (Atglen, Pennsylvania: Schiffer Publishing, Ltd.,
1 9 9 3 ) , p p. 2 5 -3 1 . See Section 6.5. of this re p o rt fo r
information about production of M a u l t i e r s at Ford-Werke.

1 8 4 B A -L , R 2/ 30038, Memo by B�nfer on meeting, Feb ru a ry 20,
1940 (BAL 3548).

1 8 5 B A -L , R 2/ 30038, Memo on the tre atment of enemy
businesses, June 5, 1940 (BAL 3564-3566). For more general
information, see Karl Krieger, "Der Reichskommissar fuer die
Behandlung feindlichen Vermoegens," B a n k -A r c h i ve , March 15,
1940, p. 1.

1 8 6 BA-L, R 87/ 6205, Schmidt and Albert to Reich Commissioner,
June 18, 1941 (BAL 1181-1184; for English translation, see
BAL 12928-12931). In mid-December 1941, during a Nazi
government discussion about appointing custodians for enemy
property, the German Undersecretary of State expressed doubts
about appointing the managing director of Standard Oil in
Germany as the wartime custodian because he was seen as too
closely connected with the American parent company. See
WNRC, Acc. 299-68A-0243, Box 536, File: W17536, Journal
No. II by Warncke, December 15, 1941 (DOJ 0011053-
0011054; for English translation, see DOJ 0011055-0011056).
L ater that month, in a letter to Schmidt discussing the
appointment of a custodian, Albert mentioned his concern that
"a third party" might suddenly step in at Ford-Werke, a
prospect that would not be welcomed by Ford-Werke. Albert
indicated that was a real danger because such possibilities had
been discussed for German automobile companies. See NARA,
RG 407, Entry 368B, Box 1032, Schneider Report, Exhibit
191A, Albert to Schmidt, December 30, 1941 (NARA 0000455
and NARA 0000462; for English translat i o n s , see NA R A
0000451-0000453 and NARA 0005917-0005918).

1 8 7 WNRC, Acc. 299-68A-0243, Box 536, File: W17536, Report
Regarding the Administration of Ford-Werke AG, August 1,
1 9 4 5 , (DOJ 0011138; for English translat i o n , see DOJ
0011208). In an August 1945 memo, Schmidt wrote: "I had
not the slightest objection when he [Albert] proposed to let
him have priority for the custodianship of Ford Cologne. I
knew he considered Cologne as his baby grown up under his
thorough care. Small surprise that he wanted to retain the
leadership. I was not offended by his numerous efforts to
obtain the post as custodian and to me it would not have meant
any difference then if he had got it. We agreed that I would
come in question only if he failed." See NARA, RG 407, Entry
368B, Box 1032, Schneider Report, Exhibit 3, Memo by
Schmidt on relations between Albert and himself, August 13,
1945 (NARA 0000051-0000052).

war economy. Nazi officials also noted that these firms
could be ransomed back to their owners at the end of
the war. 184 However, foreign companies were not to be
"treated like domestic companies in every respect,"
especially in areas relating to special taxation, the
assignment of public contracts, the allocation of
supplies, etc. German nationals were to be appointed as
official custodians of these firms for the duration of the
war. 185

As Germ a n -A m e rican re l ations worsened duri n g
1941, Schmidt and Albert were pushing for Albert to be
appointed as custodian of Ford-Werke in the event of
war between the two countries. They broached the
subject with the Reich Commissioner for Enemy
Property in a letter written in June 1941, shortly before
the Nazi regime froze all American assets in Germany.
If a trustee should be needed, they wrote, Albert would
be the logical choice, primarily because he had been
"the moving force behind the limitation of American
i n f l u e n c e " over Fo r d -We r ke since 1934, but also
because he had been a trustee for enemy property
under the imperial government during World War I.
The letter also mentioned Schmidt as a possibl e
candidate for custodian. 186 (See Section 8.3. for a
description of a similar letter from Albert to the Reich
Commissioner one year earlier.) Albert was especially
interested in being appointed, and followed up with a
visit to the Reich Commissioner. 1 8 7 The Reich
Economic Minister and the Plenipotentiary fo r
Automotive Affairs endorsed Albert's appointment in
July 1941. But in January 1942, the head of the
Security Police and the Security Service (SD) raised

Maultier was a truck with wheels on the front end and
a track on the back end. 183

5.4. German Go vernment Custodianship of Ford-Wer ke
When the United States entered the war in
December 1941, Ford-Werke fell under the direct
authority of the Reich Commissioner for the Treatment
of Enemy Property in Berlin. Established in January
1940, this office was responsible for securing and
maintaining the assets of firms that were indirectly or
directly under majority enemy influence. At a meeting
in February 1940, government officials decided that, in
g e n e r a l , fo re i g n -owned companies we re to be
p rotected and allowed to continue manu fa c t u ri n g
operations since they could contribute to the German 58
58 Page 59 60
33
Fo r d -We r k e i n t h e G e r ma n Wa r t i me E c o n o my, 1 9 3 9 -1 9 4 5
1 8 8 WNRC, Acc. 299-68A-0243, Box 536, File: W17536, Report
Regarding the Administration of Ford-Werke AG, August 1,
1 9 4 5 , (DOJ 0011138; for English translat i o n , see DOJ
0011208. Note: The Allied military translation uses the words
"political doubts."). The SD [Sicherheitsdienst] was responsible
for the entire security of the Third Reich. It functioned as the
intelligence branch of the SS [Schutzstaffel, Elite Guard], the
political police of the Nazi regime. The SD and the Security
Police, which included the Gestapo [Geheime Sta atspolizei,
Secret State Police], were closely related and under the same
command. See Snyder, Encyclopedia of the Third Reich, pp. 317-318
and 329-330. In a postwar memo, Schmidt wrote that Albert
ran into considerable difficulty "on account of his political past.
The SS was after him especially when they detected that he had
helped Czechoslowakian [sic] Jews to save some of their
p ro p e rt y." See NA R A , RG 407, E n t ry 368B, B ox 1032,
Schneider Report, Exhibit 2, Memo by Schmidt on Albert, June
22, 1945. Schmidt said in a later oral history interview that
Albert's political influence gradually declined as the Nazis'
power grew. See HFM, Acc. 880, Box 7, File: Germany,
Interview with Robert Schmidt No. 2, July 22, 1960 (HFM
0000907). Albert was arrested in September 1944 and held by
the Gestapo for six months because the Nazis suspected him of
having known about or having participated in an attack on
Hitler on July 20,1944. In a postwar interview, Albert said that
when he was arrested regarding the plot, he also was accused
of violating the racial decrees against Jews because so many of
his friends were Jewish. See NARA, RG 56, Acc. 56-69A-4707,
Box 81, File: Interrogations, Misc. Report of Discussions with
Albert, September 18,1945 (NARA 0007161); HFM, Acc. 880,
Box 7, File: Germany, Notes on Interview with Heinrich Albert,
July 26, 1960 (HFM 0000880); WNRC, Acc. 299-68A-0243,
Box 540, File: 96/ 4, Memo from Albert, July 16, 1945 (DOJ
0010430); and Snyder, Encyclopedia of the Third Reich, pp. 184-186.
See Section 2.4. for more on Albert's background.

1 8 9 WNRC, Acc. 299-68A-0243, Box 536, File: W17536, Regional
Economic A dvisor to Lammers, Feb ru a ry 7, 1942 (DOJ
0 0 1 1 0 4 3 -0 0 1 1 0 4 4 ; for English translat i o n , see 0011045-
0011046). The letter said that Schmidt "being a party member,
enjoys my confidence � In my opinion, these powers can be
conferred on Mr. Schmidt." (After the war, Schmidt was cleared
of the allegation that he was a party member. See Section 10.7.)
The letter concluded, "In the interest of the Germ a n
s t o ck h o l d e r s , as well as to ensure undisturbed furt h e r
development of this works which may already be regarded as

German, I must emphatically refuse to have an outsider, who
might well have his eye on other interests, put in there as
custodian." The Nazi party Chancellery forwarded this letter to
the Reich Commissioner for the Treatment of Enemy Property
and asked if he agreed that "in view of the German character of
these Works, the appointment of a special [outside] custodian is
superfluous." See same source, NSDAP Chancellery to Reich
Commissioner, February 13, 1942 (DOJ 0011047; for English
translation, see DOJ 0011048).

1 9 0 BA-L, R 87/ 6205, Unsigned memo, March 30, 1942 (BAL
1228); WNRC, Acc. 299-68A-0243, Box 536, File: W17536,
Report Regarding the Administration of Ford-Werke AG, August
1, 1945, (DOJ 0011138-0011139; for English translation, see
DOJ 0011208).

1 9 1 BA-L, R 87/ 6205, Notarized declaration by Schmidt, May 15,
1942 (BAL 6707). In an August 1945 memo, Schmidt wrote
that his selection over Albert did not cause a breach between the
two: "When I was appointed, and as he told me, he was really
offended and angry, not because I had got the job but he felt
denounced by the government. As it turned out � he
overcame his bother and things went quite smoothly.
Concluding I might be permitted to say that our cooperation
was extremly [sic] good and I am sure he would state the
same." See NARA, RG 407, Entry 368B, Box 1032, Schneider
Report, Exhibit 3, Memo by Schmidt on relations between
Albert and himself, August 13, 1945 (NARA 0000051).

1 9 2 Fo r d -We r ke Records, Resolution of the Superior Court -Cologne,
May 15,1942 (FW 0008375); for English translation,
see FMC, AR 75-63-430, Box 207, File: Germany AG Minutes of
Meetings 1929-1952 (FMC 0003361); WNRC, Acc. 299-68A-0
2 4 3 , B ox 536, F i l e : W 1 7 5 3 6 , R e p o rt Regarding the
A d m i n i s t r ation of Fo r d -We r ke AG, August 1, 1945 (DOJ
0011139; for English translation, see DOJ 0011208).

1 9 3 B A -L , R 87/ 6205, N o t a rized declaration by Sch m i d t ,M ay 15,
1942 (BAL 6707).

and the SD did not object. 190 On May 9, 1942, the
Reich Commissioner requested that the plant be put
into trusteeship and authorized the appointment of
S chmidt as custodian. 1 9 1 On May 15, 1 9 4 2 , t h e
Superior Court in Cologne declared Ford-Werke to be
an "enterprise under authoritative enemy influence"
and appointed Schmidt as custodian. 1 9 2 He wa s
required to submit reports to the Reich Commissioner
every three months and had to seek approval for such
decisions as planned profit margins and bookkeeping
practices. 193 Nazi government regulations also required
that Ford-Werke management obtain permission from
the Reich Commissioner before deciding to:

� p u r ch a s e, dispose of or mort g age any real estate or
similar pro p e rt y ;
� p u r chase or dispose of any interest in other
enterprises;

political objections [politische Bedenken]. 188 In a letter
to the Nazi party leadership in February 1942, the
p a rt y 's regional economic adviser re c o m m e n d e d
S ch m i d t , explaining that in light of the Germ a n
character of Fo r d -We r ke and his " c o n fi d e n c e " i n
S ch m i d t , it was unnecessary to name an outside
custodian. 189 By March 1942, it was apparent that
Albert had been passed over in favor of Schmidt: The
Reich Economic Ministry now had strong objections
[starke Bedenken] to Albert's appointment. However,
he approved of Schmidt, and so did the Plenipotentiary
for Automotive Affairs. The head of the Security Police 59
59 Page 60 61
34
� begin or end any product lines or types of
bu s i n e s s ;
� e s t ablish or dissolve branch e s ;
� build or extensive ly remodel any fa c i l i t i e s ;
� change the company stat u t e s ; or
� s e l l , l i q u i d ate or close any part of the enterp ri s e. 1 9 4

Schmidt was forbidden to have any contact with
"enemy stockholders or their intermediaries" without
the express permission of the Reich Commissioner. 195

Also on May 15, 1942, the Ford-Werke Board of

Directors was relieved of its duties and replaced by a
board of advisors whose duty it was to assist the
custodian in the administration of the company. 196 In
b rief messages to Schmidt and A l b e rt , the Reich
Commissioner for the Treatment of Enemy Property
indicated that his choice for chairman of this new body
was Albert. 197 Albert accepted and recommended that
the three other Germans who had been members of the
board of directors � Carl Krauch, Hans H�nemeyer and
Wilhelm B�tzkes � be appointed to the new board of
advisors. 198

R e s e a r c h F i n d i n g s Ab o u t Fo r d -We r k e U n d e r t h e Na z i R e g i m e

1 9 4 Fo r d -We r ke Records, Resolution of the Superior Court -Cologne,
May 15,1942 (FW 0008375); for English translation,
see FMC, AR 75-63-430, Box 207, File: Germany AG Minutes of
Meetings 1929-1952 (FMC 0003361); WNRC, Acc. 299-68A-0
2 4 3 , B ox 536, F i l e : W 1 7 5 3 6 , R e p o rt Regarding the
A d m i n i s t r ation of Fo r d -We r ke AG, August 1, 1945 (DOJ
0011139; for English translation, see DOJ 0011209). See also
NARA, RG 407, Entry 368B, Box 1032, Schneider Report,
Exhibit 196, Memo by Schmidt on custodianship, J u n e
25,1945 (NARA 0000464).

1 9 5 WNRC, Acc. 299-68A-0243, Box 536, File W17536, Letter to
Schmidt, May 23,1942 (DOJ 0011040; for English translation,
see DOJ 0011042).

1 9 6 F M C, A R -7 5 -6 2 -6 1 6 , B ox 79, Custodian Report (FMC
0001017).

1 9 7 BA-L, R 87/ 6205, Memos to Schmidt and Albert from Reich
Commissioner, May 9, 1942 (BAL 1246); WNRC, Acc. 299-
68A-0243, Box 536, File: W17536, Report Regarding the
A d m i n i s t r ation of Fo r d -We r ke AG, August 1, 1945 (DOJ
0011139; for English translation, see DOJ 0011208).

1 9 8 BA-L, R 87/ 6205, Letter from Albert to Reich Commissioner,
May 14, 1942 (BAL 1247-1248). 60
60 Page 61 62
35
1 9 9 NARA, RG 407, Entry 368B, Box 1032, File: Ford-Werke AG,
GED Report, February 1946 (NARA 0001562), Schneider
Report, p. 22, September 5,1945 (NARA 0000024).

2 0 0 Estimates on the total number of vehicles produced at Ford-Werke
during the war vary. The most authoritative sources
indicate that wartime vehicle production levels were between
87,000 and 92,000; see FMC, AR-98-213541, Box 131, Perry
Report, September 19, 1946 (FMC 0000917-0000918); and
FMC, AR-98-213541, Box 40, File: Ford of Europe Chronology,
Information on Ford-Werke AG, circa 1986 (FMC 0005940).

2 0 1 According to postwar investigations conducted by the U. S.
Strategic Bombing Sur vey, total production of three-ton trucks
and half-track trucks by all manufacturers in Germany during
the war amounted to just over 250,000 vehicles. See U. S.
Strategic Bombing Survey, Munitions Division, G e r man Motor
Vehicl es Industry Report , B ritish Intelligence Objective s
Subcommittee (hereafter B. I. O. S.) Misc. Report No. 69, Exhibits
C and D (FMC 0006013-0006015).

2 0 2 NARA, RG 260, Entry 108, Box 183, File: Adam Opel, German
Economic Report on Adam Opel, August 1945; NARA, RG 243,
E n t ry 6, B ox 684, F i l e : 7 7 a 2 , Automobile Manu fa c t u re r s
Planned and Actual Pro d u c t i o n , 1943 and 1944 (NA R A
00003658-0003659).

2 0 3 FMC, AR-98-213546, Box 2, File: History of Plant -All Aspects,
1 9 2 5 -1 9 4 6 , Vitger Report , September 24, 1946 (FMC
0001995). Regarding Hungarian and Romanian sales, see BA-L
, R 3101/ 3561, Memo to Reich Economic Ministry,
September 27, 1939 (BAL 0005); regarding sales to the SS, see
R 13 IV Wirtschaftsgruppe Fahrzeugindustrie/ 21, Memo to
Automotive Industry Economic Group, October 9, 1941 (BAL
2989). Originally established as Hitler's personal guard, the SS
expanded to become a major branch of the German military
during the war; see Snyder, Encyclopedia of the Third Reich, p. 329.

S e c t i o n 6
M I L I T A R Y P R O D U C T I O N
A T F O R D -W E R K E

use by German military forces and provided repair and
overhaul services. From September 1939 until the
beginning of March 1945, when Cologne wa s
occupied by Allied tro o p s , Fo r d -We r ke pro d u c e d
between 87,000 and 92,000 vehicles, including trucks
and passenger cars. 200 Ford-Werke's output represented
about one-third of Germ a ny 's military tru ck
production during the war. 201 Other major truck
manufacturers included Opel, which produced about
92,000 three-ton trucks between 1940 and 1944, as
well as Daimler-Benz, Kl�ckner and Borgward. 202

Most of Ford-Werke's military production was sent
to the German army, although the plant also supplied
vehicles to SS [Schutzstaffel, Elite Guard] units and to
the Romanian and Hungarian governments. 203 The
following table summarizes the range of Ford-Werke

6.1. Production Overvie w
At the outbreak of the war, Ford-Werke was one of
the four largest automobile firms in Germany and
manufactured a variety of cars, vans, trucks, tractors
and other vehicles. It ranked fourth in passenger car
sales and second in commercial vehicle sales, and was
the second largest producer of trucks in Germany
behind the General Motors subsidiary Opel. 199 In
addition to a limited number of passenger cars, Ford-Werke
produced two different military vehicles during
the war: a standard three-ton truck (which came in
several models) and the Maultier half-track personnel
carrier. Ford-Werke also manufactured spare parts for 61
61 Page 62 63
36
production figures from September 1939 through early
March 1945, and provides estimated totals.

6.2. Start of Tr uck Production, 1939
Early in 1939, the German army asked Ford-Werke
to prepare plans to produce 2,500 trucks per month in
case of war. 204 In September 1939, with the outbreak of
World War II, there was a gradual conversion from

R e s e a r c h F i n d i n g s A b o u t Fo r d -We r k e U n d e r t h e Na z i R e g i m e
2 0 4 NARA, RG 407, Entry 368B, Box 1032, Schneider Report,
Exhibit 204, S chmidt to Pe rry, M ay 28, 1945 (NA R A
0000477). In an earlier letter to Sorensen, Albert wrote, "In
this country it would not do to counter-act governmental
requests. They are less requests than orders." See HFM, Acc. 38,
File: Germany -Cologne -List E, Albert to Sorensen, August 5,
1935.

2 0 5 FMC, AR-75-63-430, Box 90, File: Ford-Werke Annual Reports
1938-1939, Business Report for 1939 (FMC 0017062); see
also FMC, AR-98-213541, Box 40, File: Ford of Europe
Chronology, Information on Ford-Werke AG, circa 1986 (FMC
0005940).

2 0 6 BA-F, RW 21/ 1, War Diary, September 25-October 7, 1939
(BAF 0767-0789).
2 0 7 BA-L, R 3101/ 3446, Monthly report on export situation,
October 1939, November 22, 1939 (BAL 0419); BA-L, R
3101/ 3446, Monthly report on export situation December
1939, January 19, 1940 (BAL 0423-0424).

2 0 8 FMC, AR-98-213541, Box 131, Perry Report, September 19,
1946 (FMC 0000917); FMC, AR-98-213541, Box 40, File:
Ford of Europe Chronology, Information on Ford-Werke AG,
circa 1986 (FMC 0005940).

2 0 9 F M C, A R -6 5 -1 5 0 0 , B ox 6, F i l e : G e rm a ny 1939-1945
( S o re n s e n ) , S chmidt to Sore n s e n , A p ril 4, 1940 (FMC
0003155-0003157) and Albert to Sorensen, February 2, 1939
(FMC 0003177-0003178); H F M , A c c. 3 8 , B ox 40, F i l e :
Germany Jul-Dec 1938, Albert to Sorensen, December 15,
1938 (HFM 0000294).

Ford-Wer ke Wartime Production
1939-1945

Sources:
FMC, AR-98-213541, Box 131, Perry Report, September 19, 1946 (FMC
0000917-0000918) and Box 40, F i l e : Ford of Europe Chronology,
Information on Ford-Werke AG, circa 1986 (FMC 0005940); Ford-Werke
Records, Summary of Ford Germany Production, February 9, 1978 (FW
0003910). Estimated figures are prorated from full-year totals � 33,928
(FMC 0000917) and 35,364 (FMC 0005940 and FW 0003910) for
1939 and 2,846 (FMC 0005940 and FW 0003910) for 1945. See also
WNRC, Acc. 299-68A-0243, Box 536, File W17536, Report Regarding the
Administration of Ford-Werke AG, August 1, 1945, (DOJ 0011133-
0011152; for English translation, see DOJ 0011204-0011217); Ford-Werke
Records, Financial Ledger, January 1942� September 1944 (FW 0007011-
0007890); and NARA, RG 243, Entry 6, Box 684, File: 77a2, Automobile
Manufacturers Planned and Actual Production, 1944 (NARA 0003659).

Year Number of Vehicles
1939 Sep 1-Dec 31 11,309 est. � 11,788 est.
1940 16,537 � 17,557
1941 14,330 � 16,243
1942 14,762 � 14,992
1943 17,202 � 17,472
1944 12,915 � 13,015
1945 Jan 1-Mar 6 170 � 507 est.
Total 87,225 � 91,574
Additional production: � In 1942, Fo r d -We rke produced RM 45,000,000 wo rth of spare part s.

� In 1943, Fo r d -We rke produced 3, 551 G28TG motors. Also in
1 9 4 3 ,a p p r ox i m at e ly 40 percent of the plant's output was devoted to
s p a re parts production.

p roduction of passenger cars to military tru ck s. 2 0 5
Consequently, there was an initial slowdown in plant
operations, and Ford-Werke released more than 600
personnel for use by other industrial facilities in the
Cologne area. 206 In October 1939, however, Ford-Werke
received a large order for several hundred trucks
from the German government. And in December, the
company received an order for 1,000 trucks from the
Romanian War Ministry. 2 0 7 In total, Fo r d -We r ke
produced approximately 34,000 to 35,400 vehicles
d u ring 1939, including both passenger cars and
trucks. 208

6.3. 1940 Production
As had been the case since the late 1930s, every
automobile manufacturer in Germany was told what
models to produce in 1940. 209 In February 1940, the
Plenipotentiary for Automotive Affairs, acting on behalf
of the army, announced plans to requisition 4,100
vehicles slated for export, including 1,830 produced by
Fo r d -We r ke, although the gove rnment authori t i e s
promised that the companies would be reallocated raw 62
62 Page 63 64
37
Mi l i t a r y P r o d u c t i o n a t Fo r d -We rk e
2 1 0 BA-L, R 3101/ 3556, Plenipotentiary for Automotive Affairs to
WiGruFa and Reich Economic Ministry, February 17, 1940
(BAL 0121); BA-L, R 3101/ 3556 Unsigned memo, February
12, 1940 (BAL 0122-0123 ). In March 1940, 400 Ford
vehicles originally slated for export were conscripted by the
plenipotentiary on behalf of the army.

2 1 1 FMC, AR-98-213541, Box 131, Perry Report, September 19,
1946 (FMC 0000935).
2 1 2 WNRC, Acc. 299-68A-0243, Box 536, File: W17536, Report
Regarding the Administration of Ford-Werke AG, August 1,
1 9 4 5 , (DOJ 0011149; for English translat i o n , see DOJ
0011215).

2 1 3 FMC, AR-98-213541, Box 131, Perry Report, September 19,
1946 (FMC 0000917); NARA, RG 407, Entry 368B, Box 1032,
File: Ford-Werke AG, GED Report, February 1946 (NARA
0001565).

2 1 4 BA-L, R 3101/ 3561, Memo to Reich Economic Ministry,
September 27, 1939 (BAL 0005); BA-L, R 3101/ 3556, Ford-Werke
to WiGruFa, May 6, 1940 (BAL 0114).

2 1 5 BA-L, R 3101/ 3554, Reich Economic Ministry to von Schell
(BAL 0436).

2 1 6 FMC, AR-98-213541, Box 131, Perry Report, September 19,
1946 (FMC 0000917); FMC, AR-98-213541, Box 40, File: Ford
of Europe Chronology, Information on Ford-Werke AG, circa
1986 (FMC 0005940); Ford-Werke Records, Summary of Ford
of Germany Production 1926-1977, February 9, 1978 (FW
0003910).

2 1 7 NARA, RG 407, Entry 368B, Box 1032, Schneider Report,
Exhibit 178, Memo from Grandi, August 27, 1945 (NARA
0000431).

2 1 8 NARA, RG 407, Entry 368B, Box 1032, Schneider Report,
Exhibit 172, Memo by Schmidt on L. C. 8 motors, July 20,1945
(NARA 0000418); NARA, RG 319, Entry 47C, Box 483, File:
350.05, Military Attach� Report No. 59, September 25, 1940
(NARA 0005677).

2 1 9 F ra n k f u rter Zeitung, N o. 1 -2 , p. 6 , Ja nu a ry 1, 1 9 4 1 . T h e
a dve rtisement also said: " G e rman Ford vehicles we re the
dependable servants of the brave soldier. Also for the peace-time
build-up for the Greater Germany, we will be there."

2 2 0 F M C, A R -7 5 -6 3 -3 0 1 , B ox 32, F i l e : Fo r d -We r ke Sales,
P roduction & A s s e m bly 1945-1953, P roduction for Civil
Purposes, 1945 (FMC 0000029). Other documents indicate
that 41 cars were actually manufactured in 1942; see Ford-Werke
Records, Summary of Ford of Germany Production
1926-1977, February 9, 1978 (FW 0003910).

materials needed to make up this output. 210 Although
the Ford-Werke facility continued to manufacture some
passenger cars during the year to use up available parts,
the production of new cars was prohibited by the Nazi
regime, and the plant increasingly switched over to
military truck production. 211 The change to production
of larger military vehicles decreased the number of
vehicles the plant could sell. 212 The company's initial
production goal was set at 1,300 trucks per month,
although in September the plant was only operating at
approximately 50 percent capacity. 213 The company
e x p o rted some cars to Hungary, although ru bb e r
shortages forced delivery of the vehicles without tires.
In May 1940, the company applied for additional steel
allocations to build 400 trucks for the Hungarian
a rmy. 2 1 4 Fo r d -We r ke also supplied tru cks to the
Romanian armed fo r c e s. 2 1 5 According to postwa r
reports, total production for the year amounted to
approximately 16,500 to 17,500 vehicles, including
approximately 4,750 to 4,850 passenger cars. 216

The Cologne plant produced parts for other types of
machinery and transport. In early 1940, the company

began work on a contract with the Junkers aircraft firm
in Magdeburg to produce gears to be used in the
transmission systems of machine tools. 217 Also in 1940,
Ford-Werke entered into a contract with the German air
force to manufacture motors for barges. Ford-Werke
brought the matter of the contract before the local
Economic Group, and material and labor were assigned.
According to a postwar interview with Robert Schmidt,
Hermann G�ring planned to use the barge motors for
the invasion of England, an initiative for which G�ring
had assumed responsibility. A September 1940 U. S.
military intelligence report indicated that Ford-Werke
was employed full time in the production of "motors
with long driving shats [sic] for use on barges." Over
the next few years, Ford-Werke delivered approximately
1,000 such motors. 218 (See Section 7.2.)

6 . 4 . 1941 Pr oduct i on
On January 1, 1941, a Ford-Werke advertisement
was published in the F ra n k f u rter Zeitung [ F r a n k f u rt
Newspaper] proclaiming that German Ford vehicles
we re present during German army campaigns in
Poland, Norway, Holland, Belgium and France. 219 In
Feb ru a ry 1941, Fo r d -We r ke manu fa c t u red its last
Taunus passenger car, and all remaining production at
the plant for the duration of the war was limited to
m i l i t a ry ve h i c l e s. 2 2 0 Fo r d -We r ke continued to
m a nu fa c t u re three-ton tru cks in 1941, a l t h o u g h
production was hindered as increasing numbers of
company personnel were drafted into the German 63
63 Page 64 65
38
R e s e a r c h F i n d i n g s Ab o u t Fo r d -We r k e U n d e r t h e Na z i R e g i m e
2 2 1 FMC, AR-98-213541, Box 131, Perry Report, September 19,
1946 (FMC 0000935).
2 2 2 BA-L, R 3901/ 195, Report of bombing impact on labor
distribution, Cologne Labor Office, August 15, 1941 (BAL
0622-0645).

2 2 3 BA-L, R 13 IV Wirtschaftsgruppe Fahrzeugindustrie/ 21, Memo
from Army High Command, May 26, 1941 (BAL 2984-2988)
and Memo to Automotive Industry Economic Group, October
9, 1941 (BAL 2989). The Waffen-SS [Armed SS] was the
military arm and the largest of the main branches of the SS; see
Snyder, Encyclopedia of the Third Reich, p. 366.

2 2 4 BA-L, R 3101/ 3449, Monthly report on export situation June
1941, July 19, 1941 (BAL 0488).
2 2 5 Postwar documents report either 14,330 vehicles (see FMC, AR-98-
213541, Box 131, Perry Report, September 19, 1946 [FMC
0000917]), or 16,243 vehicles (see Ford-Werke Records,
Summary of Ford of Germany Production 1926-1977, February
9,1978 [FW 0003910]).

2 2 6 WNRC, Acc. 299-68A-0243, Box 536, File: W17536, Advisory
Board Meeting Minutes, August 17, 1942 (DOJ 0011160-
0011161; for English translation, see DOJ 0011167), Report
Regarding the Administration of Ford-Werke AG, August 1,
1 9 4 5 , (DOJ 0011149; for English translat i o n s , see DOJ
0011179 and DOJ 0011215).

2 2 7 WNRC, Acc. 299-68A-0243, Box 536, File W-17536, Schmidt
to Reich Commissioner, July 24, 1942 (DOJ 0011015; for
English translation, see DOJ 0011016).

2 2 8 WNRC, Acc. 299-68A-0243, Box 536, File W17536, Ford-Werke
to Regierungspraesident Cologne, December 16, 1942
(DOJ 0011023; for English translation, see DOJ 0011234).

2 2 9 Ford-Werke Records, Memo on meeting with Plenipotentiary
for Automotive Affairs, February 20, 1942 (FW 0001792-
0001795), Report on meeting with representatives of the
automobile industry, June 6,1942 (FW 0001927-0001930).

2 3 0 WNRC, Acc. 299-68A-0243, Box 536, File: W17536, Report
Regarding the Administration of Ford-Werke AG, August 1,
1945 (DOJ 0011149-0011150; for English translation, see DOJ
0011215-0011216).

2 3 1 Sources provide varying Maultier production figures for 1942.
Ford-Werke management, discussing production, reported that
the company delivered 755 Maultiers in December 1942; see
B A -L , R 3/ 287a, Fo r d -We r ke to Main Committee fo r
Automobiles, January 5, 1943 (BAL 0441). After the war,
Schmidt's recollection was that Ford-Werke had not begun
Maultier production until January 1943, when 500 "halftracks"
were produced; see NARA, RG 407, Entry 368B, Box 1032,
Schneider Report, Exhibit 91, Memo by Schmidt on halftracks,
July 10, 1945 (NARA 0000266). Minutes of a Ford-Werke
Board of Advisors meeting mention the production line for
Mules and their limitations in the field. The minutes indicate
that the German automotive industry's Special Committee on
Maultiers (of which Alfons Streit was chairman) had produced
2,500 of the vehicles by December 31, 1942; see WNRC, Acc.
2 9 9 -6 8 A -0 2 4 3 , B ox 536, File W 1 7 5 3 6 , A dv i s o ry Board
Meeting Minutes, January 13, 1943 (DOJ 0011115-0011116;
for English translations, see DOJ 0011129 and DOJ 0011220).
See also Section 5.3.

end of the year, Ford-Werke officials reported that the
plant was "working wholly for the war economy" in
the production of trucks and spare parts. 228 In February
1 9 4 2 , the Plenipotentiary for Au t o m o t i ve A f fa i r s
ordered steps to streamline three-ton-truck production
in Germany since five different companies, including
Fo r d -We r ke, we re manu fa c t u ring the ve h i c l e s.
However, at a later meeting of automotive industry
leaders, representatives from Ford-Werke, Opel and
D a i m l e r-Benz ag reed that industry -w i d e
standardization was not possible and that Ford-Werke
should continue using its own production methods. 229

In mid-1942, as a war-induced gasoline shortage
worsened, a German decree demanded that Ford-Werke
switch its production line to make four-cylinder trucks
with generators rather than eight-cylinder vehicles with
gasoline engines. However, this order was rescinded in
the autumn, and the Cologne plant again began
m a nu fa c t u ring the eight-cylinder gasoline-powe re d
models. 230 In the last quarter of 1942, Ford-Werke also
began production of Maultier half-track vehicles. 231
According to Ford-Werke internal financial documents,

military. 221 Also, plant operations were halted briefly
after a series of British air raids on Cologne in August
1941. 222 According to iron and steel rationing reports
prepared by the German government, in May 1941
Ford-Werke entered a new contract with the German
military. In October 1941, the company received a
contract to produce 600 trucks for the Waffen-SS. 223
Ford-Werke exported trucks to Romania, Hungary and
Slovakia. 224 Reports on total production for the year
range from 14,330 to 16,243 vehicles. 225 Production of
spare parts was a significant part of the business.
During 1941 and 1942, Ford-Werke switched from
obtaining its supplies from outside producers to
obtaining them larg e ly from Ford subsidiaries in
Amsterdam, Antwerp and, to a limited extent, Paris. 226

6.5. 1942 Production
S h o rt ly after the Reich Commissioner for the
Treatment of Enemy Property assumed custodianship of
Ford-Werke in May 1942, Robert Schmidt noted that
the firm's industrial activity was "under the influence
and control" of the Plenipotentiary for Automotive
Affairs and the Speer armaments ministry. 227 And by the 64
64 Page 65 66
39
Mi l i t a r y P r o d u c t i o n a t Fo r d -We rk e
2 3 2 See Fo r d -We r ke Records, Financial Ledger, Ja nu a ry 1942-
September 1944 (FW 0007011-0007890). Another postwar
report indicates Ford-Werke's 1942 production was 14,992
ve h i c l e s ; see Fo r d -We r ke Records, S u m m a ry of Ford of
G e rm a ny Production 1926-1977, Feb ru a ry 9, 1978 (FW
0003910). The figure of 16,000 vehicles is reported in WNRC,
Acc. 299-68A-0243, Box 536, File: W17536, Report Regarding
the Administration of Ford-Werke AG, August 1, 1945 (DOJ
0011150; for English translation, see DOJ 0011216).

2 3 3 NARA, RG 407, Entry 368B, Box 1032, File: Ford-Werke AG,
GED Report, February 1946 (NARA 0001566).

2 3 4 WNRC, Acc. 299-68A-0243, Box 536, File: W17536, Report
Regarding the Administration of Ford-Werke AG, August 1,
1945 (DOJ 0011150; for English translat i o n , see DOJ
0011216).

2 3 5 I n t e rnal Fo r d -We r ke records re p o rt 16, 236 ve h i c l e s ; s e e
Financial Ledger, Ja nu a ry 1942-September 1944 (FW
0007011-0007890). Postwar reports range from 17,202
vehicles in FMC, AR-98-213541, Box 131, Perry Report,
September 19, 1946 (FMC 0000918) to 17,472 vehicles in
FMC, AR-98-213541, Box 40, File: Ford of Europe Chronology,
Information on Ford-Werke AG, circa 1986 (FMC 0005940).

2 3 6 NARA, RG 407, Entry 368B, Box 1032, File: Ford-Werke AG,
GED Report, February 1946 (NARA 0001562).
2 3 7 FMC, AR-98-213541, Box 131, Perry Report, September 19,
1946 (FMC 0000918-0000919).

2 3 8 NARA, RG 243, Entry 6, Box 684, File: 77a2, Automobile
Manufacturers Planned and Actual Production, 1943 (NARA
0003658).

2 3 9 WNRC, Acc. 299-68A-0243, Box 536, File W17536, Advisory
Board Meeting Minutes, July 1, 1943 (DOJ 0011103; for
English translation, see DOJ 0011230). The board minutes
indicate that one-third of Ford-Werke production was changed
over to Maultier vehicles.

2 4 0 Ford-Werke Records, Memo on G28TG motors, October 29,
1943 (FW 0001424).
2 4 1 WNRC, Acc. 299-68A-0243, Box 536, File W17536, Advisory
Board Meeting Minutes, January 13, 1943 (DOJ 0011114; for
English translation, see DOJ 0011219).

average monthly production at the facility was 1,230
vehicles, with total 1942 production amounting to
14,762. Other reports indicated that the company
manufactured approximately 16,000 vehicles during
1 9 4 2 . 2 3 2 A postwar military gove rnment re p o rt
estimated that Ford-Werke produced about 35 percent
of the total German medium-truck output during
1942. 233 In addition, Ford-Werke produced RM 45
million wo rth of spare parts during the ye a r,
representing about one-third of the plant's output. 234

6.6. 1943 Production
Ford-Werke's production of military vehicles peaked
in 1943. According to internal financial documents,
the plant produced an average of 1,350 trucks and
Maultiers per month during the year. In May 1943,
Ford-Werke manufactured 1,738 vehicles, its highest
m o n t h ly total during the wa r. R e p o rts on total
production for the year range between about 16,200
and 17,500 vehicles. 235 In March 1943, Schmidt was
d e l e g ated by the Speer armaments ministry to
"coordinate the production of all Ford vehicles for the
whole of Axis Euro p e." 2 3 6 This effo rt included
streamlining vehicle manufacturing operations at Ford
subsidiaries in occupied France, Belgium and Holland.
S chmidt also established a fo u n d ry near Li�ge in
Belgium to make spare part s. 2 3 7 The monthly
production schedules set by German authorities for all
Ford subsidiaries, including Ford-Werke and the plants
in the occupied territories, increased steadily during
the year and in December reached a high point of
2,950 three-ton trucks and 1,000 Maultiers. However,
actual monthly production levels from the combined

Ford facilities in Europe generally were between 30
percent and 50 percent lower than the schedules set by
the German authorities, with the total for the year
falling 32 percent below the targets. 238 Although Ford-Werke
met its production goals during the first quarter
of 1943, by the middle of the year, the advisory board
reported "mounting difficulties" in obtaining materials
from suppliers and in the use of labor at Ford-Werke.
Another factor was the production switch to include
Maultiers. But the chief reasons for the production
problem were the "effects of enemy action," which had
been on the incre a s e, s i g n i fi c a n t ly impacting the
capacity of subcontractors and undermining worker
morale. 239

In addition to vehicles, Ford-Werke carried out other
military production and repair operations during 1943.
The Cologne plant manu fa c t u red 3, 551 motors
between January and September 1943. 240 According to
minutes from the January 1943 meeting of the Ford-We
r ke Board of A dv i s o r s , the company ove r s aw
operations at a repair facility in Athens. 241 And in July
1943, Schmidt reported that because of the German
army's continuing repair problems with Ford-Werke
engines, the company would "organize the repair"
itself and, if necessary, replace the damaged engines 65
65 Page 66 67
40
R e s e a r c h F i n d i n g s Ab o u t Fo r d -We r k e U n d e r t h e Na z i R e g i m e
2 4 2 WNRC, Acc. 299-68A-0243, Box 536, File W17536, Advisory
Board Meeting Minutes, July 1, 1943 (DOJ 0011103; for
English translation, see DOJ 0011230). In a postwar report,
Schmidt indicated that in 1944 one Ford-Werke engineer had
been sent to provide help at a military truck repair facility being
erected near Dneprpetrowski in Russia; see NARA, RG 407,
Entry 368B, Box 1032, Schneider Report, Exhibit 181, Memo
by Schmidt on M�llrose, June 22, 1945 (NARA 0000435).

2 4 3 FMC, AR-98-213541, Box 131, Perry Report, September 19,
1946 (FMC 0000918); NARA, RG 243, Entry 6, Box 684, File:
7 7 a 2 , Automobile Manu fa c t u rers Planned and A c t u a l
Production, 1944 (NARA 0003659). Both list the 1944
production figure as 12,915 vehicles. Other sources list the
figure as 13,015; see Ford-Werke Records, Summary of Ford of
G e rm a ny Production 1926-1977, Feb ru a ry 9, 1978 (FW
0003910); and FMC, AR-98-213541, Box 40, File: Ford of
Europe Chronology, Information on Ford-Werke AG, circa 1986
(FMC 0005940).

2 4 4 B A -L , R 3/ 3181, Memo from Main Committee fo r
Automobiles, July 27, 1944 (BAL 2512).
2 4 5 BA-L, R 3/ 516, Memo, October 2, 1944 (BAL 2588).

2 4 6 NARA 0003634 Factory Brief -Cologne Area, October 5,1944;
NARA, RG 407, Entry 368B, Box 1032, File: Ford-Werke AG,
GED Report, February 1946 (NARA 0001572); FMC, File:
Briefing Binder Part F, Interview with W. I., July 27,1987 (FMC
0004309 and 0004337).

2 4 7 Ford-Werke Records, Vitger to Albert, August 19, 1944 (FW
0002370); NARA, RG 407, Entry 368B, Box 1032, Schneider
Report, Exhibit 204, Schmidt to Perry, May 28, 1945 (NARA
0000483); FMC, AR-98-213546, Box 2, File: History of Plant -All
Aspects, 1925-1946, Vitger Report, September 24, 1946
(FMC 0002129).

2 4 8 NARA, RG 243, Entry 36, Box 178, File 423, Preliminary
Report on Ford-Werke AG, March 22, 1945 (NARA 0006932).
2 4 9 NARA, RG 243, Entry 6, Box 687, File: Ford-Cologne, Report
on Air Raid History, no date (NARA 0003249).
2 5 0 Ford-Werke internal financial documents report 296 vehicles
made between October and December 1944; see Ford-Werke
Records, Financial Ledger, December 1944-December 1946
(FW 0007924-0008282). G e rman gove rnment re p o rt s
indicate 540 vehicles were made during this period; see NARA,
RG 243, E n t ry 6, B ox 684, F i l e : 7 7 a 2 , Au t o m o b i l e
Manufacturers Planned and Actual Production, 1944 (NARA
0003659).

2 5 1 BA-L, R 3/ 290E, Telegram, February 20, 1945 (BAL 2147).

2 5 2 Ford-Werke Records, Affidavit of Guckel, January 30,1967 (FW
0005956).

2 5 3 NARA, RG 407, Entry 368B, Box 1032, Schneider Report,
Exhibit 204, Schmidt to Perry, May 28,1945 (NARA 0000483).

with new ones. Schmidt also noted that production of
spare parts had increased to the point that spare parts
constituted about 40 percent of the Cologne plant's
sales. 242

6.7. 1944 and Ear ly 1945 Production
Ford-Werke's production levels dropped in 1944,
falling to less than 1,000 vehicles per month, and total
production for the year amounted to approximately
13,000 trucks. 243 In July 1944, German authorities
ordered changes in the production schedules for Ford-Werke
and other Ford subsidiaries in the occupied
territories, phasing out the manufacture of the Maultier
in favor of additional "S" type three-ton trucks. 244 By
October 1944, the M a u l t i e r p rogram had been
e l i m i n ated and production dive rted into tru ck
production. 245 (See Section 6.10. for information about
a repair shop and reassembly program in eastern
Germany in 1944.)

O verall production at the plant was seve re ly
hampered during the last months of 1944, primarily
due to air raids on Cologne and increased difficulty of
obtaining adequate supplies. 246 In August 1944, the
plant was slightly damaged during a British air raid, and
soon afterwards, Ford-Werke began dispersing parts of
its manufacturing assemblies to a number of outlying
areas away from Cologne, including M�llrose, where
the repair shop was located. 247 Additional attacks on
Cologne in the autumn of 1944 caused power outages
that interrupted plant operations. 248 Ford-Werke was
directly targeted on October 15 and 18, 1944. 249 As a
result, production at the facility came almost to a
standstill, and only a few hundred vehicles were made
during the last three months of the year. 250 Production
during the first months of 1945 remained limited.
Ford-Werke reported difficulty in delivering vehicles
because of continued air raids. 251 From January until
U. S. forces occupied Cologne in early March, the
Cologne facility manufactured 403 vehicles. 252

6.8. Relocation of Plant Equipment,
1944-1945

In the fall of 1944, Fo r d -We r ke began re l o c at i n g
some of its production facilities and storage sites to the
Agger River Va l l ey towns on the east side of the Rhine. 2 5 3
In September 1944, Fo r d -We r ke re c e i ved gove rn m e n t a l
d i rections to begin dispersing its machine tools and
p a rts manu fa c t u ring processes to Berg i s ch -G l a d b a ch , 66
66 Page 67 68
41
Mi l i t a r y P r o d u c t i o n a t Fo r d -We rk e
2 5 4 FMC, AR-98-213546, Box 2, File: History of Plant -All Aspects,
1 9 2 5 -1 9 4 6 , Vitger Report , September 24, 1946 (FMC
0002129). See also, PRO, FO 837/ 21, Ministry of Economic
Warfare [hereafter MEW] Intelligence Weekly Report No. 156,
February 1, 1945 (PRO 0000148). This MEW weekly report
contains a second reference to a camouflaged plant to the
southwest of Cologne, allegedly affiliated with Ford-Werke,
producing 36 trucks daily. This is the only report of such a
plant, and is not confirmed by any other documents.

2 5 5 FMC, AR-98-213546, Box 2, File: History of Plant -All Aspects,
1 9 2 5 -1 9 4 6 , Vitger Report , September 24, 1946 (FMC
0002129). See also NARA, RG 169, Entry 500B, Box 396, File:
1 8 0 4 5 5 , F. I . A . T. R e p o rt on German Automobile Industry,
November 7, 1945 (NARA 0007047).

2 5 6 NARA, RG 407, Entry 368B, Box 1032, File: Ford-Werke AG,
GED Report, February 1946 (NARA 0001565).

2 5 7 NARA, RG 260, Economics Division, Industry Branch, Box 37,
Reel 39.3, Combined Intelligence Objectives Subcommittee
[ h e reafter C. I . O. S.] Ta rget Report 19/ 8 on visit to Fo r d -Cologne-
Niehl March 10, 1945, document date March 23,
1945,( NARA 0005653).

2 5 8 FMC, AR-65-71, Box 25, File: International 1947 No. 1, Vitger
to Roberge, June 26, 1947 (FMC 0000103); HP, Acc. 61-
000417, Box 1, German War Recovery Study, 1950 (HP
0000246).

2 5 9 HStAD, NW 1049/ 76620, Memo from Pieck, March 12, 1945
(HSAD 0835). In a postwar memo, Schmidt talked of dragging
out the evacuation (in the expectation that the Allies would
arrive faster than they did) to the point that the authorities'
threats to hurry up became constant; see NARA, RG 407, Entry
368B, Box 1032, Schneider Report, Exhibit 11, Memo by
Schmidt, June 22, 1945 (NARA 0000066). In a letter in
Schmidt's postwar denazification file, Max Ueber, Ford-Werke's
head of exports, wrote that Schmidt would sit at the west
window muttering to himself, "Why are the Americans so slow
in arriving. I cannot go any slower with evacuation, or
someone may still hang me." See HSAD, NW 1049/ 76620,
Ueber to Schmidt, November 15, 1945 (HSAD 0860-0861).

2 6 0 WNRC, Acc. 299-68A-0243, Box 536, File: W17536, Report
Regarding the Administration of Ford-Werke AG, August 1,
1945 (DOJ 0011141-0011142; for English translation, see DOJ
0011210-0011211), Albert to Reich Commissioner, April 3,
1945 (DOJ 0011094). In his letter, Albert reports that he heard
Schmidt had died. The report of Schmidt's death turned out to
be erroneous.

2 6 1 FMC, AR-98-213541, Box 131, Perry Report, September 19,
1946 (FMC 0000935); HFM, Acc. 880, Box 7, File: Germany,
Interview with Robert Schmidt, July 18,1960 (HFM 0000902-
000903); FMC, AR-98-213541, Box 52, File: Audit

O s b e rghausen and Fri e d ri ch s t h a l . 2 5 4 The dispersal wa s
made official by the German A rmy High Command in
l ate December 1944, fo l l owed in Ja nu a ry 1945 by the
m ove of stocks of mat e rial and finished parts to Kloster
and Duemmlinghausen. 2 5 5 These facilities we re intended
to " feed the military reconditioning and assembly plant
a l re a dy in operation at M�llro s e." 2 5 6 (See Section 6.10.)
The main Fo r d -We r ke engineering and drawing offi c e s
we re re l o c ated to nearby Dersch l ag in Feb ru a ry 1945. 2 5 7
According to Erhard Vi t g e r, the entire cost of the
dispersal (including the rental of re l o c ation sites) wa s
c ove red in advance by a RM 8,000, 000 pre -p ayment by
the German gove rnment early in 1945. 2 5 8 (See Section
1 1 . 3 . for more info rm ation on use of dispersal funds. )
Local Nazi party leaders suspected that Sch m i d t
d e l i b e r at e ly slowed the process of re l o c ation by ke e p i n g
key personnel in Cologne until the A m e ricans could
a rri ve to take the city. 2 5 9

In early 1945, the Allied advance cut off
c o m mu n i c ations with Cologne, and the Fo r d -We r ke
Board of A dvisors heard rumors that Schmidt had been
killed or cap t u re d . It requested that Fo r d -We r ke
e xe c u t i ve A l fons von Gusmann be appointed as
custodian for the Fo r d -We r ke assembly equipment that
had been dispersed across the Rhine. The Reich

Commissioner for the Tre atment of Enemy Pro p e rt y
ag re e d , although it is not clear whether this eve r
fo rm a l ly took place. In March 1945, h oweve r, t h e
G e s t apo appointed Karl Buse, one of Fo r d -We r ke 's
e xe c u t i ve s , as " p ro p e rty administrat o r " of the dispersed
fa c i l i t i e s. With the liberation of Cologne, Fo r d -We r ke
fell under the control of Allied military authori t i e s. 2 6 0

6.9. Arendt Plant
In late 1939, G e rman authorities ap p ro a ch e d
S chmidt and requested that he establish a new fi rm to
m a nu fa c t u re war mat � ri e l . According to postwa r
re p o rt s , S chmidt and A l b e rt entered an ag reement with
a local Fo r d -We r ke supplier, Walter A re n d t , to fo rm a
n ew company, Walter A rendt GmbH, without the
k n owledge or ap p roval of Ford Motor Company.
According to some sources, A rendt provided 24 percent
of the initial cap i t a l , with the remainder supplied by
bank loans secured with the cooperation of Sch m i d t
acting in Fo r d -We r ke 's name. In other sources, S ch m i d t
is identified as owning the remaining 76 percent of the
n ew company himself, although he claimed to have
re c e i ved a promise from A l b e rt that Fo r d -We r ke wo u l d
re i m burse him for any losses. 2 6 1 No defi n i t i ve
i n fo rm ation regarding the company 's balance sheets
could be locat e d . H oweve r, in a postwar statement to 67
67 Page 68 69
42
R e s e a r c h F i n d i n g s A b o u t Fo r d -We r k e U n d e r t h e Na z i R e g i m e
Report -July 28, 1949, Confidential Supplement to Cooper
with Report to Ford-Werke Board of Directors from Hibberson
and Platt, July 28,1949, and August 1949, hereafter Hibberson-Platt
Report (FMC 0000830); NARA, RG 407, Entry 368B, Box
1032, Schneider Report, Exhibit 163, Memo by Schmidt on
Arendt, June 15,1945 (NARA 0000406).

2 6 2 NARA, RG 56, Acc. 56-69A-4707, Box 81, File: Interrogations,
Misc., Report on Discussion with Albert, September 18, 1945
(NARA0007154). Ford engineer Valentine Tallberg had spent
several years at Ford-Werke and returned for four months in
1940. In a 1956 interview, he recalled that during that visit, he
noticed a new building on the grounds that was surrounded by
a tall fence. He asked the director of purchasing for an
explanation but was given no information. Tallberg ran into a
former Ford-Werke employee who worked at the new building
a n d , over coffe e, l e a rned that some Fo r d -We r ke milling
machinery was being used there. He again approached the
p u r chasing director who relented and told him that the
building and its operations were to remain a secret, but that
Schmidt and Albert were using Ford-Werke equipment in their
own business of machining parts for airplanes. "I'm sure that
if Mr. Ford found out that one of his managers had put up a
business of his own, making war material for the German Army,
he wouldn't have liked it," Tallberg said in the 1956 interview.
See HFM, Acc. 65, Box 72, File: Tallberg (214) Final 72-1,
Reminiscences of V. Y. Tallberg, July 1956 (HFM 0004867-
0004868).

2 6 3 NARA, RG 407, Entry 368B, Box 1032, Schneider Report,
Exhibit 163, Memo by Schmidt on Arendt, June 15, 1945
(NARA 0000404-0000405). Opel had gone further than Ford-Werke
in that it had redesigned its trucks to the German
standard, which Ford had not done. But when Opel insisted

on sticking to its product line, some of its management was
forced out and the plant was immediat e ly conve rted to
armaments production. According to another postwar memo
by Schmidt, Albert had considerable influence with the older
military authorities because of his status as a former state
secretary: "In my estimation it was thanks to him [Albert], that
we had'nt [sic] to go into armament in 1939 and concluded
what is now known as the Arendt deal." See Schneider Report,
Exhibit 2, Memo by Schmidt on Albert, June 22, 1945 (NARA
0000049).

2 6 4 FMC, AR-98-213541, Box 131, Perry Report, September 19,
1946 (FMC 0000935); FMC, AR-98-213541, Box 52, File:
Audit Report -July 28, 1949, Hibberson-Platt Report, July 28,
1949, and August 1949 (FMC 0000830); HFM, Acc. 880, Box
7, File: Germany, Interview with Robert Schmidt, July 18,1960
(HFM 0000902-000903); NARA, RG 407, Entry 368B, Box
1032, Schneider Report, Exhibit 163, Memo by Schmidt on
Arendt, June 15, 1945 (NARA 0000406).

2 6 5 BA-L, R 97II/ 53 Reich Professional Organization of Mechanics
to Reich Economic Ministry, June 5, 1941 (BAL 9797-9802).
After the fall of France, such repair shops had been established
in Western Europe, and the army asked several of the French
repair shops to move their operations and skilled employees to
Eastern Europe.

2 6 6 For a set of K -We r ke regulations applicable in France and
Belgium; see BA-L, R 97II/ 70, Report on transfer of automobile
repair shops to the occupied Western territories, July 1940 (BAL
9938-9943).

facility in Cologne using some mach i n e ry and
equipment supplied by Ford-Werke. In mid-1940, the
plant began producing military equipment. Some
sources identify the primary product as a 15mm
turbine; others suggest that the plant made parts for
f l a m e -t h rowe r s. In a 1960 interv i ew, S ch m i d t
suggested that the facility was manufacturing a rocket
engine piece. Sources also indicate that by 1943, the
Arendt plant was manufacturing truck parts as well.
After the war, Arendt was taken over by the military
government and at one time was on a list of factories to
be dismantled under Allied demilitarization plans. 264

6.10. Repair Facilities
After the German invasion of the Soviet Union in
June 1941, the German Army High Command began
developing plans for the establishment of specialized
repair facilities [K r a f t fa h r z e u g swe r k s t � t t e n o r
Kriegswerkst�tten, often abbreviated in the plural as K-Werke]
in the East. 265 Although these repair shops were
quasi-military facilities set up by the army, the K-Werke
were operated by German companies under the aegis of
the Reich Professional Organization of Mechanics. 266
Typically, the German army contracted with a company

i nve s t i g at o r s ,A l b e rt said that Schmidt and A rendt share d
all pro fits from the undert a k i n g. 2 6 2

In a postwar memorandum, S chmidt described the
ve n t u re as a secret compromise with the military that
would allow Fo r d -We r ke to continue manu fa c t u ri n g
t ru ck s. The condition was that Fo r d -We r ke would fi n d
a supplier to manu fa c t u re what ever the military wa n t e d .
After the outbreak of war on September 1, 1 9 3 9 ,
S chmidt said there was growing pre s s u re on Fo r d -We r ke
to reduce or abandon tru ck production in favor of
" a m munition and what ever enjoyed higher pri o ri t y "
than tru ck s : " E ve ry b o dy concerned at Fo r d 's [Fo r d -We
r ke] thought that this arrangement was the best to be
obtained � [B] y a comparat i ve ly small concession �
Ford could stay out of being turned into a plant for re a l
a rm a m e n t ." According to Sch m i d t , one of the factors
that prompted the arrangement with Arendt was the
forced conversion of a substantial amount of Opel's
capacity to armaments manufacturing. 263

Walter Arendt GmbH set up operations in a separate 68
68 Page 69 70
43
Mi l i t a r y P r o d u c t i o n a t Fo r d -We rk e
2 6 7 BA-L, R 97II/ 6, Blank contract, no date (BAL 11172-11183);
BA-L, R 97II/ 53, Note on discussion at the Quartermaster
General, February 21, 1944 (BAL 9820-9826).

2 6 8 B A -L , R 97II/ 95, Fo r d -We r ke to A rmy High Command,
November 25, 1941 (BAL 9794).
2 6 9 BA-L, R 97II/ 95, Reich Professional Organization of Mechanics
to Army High Command, December 1, 1941 (BAL 9795-
9796). For complaints against Eberl, see BA-L, R 97II/ 95,
Letter to Reich Professional Organization of Mechanics, May 28,
1941 (BAL 9770-9771) and Eberl to Reich Pro fe s s i o n a l
Organization of Mechanics, November 1,1941 (BAL 9772).

2 7 0 WNRC, Acc. 299-68A-0243, Box 536, File W17536, Schmidt to
Reich Commissioner, July 24,1942 (DOJ 0011015; for English
translation, see DOJ 0011016).

2 7 1 WNRC, Acc. 299-68A-0243, Box 536, File W17536, Ford-Werke
to Regierungspr�sident -Cologne, December 16, 1942
(DOJ 0011024; for English translations, see DOJ 0011028 and
DOJ 0011236).

2 7 2 See, for example, BA-L, R 97II/ 34, Schneider to the Reich
Professional Organization of Mechanics, July 28, 1943 (BAL
11082); BA-L, R 97II/ 34, Heinsen to the Reich Professional
Organization of Mechanics, May 4,1943 (BAL 11089); BA-L, R
97II/ 43b, Reich Professional Organization of Mechanics to
Maletz, May 5,1942 (BAL 11356); BA-L, R 97II/ 121, J�rgens
to Reich Professional Organization of Mechanics, June 25,1942
(BAL 9827); and BA-L, R 97II/ 42 Daily Order from Major
Gum, March 9, 1943 (BAL 11406). With the Soviet Army
advancing in 1944, most of the Ford dealer-operated K -We r ke
were evacuated westward. For more information, see BA-L, R
9 7 I I / 4 2 , Witte to Reich Pro fessional Org a n i z ation of
Mechanics, March 21, 1944 (BAL 11400); BA-L, R 97II/ 43a,
Junge to Reich Professional Organization of Mechanics, March
21, 1944 (BAL 12335-12336); and BA-L, R 97II/ 120,
Schneider to Reich Professional Organization of Mechanics,
September 9,1944 (BAL 9684-9685).

2 7 3 Ford-Werke Records, Letters from T. F. to Ford-Werke, October
1988 and April 1989 (FW 0005960-0005967). In these
postwar letters, T. F., a Polish citizen, described his experiences
working for such a facility, operated by Ford-Werke dealer
Maletz, in Charkow.

2 7 4 BA-L, R 97II/ 95, Note to files, October 7, 1941 (BAL 9774-
9 7 7 7 ) ; B A -L , R 97II/ 43b, Maletz to Reich Pro fe s s i o n a l
O rg a n i z ation of Mech a n i c s , J u ly 27, 1942 (BAL 11348-
1 1 3 4 9 ) ; B A -L , R 97II/ 42, Witte to Reich Pro fe s s i o n a l
Organization of Mechanics, March 17,1943 (BAL 11373); BA-L,
R 97II/ 121, J�rgens to Reich Professional Organization of
Mechanics, June 25, 1942 (BAL 9827). BA-L, R 97II/ 120,
Reich Professional Organization of Mechanics to Military High
Command, September 4, 1944, (BAL 9691-9692) reports that
180 Jews we re working in Fo r d -We r ke dealer Heinri ch
Schneider's Riga facility. Beginning in the fall of 1941, German
Jews had been deported to the Riga ghetto in large numbers,
thus creating a huge German-speaking pool of workers for
German industrial organizations.

for the establishment of an Eastern repair facility. The
Army paid for the transfer of the facilities to the place
of operation and back, while the firm provided the
machinery. The personnel at the K-Werke included
Germans, Western civilian workers, Poles, civilians from
the occupied areas of the Soviet Union, Soviet POWs
and "sometimes Jews." 267

In November 1941, Ford-Werke indicated an interest
in operating repair shops in Riga, Warsaw and Lemberg.
At Lemberg, Ford-Werke proposed that it assume direct
control over a facility run by a Mr. Eberl, who had
served as a Ford-Werke dealer in Salzburg. Ford-Werke
intended to utilize the facility as a garage for the
" fab ri c ation of exchange engines." 2 6 8 B e fo re any
arrangements could be made, however, the facility was
assigned to another company after Eberl was removed
by the army in late 1941. 269 In a letter to the Reich

Commissioner for the Treatment of Enemy Property in
J u ly 1942, S chmidt mentioned discussions " o f
fundamental importance" taking place between the
Reich Minister for Armaments and War Production and
Ford-Werke regarding Eastern repair shops. 270 In a
December 1942 war damages claim filed with the city
of Cologne, Ford-Werke cited its efforts on behalf of the
German military, including the construction of repair
facilities and production facilities for re p l a c e m e n t
engines. 271

Several independent Ford-Werke dealers established
their own repair shops on the Eastern Front during the
war at sites in Latvia, Estonia and the Soviet Union. 272
These facilities employed a va riety of wo r ke r s ,
including Germans, Poles, 273 Soviet POWs, Estonians,
and, in at least one repair shop, Jewish laborers. 274

Ford-Werke assisted in repair and reconditioning
efforts for the German army on the Eastern Front and in
Germany. In 1943, a review of the vehicle situation at
the Eastern Front had revealed that Ford trucks did not
fare well under wartime circumstances. Ford-Werke
disputed these fi n d i n g s , s t ressing that the alleged
unreliability of Ford-Werke trucks at the Eastern Front
was primarily due to the unprofessional repair of the
vehicles by soldiers. As a response, Ford-Werke, in
agreement with the military, created "East-Training-A
c t i o n s " [O s t s ch u l u n g s a k t i o n] . Fo r d -We r ke sent
trained mechanics and skilled workers to all front lines
in order to train the soldiers to properly repair Ford 69
69 Page 70 71
44
R e s e a r c h F i n d i n g s A b o u t Fo r d -We r k e U n d e r t h e Na z i R e g i m e
2 7 5 WNRC, Acc. 299-68A-0243, Box 536, File W17536, Advisory
Board Meeting Minutes, January 13, 1943 (DOJ 0011118-
0011119; for English translation, see DOJ 0011221).

2 7 6 Ford-Werke Records, Financial Ledger, January 1942-September
1944, Balance Sheet, May 31,1944 (FW 0007113). The ledger
also contains invoices from Ford-Werke to the Army High
Command for the Ost A k t i o n; see Balance Sheet, December 31,
1944 (FW 0008277).

2 7 7 NARA, RG 407, Entry 368B, Box 1032, Schneider Report,
Exhibit 181, Memo by Schmidt on M�llrose, June 22, 1945
( NARA 0000435); P RO, FO 837/ 21, M . E . W. I n t e l l i g e n c e
Weekly Report No. 156, February 1, 1945. There is some
indication that Ford-Werke personnel may have been involved
in operations at the site in late 1943; see Ford-Werke Records,
Personnel File for J. H. (FW 0023159-0023195).

2 7 8 NARA, RG 407, Entry 368B, Box 1032, Schneider Report,
Exhibit 181, Memo by Schmidt on M�llrose, June 22, 1945
(NARA 0000435); BA-L, R 3/ 290a, Note to files re: Meeting
Minutes of September 12, 1944 (BAL 2616).

2 7 9 BA-L, R 3/ 290a, Note to files re: Meeting Minutes of September
12,1944 (BAL 2615-2621).

2 8 0 BA-L, R 97II/ 43b, Work Committee for Reconditioning to
K-Werk Maletz, et al., January 20, 1945 (BAL 11308). When
Maletz moved his facility to Brieg, he requested to take 14
auxiliaries with him who had been with the company since
Charkow, but the request was denied; see BA-L, R 97II/ 43b,
Maletz to OT Main Technical Office, August 18, 1944 (BAL
11314).

ve h i c l e s. 2 7 5 Fo r d -We r ke ledgers indicated that
mechanics, engineers and skilled workers worked in the
East, in the Balkans and in Italy. 276 The "Transport-Gruppe
Nagel" (a government institution to handle
transports) made plans for a large Ford repair shop in
Ukraine. After those plans were thwarted by the
Russian advance, Ford-Werke established a truck repair
facility within the Reich itself, at M�llrose in Eastern
Germany. 277 According to a postwar affidavit from
Schmidt, the company sent seven employees to set up
the project, which called for the creation of an assembly
line operation to dismantle, recondition and reassemble
d a m aged tru ck s. 2 7 8 In a meeting of the Special

Committee -Vehicle Repair on September 12, 1944,
with Ford-Werke's Alfons von Gusmann in attendance,
the M�llrose facility was praised as an example of an
excellent and efficient reconditioning shop. 2 7 9
Beginning in Ja nu a ry 1945, Fo r d -We r ke prov i d e d
consultants for the repair and reuse of Ford parts in
s u p p o rt of the German army under the
"Reconditioning Plan of the Ford-Werke." Under the
plan, two of the facilities devoted to the reconditioning
of ag g re g ates and parts we re the Klosdorf and
Freudenberg facilities of the Ford-Werke dealer Eduard
Maletz. 280 70
70 Page 71 72
45
2 8 1 M i chael Burleigh and Wolfgang Wi p p e rm a n n , The Racial Stat e :
G e rm a ny 1933 � 1945 ( C a m b ri d g e, E n g l a n d : U n i versity Pre s s ,
1 9 9 1 ) , p p. 44-74 and 296.

2 8 2 The exact number of foreign workers sent to Germany is very
difficult to determine. According to historian Ulrich Herbert,
there were 7.8 million foreign workers registered in Germany
at the peak in August 1944. Herbert estimates that, in total,
more than 12 million foreign laborers were put to work in the
Reich for varying periods. See Ulrich Herbert, H i t l e r 's Fo re i g n
Wo rk e r s : E n forced Fo reign Labor in Germ a ny under the Third Reich, t r a n s l ated

by William Templer (Cambri d g e : C a m b ridge University Pre s s ,
1 9 9 7 ) , P re face and p. 1 . Another histori a n , E dward Homze,
suggests that the total number of wo r kers brought to Germ a ny
was well over 8 million; see Edward L. H o m z e, Fo reign Labor in Nazi
G e rm a ny ( P ri n c e t o n :P rinceton University Pre s s ,1 9 6 7 ) , p. v i i .

2 8 3 Overy, War and Economy in the Third Reich, p. 191; William L. Shirer,
The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich (NewYork: Simon and Schuster,
1960), pp. 497-498.

S e c t i o n 7
F O R E I G N A N D F O R C E D L A B O R
A T F O R D -W E R K E

Europe. Western workers generally received better pay
and tre atment than wo r kers from Eastern Euro p e.
Following Italy's surrender to the Allies in September
1943, German forces occupied northern Italy and
forced into labor several hundred thousand captured
Italian soldiers, who were often treated as poorly as
Eastern workers. Finally, concentration camp inmates
were made to work without pay, as slave laborers.
Initially, their use by German firms was restricted to
i n d u s t rial sites established by the fi rms at the
concentration camps. However, toward the end of the
wa r, m a ny German companies used concentrat i o n
camp slave laborers at their own facilities, as well. 282
(See Section 7.7. for more on concentration camp
labor.)

In 1939, before the war broke out, there was already
a shortage of labor in Germany. On June 23, 1939,
civilian and military officials were notified that Hitler
planned to draft 7 million men into the military. Hitler
was preparing to launch a "total war" against Poland. 283
The large-scale use of foreign workers commenced

7.1. Overview of Foreign and
Forced Labor in German y

Between 1939 and 1945, millions of non-Germans
were registered to work (usually forcibly) in factories,
farms, mines and construction sites throughout the
G e rman Reich . Almost eve ry industrial company
operating in Germany during World War II used foreign
and forced wo r ke r s. Their overall tre atment wa s
determined by Nazi ideology and practice that placed
workers on a scale according to race, nationality and
gender. 281 These workers were drawn from several
different sources. One such group included workers
recruited from German allies. These workers generally
were treated better and paid better than other foreign
workers. In the wake of Germany's initial military
victories, many enemy prisoners of war (POWs) were
put to work for only token wages. In addition,
Germany transported large numbers of civilian forced
workers from occupied territory in Western and Eastern 71
71 Page 72 73
46
put to work in construction pro j e c t s , in some cases in
v i o l ation of re g u l ations set fo rth in the 1929 Geneva
C o nve n t i o n . 2 8 7 The German fi rms that used POW lab o r
paid 60 to 80 percent of the normal local wages dire c t ly
to the POW camp [Sta m mlage r, u s u a l ly abb rev i ated as
Stalag] that supplied the pri s o n e r s. E m p l oyers we re to
p rovide food and housing for the POWs working fo r
t h e m . By the end of 1940, F re n ch POWs we re the single
l a rgest group of fo reigners working in Germ a ny. 2 8 8

In the fall of 1941, civilian and military authorities in
G e rm a ny began easing re s t rictions placed on We s t e rn
P OWs and improving their living and wo r k i n g
c o n d i t i o n s , in part to encourage the re c ruitment of
civilian lab o rers from the occupied We s t e rn terri t o ri e s.
In 1942, under the direction of the Plenipotentiary fo r
L abor Deploy m e n t , G e rman authorities embarked on a
m a s s i ve campaign to attract additional wo r kers fro m
occupied We s t e rn Euro p e, e s p e c i a l ly France. In May
1 9 4 2 , n ew re g u l ations called for the improve d
t re atment of We s t e rn wo r ke r s , who we re offi c i a l ly
granted the same rights as German wo r kers when it
came to wag e s , working conditions, s e p a r at i o n
c o m p e n s at i o n , working hours, ove rtime and taxe s.
I n c re a s i n g ly, h oweve r, fo reign wo r kers from the We s t
we re not allowed to re t u rn home after their wo r k
contracts had ended. 2 8 9 L i kew i s e, in A p ril 1943,
ap p rox i m at e ly 250,000 Fre n ch POWs we re re l e a s e d
f rom their POW status and re c l a s s i fied as fo reign civilian
wo r ke r s. But despite this ch a n g e, most had to remain in
G e rm a ny and continued to work at the same fa c i l i t i e s
under conditions consistent with Nazi ideology fo r
other Fre n ch wo r ke r s. 2 9 0

R e s e a r c h F i n d i n g s A b o u t Fo r d -We r k e U n d e r t h e Na z i R e g i m e

2 8 4 Herbert, H i t l e r 's Fo reign Wo rk e r s, pp. 61-63 and 85-89. According
to Herbert, the number of Polish POWs put to work grew
rapidly and reached 300,000 by the end of 1939. Another
estimate places the number at 300,000 in the autumn, and
indicates that by May 1940, more than 1 million Polish POWs
were working forcibly in Germany. See Barbara Hillman, Volrad
Kluge and Erdwig Kramer, L w. 2/ XI � Mune L�bberstedt Zwa n g s a r b e i t
f�r den Krieg, (Bremen, Germany: Edition Temmen, 1996), p. 70.

2 8 5 Herbert, H i t l e r 's Fo reign Wo rk e r s, pp. 70-79. For information on
racism as a state policy in Germ a ny, see Burleigh and
Wippermann, The Racial Stat e :G e rm a ny 1933-1945, pp. 44-74.

2 8 6 S. P. MacKenzie, "The Treatment of Prisoners of War in World War
II," The Jo u r nal of Modern History, Volume 66, Issue 3 (September
1994), pp. 497-498; Herbert, H i t l e r 's Fo reign Wo rk e r s, pp. 95-96.

2 8 7 Homze, Fo reign Labor in Nazi Germ a ny, p. 48; Klaus P. Fischer, N a z i
G e rm a ny : A New History ( N ew Yo r k : C o n t i nuum Publ i s h i n g
Company, 1995), pp. 487-488. According to Homze, the
G e rman army closely fo l l owed the Geneva Conve n t i o n
proscriptions against using POWs in war industries until the
latter part of 1941; in 1942, British intelligence reported that
POWs were known to be used in armaments manufacturing and
transportation, contrary to the terms of the treaty. See also
NARA, RG 319, Entry 47C, Box 463, File 004 Labor, Military
Attache Report, August 18, 1942 (NARA 0007141).

2 8 8 Herbert, H i t l e r 's Fo reign Wo rk e r s, pp. 96-97; MacKenzie, "The
Treatment of Prisoners of War in World War II," p. 497.
2 8 9 Herbert, H i t l e r 's Fo reign Wo rk e r s, pp. 194-195.

2 9 0 Barbara Hillman, et al. L w. 2/ XI � Mune L�bberstedt Zwangsarbeit f�r
den Krieg, p. 5 9 ;H e r b e rt , H i t l e r 's Fo reign Wo rk e r s, p p. 2 7 3 -2 7 4 ,2 9 2 -293
and 314-315; R e i c h s a r b e i t s bl at t , N o. 22 (August 5, 1 9 4 3 ) , p.
I 404 (BAL 12936).

immediately after the conflict began. By the end of
September 1939, less than one month after the German
i nvasion of Po l a n d , ap p rox i m at e ly 100,000 Po l i s h
P OWs we re deployed in Germ a ny, working in
ag ri c u l t u re. G e rman authorities began re c ru i t i n g
civilian workers in Poland. In addition to agriculture, a
few of these civilian Polish workers were used in
construction, industry and mining. 284

In order to re g u l ate the use of Polish labor more
c a re f u l ly, in Feb ru a ry 1940, the Nazi gove rn m e n t
re c l a s s i fied all Polish POWs as civilian wo r ke r s. B e t we e n
M a r ch and September 1940, the gove rn m e n t
i n t roduced a set of decrees re l ating to the tre atment of
all Polish wo r kers in Germ a ny. The decrees gove rned the
t r a n s p o rt of Poles into the Reich and their wo r k i n g
h o u r s , wages and tax rat e s , including a special " s o c i a l
c o m p e n s ation tax." The re g u l ations also gove rned their
social activities and contacts with the Germ a n
p o p u l at i o n , as well as the policing of the Polish wo r ke r s
by the Gestap o. Polish wo r kers we re re q u i red to wear a
special identifi c ation badge. According to Ulri ch
H e r b e rt , one of Germ a ny 's leading experts on the use of
forced labor in Nazi Germ a ny, these decrees legitimized
r a c i a l ly discri m i n at o ry policies and legalized the Nazi
"master race" t h e o ry. 2 8 5

Fo l l owing the German invasion of the Netherlands,
B e l g i u m , L u xe m b o u rg and France in May 1940,
G e rman authorities also began employing Fre n ch and
Belgian POWs in Germ a ny. 2 8 6 In the earliest years of the
wa r, P OWs we re mostly used as ag ricultural wo r ke r s ,
although many we re sent to industrial facilities that we re
m a nu fa c t u ring military mat � ri e l , or sent to mines, o r 72
72 Page 73 74
47
Fo r e i g n a n d Fo r c e d L a b o r a t Fo r d -We rk e
2 9 1 Christian Streit, Keine Kamera d e n . Die We h r macht und die sow j e t i s c h e n
K r i e g s ge fa n ge n e n (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlagsanstalt: 1978), pp. 9-
25; Burleigh and Wippermann, The Racial Stat e : G e rm a ny 1933-
1 9 4 5 , p. 296.

2 9 2 Herbert, H i t l e r 's Fo reign Wo rk e r s, pp. 145-149; MacKenzie, "The
Treatment of Prisoners of War in World War II," p. 499.

2 9 3 B A -K , A l l . P ro z . 2/ FC 6126 P, I n t e rro g ation of Mich a e l
Schrieber, August 28, 1946 (BAK 0074-0106); Herbert, H i t l e r 's
Fo reign Wo rk e r s, pp. 167-182.

2 9 4 Herbert, H i t l e r 's Fo reign Wo rk e r s, p. 170; Herbert, A History of Fo re i g n
Labor in Germ a ny, 1880-1980 (Ann A r b o r: U n i versity of
Michigan Press, 1990), p. 149.

2 9 5 Hillman, et al., Lw. 2/ XI � Mune L�bberstedt Zwangsarbeit f�r den Krieg,
pp. 72-73; Burleigh and Wippermann, The Racial Stat e : G e rm a ny
1 9 3 3 -1 9 4 5 , pp. 298-302; Herbert, H i t l e r 's Fo reign Wo rk e r s, p. 74.

2 9 6 Herbert, H i t l e r 's Fo reign Wo rk e r s, p. 91.

2 9 7 Ricciotti Lazzero, Gli Schiavi di Hitler (Milan: Arnoldo Mondadori
Editore S. p. A, 1996), pp. 6-32; Herbert, H i t l e r 's Fo reign Wo rk e r s,
pp. 100-106.

The invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941 did
not lead to another quick victory, c o n t r a ry to Hitler's
e x p e c t at i o n s , and it soon became ap p a rent that Germ a n
soldiers would not be able to re t u rn to their wo r k p l a c e s
a nytime soon. The vast number of Soviet POWs did not
p resent a re m e dy for the German economy 's pre s s i n g
l abor short ag e, as most had been deliberat e ly allowed to
s t a rve to death within a few months of their cap t u re by
the German army. 2 9 1 G e rman officials now turned to the
n ew ly occupied terri t o ries in Eastern Europe fo r
replacement lab o r. In October 1941, Hitler ordered the
e x t e n s i ve utilization of Russian civilian wo r kers in order
to re m e dy serious labor short ages in ag ri c u l t u re, m e t a l s ,
c o n s t ruction and mining. I n i t i a l ly, G e rman authori t i e s
e nvisioned that Russian wo r kers would be used in larg e
g roups under the strictest surveillance and without any
contact with the German populace, while We s t e rn
fo reigners would be transfe rred to more skilled
i n d u s t rial positions. As this re s t ricted use of Russian
wo r kers ran counter to the needs of the war economy, i t
was eve n t u a l ly modifi e d , and Russians began to be
d e p l oyed in wa r-re l ated industri e s , t o o. 2 9 2

E x t e n s i ve re c ruitment in the occupied terri t o ries of
the Soviet Union began in early 1942, under the
s u p e rvision of Fritz Saucke l , the German Plenipotentiary
for Labor Deploy m e n t . While Russians, Ukrainians and
B e l o russians we re first re c ruited vo l u n t a ri ly, G e rm a n
t roops in the occupied terri t o ries soon began to use
m o re coercive methods, as civilians we re rounded up
and transported west to facilities in Germ a ny. Once they
had arri ve d , the forced wo r kers we re distri buted to
i n d u s t ries that had requested wo r kers through local
g ove rnment labor offi c e s. 2 9 3 According to Saucke l 's
fi g u re s , 1,480,000 civilian wo r kers we re brought to
G e rm a ny from the Soviet Union in 1942, most of them
after A p ril 1, 1 9 4 2 , when an ave r age of 40,000 we re
sent to Germ a ny eve ry we e k . These transports included
men and women in ap p rox i m at e ly equal nu m b e r s. 2 9 4

The lives of civilian wo r kers from the East we re
g ove rned by a set of Decrees on Eastern Wo r ke r s
[O s t a r b e i t e re r l � s s e] , the first draft of which was signed
by Reinhard Hey d ri ch of the Reich Main Security Offi c e
in Feb ru a ry 1942. E ve ry Soviet civilian wo r ker had to
wear a badge labeled "O s t" ( " E a s t " ) . T h ey re c e i ved poor
food rat i o n s , p a rt i c u l a r ly in the early months of 1942,
and we re re q u i red to live in separate camps surro u n d e d
by barbed wire. T h ey also we re subjected to many
re g u l ations gove rning their behav i o r. While minor
infractions we re under the jurisdiction of plant guards,
the Gestapo administered harsher punishments, w h i ch
could include transfer to concentration camps or
e xe c u t i o n . 2 9 5 E a s t e rn wo r kers re c e i ved low wages and,
as was the case with Polish wo r ke r s , had to pay special
t a xe s. The low wages also effe c t i ve ly prevented wo r ke r s
f rom transfe rring any money back to their fa m i l i e s ,
e s p e c i a l ly since postal commu n i c ation was larg e ly
p ro h i b i t e d . 2 9 6

In September 1943, another group joined the ranks
of people fo r c i bly employed in Nazi Germ a ny : I t a l i a n
P OW s , or Italian Military Internees (IMIs). Italians had
wo r ked in Germ a ny befo re the war and had been
re c ruited in the early 1940s. As allies, Italian wo r ke r s
we re offi c i a l ly tre ated we l l , although they we re often
a f fected by racism despite ideological links betwe e n
Nazi Germ a ny and fascist Italy. 2 9 7 H oweve r, after Italy 's
s u rrender to the Allies in September 1943, and the
G e rman military occupation of the nort h e rn part of
I t a ly, l a rge numbers of Italian POWs fell into Germ a n
h a n d s. C o m m o n ly regarded as " t r a i t o r s " and " c owa r d s "
by the Germ a n s , Italian POWs sent to Germ a ny we re
often tre ated as poorly as Russian wo r ke r s. As a gesture
t oward the Italian fascist dictator Benito Mussolini,
G e rman authorities re c l a s s i fied Italian POWs as civilian
wo r kers in September 1944, a l t h o u g h , as was the case 73
73 Page 74 75
48
R e s e a r c h F i n d i n g s Ab o u t Fo r d -We r k e U n d e r t h e Na z i R e g i m e
2 9 8 Luigi Cajani, "Die italienischen Milit�r-I n t e rn i e rten im
nationalsozialistischen Deutschland," in Ulrich Herbert, ed.,
Europa und der " R e i c h s e i n s at z." Ausl�ndische Zivilarbeiter, K r i e g s ge fa n ge n e
und KZ-H�ftlinge in Deutschland 1938-1945 (Essen: Klartext, 1991),
pp. 295-316.

2 9 9 M a rtin Bro s z at , " N at i o n a l s o z i a l i s t i s che Ko n z e n t r at i o n s l ag e r
1933-1945," in Hans Buchheim et al., A n atomie des SS Staat e s, vol.
1 (M�nchen: DTB, 1989), pp. 108-20.

3 0 0 For an overview on Jewish slave labor in Nazi Germany from
1938 to 1943, see Wolf Gruner, Der Geschlossene A r b e i t s e i n s at z
deutscher Ju d e n : Zur Zwangsarbeit als Element der Ve r folgung 1938-1942
(Berlin: Metropol Verlag, 1997).

3 0 1 For a description of the death marches, see Daniel Jonah
Goldhagen, H i t l e r 's Willing Exe c u t i o n e r s : Ordinary Germans and the
H o l o c a u s t (NewYork: Knopf, 1996), pp. 327-75. On the use of
Jewish workers in industries in the Reich, see Hans Mommsen
and Manfred Grieger, Das Vo l k swage n we rk und seine Arbeiter im Dritten
R e i c h (Econ: Darmstadt, 1997), pp. 859-867.

3 0 2 NARA, RG 226, Microfilm M1499, Reel 263, Department of
Justice, Report on Ford-Werke AG, May 10, 1943 (NARA
0004270). Simon Reich suggests that Ford-Werke's status as a
foreign firm may have contributed to the company's labor
shortage; see Reich, The Fruits of Fa s c i s m , p. 117.

3 0 3 Burleigh and Wippermann, The Racial Stat e , p. 264. See also
NARA, RG 46, Entry 43, Box 670, File: Untitled, Civil Affairs
Handbook on Germany, no date (NARA 0005099). Historian
Edward Homze addresses the impact of the Nazi social policy
on the wartime economy in Germany: "None of the early Nazi
labor actions had as serious after effects as this campaign to
remove women from all gainful employment. The social policy
of the Nazis regarding German women and their role in society
had a direct bearing on the decision to mobilize foreign labor
during the war. Rather than attempting to intensify the
mobilization of native, especially female, labor, the Nazis
followed a seemingly easier course and recruited millions of
foreigners." See Homze, Fo reign Labor in Nazi Germ a ny, pp. 4-10.

3 0 4 Ford-Werke Records, Business Report for 1936 (FW 0005317).
In a letter to Charles Sorensen in 1936, Albert noted that
conscription had been introduced in Germany, putting the
country "under the rule of principles of military economy." See
H F M , A c c. 3 8 , B ox 33, F i l e : 168-F-1 Ja n -J u n , A l b e rt to
Sorensen, January 20,1936 (HFM 0000463).

3 0 5 For example, the man who eventually became head of the Ford-We
r ke camp for Eastern wo r kers was a fo rmer police officer who

with Fre n ch POW s , this official designation did not
g re at ly alter conditions for the Italian wo r ke r s. 2 9 8

Another group of forced workers in Nazi Germany
consisted of slave laborers taken from concentration
camps. Ever since the establishment of the first German
camps in 1933, inmates had been forced to work while
imprisoned, though mostly in facilities established at
the camps themselve s. Beginning in mid-1943,
however, the SS began to send groups of prisoners to
work on-site at companies within Germany. While
some of the prisoners were Jewish, a great many were
non-Jewish political prisoners and other people labeled
"asocial" by the Nazis. The prisoners were first used in
construction projects and in the most critical war
industries. As the war went on, however, more and
m o re companies became eligible for the use of
concentration camp labor. Groups of inmates with
their SS guards were dispatched to work at numerous
firms, where they were kept in satellite camps, or
s u b c a m p s , maintained by the main concentrat i o n
camps. For these services, the companies paid the SS
Economic Administrative Main Office a daily fee per
worker based on the worker's skill level. 299 (See Section
7.7. for more on concentration camp labor.)

Jews who were held in concentration camps and
ghettos also were used as workers. After the pogrom of

1938, in which steadily worsening intimidation of Jews
erupted into the violence of Kristallnacht [The Night of
Broken Glass], and before their deportation to the
ghettos and extermination centers in the East in the
early 1940s, some German Jews were used as slave
workers in the Reich. 300 However, the vast majority of
Jewish slave laborers worked at facilities established in
the occupied Eastern territories. With the German
retreat from the East, Jewish prisoners were marched
westward and, for a few months toward the end of the
war, were used at some facilities within Germany. 301

7.2. Overview of Foreign and
Forced Labor at Ford-Wer ke

In the late 1930s, Ford-Werke experienced a serious
shortage of skilled labor. 302 Military conscription,
coupled with the Nazi social policy of keeping women
out of the work force, contributed to a shortage of labor
t h roughout Germ a ny. 3 0 3 The 1936 Fo r d -We r ke
Business Report noted that Ford-Werke had been able to
increase the number of employees only by training a
large number of unskilled laborers and the long-term
unemployed. 304 Some had been out of work for years. 305
In February 1939, Ford-Werke co-manager Robert
Schmidt wrote to Ford executive Charles Sorensen to
emphasize that the lack of skilled labor in Germany was
"tremendous." Schmidt asked if there were German-speaking
men in Dearborn who might be willing to 74
74 Page 75 76
49
Fo r e i g n a n d Fo r c e d L a b o r a t Fo r d -We rk e
lost his job because he belonged to the wrong political party.
He was imprisoned and remained unemployed for three years
before being hired by Ford-Werke in 1936. See Section 7.6.3.
and FMC, Interview with Friedrich Wierscheim, December 8,
1999 (FMC 0018603). A machine designer hired at Ford-Werke
had been out of work for two years; see HStAD, NW
1 0 4 9 / 3 9 2 8 7 , M i l i t a ry Gove rnment questionnaire of J. W. ,
September 16,1946. An accountant who was active against the
rise of the Nazi regime remained unemployed for four years.
He joined the Nazi party for the sake of his family and began
working under Vitger in the statistical analysis division of Ford-We
r ke ; see HStAD, NW 1049/ 39230, G. H . , M i l i t a ry
Government questionnaire, February 24, 1947 (HSAD 1401-
1419).

3 0 6 F M C, A R -6 5 -1 5 0 0 , B ox 6, F i l e : G e rm a ny 1939-1945
(Sorensen), Schmidt to Sorensen, February 22, 1939 (FMC
0003176).

3 0 7 F M C, A R -6 5 -1 5 0 0 , B ox 6, F i l e : G e rm a ny 1939-1945
( S o re n s e n ) , S chmidt to Sore n s e n , June 22, 1939 (FMC
0003166-0003168) and Schmidt to Sorensen, June 7, 1939
(FMC 0003169). For example, a former judge who presided
over the trial of one of Hitler's friends joined Ford-Werke as "an
ordinary workingman" after being imprisoned and labeled
politically unreliable; see HStAD, NW 1048/ 34/ 272,Translated
affidavit of H. S., no date (HSAD 3051-3053; for English
translation, see HSAD 3047-3048). A lawyer who joined the
Nazi party to protect the identity of her Jewish mother became
a secretary at Ford-Werke after the Nazis barred women from
positions in the judicial arena; see HStAD, NW 1048/ 11/ 65,
Military Government questionnaire of M. B., November 27,
1947 (HSAD 0470-0506).

3 0 8 HAStK, Acc. 100, Police Chief Reports, June 2, 1944 to
December 30, 1944 (HASK 0286-0316).
3 0 9 Reinhold Billstein and Eberhard Illner, " You are now in Colog n e.
C o m p l i m e n t s." K�ln in den A u gen der Siege r. H u n d e rt Tage unter
Amerikanischer Kontrolle (K�ln: Emons, 1995), p. 164.

3 1 0 F M C, A R -7 5 -6 2 -6 1 6 , B ox 79, Custodian Report (FMC
0001023).

3 1 1 NARA, RG 226, Microfilm M1499, Reel 263, Department of
Justice, Report on Ford-Werke AG, May 10, 1943 (NARA
0004260-0004261 and 0004264-0004265).

3 1 2 NARA, RG 407, Entry 368B, Box 1032, Schneider Report,
Exhibit 172, Memo by Schmidt on L. C. 8 motors, July 20,1945
(NARA 0000418). Schmidt said that after Holland, Belgium
and France had fallen so fast, with G�ring's Luftwaffe [German
Air Force] receiving much of the credit, G�ring committed
himself to bringing England to its knees within six weeks.
Because of Fo r d -We r ke 's " c o nviction to stay on standard
p ro d u c t s ," Fo r d -We r ke managers brought the matter befo re
the Au t o m o t i ve Industry Economic Group to establish the
p ri o rity and address the issues of labor and mat e ri a l s. T h e
L u f t wa f fe fi n a l ly ordered 2, 000 motors and a special
t r a n s m i s s i o n , but there we re pro blems with the design and
other delay s. About 1,000 motors we re delive red over two
ye a r s , with a gre at deal of mat e rial left ove r. For more on
G � ri n g, see Sny d e r, Encyclopedia of the Third Reich, p p. 1 2 2 -1 2 3 .

3 1 3 NARA, RG 319, Entry 47C, Box 483, File: 350.05 Germany,
Military Attach� Report, C u r rent Eve n t s No. 59, September 25,
1940 (NARA 0005677).

come to Germany to work and become citizens. 306 A
few months later, Schmidt asked Sorensen for a loan of
six tool designers for a maximum of six months
because Fo r d -We r ke 's engineering department wa s
working 60 hours per week due to the labor shortage.
Sorensen replied that it was impossible. Schmidt
explained that not only was there a short age of
engineers and draftsmen, but new re g u l at i o n s
prohibited hiring workers away from competitors. He
added that many people who under normal conditions
never would have been put to work in an automobile
factory were being trained to work at Ford-Werke. 307

The use of foreign and forced labor at Ford-Werke
began in 1940, and generally followed the same pattern
as at other industrial facilities in Germany. Foreigners
from Eastern and Western Europe, as well as Italian and
French POWs were put to work at Ford-Werke. These
men and women lived in barracks constructed by Ford-Werke
adjacent to its plant site, in what became known
in Cologne as the "Ford camp." 308 After the Reichsbahn
[the German railways], Ford-Werke was the next largest
employer of forced workers in Cologne. 309 Late in the

war, men from the concentration camp Buchenwald
worked at Ford-Werke as slave laborers. (See Section
7.7.)

Until 1940, only German laborers were employed at
the Cologne plant, according to a postwar report by
Ford-Werke manager Erhard Vitger. 310 In September
1940, the plant was working at 100 percent capacity in
spare parts manufacturing, while assembly operations
were at approximately 50 percent capacity. The chief
obstacle to increased production was an acute shortage
of skilled labor. 311 During that summer, Ford-Werke's
Berlin office had been contacted by a representative of
R e i ch Minister Hermann G�ring and asked ab o u t
supplying up to 10,000 specially equipped V-8 motors
within three months or sooner. Schmidt recalled that,
"material and labor were assigned to us" for the
production of what turned out to be motors for landing
barges. 312 By the end of September 1940, an American
official at Cologne reported that the Cologne plant was
exclusively turning out motors for use on barges. 313
(See Section 6.3.) 75
75 Page 76 77
50
R e s e a r c h F i n d i n g s Ab o u t Fo r d -We r k e U n d e r t h e Na z i R e g i m e
3 1 4 F M C, A R -7 5 -6 2 -6 1 6 , B ox 79, Custodian Report (FMC
0001023). In a postwar letter to Lord Perry, Schmidt wrote, "In
September 1940, many of our employees were called to the
colours and had to be replaced by whatever was available." See
NARA, RG 407, Entry 368B, Box 1032, Schneider Report,
Exhibit 204, Schmidt to Perry, May 28,1945 (NARA 0000481-
0000485).

3 1 5 Fo r d -We r ke Records, Letter to Vi t g e r, J u ly 8, 1946 (FW
0022372-0022377). According to historian Ulrich Herbert,
half of the 2 million foreigners working in Germany in 1940
were French POWs, and in September 1940 French POWs
constituted nearly 10 percent of the total German work force.
Also according to Herbert, the presence of the French changed
German attitudes toward foreign labor. They were dispersed in
small groups throughout the country as fa rmhands and
industrial skilled labor. Others were deployed in platoons of
roofers and glaziers who went from city to city repairing bomb
damage. Consequently, these POWs had contact with the
G e rman populace, and enjoyed increasing freedom of
movement. See Herbert, H i t l e r 's Fo reign Wo rk e r s, pp. 96, 108 and
124-125.

3 1 6 NARA, RG 407, Entry 368B, Box 1032, Schneider Report,
Exhibit 204, Schmidt to Perry, May 28, 1945 (NARA 0000481-
0000485).

3 1 7 HAStK, Acc. 606/ 1, Report of the Cologne 17 th Police Precinct,
June 18, 1949 (HASK 0111).

3 1 8 NARA, RG 84, Entry 3126, Box 76, Memo on visit to Portugal
of the manager of the Ford Motor Company plant at Cologne,
Germany, June 9,1943 (NARA 0003830-0003832). For more
information on Western workers at Ford-Werke, see HStAD, NW
1048/ 34/ 272, Affidavit of Kaj Meyer, July 23, 1945 (HSAD
3073); HAStK, Acc. 606/ 1, International Tracing Service List of
Camps -Cologne, July 1949 (HASK 0082-0118); and HStAD,
Rep 118/ 1179, Investigation of V�lker et al. for Murder, 1946-
1952 (HSAD 0152-0176).

3 1 9 NARA, RG 407, Entry 368B, Box 1032, Schneider Report,
Exhibit 183A, B r a ch to Sch m i d t , June 12, 1945 (NA R A
0000437 and 0000455; for English translation, see NARA
0000438).

3 2 0 The terms " R u s s i a n " and " E a s t e rn " often we re used
interchangeably in Germany throughout the war to describe
workers from all parts of the Soviet Union. From February
1 9 4 3 , Fo r d -We r ke 's monthly financial statements began
classifying all civilian wo r kers from the East, i n c l u d i n g
Russians, as Eastern workers.

3 2 1 Fo r d -We r ke Records, Grass to Vi t g e r, J u ly 8, 1946 (FW
0022372-0022377). See also HStAD, NW 1048/ 34/ 272,
Translation of Report by Wierscheim, December 26, 1945
(HSAD 3089-3093).

3 2 2 ELDE, Z10.639, Oral history of L. S., September 10,1996 (ELDE
0 0 0 0 4 5 9 -0 0 0 0 4 7 3 ; for English translat i o n , see ELDE
0000906); ELDE, Z10.615, Oral history of S. S., September 13,
1995 (ELDE 0000256-0000274; for English translation, see
ELDE 0000632); E L D E , Z 1 0 . 6 3 3 , Oral history of T. N. ,
September 12, 1996 (ELDE 0000233-0000255; for English
translation, see ELDE 0000532). Ford Motor Company was not
involved in these interviews. They were conducted through EL-DE
House, a museum, research and educational facility in
Cologne. Former forced workers who had labored in Cologne
during the war were invited to return to the city for oral history
interviews conducted through EL-DE House during the 1990s.
The building houses the National Socialist Documentation
Center and a permanent exhibit on Cologne under National
Socialism as well as a memorial to prisoners of the Cologne
Gestapo, which had been located in the building. EL-DE, or
ELDE, is from the initials (L. D.) of the building's first owner.

3 2 3 Ford-Werke Records, Financial Ledger, January 1942-September
1944 (FW 0007011-0007890).

The first POWs, totaling "between 100 and 200,"
started working at Ford-Werke in September 1940. 314
According to one source, these POWs were French. 315
In a postwar letter to Lord Percival Perry of Ford of
Britain, Schmidt reported that 200 French POWs were
employed at Ford-Werke in 1941. Schmidt added that
most of these POWs were men picked for the tool and
machine shop. 316 A 1949 investigation by a police
officer in the city of Cologne reported that a POW camp
existed at Ford-Werke from 1942 to 1945, housing "on
average eighty to ninety prisoners" who were French. 317

Over the course of the war, Ford-Werke employed
wo r kers from We s t e rn European countries under
G e rman occupat i o n . These " We s t e rn wo r ke r s "

included Dutch, French and Belgian laborers. 318 There
is no clear indication when the first Western workers
arrived at the plant.

Po s t war re p o rts indicate that the first civilians fro m
E a s t e rn Europe began working at Fo r d -We r ke in the
s p ring of 1942. An internal Fo r d -We r ke memorandum
w ritten in June 1945 stat e d , "As far as we can
re m e m b e r, the first Russian men and women came to us
in March 1942." 3 1 9 Other postwar documents re p o rt e d
t h at the Eastern 3 2 0 wo r kers arri ved in A p ril 1942. 3 2 1 I n
oral history interv i ews conducted during the 1990s,
s everal Russian and Ukrainian fo rmer wo r kers re c a l l e d
a rriving between A p ril and June 1942. 3 2 2 Wa rt i m e
financial records from Fo r d -We r ke re p o rted 320 Eastern
wo r kers in May 1942, with the numbers increasing each
month to a maximum of 900 wo r kers in October 1943.
B e t ween November 1943 and August 1944, the nu m b e r
of Eastern wo r kers indicated in these records va ri e d
b e t ween 777 and 882. 3 2 3

Italian Military Internees (IMIs) arrived at the plant
in the fall of 1943, shortly after Italy's surrender to the 76
76 Page 77 78
51
Fo r e i g n a n d Fo r c e d L a b o r a t Fo r d -We rk e
3 2 4 NARA, RG 407, Entry 368B, Box 1032, Schneider Report,
Exhibit 18A, Letter from Buchwald to the Gestapo Cologne,
November 8, 1943 (NARA 0000076).

3 2 5 Ford-Werke Records, Financial Ledger, January 1942-September
1944 (FW 0007011-0007890). See also FMC, AR-75-62-616,
Box 79, Custodian Report (FMC 0001023); ELDE, Oral history
of M. M., September 8, 1998, (ELDE 0000162-0000186; for
English translat i o n , see ELDE 0000201); and IWM, F D
4369/ 45, Folder A, Staff report summary, September 1, 1944
(IWM 0000471). All these sources indicate that Italian Military
I n t e rn e e s , or POW s , we re classified as ordinary wo r ke r s
beginning in September 1944. However, one source suggests
this may have occur red in the spring of 1944; see NARA, RG
407, Entry 368B, Box 1032, Schneider Report, Exhibit 183A,
Memo from Brach to Schmidt, June 12,1945 (NARA 0000437
and 0000455; for English translation, see NARA 0000438).

3 2 6 E L D E , Oral history of M. M., September 8, 1998 (ELDE
0000162-0000186; for English translation, see ELDE 0000198-
0000203): "Our group had 500 men, and they sent us to Ford.
� How do you know there were exactly 500? ... They gave us
work numbers that went from 15.001 through 15.500." M. M.
also said," Yes, there were five hundred ... anyone who got sick
was replaced by someone new."

3 2 7 NARA, RG 407, Entry 368B, Box 1032, Schneider Report,
Exhibit 183A, Memo from Brach to Schmidt, June 12, 1945
(NARA 0000437 and 0000455; for English translation, see
NARA 0000438); FMC, AR-75-62-616, Box 79, Custodian
Report, (FMC 0001023).

3 2 8 Fo r d -We r ke Records, Financial Ledger, Ja nu a ry 1942 -September
1944 (FW 0007011-0007890). P roviding an accurate number of forced and foreign workers is further

complicated by the fact that different categories of workers were not always referred to in the same way. The term
"prisoner," for example, was not restricted to POWs but sometimes was used synonymously with "people working at
the plant not of their own free will." In the postwar period, some Ford-Werke employees referred to forced laborers as
"displaced persons." The available documentation does not allow for the tracking of individual workers, making an
evaluation of work force turnover difficult. See FMC, AR-98-213541, Box 131, Perry Report, September 19, 1946 (FMC
0 0 0 0 9 1 7 -0 0 0 0 9 1 8 ) ; NA R A , RG 260, P ro p e rty Division, Property Control and External Assets Branch, Box 546, File:
Ford-Werke, Memo to files by Rains, June 13, 1945 (NARA 0000582-0000583); HStAD, NW 1048/ 34/ 272, Testimony of
Dr. Wenzel, December 16, 1945 (HSAD 3060); and Herbert, H i t l e r 's Fo reign Wo rk e r s, pp. 105-116.

3 2 9 WNRC, Acc. 299-68A-0243, Box 536, File W17536, Advisory
Board Meeting Minutes, August 17, 1942 (DOJ 0011161; for
English translation, see DOJ 0011167). In the English version,
the German Gefangenen [prisoners] is translated incorrectly as
" p risoners of wa r " [ K ri e g s g e fa n g e n e n ] . While the term
"Gefangenen" is usually translated as "prisoners" or "captives,"
it might be used here to refer to foreign workers. Although
both the German and English versions are unclear, they appear
to indicate that foreign workers made up more than one-fourth
of the work force at this point.

3 3 0 WNRC, Acc. 299-68A-0243, Box 536, File W17536, Schmidt to
the Reich Commissioner, October 13,1942 (DOJ 0011012; for English translation, see DOJ 0011013); Ford-Werke Records,

Financial Ledger, January 1942 � September 1944, Statistik, September 30, 1942 (FW 0007697).

3 3 1 WNRC, Acc. 299-68A-0243, Box 536, File W17536, Schmidt to
the Reich Commissioner, July 15, 1943, (DOJ 0010990; for English translation, see DOJ 0010991).

Western Allies. A November 1943 letter from Ford-Werke
to the Gestapo indicated that a further allotment
of 100 Eastern workers had been received, "within our
need, reported and approved," and that 600 Italian
POWs had been assigned to the plant. 324 Ford-Werke's
wartime ledgers recorded the population of Italian
POWs as ranging from 486 to 568 between November
1943 and August 1944, when the Italian POWs were
reclassified as civilian foreign workers. 325 In an oral
history interview in 1998, one of the Italian workers
employed by Ford-Werke during the war maintained
that the number of IMIs at Ford-Werke remained stable
at approximately 500 men through August 1944. 326
Postwar reports by Ford-Werke's management stated
that 400 Italian POWs worked at the plant. 327

7.3. Number of Foreign and Forced
Workers at Ford-Wer ke

The total number of foreign and forced laborers who
worked at Ford-Werke over the course of the war is
difficult to determine for several reasons. Some sources
provide general approximations; others give precise
numbers, but only for selected groups or for a narrow

time period. However, according to the wartime
monthly ledgers and balance sheets from Ford-Werke,
the highest number of foreign and forced workers at
any point during the war was approximately 2,000.
This peak occurred in August 1944. 328

In some other re c o r d s , t h e re are re fe rences to
numbers of workers, including foreign and forced
workers, during 1942 and 1943. In August 1942, the
Ford-Werke Board of Advisors discussed the need to
employ still more "prisoners," in particular Russians. 329
In October 1942, S chmidt re p o rted to the Reich
Commissioner for the Treatment of Enemy Property
that as of September 30, Ford-Werke's work force
nu m b e red 4, 172 people, including 570 Russian
civilian workers and 89 French POWs. 330 In July 1943,
Schmidt's quarterly report to the Reich Commissioner
indicated the total work force as of June 1943 was
4,985, including 749 Eastern workers and 79 POWs. 331 77
77 Page 78 79
52
R e s e a r c h F i n d i n g s A b o u t Fo r d -We r k e U n d e r t h e Na z i R e g i m e
3 3 2 NARA, RG 84, Entry 3126, Box 76, Memo re: Visit to Portugal
of the manager of the Ford Motor Company plant at Cologne,
Germany, June 9, 1943 (NARA 00003830-00003832). This
information was provided by Schmidt during a visit with the
management of Ford of Portugal. Schmidt also reported that of
the remaining men in the Ford-Werke work force, most were
Russians. Belgian men were next in numbers, followed by
various other nationalities.

3 3 3 WNRC, Acc. 299-68A-0243, Box 536, File W17536, Advisory
Board Meeting Minutes, July 1, 1943 (DOJ 0011103; for
English translation, see DOJ 0011230).

3 3 4 The monthly financial records sometimes refer to Russian
civilian workers and sometimes to workers from the East.
References to POWs sometimes refer specifically to French
POWs and sometimes not. Also, the numbers of other foreign
workers were not always recorded.

Also as of June 1943, Schmidt reported that half of the
employees at Ford-Werke were female. 332 In July 1943,
Schmidt reported to the board of advisors that about
half the work force was made up of fo re i g n e r s ,
including 1,200 Russians, and that most of the Russian
workers were female. 333

Internal Ford-Werke financial records � the wartime
monthly ledgers and balance sheets � included some

breakdowns on categories of foreign workers at the
plant. Internal Ford-Werke staff reports also included
some information on the work force. However, the
information for the different categories of workers was
not always reported or described systematically in these
sources. 334 Also, they provide scant information on
numbers of foreign workers, including POWs, at the
plant prior to April 1942, or after August 1944. The bar
chart, Labor Trends at Ford-Werke, shows the makeup
of the work force from January 1941 through August
1944. (See Appendix D for a table showing the month-by-
month statistical breakdowns that were available for
the period from January 1941 through December
1944.)

Total Work Force Workers of Indeterminate Nationality POWs
Italian POWs Other Foreign Workers Russian or Eastern Workers Sources: Ford-Werke Records, Financial Ledger, January 1942-September 1944 (FW 0007011-0007890); IWM, FD 4369/ 45, Folder B, Ford-Werke Staff

Reports, April 27,1942-July 17,1942 (IWM 0000283-0000297). (Note: Statistics for 1941 were presented along with 1942 statistics in the 1942 records.)
In the chart above, the numbers of workers have been tabulated in a manner identical to that outlined in the table in Appendix D. The "Workers of Indeterminate
Nationality" designation is used in this chart where precise information concerning the makeup of the "Workers on the wage rolls" was not recorded for the line item on
the balance sheet. This category primarily includes Germans.

Labor Tr ends at Ford-Wer ke 78
78 Page 79 80
53
Fo r e i g n a n d Fo r c e d L a b o r a t Fo r d -We rk e
3 3 5 One of the first postwar communications from Ford-Werke to
Lord Perry of Ford of Britain indicates that 800 Russians were
employed in 1942. The report further states that by 1943, 400
Italian men worked for Ford-Werke Cologne; see NARA, RG
407, Entry 368B, Box 1032, Schneider Report, Exhibit 204,
Schmidt to Perry, May 28,1945 (NARA 0000481-0000485). A
report prepared by Lord Perry's office and dated September 19,
1946, provides some of the same numbers as the report cited
above; however, it pr ovides no information on the number of
French prisoners; see FMC, AR-98-213541, Box 131, Perry
R e p o rt , September 19, 1946 (FMC 0000917-0000918).
Vitger's 1946 report to Ford Motor Company breaks down the
information for the years 1943 and 1944. Vitger states that in
the fall of 1943, more than 1,000 forced workers were
employed at the plant, and by 1944, at least 2,000 of the
ave r age number of 4, 500 wo r kers on the pay roll we re
foreigners. The report further states "that 50 percent of these
[were] Russian civil[ ian] workers, the rest consisting of 25
percent war-prisoners and other foreign workers." See FMC,
AR-75-62-616, Box 79, Custodian Report,( FMC 0001023). In
1 9 4 6 , Fo r d -We r ke 's wa rtime food purchaser claimed that
"1,800 German workers received lunch, while 3,600 foreign
workers received all three meals." See Ford-Werke Records,
Grass to Vitger, July 8, 1946 (FW 0022372-0022377). In
testimony on behalf of the former plant physician, the leader of
the Russian camp wrote in 1945, "During the time more and
more east-workers were placed at the disposal of the Ford
Works, Cologne, up to the average of about 800 persons (about
270 to 300 males and the balance females) during the last 1 1 �2
years." See HStAD, NW 1048/ 34/ 272,Translation of Report by
Wierscheim, December 26, 1945 (HSAD 3089-3093).

3 3 6 NARA, RG 338, Entry 42389, Box 3, File: 15th Daily Reports 9
Mar-12 May '45, Detachment E1H2 Daily Report No. 3, March
12, 1945 (NARA 0004880-0004881).

3 3 7 NARA, RG 260, Economics Division, I. G. Farben Control Office,
Box 24, unlabeled file, Memo to files on conversation with
Vitger, June 11,1945 (NARA 0006980-0006982).

3 3 8 IWM, G e rm a ny Basic Handbook (Ministry of Economic Warfare,
1944), Part II, Section R, p. 12 (IWM 0000036). From the
A r b e i t s a m t , the foreign labor applications went to a department
of the German Labor Front known as the Office for Labor
Deployment. Those that were approved went to the regional
labor office. If the requirements of any given request could be
met from within the region, arrangements were made for the
transfer of labor to the requesting company. If there was
insufficient foreign labor available, the application was sent to
the Reich Ministry of Labor, where it was handled by an office
that kept a card index showing work force data on all the firms
employing foreign labor.

3 3 9 Herbert, H i t l e r 's Fo reign Wo rk e r s, pp. 167-87. See also the
explanations given at the Nuremberg trials, BA-K, All. Proz.
2/ FC 6126 P, Interrogation of Michael Schrieber, August 28,
1946 (BAK 0074-0106).

3 4 0 NA R A , RG 260, P ro p e rty Division, P ro p e rty Control and
External Assets Branch, Box 546, File: Ford-Werke, Memo from
Rains, June 13, 1945 (NARA 0000582).

Po s t war re p o rts on the numbers of fo re i g n e r s
working at the plant provide even less precise figures
than the wa rtime ledgers. 3 3 5 In March 1945,
immediately after the capture of Cologne, Schmidt
described the work force at the plant to American
military investigators. He stated that in the third
quarter of 1944, the work force was composed of a
"total of 5,000, consisting of 800 on salary roll, [the]
balance of payroll [consisted of] 2,000 Germans, 2,200
foreigners of which 800 were Russians, 400 Italians
and [the] balance Dutch , F re n ch and Belgian." 3 3 6
Erhard Vitger also was questioned about the numbers of
foreign workers, and during his interview, he showed
the Americans some documents. A memorandum
prepared by U. S. military investigators reported that one
of those documents indicated that approximately 40
percent of the total workers in the plant during 1943
and 1944 were foreigners. About one-third of the
fo reign wo r kers we re POWs (pri m a ri ly Russians),
while another one-third we re Russian civilians,
according to that document. 337

7.4. Obtaining Foreign and
Forced Workers

Companies went through an application process to
employ foreign labor. A detailed form describing the
conditions of employment and the reasons for needing
the foreign labor was submitted to the local labor office
[Arbeitsamt]. The application was then forwarded for
approval by other government labor offices before
workers were assigned. 338 Similarly, to retain and
maintain their work forces, companies reported their
needs � based on the orders they had received � to the
labor office. This was standard procedure not only for
forced and foreign workers, but also for German
personnel. 339 When asked in a postwar interrogation
how foreign workers and POWs were obtained at Ford-Werke,
Robert Schmidt explained that the government
asked the combine of automobile firms how much it
could produce if it were "given a certain number of DPs
[displaced persons] for laborers. After consultation the
combine informed the Speer ministry and the laborers
were ultimately sent" to the plants. 340 In oral history
i n t e rv i ews conducted in the 1990s, some fo rm e r
Eastern workers recalled being sent to Germany via
train and initially arriving at transit camps, where Ford-We
r ke employees selected them for work at the 79
79 Page 80 81
54
R e s e a r c h F i n d i n g s Ab o u t Fo r d -We r k e U n d e r t h e Na z i R e g i m e
3 4 1 See ELDE, Z10.617, Oral history of I. K., September 16, 1995
(ELDE 0000065-0000087; for English translation, see ELDE
0000661); ELDE, Z10.665, Oral history of N. S., September 8,
1998 (ELDE 0000391-0000401; for English translation, see
ELDE 0000615-0000621). A 1942 Ford-Werke financial audit
reported that the company paid RM 30,925 for the transport of
Russian civilian workers to Cologne; see BA-L, R 87/ 6210,
Audit by Knipprath for Business Year 1942, (BAL 7555 and BAL
7559).

3 4 2 IWM, FD 4369/ 45, Folder B, Stoecker to Schmidt, July 4,1942
(IWM 0000183-0000184).

3 4 3 NA R A , RG 260, P ro p e rty Division, P ro p e rty Control and
External Assets Branch, Box 546, File: Ford-Werke, memo to
files by Rains, June 13, 1945 (NARA 0000582-0000583);
Ford-Werke Records, Financial Ledger, January 1942-September
1944 (FW 0007011-0007890).

3 4 4 For a discussion of Nazi racial hierarchy ideology and
regulations, see Herbert, H i t l e r 's Fo reign Wo rk e r s, pp. 202-204, and
Burleigh and Wippermann, The Racial Stat e , pp. 44-74.

3 4 5 NARA, RG 407, Entry 368B, Box 1032, Schneider Report,
Exhibit 183, Memo from Brach to Schmidt, June 12, 1945
(NARA 0000437 and 0000455; for English translation, see
NARA 0000438). Some companies adopted the policy of
paying their Eastern workers with camp money that could be
used only for purchases on the plant site; see Herbert, H i t l e r 's
Fo reign Wo rk e r s, p. 185.

3 4 6 F M C, A R -7 5 -6 2 -6 1 6 , B ox 79, Custodian Report , ( F M C
0001023). Beginning in January 1943, several agreements
were reached between the Vichy regime's leader, Pierre Laval,
and the German Plenipotentiary for Labor Deployment, Fritz
Sauckel, regarding French POWs. These include a "liberalized
statute" whereby some POWs were immediately reclassified as
civilian wo r ke r s , and a re c r uitment exchange pro g r a m
stipulating that the German government released two POWs
and reclassified a third for every three new French civilian
workers sent to Germany. See Herbert, H i t l e r 's Fo reign Wo rk e r s, pp.
273-274, and MacKenzie, "The Treatment of Prisoners of War in
World War II," pp. 500-501. Available documentation does not
indicate under which program the Ford-Werke POWs were
reclassified.

facility. 341 (A different process was required for the use
of concentration camp labor. See Section 7.7.)

An internal Fo r d -We r ke document from 1942
reported that the company made efforts to recruit
Belgian workers from the Ford of Belgium facility in
Antwerp, which was administered by Ford-Werke.
These efforts included a plan to establish a training
program for Ford-Werke at Ford of Belgium, although
Fo r d -We r ke officials expressed concerns that the
Belgian workers might be assigned to other companies
by the local Labor Office once they had completed the
training program. 342

7.5. Compensation for Foreign and
Forced Workers at Ford-Wer ke

Few records are available regarding compensation
for foreign and forced labor at Ford-Werke. Pay ledgers
were included in the financial documents taken from
the plant by the U. S. military investigative team, but the
ledgers that survived the ensuing years do not provide
enough information to calculate wage rates for foreign
workers. 343 Postwar reports and interrogations of Ford-We
r ke managers do provide some info rm at i o n ,
although the picture is incomplete. The best available
information regarding foreign workers' wages and
other Ford-Werke pay rates is shown in a table, Ford-Werke
Wage Schedule During World War II, on page 56.
In accordance with compulsory Nazi re g u l at i o n s
governing pay scales for foreign workers, male workers

from Western Europe received the highest pay (in line
with male wo r kers from Germ a ny ) , while fe m a l e
workers from Eastern Europe received the lowest pay. 344

An internal Ford-Werke memorandum dated June
12, 1945, and addressed to Schmidt states that French
POWs received RM 0.80 per hour in wages, with 60
percent of that amount paid to S t a l ag Bonn in
accordance with German POW regulations and the
balance paid to the French workers in POW money. 345
These fi g u res are consistent with Vi t g e r 's postwa r
reports to Ford Motor Company. Vitger's reports also
state that as of September 1943, French POWs were
c l a s s i fied and paid as " o r d i n a ry wo r k m e n ." T h i s
occurred as a result of a decision by German officials in
c o n s u l t ation with the Vi c hy regime in Germ a n -occupied
France. 346

Postwar reports are in general agreement about the
initial pay rates for Italian POWs and the subsequent
change in their status and pay in 1944. The June 1945
memorandum to Schmidt states that the Italian POWs
initially received RM 0.60 to RM 0.70 per hour, with
60 percent of the wages paid to Stalag Bonn in
accordance with the POW re g u l ations and the
remaining 40 percent paid in POW money. The memo
indicates, however, that "as far as we can recall," in the
spring of 1944, the Italian POWs began to be regarded
as civilians and were paid RM 0.80 to RM 1.00 per
h o u r, depending on age and effi c i e n c y. T h e i r
deductions were the same as for the German workers 80
80 Page 81 82
55
Fo r e i g n a n d Fo r c e d L a b o r a t Fo r d -We rk e
3 4 7 NARA, RG 407, Entry 368B, Box 1032, Schneider Report,
Exhibit 183, Memo from Brach to Schmidt, June 12, 1945
(NARA 0000437 and 0000455; for English translation, see
NARA 0000438), Exhibit 20, Memo from Schmidt, July 18,
1945 (NARA 0000083-0000085).

3 4 8 F M C, A R -7 5 -6 2 -6 1 6 , B ox 79, Custodian Report (FMC
0001023).
3 4 9 NARA, RG 407, Entry 368B, Box 1032, Schneider Report,
Exhibit 20, Memo from Sch m i d t , J u ly 18, 1945 (NA R A
0000085), Exhibit 183A, Brach to Schmidt, June 12, 1945
(NARA 0000437 and 0000455; for English translation, see
NARA 0000438); FMC, AR-75-62-616, Box 79, Custodian
Report (FMC 0001023).

3 5 0 FMC, AR-98-213546, Box 2, File: History of Plant -All Aspects,
1 9 2 5 -1 9 4 6 , Vitger Report , September 24, 1946 (FMC
0002046-0002047).

3 5 1 Ford-Werke Records, Vitger to Albert, November 19,1943 (FW
0002445).

3 5 2 NA R A , RG 260, P ro p e rty Division, P ro p e rty Control and
External Assets Branch, Box 546, File: Ford-Werke, memo to
files by Rains, June 13, 1945 (NARA 0000582).

3 5 3 NARA, RG 407, Entry 368B, Box 1032, Schneider Report,
Exhibit 183A, Memo from Brach to Schmidt, June 12, 1945
(NARA 0000437 and 0000455; for English translation, see
NARA 0000438); FMC, AR-75-62-616, Box 79, Custodian
Report (FMC 0001023).

3 5 4 NARA, RG 407, Entry 368B, Box 1032, Schneider Report,
Exhibit 184, Memo from Buchwald to Grandi, August 20,1943
(NARA 0000438-0000439).

the plant. A Russian worker under the first pay plan
received about a third of the total pay that was due,
with the rest going for taxes (50 percent) and food and
lodging, which were provided by Ford-Werke. Men
were paid more than women. Schmidt also said that
the pay for Eastern workers eventually approached that
of the German workers. 352 Other postwar documents
indicate that Eastern workers' wages were paid monthly,
with about half of the amount deducted for taxes and
an additional RM 45 taken out for food and lodging,
leaving approximately RM 30 to RM 40 per month left
over after deductions. These documents also indicate
that a new pay schedule for Eastern workers was
implemented in the autumn of 1943, under which
workers received higher wages, health insurance and a
reduced level of deductions amounting to 50 percent of
earnings. 353

In August 1943, Eastern workers complained that
they were not receiving all of their pay. An internal
investigation revealed that in nearly 30 cases reviewed
up to that point, not enough hours had been recorded
and some people were not mentioned at all in the
reports recording time worked. Werner Buchwald, a
Ford-Werke employee and the plant counterintelligence
liaison, asked the plant wage office to clear up the
matter and prepare payment immediately. 354

Postwar financial records from Ford-Werke include
references to monies owed to former foreign workers.
The December 1945 balance sheet identified items not
under the control of the business. This category
included unclaimed wages and salaries of fo re i g n
workers employed at Ford-Werke during the war. The
entry indicates that RM 63,419 in "[ s] avings deposits
of foreign workers employed during the war at Ford-Werke
AG" had been credited to a blocked account at
the Deutsche Bank, Cologne, by order of the military

(25 percent.) 347 Vitger's reports indicate the Italian
POWs were initially paid RM 0.65 per hour, although
he indicated that they were reclassified as civilian
workers in September 1944. 348

These postwar records suggest Western workers at
Ford-Werke received roughly the same wages as the
German workers, 349 whose pay ranged from RM 1.00
per hour to RM 1.70 per hour. The Western workers
who lived on the grounds had RM 1.50 per day
deducted for living expenses. 350

In a November 1943 report to Albert regarding
Ford-Werke business matters for October 1943, Vitger
wrote that the hourly wage rate for manufacturing
labor at Ford-Werke had decreased from RM 1.28 per
hour in January 1943 to RM 1.22 per hour in October.
The hourly wage rate for all labor at Ford-Werke
declined from RM 1.23 to RM 1.17 during the same
period, he wrote. Vitger attributed the decline in these
rates to the increased use of women and foreigners. 351
Government regulations required that Eastern workers
be paid at the lowest rates of all nationalities working in
Germany during the war. During an interrogation by
American military inspectors in June 1945, Schmidt
said that the system for paying the workers changed
gradually for the better after they were first brought to 81
81 Page 82 83
56
R e s e a r c h F i n d i n g s Ab o u t Fo r d -We r k e U n d e r t h e Na z i R e g i m e
3 5 5 FMC, AR-98-213546, Box 2, File: History of Plant -All Aspects,
1 9 2 5 -1 9 4 6 , Vitger Report , September 24, 1946 (FMC
0002047). Under Wage and Salary Levels in the Vitger report,
" N o n -P ro d u c t i ve lab o r " was described as " c l e a n i n g, c a r
washing, etc." "Non-Productive departments" were considered
to be such as "Stock-Dept., Chauffeurs, Factory-Service, etc."
"Productive departments" were considered to be "machine-hall,
tool-job, assembly-line, etc." See Section 7.6.1. for more
details on work assignments at Ford-Werke during the war.

3 5 6 French POWs were classified and paid as "ordinary workmen"
beginning in September 1943, according to FMC, AR-75-62-
616, Box 79, Custodian Report (FMC 0001023).

3 5 7 These were the initial pay rates. In 1944, Italian POWs were
reclassified and paid as "ordinary workmen." See FMC, AR-98-
213546, Box 2, File: History of Plant -All Aspects, 1925-1946,
Vitger Report, September 24, 1946 (FMC 0002046).

3 5 8 R ates ranged according to ag e ; see FMC, A R -9 8 -2 1 3 5 4 6 , B ox
2 , F i l e : H i s t o ry of Plant -All A s p e c t s , 1 9 2 5 -1 9 4 6 , Vi t g e r
R e p o rt , September 24, 1946 (FMC 0002046).

3 5 9 F rom this time onwa r d , E a s t e rn/ Russian wo r kers we re paid
"according to sex, age and efficiency RM 0. 60 to RM 1.20 per
h o u r." See NA R A , RG 407, E n t ry 368B, B ox 1032, S ch n e i d e r
R e p o rt , Exhibit 183A, Memo from Brach to Sch m i d t , June 12,
1945 (NARA 0000437 and 0000455; for English translat i o n ,
see NARA 0000438).

3 6 0 FMC, AR 75-62-616, Box 79, Custodian Report, Separate
Schedule of all Assets and Liabilities of Balance Sheet, December
31,1945 (FMC 0006056-0006057). The amount was listed as
an asset. Vitger's postwar report confirmed that the savings of
displaced persons in the amount of RM63,419 were being held
at the Deutsche Bank; see FMC, AR-75-62-616, Box 79,
Custodian Report (FMC 0000989). See also Ford-Werke
Records, Unclaimed Wages and Salaries of Foreign and Migrant
Workers, no date (FW 0006052-0006061) for a breakdown of
the RM63,419 into the amounts owed to individual workers by
nationality. According to historian Edward Homze, German
authorities during the war encouraged foreign workers to place
some of their wages in savings accounts to be transferred to
their families abroad. The Germans were hoping to prevent the
fo reign wo r ke r s ' wages from entering the alre a dy heav i ly

government. 360 During 1947, these and other funds,
totaling RM 109,292.66 and described as "Savings of
displaced persons," we re shown as having been
transferred to a special account at the Deutsche Bank.

Ford-Wer ke Wage Schedule During World War II
Source: FMC, AR-98-213546, Box 2,
File: History of Plant -All Aspects,
1925-1946, Vitger Report, September
24, 1946 (FMC 0002042-0002055).

Wage Rate (RM)
Wages for Germans (per hour) Low High
Non-productive 355 labor 1.00 1.20
Non-productive departments 1.00 1.50
Productive departments 1.20 1.70

Wages for other laborers (per hour)
Western workmen 1.00 1.70
French POWs 356 0.80 0.80
Italian POWs 357 0.65 0.65
East workmen/ Russian civilian 0.32 0.78
workers (men) (pre-autumn 1943)
East/ Russian civilian workers 0.24 0.59
(women) 358 (pre-autumn 1943)
East workmen/ Russian civilian 0.60 1.20
workers (autumn 1943 and afterward) 359

Salaries of German employees (monthly RM) Low High
Group 1: Non-skilled employees 125 325
Group 2: Skilled employees-dependent jobs 130 475
Group 3: Skilled employees-independent jobs 150 575
Group 4: Assistant department heads 600 750
Group 5: Department heads 800+ 82
82 Page 83 84
57
Fo r e i g n a n d Fo r c e d L a b o r a t Fo r d -We rk e
depleted consumer market. In the case of Eastern workers,
h oweve r, H e r b e rt notes that their low wages effe c t i ve ly
prevented them from saving any substantial amounts. See
Homze, Fo reign Labor in Nazi Germ a ny, pp. 245-246, and Herbert,
H i t l e r 's Fo reign Wo rk e r s, p. 91.

3 6 1 Ford-Werke Records, Main Account Book 1947, Deutsche Bank
K�ln -Savings of Displaced Persons (FW 0015156). The funds
were transferred in three stages: RM 63,419.31 was sent on
January 1, 1947; RM 45,402.35 was transferred on May 31,
1947; and a final transfer of RM 471 occur red on September
30,1947. In May 1952, the Allied High Commission asked the
West German government to accelerate the collection of back
p ay owed to fo rmer POWs and fo reign wo r ke r s. ( T h e
commission, consisting of representatives from Britain, France
and the United Stat e s , was cre ated in 1949 with the
establishment of the German Federal Republic, also known as
West Germany. The commission replaced the former postwar
Allied military government in Germany.) Back pay sums
collected in response to the commission's request were to be
transferred to accounts or representatives in Germany to be
nominated by the entitled persons. In September 1952, the
West German government reported to the commission that the
question of payment of back pay for former POWs and foreign
workers had been settled at the London Debt Conference.
Former workers were entitled to receive the amounts owed to
them in five equal yearly installments starting in January 1953.
Under terms of the agreement, the amounts that had been
placed in financial institutions on behalf of the former workers
could be applied for and included in the settlement. See PRO,
FO 1036/ 932, Slater to Blankenhorn, May 5, 1952 (PRO
0000165-0000168) and PRO, FO 1036/ 932, von Tr�tzschler to
Joos, September 18, 1952 (PRO 0000171).

3 6 2 F M C, A R -7 5 -6 2 -6 1 6 , B ox 79, Custodian Report (FMC
0001023).

3 6 3 NARA, RG 84, Entry 3126, Box 76, Memo on visit to Portugal
of the manager of the Ford Motor Company plant at Cologne,
Germany, June 9,1943 (NARA 0003830-0003832).

3 6 4 WNRC, Acc. 299-68A-0243, Box 536, File W17536, Advisory
Board Meeting Minutes, July 3,1943 (DOJ 0011103-0011104;
for English translation, see DOJ 0011230). Schmidt said that it
was necessary to have people work long hours to avoid losing
more workers to the military draft.

3 6 5 One of the Italian Military Intern e e s , M . M . , re m e m b e r s
working nine hours daily in the first few months and 10 hours
daily toward the end of the war; see ELDE, Oral history of M. M.,
September 8, 1998 (ELDE 0000162-0000186; for English
Translation, see ELDE 0000201). Others, mostly Russians or
Po l e s , recall 12-hour wo r k d ay s ; s e e, for example, E L D E ,
Z 1 0 . 5 6 9 , Oral history of I. A., October 15, 1992 (ELDE
0000275-0000297; for English translation, see ELDE 0000515)
and ELDE, Z10.672, Oral history of I. K., September 16, 1995
(ELDE 0000065-0000087; for English translation, see ELDE
0000662).

3 6 6 All former foreign workers recall being part of the production
process. See, for example, ELDE, Oral history of I. A., October
15,1992 (ELDE 0000275-0000297; for English translation, see
ELDE 0000512) and ELDE, Oral history of K. F., September 12
1995 (ELDE 0000127-0000143; for English translation, see
ELDE 0000759).

3 6 7 See, for example, BA-K, Z 42 V/ 3843, Court documents for trial
of F. V. (BAK 0115-0177); Ford-Werke Records, Personnel File
of H. W. (FW 0021964-0021987) and Personnel File of W. H.
(FW 0023145-0023158).

3 6 8 IWM, FD 4369/ 45, Folder B, Eastern workers staff report, April
to August 1942 (IWM 0000289-0000290).
3 6 9 IWM, FD 4369/ 45, Folder B, Streit to Brach, October 14,1943
(IWM 0000185).

These funds do not appear in Ford-Werke's financial
records after 1947. 361

7.6. Conditions for Foreign and Forced
Workers at Ford-Wer ke

7.6.1. Working Hours and Tasks
The average workweek at Ford-Werke for all workers
grew longer as the war continued. In his postwar
report, Vitger wrote that before the war, Ford-Werke
was working five days, or 40 hours, per week. In 1940,
working hours in the factory were set at 48 hours per
week; they were raised to 54 hours per week at the

beginning of 1943. In 1944, work hours were raised
again, this time to 57.5 hours. The last increase took
effect in August 1944. From this time on, 60 hours
were worked per week. 362 During his visit to Portugal
in June 1943, Robert Schmidt emphasized that, "all
Ford plants in Europe are working 24 hours a day." 363 In
July 1943, Schmidt reported to the board of advisors
that everyone at the Cologne plant was working 54 to
60 hours a week. 364 In interviews conducted in the
1990s, former forced workers remembered working
between 10 and 12 hours a day. 365

Most former forced workers describe their tasks as
manual labor in production. 366 Postwar documentation,
mostly denazification and personnel files, reported that
Germans and foreigners worked together in all aspects
of the work. 367 Internal Ford-Werke documents provide
further details. Monthly employment reports from
1942 indicate that Eastern workers were assigned to a
variety of different departments at the facility. These
include " p ro d u c t i ve " work on the rear axle,
transmission and other assembly lines, as well as
"unproductive" work in warehouses, machine repair,
tool making, vehicle inspection, kitchen work and
general maintenance. 3 6 8 An October 1943 memo
reported that Ford-Werke planned to use some Italian
P OWs for inspection and quality control wo r k . 3 6 9 83
83 Page 84 85
58
R e s e a r c h F i n d i n g s A b o u t Fo r d -We r k e U n d e r t h e Na z i R e g i m e
3 7 0 WNRC, Acc. 299-68A-0243, Box 538, Book 38-II. a-1944 (2) -locations
other than Cologne, Invoice No. 802379, December
31,1944 (DOJ 0006024-0006026; for English translation, see
DOJ 0006031-0006032). In the English translation, Gfm. is
recognized as Gefangenen (prisoners) and translated as such. It
seems more like ly, t h o u g h , t h at Gfm. m e a n s
Gefolgschaftsmitglieder (work force).

3 7 1 See IWM, FD 4369/ 45, Folder A , Staff re p o rt summary,
November 19, 1943 (IWM 0000367), Staff labor report, January 7,1944 (IWM 0000390), Staff labor report, March 24,

1944 (IWM 0000423) and Staff labor report, May 18, 1944 (IWM 0000440).

3 7 2 In 1940, RM 28,969 was spent to erect wooden barracks for a
" Fo reign Wo r ke r s ' C a m p." An additional investment of RM 24,242 was made in 1941, and a considerable extension

was necessitated in 1942, amounting to RM 831,530. The camp was equipped with an air raid shelter and a special
kitchen. In 1943, additional air raid protection was provided at a cost of RM 216,275, and roads at RM 10,255. After its
completion in 1944, the camp comprised 45 wooden buildings of different sizes totaling 749,972 square feet. See HP, Acc. 61-
000417, Box 1, German War Recovery Study, 1950, pp. 25, 28, 31-32 and 34-35 (HP 0000212,0000215, 0000218-0000219
and 0000221-0000222); Ford-Werke Records, Scheuffgen to Stadtverwaltung K�ln, September 17, 1946 (FW 0003919),
Policy with Regard to Depre c i ation of Fixed Assets (FW 0006220); ELDE, Z10.615, Oral history of S. S., September 13,
1995 (ELDE 0000256-0000274; for English translation, see ELDE 0000633); BA-L, R 87/ 6208, Audit Report by Knipprath
for 1943, (BAL 7602); HStAD, RW 54/ 104, Building Project Correspondence, January-August, 1944 (HSAD 0032-0043);
and WNRC, Acc. 299-68A-0243, Box 537, Book 13-I. b-1946 (2), Repair Invoice, May 16, 1946 (DOJ 0001509-0001522).

3 7 3 According to a British wartime summary of Nazi procedures for
e m p l oying fo reign lab o r, it was a frequent practice fo r companies to establish separate groups of huts for each nation

represented in their foreign worker camps. "The two groups of workers most often housed in special national camps are
Italians � originally privileged as important allies � and 'Eastern Workers'� always segregated as much as possible as dangerous
and inferior elements." See IWM, G e rm a ny Basic Handbook (Ministry of Economic Warfare, 1944), Part II, Section R, p. 12
(IWM 0000036). At Ford-Werke, repair invoices distinguished between a "Russian Camp," a "Camp for Foreigners" and an
"Italian Camp." See WNRC, Acc. 299-68A-0243, Box 537, Book 13-I. b-1946 (2), Repair Invoice, May 16, 1946 (DOJ
0001509-0001522). Also, postwar testimony reported that there were different work camps for civilian foreigners, POWs
and Eastern Workers; see HStAD, NW 1048/ 34/ 272, Testimony of H. H., July 30,1946 (HSAD 3056).

3 7 4 NARA, RG 407, Entry 368B, Box 1032, Schneider Report,
Exhibit 17, Memo by Schmidt on Buchwald, June 22, 1945 (NARA 0000074).

3 7 5 S chmidt said that most We s t e rn Europeans pre fe rred to live in
the camp because the food was better and the housing wa s ch e ap. In part i c u l a r, he said, t h ey felt safer in the event of

bomb at t a ck s ; see NA R A , RG 407, E n t ry 368B, B ox 1032, S chneider Report , Exhibit 20, Memo from Sch m i d t , J u ly 18,
1945 (NARA 0000083-0000085).

Toward the end of the war, in September 1944, Italians
and Germans were put to work sorting through rubble
at a Ford-Werke part warehouse in Stolberg to salvage
repairable items. 370

Italian POWs we re sent to work at companies
a f fi l i ated with Fo r d -We r ke. A staff re p o rt fro m
November 1943 shows that 44 Italian workers were
delegated to the Krupp factory, and therefore were not
listed on the report. In January 1944,approximately 70
Italian POWs originally assigned to Ford-Werke began
working for Ford-Werke supplier companies, although
they continued to be listed on the Ford-Werke staff
reports. By March 1944, approximately 80 Italians
were listed as working for supplier firms. In May 1944,
the number was about 70 Italians, with 10 Eastern
workers also listed as working at supplier companies. 371

7.6.2. Housing Conditions
Most foreign and forced workers employed at Ford-We
r ke we re housed in barr a c ks built on land

immediately to the northwest of the plant. Ford-Werke
rented the land from the city of Cologne and began
construction of the barracks in 1940. Additional
construction was done in 1941, and a more significant
expansion occurred in 1942, when additional barracks
were erected for the Russian workers. One of the
fo rmer forced wo r kers re m e m b e red building the
barracks. Multiple sources indicate the barracks were
built of wood. In October 1944, repairs were made to
the foreign workers' camp after it was damaged during
Allied bombing raids. There are several indications that
air raid shelters were available for forced and foreign
workers in the camp. 372

Ford-Werke, like most other companies employing
foreign workers, had a camp with separate sections for
the diffe rent nationalities employed at the plant,
following Nazi guidelines. 373 In a postwar memo,
Schmidt wrote that when foreign workers arrived at
German plants, the Gestapo stepped in and took over all
"political ends," which Schmidt defined as including
the housing and feeding of all workers, foreigners as
well as Germans. 374 In a separate postwar memo, he
wrote that under the Gestapo rules, Russian camps had
to be fenced and closed, but Western European camps
were open and Western Europeans could live in town if
they wanted to. 375 84
84 Page 85 86
59
Fo r e i g n a n d Fo r c e d L a b o r a t Fo r d -We rk e
3 7 6 Fo r d -We r ke Records, Financial Ledger, Ja nu a ry 1942 -September
1944 (FW 0007344 and 0007457).
3 7 7 ELDE, Z10.639, Oral history of L. S., September 10,1996 (ELDE
0 0 0 0 4 5 9 -0 0 0 0 4 7 3 ; for English translat i o n , see ELDE
0000906); ELDE, Z10.615, Oral history of S. S., September 13,
1995 (ELDE 0000256-0000274; for English translation, see
ELDE 0000635); E L D E , Z 1 0 . 6 3 3 , Oral history of T. N. ,
September 12, 1996 (ELDE 0000233-0000255; for English
translation, see ELDE 0000896); ELDE, Z10.672, Oral history of
I . K . , September 16, 1995 (ELDE 0000065-0000087; fo r
English translation, see ELDE 0000662).

3 7 8 FMC, Interview with Friedrich Wierscheim, December 8,1999
(FMC 0018603).
3 7 9 ELDE, Z10.633, Oral history of T. N., September 12,1996 (ELDE
0 0 0 0 2 3 3 -0 0 0 0 2 5 5 ; for English translat i o n , see ELDE
0000896); ELDE, Translated oral history of K. N., September 13,
1 9 9 5 , (ELDE 0000698); F M C, I n t e rv i ew with A n n a -L u i s e
Hofst�tter, December 13, 1999 (FMC 0018305).

3 8 0 U. S. bombing sur vey reports mention 37 huts; see NARA, RG
243, Entry 6, Box 687, File: 77a17, Interpretation Report No. K.
300 (R), July 18,1945 (NARA 0004500). Postwar Ford-Werke
documents describe 45 buildings; see HP, Acc. 61-000417, Box
1, German War Recovery Study, 1950, p. 31 (HP 0000218).

3 8 1 F M C, A R -7 5 -6 2 -6 1 6 ,B ox 79, Custodian Report (FMC 0000992).
As a compari s o n , Vitger quotes a fi g u re of 12, 136 square meters
(130,631 square feet) for Fo r d -We r ke 's assembly hall.

3 8 2 WNRC, Acc. 299-68A-0243, Box 536, File: W17536, Advisory
Board Meeting Minutes, July 1, 1943 (DOJ 0011104; for English translation, see DOJ 0011230).

3 8 3 FMC, AR-98-213541, Box 52, File: Audit Report -July 28,
1949, Hibberson-Platt Report, July 28, 1949, and August 1949 (FMC 0000773). In 1946, the Foreign Workers' Camp was

reconditioned and equipped with sanitary and heating facilities for employees who lost their homes during the war. See HP,
Acc. 61-000417, Box 1, German War Recovery Study, 1950, p. 103 (HP 0000292).

3 8 4 NARA, RG 407, Entry 368B, Box 1032, Schneider Report,
Exhibit 185D, Buchwald to Gestapo Cologne, July 13, 1942 (NARA 0000441; for English translation, see NARA 0005907).

Werner Buchwald was a Ford-Werke employee whose duties included plant counterintelligence to German military
intelligence and the Gestapo.
3 8 5 ELDE, Z10.616, Oral history of A. N., September 12, 1995
(ELDE 0000088-0000110; for English translation, see ELDE 0000078).

3 8 6 Herbert, H i t l e r 's Fo reign Wo rk e r s, pp. 177-179.
3 8 7 NARA, RG 407, Entry 368B, Box 1032, Report on preliminary
investigation of Ford-Werke, AG (External Assets -Germany) by Rains and Naiden, June 21, 1945 (NARA 0001173).

3 8 8 NARA, RG 407, Entry 368B, Box 1032, Schneider Report,
Exhibit 20, Memo from Sch m i d t , J u ly 18, 1945 (NA R A 0000083-0000085).

Scant information could be found regarding the
f u rnishing of the camps. Fo r d -We r ke fi n a n c i a l
documents show purchases of metal beds and lockers
for the foreign workers' camps in 1943. 376 However,
fo rmer forced wo r kers interv i ewed in the 1990s
recalled that the barracks were furnished with wooden
plank beds; some mentioned additional items,
including lockers and heating stoves. 377 There are
conflicting reports on the sanitary conditions of the
camps. In a postwar interview, the son of the head of
the Russian camp emphasized that the hy g i e n i c
situation in the barracks was good. 378 However, several
former forced workers as well as a German former
employee interviewed in the 1990s described the
barracks as infested with bugs. 379

By the end of the war, the camp for all of Ford-Werke's
forced workers consisted of some 37 to 45
barracks or huts. 380 According to Vitger's postwar
report, the total floor space available in the camp
buildings amounted to 10,500 square meters (113,021
square feet). 381 Schmidt's report to the board of
advisors on July 1, 1943, described the cluster of
residences as a specifically built barrack town. 382 In
1949, the barracks were still being used as housing for

bombed-out employe e s , although the company 's
Welfare Section was trying to find "more suitable
accommodations." 383

7.6.3. Supervision and Control of Foreign and
Forced Workers

The supervision of foreign and forced workers at
Ford-Werke was the responsibility of both the plant
guards and the Gestapo. Plant guards controlled all
foreign workers. However, as dictated by Nazi decrees,
special guards were assigned to Eastern workers. 384 In
an oral history interview conducted in the 1990s, one
former worker recalled that the Eastern, or Russian,
wo r ke r s ' camp had some Russian guards. 3 8 5 T h e
G e rman authorities promoted the practice of
supplementing German guards with select Russian
forced workers as a means of improving productivity. 386
According to a postwar A m e rican military
investigation, the Eastern worker camp at Ford-Werke
was surrounded by barbed wire. 387 In his July 1945
statements to American military authorities, Schmidt
said, "The camps for the Russians were to be fenced in
and kept closed all the time." 388 A June 1943 letter from
Ford-Werke Plant Security Chief Lieutenant K. Scheben 85
85 Page 86 87
60
R e s e a r c h F i n d i n g s A b o u t Fo r d -We r k e U n d e r t h e Na z i R e g i m e
3 8 9 NARA, RG 407, Entry 368B, Box 1032, Schneider Report,
Exhibit 185H, Scheben to Gestapo Cologne, June 1, 1943
(NARA 0000443; for English translation, see NARA 0005910).
The letter says that around 6: 45 p. m. on May 31, 1943, two
Eastern workers left the Ford-Werke camp without permission.
Outside the fence, they were told three times to stand still. One
did, but the other kept running. The officer gave off a warning
shot and once again commanded the worker to stand still.
When this was ignored, the officer followed orders and shot the
man through the left arm with a pistol. Plant security reported
the man was in medical care, and that the wound was not
serious and would not disable him from working. The letter
stated that Eastern workers knew security personnel would
shoot at anyone attempting to flee.

3 9 0 S e e, for example, E L D E , Z 1 0 . 6 3 3 , Oral history of T. N. ,
September 12, 1996 (ELDE 0000233-0000255; for English
translation, see ELDE 0000542); and ELDE, Z10.616, Oral
history of A. N. and N. S., September 12, 1995 (ELDE 0000088-
0 0 0 0 1 1 0 ; for English translat i o n , see ELDE 0000769-
0000770).

3 9 1 BA-K, Z 42 V 3843, Court documents for trial of F. V. (BAK
0128).

3 9 2 NARA, RG 407, Entry 368B, Box 1032, Schneider Report,
Exhibit 20, Memo from Sch m i d t , J u ly 18, 1945 (NA R A
0000083-000085); HAStK, Acc. 606/ 2, Report on Foreigner
Camps, June 13, 1949 (HASK 0117-0118). Mention is made
of civilian workers' camps at Kalker-Hauptstrasse 216, 272 and
296. The inhabitants, who included several Belgian laborers
working at Ford-Werke, "were allowed to move around freely.
They were only under surveillance of the foreigner police." See
also HStAD, Rep 118/ 1179, Rapport Definitiv No. 79 (HSAD
0161).

3 9 3 IWM, FD 4369/ 45, Folder A, Staff report summaries January 21
and 28,1944 (IWM 0000394 and 0000399).

3 9 4 IWM, FD 4369/ 45, Folder E, Scheid to Armaments Ministry,
July 22, 1943 (IWM 0000759-0000760).
3 9 5 IWM, FD 4369/ 45, Folder E, Order No. 12, Fritz Sauckel,
October 2, 1943 (IWM 0000627-0000628).
3 9 6 IWM, FD 4369/ 45, Folder E, Scheid to Armaments Ministry,
September 30,1943 (IWM 0000640-0000641).
3 9 7 NARA, RG 407, Entry 368B, Box 1032, Schneider Report,
Exhibit 185D, Buchwald to Gestapo Cologne, July 13, 1942
(NARA 0000441; for English translation, see NARA 0005907).

3 9 8 NA R A , RG 260, P ro p e rty Division, P ro p e rty Control and
External Assets Branch, Box 546, File: Ford-Werke, Memo from
Rains, June 13, 1945 (NARA 0000582). For information on
Josef Wi e r s ch e i m , see HStAD, NW 1048/ 41/ 1615,
Denazification File J. Wierscheim (HSAD 0190-0196). Before
the Nazi party took power in 1933, Wierscheim had been a
police officer in Frankfurt/ Main. He had been a member of the
Social Democratic Party and other organizations supportive of
the Weimar Republic, and was therefore terminated from his
job by the Nazis. In 1936, Wierscheim joined Ford-Werke's
plant securi t y. On A p ril 8, 1 9 4 5 , the Allied Military
Government recommended him "for position as police chief."
In a December 1999 interview, his son, Friedrich, said that his
father remained on the postwar police force until he retired.
F ri e d ri ch Wi e r s cheim also said that his father had been
imprisoned for two weeks after his dismissal by the Nazis and
that the only thing that saved him from a concentration camp
was his military service in World War I. See FMC, Interview
with Friedrich Wierscheim, December 8,1999 (FMC 0018603,
FMC 0018615 and FMC 0018621-0018622).

3 9 9 HStAD, NW 1048/ 34/ 272, Denazification Subcommittee 98 to
Main Committee, September 19, 1947 (HSAD 2989-2995).
The report states that Wierscheim treated foreign workers with
an "an open hand" [lockere Hand].

to the Gestapo re p o rted that one Russian forced wo r ke r
was shot and wounded by Fo r d -We r ke plant guards
when trying to leave the camp without perm i s s i o n . 3 8 9 I n
i n t e rv i ews conducted in the 1990s, some fo rmer Fo r d -We
r ke forced wo r kers from Russia and Ukraine
re m e m b e red being allowed to leave the camp in gro u p s ,
u s u a l ly on Sunday s , after having wo r ked there for some
t i m e. 3 9 0 T h e re is some indication that the camp fo r
Italian POWs also was fenced in and specially guarded. 3 9 1

Under Nazi regulations, Western European workers
were treated differently. 392 Some Western workers were
allowed vacation time and were able to return to their
homeland for a specified period. Staffing reports from
Ford-Werke in early 1944 indicate that several hundred
Western workers left for vacation and never returned. 393
These "breaches of contract" were addressed in a memo
from the armaments ministry dated July 22, 1943,
informing companies that they could apply for a ban on
vacation time for their Western workers if they were not

able to secure the punctual return of the workers by
other means. 394 A few months later, Labor Minister Fritz
Sauckel established a system whereby every member of
a group of foreign workers would have to return before
the next group could leave. 395 The new regulations did
permit leniency in the case of family emergencies. 396

O f fi c i a l ly, the supervisor of the Eastern wo r ker camp
was to be jointly determined by the Gestapo and the
DA F ( G e rman Labor Fro n t ) . H oweve r, in a July 13,
1 9 4 2 , letter to the Gestap o, Fo r d -We r ke employee and
c o u n t e rintelligence liaison We rner Buch wald indicat e d
t h at Josef Wi e r s cheim was Fo r d -We r ke 's choice to
oversee the Eastern wo r ke r s ' camp under Plant Securi t y
Chief Sch eb e n , if the Gestapo ap p rove d . 3 9 7 S ch m i d t
c o n fi rmed in 1945 that Wi e r s cheim had been in ch a rg e
of the Russians at Fo r d -We r ke. 3 9 8 A 1947 re p o rt fro m
Fo r d -We r ke 's Denazifi c ation Committee indicated that
Wi e r s cheim phy s i c a l ly disciplined fo reign wo r kers at
the plant. 399 In an oral history interview in the 1990s, 86
86 Page 87 88
61
Fo r e i g n a n d Fo r c e d L a b o r a t Fo r d -We rk e
4 0 0 ELDE, Z10.633, Oral history of T. N., September 12,1996 (ELDE
0000233-0000255; for English translation, see ELDE 0000542
and 0000548). The former worker said punishment for
stealing food, for instance, might be confinement to a detention
cell for three or four days, or not being allowed to go into the
city for three weeks.

4 0 1 ELDE, Z10.665, Oral history of N. S., September 8,1998 (ELDE
0 0 0 0 3 9 1 -0 0 0 0 4 0 1 ; for English translat i o n , see ELDE
0000621). N. S. agreed with T. N., another former forced
worker, that the plant commandant did not send anyone from
Ford-Werke to a concentration camp. In a 1999 interview,
Wierscheim's son, Friedrich, said that twice in early 1945, his
father was called in for interro g ation by the Gestap o,
presumably because he was treating the workers too well.
Friedrich Wierscheim also recalled that two Ukrainians, the
camp elders, had helped Josef Wierscheim and his wife move
into an apartment created from part of the camp medical
barracks after their home was destroyed in a bombing raid; see
FMC, Interview with Friedrich Wierscheim, December 8, 1999
(FMC 0018657, 0018664 and 0018686-0018687).

4 0 2 NARA, RG 407, Entry 368B, Box 1032, Schneider Report,
Exhibit 185E, Buchwald to Gestapo Cologne, February 25,
1943 (NARA 0000442; for English translation, see NARA
0005908).

4 0 3 ELDE, Z10.617, Oral history of I. K., September 16,1995 (ELDE
0 0 0 0 0 6 5 -0 0 0 0 0 8 7 ; for English translat i o n , see ELDE
0000665); ELDE, Oral history of M. M., September 8, 1998
(ELDE 0000162-0000186; for English translation, see ELDE
0000206); ELDE, Z10.605, Oral history of M. S., September 19,
1994 (ELDE 0000440-0000458; for English translation, see
ELDE 0000869); ELDE Z10.569, Oral history of I. A., October
15,1992 (ELDE 0000275-0000297; for English translation, see
ELDE 0000513-0000515).

4 0 4 NARA, RG 407, Entry 368B, Box 1032, Schneider Report,
Exhibit 185A, Buchwald to Grandi, October 14, 1943 (NARA
0000439-0000440). Starting in mid-1943, German officials
began relaxing regulations governing the administration of
Eastern workers and bringing their treatment more in line with
that of Western workers; see Herbert, H i t l e r 's Fo reign Wo rk e r s, pp.
261-273.

4 0 5 NA R A , RG 260, P ro p e rty Division, P ro p e rty Control and
External Assets Branch, Box 546, File: Ford-Werke, memo from
Rains, July 25,1945 (NARA 0000581).

4 0 6 Ford-Werke Records, Personnel File of W. H., March 31, 1948
(FW 0023149). The postwar denazification subcommittee
opposed this man's re-employment.

4 0 7 NARA, RG 407, Entry 368B, Box 1032, Schneider Report,
Exhibit 20, Memo from Sch m i d t , J u ly 18, 1945 (NA R A
0000083-0000085). A May 1944 letter from Ford-Werke to
the local Gestapo office describes rifles supplied to the plant
guards as old, rusty and without safety catches, and asks for
new weapons that would be less likely to go off accidentally.
See Exhibit 185G, Ford-Werke to Gestapo Cologne, May 3,1944
(NARA 0000443).

4 0 8 NARA, RG 407, Entry 368B, Box 1032, Schneider Report,
Exhibit 185J, Ford-Werke to Gestapo Cologne, July 10, 1944
(NARA 0000445; for English translation, see NARA 0005916).

one former Eastern worker recalled that the plant
commandant "wasn't strict. He punished, but he
forgave as well � He was sympathetic." 400 Another
worker remembered the head of the camp as being "a
noisy guy. He was always shouting. But you could say
he was a good person � He often punished me for this
and that." 401

According to wa rtime re p o rts and postwa r
d o c u m e n t s , Fo r d -We r ke plant guards disciplined
workers physically and put them under house arrest. 402
Fo rmer wo r kers recalled during interv i ews in the
1990s that plant foremen occasionally slapped or hit
workers when they left their posts or made mistakes on
the job. 403 An October 1943 in-house communication
from Buchwald to Ford-Werke Production Manager
Hans Grandi noted that there had been "more and more
cases of East-workers being beaten, mostly by foremen,
for some faults in the plant." Buchwald wrote that he
had "no objections against a master or fo re m a n
grabbing a Russian to show him bodily where his place

is. We cannot tolerate, however, that the mistreating of
East-workers becomes a rule." Buchwald noted that
this treatment was feared more by the Russians than
"officially pronounced, severer punishment." In the
i n t e rest of improving the working at m o s p h e re,
Buchwald asked Grandi to inform foremen that in the
future he would prosecute each case of mistreatment
brought to his attention. 404 The issue of foremen
mistreating foreigners is mentioned in postwar reports
by American military authorities. 405 Similar accusations
are found in Ford-Werke personnel files. In one case,
there are indications that a particular foreman treated
neither Germans nor foreigners well. 406

Schmidt told U. S. military officials that Buchwald
s u p e rvised the plant guards. S chmidt said that
Buchwald trained the guards to handle guns and taught
them how and when to make arrests. Schmidt also
recalled that Germans, Russians and Western workers
a l i ke we re wat ched closely for "Anti Nazi
movements." 407 A July 1944 letter marked "secret"
from Ford-Werke to the local Gestapo indicates the use
of a net of info rmants in Fo r d -We r ke 's camps. 4 0 8
Because of his position, Buchwald was involved in the
Gestapo's oversight of foreign workers at Ford-Werke.
Schmidt told the Americans that Buchwald had been 87
87 Page 88 89
62
R e s e a r c h F i n d i n g s Ab o u t Fo r d -We r k e U n d e r t h e Na z i R e g i m e
4 0 9 NARA, RG 407, Entry 368B, Box 1032, Schneider Report,
Exhibit 17, Memo by Schmidt on Buchwald, June 22, 1945
(NARA 0000074).

4 1 0 HStAD, NW 1049/ 46784, Interview statement by Buchwald,
November 30, 1946 (HSAD 0214). For examples of his
reports, see NARA, RG 407, Entry 368B, Box 1032, Schneider
R e p o rt , Exhibit 18A, B u ch wald to the Gestapo Cologne,
November 8, 1943 (NARA 0000076) and Exhibit 185J, Ford-Werke
to Gestapo Cologne, July 10,1944 (NARA 0000445).

4 1 1 NARA, RG 407, Entry 368B, Box 1032, Schneider Report,
Exhibit 17, Memo by Schmidt on Buchwald, June 22, 1945
(NARA 0000074), Exhibit 20, Memo from Schmidt, July 18,
1945 (NARA 0000083).

4 1 2 ELDE, Z10.623, Oral history of A. O., September 13, 1996
(ELDE 0000474-0000497; for English translation, see ELDE
0000586).

4 1 3 Buchwald said in a postwar statement that staff representative B.
had been with the Gestapo before coming to Ford-Werke.
Another Ford-Werke employee, H. H., was a member of the SD.
See HStAD, NW 1049/ 46784, I n t e rv i ew Statement by
Buchwald, November 30,1946 (HSAD 0214); and HStAD, NW
1049/ 76620, Hirsch to Frau Schmidt, November 15, 1945
(HSAD 0864-0865).

4 1 4 HStAD, RW 34/ 8, Weekly Report of the State Security Police of
November 19-26, November 28, 1944 (HSAD 0084-0085). The German authorities suspected Eastern workers in Cologne

of joining together in gangs. According to historian Ulrich Herbert, from the end of November 1944, there were almost
daily armed clashes in Cologne between gangs and the Gestapo,
"some reaching the scale of pitched battles." See H i t l e r 's Fo re i g n Wo rk e r s, p. 367.

4 1 5 HAStK, Acc. 606/ 8, Cologne Police Reports on Foreigners,
N ovember 1949 (HASK 0050-0053); H S t A D, B R 2034/ VH1/ 1295-1296 Cologne Police Arrest Reports, 1945;

HStAD, NW 174/ 485 I-VI Police Reports, October 4, 1943. (These documents could not be copied because of German
archival privacy restrictions.) The worker arrested for stealing milk was sent to Buchenwald; the workers arrested for stealing
clothes were executed.
4 1 6 HStAD, BR 2034/ 1327, Scheben to Gestapo, February 11,
1 9 4 5 , (HSAD 2259). The wo r ker claimed that he had exchanged a suit for the food. He was sentenced to eight weeks

in a labor education camp.
4 1 7 Manfred Huiskes et al., Die Wandinschriften des K�lner Gestapo-Gef�ngnisses
im El-DE Haus 1943-1945 ( K � l n : B � h l a u -Ve r l ag, 1983), pp. 195,200-202 and 204.

4 1 8 NARA, RG 84, Entry 3126, Box 76, Memo on visit to Portugal
of the manager of the Ford Motor Company plant at Cologne, Germany, June 9,1943 (NARA 0003830-0003832).

4 1 9 WNRC, Acc. 299-68A-0243, Box 536, File W17536, Advisory
Board Meeting Minutes, July 1, 1943 (DOJ 0011104; for English translation, see DOJ 0011231).

appointed to the position of plant counterintelligence
officer [Abwehrbeauftragter] at the beginning of the
war by the Counter Intelligence Office of German
military intelligence. Schmidt said that when foreign
workers were transferred into Germany's industrial
p l a n t s , the Gestapo stepped in and took over all political
m at t e r s , " N ow the A b we h r b e a u f t r ag t e r had two bosses,
the High Command and the Gestapo and re c e i ved orders
and re g u l ations from both." 4 0 9 In his denazifi c ation fi l e,
B u ch wald said, " F rom 1942 on, I had to send copies of
the monthly re p o rts to the Gestap o, t o o." 4 1 0 O t h e r
p o s t war testimonies indicated that the Gestapo wa s
d i re c t ly invo l ved in the administration of the fo re i g n
wo r ke r s ' c a m p. According to Sch m i d t , the Gestap o
s u p e rvised " [ f ] o o d , h o u s i n g, c l o t h i n g, wages for fo re i g n
wo r ke r s " and fre q u e n t ly searched the Russian camp,
often behaving ru d e ly. 4 1 1 In a 1996 interv i ew, a fo rm e r
forced wo r ker recalled a police raid on the camp to
s e a r ch for we ap o n s. 4 1 2 Additional postwar re p o rt s
i n d i c ate the presence of employees with Gestapo and SS
c o n n e c t i o n s. 4 1 3

In November 1944, the Cologne Gestapo re p o rt e d
the arrest of Ukrainian wo r kers from Fo r d -We r ke on
ch a rges of looting. The arrests we re fo l l owed by a raid
on the camp by German army personnel that resulted in
a " s h o o t -o u t ." 4 1 4 Other Gestapo re p o rts contain
additional re fe rences to forced wo r kers from Fo r d -We
r ke, including re p o rts of wo r kers arrested for stealing
m o n ey, a bicycle, milk and clothes. 4 1 5 In Feb ru a ry 1945,
plant guards turned over a Ukrainian wo r ker to the
Cologne Gestapo after he was arrested for possessing
food assumed to have been stolen. 4 1 6 M e s s ages scraw l e d
on the cell walls of the fo rmer Gestapo prison in
Cologne indicate that forced wo r ke r s , i n c l u d i n g
wo m e n , f rom Fo r d -We r ke we re imprisoned there. 4 1 7

7.6.4. Living Conditions
T h e re is little ava i l able contemporaneous
information on the living conditions of forced workers
at Ford-Werke beyond scattered references in a few
d o c u m e n t s. The earliest info rm ation is found in
statements made by Schmidt during his 1943 trip to
Portugal. According to Ford of Portugal Manager
Guilherme Nadal, Schmidt said that "French, English
and German was being taught when the men are off
duty." 418 During the board of advisors meetings in July
1943, Schmidt said that "[ m] aternity wards, homes for
infants, and such like are being set up." 419 Wartime
financial documents include a reference to "Christmas
Bonuses for Eastern Workers" in December 1943, and 88
88 Page 89 90
63
Fo r e i g n a n d Fo r c e d L a b o r a t Fo r d -We rk e
4 2 0 BA-L, R 87/ 6208, Audit Report by Knipprath for 1943 (BAL
7632). The report lists RM 10,000 for "Christmas Bonus for
Eastern Workers." For monthly reports on expenditures for
foreign workers in 1944, see Ford-Werke Records, Financial
L e d g e r, Ja nu a ry 1942-September 1944 (FW 0007011-
0007890); and IWM, FD 4369/ 45, Folder B, Stoecker to Ford-Werke
foremen, March 11, 1942 (IWM 0000182).

4 2 1 NARA, RG 407, Entry 368B, Box 1032, Schneider Report,
Exhibit 20, Memo from Sch m i d t , J u ly 18, 1945 (NA R A
0000083).

4 2 2 HStAD, NW 1049/ 76620, �ber to Schmidt, November 15,
1945 (HSAD 0860-0861).
4 2 3 HStAD, NW 1049/ 76620, Schmidt Appeal to Review Board,
September 10,1946 (HSAD 0836-0841).
4 2 4 HStAD, NW 1049/ 23409, Affidavit from H. L., June 6, 1948
(HSAD 2415-2418), L. to Main Committee Denazification,
September 30, 1948 (HSAD 2433), Letter by Belgian National
to L., March 28, 1947 (HSAD 2425-2426), Letter by Belgian
National, December 28, 1948 (HSAD 2428).

4 2 5 HStAD, NW 1048/ 34/ 272,Testimony of Wenzel, December 16,
1945 (HSAD 3063).

4 2 6 HStAD, NW 1057/ BIII-00843, Testimony of F. B., no date
(HSAD 0742-0743), Ellscheid to Court of Appeals, December
2 2 , 1947 (HSAD 0763-0767), A f fi d avit of Buch wa l d ,
November 23,1947 (HSAD 0771).

4 2 7 C. E., an assistant to Dr. Wenzel, said that Dr. Wenzel took the
initiative and "established the Russian and foreigner camp as a model camp for the entire G a u [party district] Cologne-Aachen."

See HStAD, NW 1048/ 34/ 272, Affidavit of C. E. no date (HSAD 2999-3000). H. H., a member of the German
socialist party, said that the Ford-Werke Eastern workers' camp was known as a "model camp beyond the city of Cologne." See
HStAD, NW 1048/ 34/ 272, Testimony of H. H., July 30, 1946 (HSAD 3056).

4 2 8 HStAD, NW 1049/ 46784, Denazification File of Buchwald,
1946-1947 (HSAD 0211-0239). See also HStAD, N W 1048/ 34/ 272, Letter from Wenzel, December 16,1945 (HSAD

3064) and Denazification Main Committee, Interrogation of Wenzel, October 28, 1947 (HSAD 2987-2988).

4 2 9 ELDE, Z10.569, Oral history of I. A., October 15, 1992 (ELDE
0 0 0 0 2 7 5 -0 0 0 0 2 9 7 ; for English translat i o n , see ELDE 0000527).

describe vacation time for Western workers. 420 (See
Section 7.6.3.)

Po s t war re p o rts pre p a red for A m e rican military
investigators or during denazification hearings contain
more details. When interrogated by American military
p e r s o n n e l , S chmidt stated that " e n t e rtainment by
cinema, theater, orchestra was granted under Gestapo
supervision. Church service was permitted." 421

Most records that appear in the postwa r
denazification files of Ford-Werke employees claim that
the foreign workers were relatively well treated. 422
Schmidt stated, "It is obvious that towards displaced
persons working at Ford I took the same basic attitude
as towards our Fordmen [sic]. They were treated and
reasonably clothed and fed as well as possible under the
rather severe regulations. Quite often have I violated
the law in order to help these persons and ease their fate
as much as possible." 423 Another Ford-Werke employee,
H. L., who had been a clerk at the plant from 1936 to
1945 and a member of the Nazi party from 1933 to
1945, said during his hearing that he had treated the
foreigners well: "[ I] was always working to make their
lives as bearable as possible. Thus, I took care of

sporting clothes, equipment and a playing field. In
order to raise the sportive interest, I gathered prizes ...
I also facilitated matches with German teams." H. L. also
said that he had helped foreign workers from "France,
Belgium, the Netherlands, and Italy" to get vacation
permits to return home, and he produced letters from
two Belgian workers he had helped. 424 The plant
physician, Dr. Carl Wenzel, stated that he had improved
living conditions for the foreign workers: "[ I] t was
upon my suggestion and with my assistance that the
barracks were built, the workers were accommodated
in small numbers in different rooms, even in single
rooms; theater performances took place and also sports
meetings." 425 (See Section 7.6.6. for information about
Dr. Wenzel's role in providing medical treatment at the
plant during the war, and postwar concerns about
wartime abortions.)

Other denazification files report that people from
Ford subsidiaries in other parts of occupied Europe
donated food, clothes, shoes, soccer equipment and
special foods for Christmas celebrations to the foreign
workers, including their countrymen and women, at
Fo r d -We r ke. 4 2 6 In postwar re p o rt s , Fo r d -We r ke
employees occasionally referred to the camps as "model
camps" frowned upon by local and regional Nazi
officials. 427 Both Dr. Wenzel and Buchwald said they
were criticized by Nazi officials based on the good
conditions in the camps. 428 A former worker who was
transferred to another company after working at Ford-Werke
described the second workplace as better, in part
because better food was provided. 429 89
89 Page 90 91
64
R e s e a r c h F i n d i n g s Ab o u t Fo r d -We r k e U n d e r t h e Na z i R e g i m e
4 3 0 FMC, AR-98-213546, Box 2, File: History of Plant -All Aspects,
1 9 2 5 -1 9 4 6 , Vitger Report , September 24, 1946 (FMC
0002046).

4 3 1 NARA, RG 84, Entry 3126, Box 76, Memo on visit to Portugal
of the manager of the Ford Motor Company plant at Cologne,
Germany, June 9, 1943 (NARA 0003830-0003832).

4 3 2 WNRC, Acc. 299-68A-0243, Box 536, File W17536, Advisory
Board Meeting Minutes, July 1, 1943 (DOJ 0011104; for
English translat i o n , see DOJ 0011230-0011231). Fo o d
availability was regulated to some extent by the German
government's food rationing system, which historian Edward
Homze describes as "overburdened by a fantastic array of
minute regulations dealing with every conceivable occupation
and racial group." See Homze, Fo reign Labor in Nazi Germ a ny, p.
247.

4 3 3 Ford-Werke Records, Personnel File of R. Z.( FW 0022190).

4 3 4 See ELDE, Z10.613, Oral History of K. F., September 12, 1995
(ELDE 0000216-0000232; for English translation, see ELDE
0000751-0000763). In 1995, K. F., a former forced worker
who lived in both the Russian and the French camps at Ford-Werke,
described the difference as a contrast between "heaven
and earth," the French camp being far better. Because the
French received Red Cross packages, there was coffee there and
the food was better, she recalled.

4 3 5 FMC, AR-75-62-616, Box 79, Custodian Report (FMC 0001023
and 0001033).
4 3 6 Fo r d -We r ke Records, Grass to Vi t g e r, J u ly 8, 1946 (FW
0022372-0022378).
4 3 7 HStAD, NW 1048/ 34/ 272,Testimony of Wenzel, December 16,
1945 (HSAD 3063).
4 3 8 NA R A , RG 260, P ro p e rty Division, P ro p e rty Control and
External Assets Branch, Box 546, File: Ford-Werke, Memo to
files by Rains, June 13, 1945 (NARA 0000583).

4 3 9 H S t A D, NW 1048/ 34/ 272, R e p o rt by Ko rn and
Wermelskirchen, December 14, 1947 (HSAD 3009-3010),
D e n a z i fi c ation Subcommittee 98 to Main Committee,
September 19,1947 (HSAD 2989-2995).

4 4 0 ELDE, Z10.633, Oral history of T. N., September 12,1996 (ELDE
0000233-0000255; for English translation, see ELDE 0000542-
0000553).

7.6.5. Food
Foreign workers living in the camp had RM 1.50 a
day deducted from their wages for food and lodging. 430
During his June 1943 trip to Portugal, Robert Schmidt
reported that the mess room at the plant distributed
three types of food rations depending on the physical
demands of the work performed by the employees.
Schmidt also mentioned that "overtime is partially paid
by increased food." 431 A month later, Schmidt told the
board of advisors that the plant had five different
k i t chens pre p a ring food for the fo reign wo r ke r s ,
according to their different nationalities. Schmidt also
re p o rted to the board that " food was especially
prepared for the foreign workers." 432 The personnel file
of a Ford-Werke cook, who was in charge of the
wo r ke r s ' camp food after Ja nu a ry 1943, a l s o
distinguishes between the " fo reigner and Russian
kitchen." 433 According to a 1990s interview with a
former worker, conditions in the Western workers'
camp were far better than in the Eastern workers'
camp. 434

After the war, in discussing the food operations for
foreign workers and others at the plant, Vitger said that
the canteen had always operated at a loss. He said the
canteen lost slightly more than RM 4,000 per month in

1 9 3 8 , and that the monthly losses incre a s e d
considerably during the war, amounting to nearly
RM 25,000 per month. The canteen was providing
food for ap p rox i m at e ly 2,000 fo reign lab o rers in
1 9 4 4 . 4 3 5 Records from postwar personnel and
denazification files often refer to the rations received by
foreign workers. In 1946, the Ford-Werke employee
responsible for wartime food purchasing wrote a letter
to Vitger claiming that he had provided approximately
3,600 foreign workers with entire days' meals. (See
Section 7.3. and Appendix D for documentation on the
numbers of foreign workers at Ford-Werke during the
war.) The employee went on to complain that the
company counterintelligence officer was taking credit
for this accomplishment. 4 3 6 D u ring his ow n
denazification procedures, Dr. Wenzel claimed "food
supplies were constantly controlled by me, also that the
quantities destined for the plant we re actually
re c e i ve d ." 4 3 7 Vitger told the A m e rican military
investigators that Dr. Wenzel had complained about the
diet and hygienic conditions for the foreign workers,
and as a result, conditions were changed for the
better. 438

S t atements from denazifi c ation files re p o rt that
Russians � children as well as adults � received poor
food rations. 439 In an interview conducted in the
1990s, one former Eastern worker recalled that her
rations typically consisted of three slices of bread and
unsweetened coffee for breakfast, soup made from
turnips and flour siftings for lunch, and bread and
coffee again for dinner. 440 Another former worker 90
90 Page 91 92
4 4 1 ELDE, Z10.569, Oral history of I. A., October 15, 1992. (ELDE
0 0 0 0 2 7 5 -0 0 0 0 2 9 7 ; for English translat i o n , see ELDE
0000508).

4 4 2 ELDE, Z10.617, Oral history of I. K., September 16,1995 (ELDE
0 0 0 0 0 6 5 -0 0 0 0 0 8 7 ; for English translat i o n , see ELDE
0000662); ELDE, Z10.665, Oral history of N. S., September 8,
1998 (ELDE 0000391-0000401; for English translation, see
ELDE 0000618).

4 4 3 H S t A D, NW 1048/ 34/ 272, Tr a n s l ation of re p o rt by
Wierscheim, December 26, 1945 (HSAD 3089-3092).

4 4 4 A Ford-Werke employee stated that in May 1944 she became Dr.
Wenzel's medical technical assistant, responsible for "X-raying
and lab work." See Ford-Werke Records, Personnel File of I. H.
(FW 0022270-0022272). Another employee stated," As of 15
June 1943 I was hired by Ford-Werke as a nurse and here I have
worked in the foreigners' camp, the dental station and in First
Aid." See Personnel File of M. B. (FW 0023266-0023271).

4 4 5 H S t A D, NW 1048/ 34/ 272, Tr a n s l ation of re p o rt by
Wierscheim, December 26, 1945 (HSAD 3089-3093). In
1947, three former forced workers from the Eastern camp at
Ford-Werke testified in a German affidavit about the care given
by Dr. Wenzel. They wrote that he had been their physician
since the establishment of the camp and had cared for them
well: "He always gave us notifications of illness [sick leave]
when necessary. He always cared for our food and
accommodation and for every single one of us. He even took
with him some Russian women who had been injured by
bombs and left them with a farmer so they could recover there.
He cured some of our campmates who had been shot by the
Gestapo and saved them from being persecuted." See HStAD,
NW 1048/ 34/ 272, Affidavit of J. M., K. Z. and N. W., November
5,1947 (HSAD 2964).

4 4 6 H S t A D, NW 1048/ 34/ 272, P u blic Notice from Vi t g e r,
September 15, 1947 (HSAD 3013).
4 4 7 HStAD, NW 1048/ 34/ 272, Transcript of meeting with K. S.,
September 14, 1947 (HSAD 3009-3010).
4 4 8 HStAD, NW 1048/ 34/ 272, Memo from Workers' Council,
October 30, 1947 (HSAD 2949).
4 4 9 H S t A D, NW 1048/ 34/ 272, Wenzel to Denazifi c at i o n
Committee, November 1,1947 (HSAD 2955-2958).

reported that he received about 300 grams (10.6
ounces, about 2 �3 pound) of bread per day but was never
given butter, meat or sugar. 441 Several foreign workers
remembered that food was in short supply for them
while working at the plant. 442

7.6.6. Medical Treatment
The medical treatment of forced and foreign workers
received particular attention after the war. Dr. Wenzel
ove r s aw Fo r d -We r ke 's health department and wa s
re s p o n s i ble for the fo reign and forced wo r ke r s ,
supported by Drs. Alwin Kresse and Paul Grouven. 443
Dr. Wenzel employed several nurses in the different
c a m p s. 4 4 4 Josef Wi e r s ch e i m , who had been the
supervisor of the Eastern workers' camp, described the
medical facilities in a December 1945 affidavit for Dr.
Wenzel's denazification hearings. He said the medical
b a rr a cks included an operating ro o m , s e p a r at e
infirmaries for men and women, a maternity area,
sufficient quantities of medical instruments and a "first

class dental station equipped with the most modern
apparatuses" and a dentist. Wierscheim credited Dr.
Wenzel with the establishment of a "modern nursery
� equipped with everything necessary for this purpose
and which was an ornament of the camp." Wierscheim
said the camp's sanitary facilities were clean, separated
for men and women, and equipped with hot and cold
running water. "[ E] very inmate of the camp could take
a bath as often as he liked to do so. � It must be said
to the honour of Dr. Wenzel that he strictly insisted
upon the fact that the medical treatment for the east-workers
in no way deviated from that for sick German
members of the staff." 445

Two years after the war, Dr. Wenzel was accused of
having performed unnecessary abortions on Russian
forced workers. The allegations arose after a review of
his denazification classification cleared him to resume
employment at Ford-Werke. In response to Dr. Wenzel's
return on September 15, 1947, the workers' council
called for a general strike. 446 Concurrently, the local
D e n a z i fi c ation Committee initiated a furt h e r
investigation of Dr. Wenzel's wartime activities. The
committee's efforts uncovered a statement by K. S., a
fo rmer nurse at Fo r d -We r ke, alleging that We n z e l
performed abortions on Russian forced workers. 447 In a
meeting with members of the Denazifi c at i o n
Committee, the Ford-Werke workers' council further
asserted that the abortions were performed to maintain
productivity and that Dr. Wenzel was more interested in
the welfare of the company than the welfare of its work
force. 448 Dr. Wenzel adamantly disputed this allegation,
claiming in a letter to the Denazification Committee
that he had performed abortions on Eastern workers
o n ly when there was a medical justifi c at i o n . 4 4 9
According to testimony in Dr. Wenzel's denazification
hearings, 10 abortions were performed at the camp. Dr.

Fo r e i g n a n d Fo r c e d L a b o r a t Fo r d -We rk e 91
91 Page 92 93
66
R e s e a r c h F i n d i n g s A b o u t Fo r d -We r k e U n d e r t h e Na z i R e g i m e
4 5 0 HStAD, NW 1048/ 34/ 272, Cologne Doctors Chamber to
Vonessen, November 8, 1947 (HSAD 2953).
4 5 1 H S t A D, NW 1048/ 34/ 272, Wenzel to Denazifi c at i o n
Committee, November 1, 1947 (HSAD 2955-2958). For
information on attitudes regarding abortion in Germany during
this period, see Atina Grossman, R e fo rming Sex: The Germ a n
M ovement for Birth Control and A b o rtion Refo rm ,1 9 2 0 -1 9 5 0 (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 70-77 and 153-156.

4 5 2 HStAD, NW 1048/ 34/ 272, Affidavit of C. E., September 26,
1947 (HSAD 2997-2998), Statement by C. E., no date (HSAD
2999-3000), Testimony by J. L. on behalf of Wenzel, 1947
(HSAD 2960).

4 5 3 HStAD, NW 1048/ 34/ 272, Affidavit of J. M., K. Z. and N. W.,
November 5, 1947 (HSAD 2964). According to historian
Ulrich Herbert, on March 11,1943, the Reich Surgeon General
issued an order giving pregnant Eastern workers the right to ask
for an abortion if they so wished, so long as they had sought an
expert opinion from the local General Medical Council. See
Herbert, H i t l e r 's Fo reign Wo rk e r s, p. 270. In the former workers'
1947 affidavit, the women said that they learned of this on their
own: "When we were in the camp we found out that we could
file a claim for an abortion when we got pregnant." In a
separate statement in support of Dr. Wenzel, Dr. Kresse wrote
that neither he nor Dr. Wenzel informed the Eastern workers
that Nazi regulations permitted abortions. "On the contrary, the
Russian women learnt this possibility very quickly from other
camps and � implored us with tears to perfo rm the
interruptions in our camp hospital, stating that we are allowed
to do this �" Dr. Kresse also described how Eastern workers
obtained approval for abortions: Applications were filled out by
the women, acting on their own, and were then passed on by
Dr. Wenzel to the Chamber of Physicians. The applications were
returned to the camp with the chamber's decision. The normal
procedure, established by the Nazis for Eastern women, was that
they would be treated by a doctor in town who performed
abortions without any anesthetic, so all the women wanted to
be treated by Dr. Wenzel. See same source, Declaration by Dr.
A lwin Kresse to German Denazifi c ation Rev i ew Board,
September 26, 1947 (HSAD 3001-3002; for English
translation, see HSAD 3005-3006).

4 5 4 HStAD, NW 1048/ 34/ 272, Cologne Doctors Chamber to
Vonessen, November 8, 1947 (HSAD 2953).

4 5 5 HStAD, NW 1048/ 34/ 272, Memo from van de Sandt, April 15,
1948 (HSAD 3100-3103).

Wenzel was said to have performed two or three and his
a s s i s t a n t , D r. K re s s e, the re m a i n d e r. 4 5 0 D r. We n z e l
insisted that the pro c e d u res we re not imposed on the
fo reign female wo r ke r s , and that it was the wo m e n
who wanted ab o rt i o n s. D r. Wenzel stated that he
wo r ked to improve the facilities for mothers and
ch i l d re n , including the more than 70 healthy bab i e s
who we re born in the camp. 4 5 1 An assistant to Dr.
We n z e l , C. E . , and a fo rmer nu r s e, J. L . , f u l ly support e d
his statements in va rious testimonies. T h ey testifi e d
t h at the ab o rtions we re perfo rmed for medical re a s o n s
o n ly, in response to signed ap p l i c ations from the
female wo r ke r s. Both said that Dr. Wenzel prov i d e d
clean facilities and tre at m e n t s , and that he prov i d e d
s u p e rior care for pregnant and nursing wo m e n . 4 5 2

This notion was supported by a 1947 affi d avit fro m
t h ree fo rmer Eastern wo r ke r s. Responding to the
c riticism of Dr. We n z e l , t h ey wrote that it was a " g re at
l i e " to say that he had perfo rmed ab o rtions on Russian
women so that pregnancy would not keep them fro m
wo r k i n g, or that he had perfo rmed ab o rtions because
the Nazis ordered him to do so. According to the
a f fi d av i t , m a ny pregnant women applied for ab o rt i o n s
because of their situat i o n : Despite the fa c i l i t y
i m p rovements made by Dr. We n z e l , t h e re we re still
m a ny women who did not want to give birth in the
c a m p. The affi d avit by the fo rmer wo r kers said that
D r. Wenzel perfo rmed ab o rtions only for the few
women who we re ve ry sick and would not surv i ve
ch i l d b i rt h . The fo rmer wo r kers said that they neve r
s aw any signs of ori e n t ation to Nazi policy in his
ap p ro a ch . 4 5 3

The inve s t i g ation into Dr. We n z e l 's wa rt i m e
activities continued through the end of 1947 and into
1 9 4 8 . In a November 1947 letter to the local health
o f fi c e, the Cologne Doctors' Chamber questioned Dr.
We n z e l 's claim that the ab o rtions we re medically
n e c e s s a ry. It suggested that the large number of
ab o rtions was due to either racial motives and effo rt s
to keep up pro d u c t i v i t y, or to a desire to allev i ate the
d i f ficult position of the pregnant wo m e n . 4 5 4 A f t e r
rev i ewing the evidence pre s e n t e d , the Cologne
E m p l oyment Committee issued a statement on A p ri l
1 3 , 1 9 4 8 , re a f fi rming Dr. We n z e l 's denazifi c at i o n
s t atus and his right to re i n s t atement at Fo r d -We r ke. 4 5 5

Regarding deaths at the plant during the wa r, t h e
names of about 15 fo reigners from Fo r d -We r ke
appear on the Cologne wa rtime death lists that still
e x i s t , but without any indication as to the cause of
d e at h . F i ve we re ch i l d ren who died during the peri o d
f rom July through September 1944. Among the fi ve
we re three babies who died in September. I n
N ovember 1944, four fo reigners of unknown ag e, 92
92 Page 93 94
67
Fo r e i g n a n d Fo r c e d L a b o r a t Fo r d -We rk e
4 5 6 HAStK, Acc. 5/ 184, List of Russians Buried in West Cemetery,
October 15, 1945 (HASK 0125-0136); HAStK, Acc. 1231/ 1,
List of Russians Buried in West Cemetery, no date (HASK 0163-
0171); HAStK, Acc. 606/ 26, Death Certificates, August 31 and
September 14,1949 (HASK 0182-0183); HAStK, Acc. 606/ 21,
ITS Documentation of Russians Buried in West Cemetery, April
10 -May 2, 1951 (HASK 0186-0192); HAStK, Acc. 606/ 17,
Alphabetical List of Foreigners buried in Cologne, no date
(HASK 0205-0278); HAStK, Acc. 100, List of foreigners buried
in Cologne, no date (HASK 0292-0299). It is difficult to
determine the exact number of foreigners who died at Ford-Werke
because the lists did not always indicate where the
foreigners lived and often misspelled their names. Also, after
September of 1944, ages were not specified on the death lists.
According to a 1996 oral history interview with a former
Eastern worker, a woman died of tuberculosis and two boys
were killed by shrapnel. The former worker also recalled that a
girl who died in the camp seemed to be homesick; she sat
around, didn't eat and was always sad. See ELDE, Z10.633, Oral
history of T. N., September 12,1996 (ELDE 0000233-0000255;
for English translation, see ELDE 0000562-0000564). A 1996
interview with another former worker indicated that a Russian
boy about 18 months old died of meningitis in the camp. See
ELDE, Z10.623, Oral history of A. O., September 13,1996 (ELDE
0 0 0 0 4 7 4 -0 0 0 0 4 9 7 ; for English translat i o n , see ELDE
0000592).

4 5 7 HStAD, NW 1048/ 34/ 272, Translated report by Wierscheim,
December 26, 1945 (HSAD 3091). According to a 1999
interview with a former Ford-Werke employee who had been
assigned to work with the Italians, an Italian worker died of
tuberculosis on Christmas Day 1944, and a Russian died of
drinking printing alcohol. See FMC, Interview with Emilia
M�ller, December 9, 1999 (FMC 0018405, FMC 0018427 and
FMC 0018440). Another former forced laborer recalled that a
young girl was killed when a bomb was dropped on the
Russian camp. See ELDE, Z10.618, oral history of K. N. P.,
September 13, 1995 (ELDE 0000411-0000439; for English
translation, see ELDE 0000697).

4 5 8 NARA RG 243, E n t ry 27, B ox 34, F i l e : III a (600) 1,
Interpretation Report S. A. 2847, October 19, 1944 (NARA
0005233).

4 5 9 HStAD, BR 1131/ 115, Air Raid Safety Daily Report, October 23-
24, 1944 (HSAD 1990-1993).
4 6 0 ELDE, Z10.623, Oral history of A. O., September 13, 1996
(ELDE 0000474-0000497; for English translation, see ELDE
0000594).

4 6 1 C h ristian Zentner and Friedemann Bed�rftig, e d s. , Th e
Encyclopedia of the Third Reich, vol. 1 (NewYork: Macmillan, 1991),
pp. 118-19.

4 6 2 HStAD, Rep. 118/ 1174, Memo from Central Authority for the
handling of Nazi mass crimes in concentration camps, May 29,
1968 (HSAD 2562); NARA, RG 238, Entry 174, Box 33, NO-1578,
Affidavit of Karl Sommer, February 27, 1947 (NARA
0 0 0 7 4 3 3 -0 0 0 7 4 3 5 ; for English translat i o n , see NA R A
0007440-0007442). Originally, concentration camp labor was
made available only for enterprises run by the SS. After August
or September 1942, a construction unit was created to repair
bomb damage. Of the five commandos with the designation
" C o n s t ruction Bri g a d e s ," one was stationed in Cologne.
Construction brigades included about 1,000 men.

4 6 3 ELDE Z20.530, Oral history of V. L., October 2, 1990 (ELDE
0000942); ELDE, Z10.614, Oral history of K. T., September 13,
1995 (ELDE 0000111-0000126; for English translation, see
ELDE 0000795); E L D E , Z 1 0 . 5 5 9 , Oral history of F. W. ,
September 25, 1990 (ELDE 0000365-0000390; for English
translation, see ELDE 0000917); ELDE, Oral history of M. G.,
August 28, 1993 (ELDE 0000961-0000963).

including twin sisters, died at Fo r d -We r ke. 4 5 6
Wi e r s ch e i m , the security chief for the Eastern
wo r ke r s ' c a m p, s a i d , "As far as I know, d u ring the
whole time in which the camp existed, about 18-20
persons only died, 8 of them for unnatural reasons,
i. e., one of them was killed by his own compatriots, 4
were killed by air-raid attacks (2 of them on account of
their own fa u l t , because they handled with [sic]
explosives). Three others drunk [sic] denatured spirits
[alcoholic substances unfit for drinking, but usable as
antifreeze or solvents] as a consequence of which they
died." 457

D u ring the air at t a ck in October 1944, the plant wa s
t a rg e t e d , and the fo reign wo r ke r s ' camp sustained most of
the damag e. 4 5 8 G e rman re p o rts indicate that an

unexploded bomb landed in one of the sites, and 30
people had to be eva c u ated from a barr a ck s. 4 5 9 A c c o r d i n g
to one fo rmer forced lab o re r, some fo reign lab o rers we re
killed during air raids. 4 6 0 (See Section 7.6.2. fo r
i n fo rm ation about air raid shelters at the camp. )

7.7. Slave Labor from the Buchenwald
Concentration Camp

In addition to Eastern workers, Western workers and
Italian POWs, Ford-Werke utilized slave labor from the
B u ch e n wald concentration camp. The camp wa s
established in 1937 for political prisoners, clergy,
homosexuals, handicapped persons, "criminals" and
people deemed "asocial" by the Nazis. Buchenwald
l abor was employed to support the German wa r
economy, both in and around the camp in Thuringia
and in satellite camps, or subcamps, scattered all over
Nazi Germany. 461 The first Cologne Buchenwald satellite
camp was established on the city fa i rg rounds in
September 1942. The prisoners were deployed for
construction and clearance work. 462 Oral histories
suggest that a few men from one of the construction
brigades may have worked at Ford-Werke before a
satellite camp was established at the plant in August
1944. 463 93
93 Page 94 95
68
R e s e a r c h F i n d i n g s A b o u t Fo r d -We r k e U n d e r t h e Na z i R e g i m e
4 6 4 BA-F, RL 3/ 9, Report on Armaments Staff Conference, August 1,
1944 (BAF 1356).
4 6 5 BA-L, R 3/ 288, Main Committee Meeting Minutes, August 21,
1944 (BAL 0896). The minutes indicate that special committee
leaders were responsible "for making sure that firms are not
assigned all bad workers."

4 6 6 BA-L, R 3/ 288, Main Committee Meeting Attendance and
Distribution Lists, August 10, 1944 (BAL 0898).

4 6 7 NARA, RG 238, Entry 174, Box 17, NO-718, Circular from
Inspectorate of Concentration Camps, November 28, 1941
(NARA 0007378-0007380; for English translation, see NARA
0007381-0007383). Although no records were found to
document Ford-Werke's application for concentration camp
l ab o r, companies wishing to employ concentration camp
prisoners were to apply to the Inspectorate of Concentration
Camps. The SS Chief of Protective Custody then would examine
the workplace, determine how many guards would be needed
and discuss with the firm the numbers and professions of
inmates required, pay rates, whether one warm meal per day
would be prov i d e d , t r a n s p o rt ation and duration of
employment. If the Inspectorate approved, the inmates were
sent to the workplace. In April 1942, the Inspectorate was
annexed to the SS Economic and Administrative Main Office. SS
officials later confirmed that concentration camps were told to
supply inmates requested by private companies, provided that
Albert Speer's Ministry of Armaments and War Production had
approved; see, for example, NARA, RG 238, Entry 174, Box 52,
NO-2739, Affidavit of Karl Sommer, April 8, 1947 (NARA
0007389; for English translation, see NARA 0007393) and Box
33, NO-1578, Affidavit of Karl Sommer, February 7, 1947
(NARA 0007445).

4 6 8 HStAD, Rep. 118/ 1179,Transport K�ln (Ford), August 10,1944
(HSAD 0175-0176); T h H S t AW, List of Buch e n wa l d
concentration camp prisoners, no date (HSTH 0017-0034).

4 6 9 B-AK, IV 406 AR 85/ 67, Gergel to the Labor Deployment Office
at Buch e n wald (BAK 0359). In a re p o rt to the main
c o n c e n t r ation camp at Buch e n wa l d , Fo r d -We r ke camp
commandant Gergel recounted the work assignments of Ford-Werke's
Buchenwald workers between August 13, their first day
of work, and August 19, 1944. Entries for the first three days
indicate that all 50 inmates were involved in concrete and
transportation work. From that point, the men were divided
into groups according to skill. There were 10 skilled workers,
including masons and carpenters, and 40 unskilled workers.
The men apparently arrived in Cologne on August 12, 1944.
Beginning on that date, according to the Gergel report, the
Cologne city kitchen allotted all 50 workers the standard
concentration camp inmate meal ration plus a heavy-labor
bonus. Another wartime document, ThHStAW, KZuHaftA/ 9,
List of Satellite Camps (HSTH 0074), contains information
about the camp known as K�ln-Ford in August 1944. See also
BA-L, NS 4/ 268,Work Assignment lists for August 20-29,1944
(BAL 12529-12530); and Martin We i n m a n , e d . , D a s
n ationalsozial istische Lage r s y s t e m ( F r a n k f u rt : Z we i t a u s e n d e i n s ,
1990), p. 146.

4 7 0 ThHStAW, NS 4/ 134, Work Statistics for K. L. Buchenwald,
November 3, 1944 (HSTH 0002-0004); ThHStAW, NS 4/ 136a
& 136b, Inmate Transfer Lists, no date (HSTH 0012-0016);
ThHStAW, NS 4/ 136b, Inmate Transfer List, no date (HSTH
0083); ThHStAW, NS 4/ 136a Inmate Transfer Lists, September
4, 1944 (HSTH 0086), October 14, 1944 (HSTH 0087),
November 1944 (HSTH 0090) and January 6, 1945 (HSTH
0093). Among the prisoners transported from Buchenwald to
the Ford-Werke camp on November 3, 1944, were a French
mechanic, an Italian mechanic and a Belgian student. See
ThHStAW, KZuHafta/ 2, List of Buchenwald concentration camp
prisoners, no date (HSTH 0026, HSTH 0028 and HSTH 0034).

The automotive industry did not become eligible for
the use of concentration camp inmates until late in the
war. In a meeting of the armaments ministry staff on
August 1, 1944, Minister Albert Speer emphasized the
importance of the automobile industry to the war
effort and announced that due to the labor shortage,
12,000 concentration camp prisoners would be sent to
work at automobile plants over the next seve r a l
weeks. 464 On August 10, 1944,Wilhelm Schaaf, head of
the Automotive Industry Economic Group, chaired a
meeting of the Main Automobile Committee where
t h e re was further discussion about the use of
c o n c e n t r ation camp prisoners by the va ri o u s
automobile manufacturers and suppliers. Schaaf said
that recent bombing raids had added to the difficulties
of the German automotive industry. Due to the
seriousness of the situation, he said, production levels
at automotive companies, including Ford-Werke, "must
be maximized." S chaaf stat e d , "The most acute
problem, namely labor acquisition, has been solved for
the time being by the provision of concentration camp
inmates." 465 Robert Schmidt and Alfons von Gusmann

of Ford-Werke were among the automotive industry
representatives in attendance at that meeting. 466

On the same day that Schmidt and von Gusmann
attended the Schaaf meeting, the main Buch e n wa l d
c o n c e n t r ation camp pre p a red a list of 50 prisoners to
send to Fo r d -We r ke. 4 6 7 Included in the group of
p risoners deployed to Fo r d -We r ke we re Russian and
C z e ch political pri s o n e r s , Po l e s , and two Germ a n s , one of
whom was described as a " c ri m i n a l " and the other as
" work shy." Among them we re carp e n t e r s , b ri ck l aye r s , a
p a i n t e r, a tailor, a cabinet make r, p l u m b e r s , e l e c t ri c i a n s ,
ag ricultural wo r ke r s ,s h o e m a ke r s , a barber and a nu r s e. 4 6 8
Their first day of work was August 13, 1 9 4 4 . 4 6 9

Buchenwald transfer lists show that at least 65
different men were assigned to the Ford-Werke satellite
camp at one time or another, and that several were
transported elsewhere or fled from Ford-Werke and 94
94 Page 95 96
69
Fo r e i g n a n d Fo r c e d L a b o r a t Fo r d -We rk e
4 7 1 During a 1946 interrogation, the Nazi government official
charged with the allocation of concentration camp labor listed
Ford-Werke as having "approximately 500" prisoners from
Buchenwald. See NARA, RG 238, Microfilm T-301, Roll 10, NI-1065,
Affidavit of Karl Sommer, October 4, 1946 (NARA
0006934). No other source was found indicating such a high
number. However, 500 is the number of civilian workers
transferred from Ford-Werke to a dispersal camp established by
Ford-Werke at Duemlinghausen in March 1945; see Weinman,
Das nationalsozialistische Lagersystem, p. 407.

4 7 2 ThHStAW, NS 4/ 31, List of Satellite camp capacity, 1944 (HSTH
0 0 9 5 ) . According to Daily Work Assignment sheets fo r
November 1944, the work detail consisted of between 43 and
50 men; see AGB, NS 4/ 29: Microfilm 32, Labor Assignment
Cards, November 1944 (BW 0001-0064).

4 7 3 NARA, RG 238, Entry 174, Box 52, NO-2739, Affidavit of Karl
S o m m e r, A p ril 8, 1947 (NARA 0007390; for English
translation, see NARA 0007394), Box 33, NO-1578, Affidavit
of Karl Sommer, Feb ru a ry 27, 1947 (NARA 0007438-
0007439; for English translation, see NARA 0007445); NARA,
RG 238, Microfilm T-301, Roll 5, NI-382, Affidavit of Oswald
Pohl, August 5, 1946 (NARA 0007410; for English translation,
see NARA 0007422). According to financial reports from the
SS, in December 1944, the Buchenwald camp requested an
invoice to be sent to Ford-Werke for RM 5,220 for the month
of November based on 1,305 unskilled workdays billed at a
daily rate of RM 4; see NARA, RG 238, Microfilm T-301, Roll
31, NI-4181, Buchenwald Concentration Camp Commandant
Office, Bills for November 1944, December 8, 1944 (NARA
0007294 and 0007300; for English translations, see NARA
0007303 and 0007307). A total of RM 6,352,137 was
requested to be billed to 95 companies as their cost of
Buchenwald prisoner labor for November 1944. See NARA, RG
238, Entry 171, Microfilm T-301, Roll 31, NI-4181, Bills from
B u ch e n wald Commandant to SS Chief Economics
Administrative Office (NARA 0007295 and 0007300; for
English translations, see NARA 0007303 and 0007307).

4 7 4 NARA, RG 238, Entry 174, Box 33, NO-1578, Affidavit of Karl
Sommer, February 27, 1947 (NARA 0007435; for English
translation, see NARA 0007442-0007443).

4 7 5 NARA, RG 238, Microfilm T-301, Roll 5, NI-382, Affidavit of
Oswald Pohl, August 5, 1946 (NARA 0007422). Private
industry generally deducted two-fifths of the wages due to the
Reich to cover "payment in kind," i. e. food, lodging, etc. Pohl
said that in light of the inadequate payment in kind, the
deduction of two-fifths must be regarded as much too high,
and the labor provided by the concentration camp prisoners for
private industry was very cheap.

4 7 6 NARA, RG 238, Entry 174, Box 33, NO-1578, Affidavit of Karl
Sommer, February 27, 1947 (NARA 0007435; for English
translation, see NARA 0007442-0007443).

4 7 7 For examples from Ford-Werke, see AGB, NS 4/ 29: Microfilm
32, Labor Assignment Cards, November 1944 (BW 0001-
0064). According to Buchenwald records, Ford-Werke and
some other satellite camps did not file all the required reports.
Ford-Werke was listed as having failed to file reports for the
month of December 1944 and the first three weeks of February
1945. The daily reports contained the numbers of workers, the
type of work, the start and the end of the workday and the
lunch break given to the prisoners. They were signed by the
commander of the satellite camp and co-signed by a
representative of the firm. See ThHStAW, NS 4/ 229, Labor
assignment lists, October 1944-February 21, 1945 (HSTH
0007-0011); and NARA, RG 238, Entry 174, Box 42, File: NO-2125,
Affidavit of Albert Schwartz, February 19, 1947 (NARA
0 0 0 7 3 9 7 -0 0 0 7 3 9 8 ; for English translat i o n , see NA R A
0007403).

4 7 8 Z wangsarbeit bei Fo r d . Eine Dokumentat i o n , P ro j e k t g ru p p e
"Messelager" im Verein EL-DE Haus e. V. K�ln, eds. (K�ln:
Betrieb Rode-Stankowski, 1996), p. 32.

new prisoners brought in to replace them. 470 Most
documentation from the period indicates that there
were 50 or fewer Buchenwald inmates at Ford-Werke at
any given time from August 1944 through the end of
February 1945. 471 A 1944 list of Buchenwald satellite
camps designates "Ford-K�ln" with a capacity of 50
prisoners. 472

The SS Economic and Administrative Main Office
controlled the use of concentration camp prisoner labor
and fixed their wages. The company that employed the
prisoners was responsible for their working conditions,
lodging, food and hygiene. According to a postwar
affidavit of Karl Sommer, a Nazi official who worked in
the office responsible for concentration camp labor, the
prisoners did not receive any wages. The various plants
paid the money to the concentration camp
inspectorate's administrative office, from where it was

collected for the Reich treasury. Beginning in spring
1943, companies paid wages of RM 4 per day for
unskilled workers and RM 6 per day for skilled labor. 473
In addition, companies were expected to hand directly
to the prisoners "a so-called 'achievement bonus'" for
work in excess of the prescribed wages. 474 Companies
were allowed to deduct food and housing expenses
from their wage payments to the Reich Treasurer. 475

The SS rules stipulated that the prisoners' working
hours were not to exceed those of civilian workers.
Sommer said in his affidavit that this was only in theory
and was decided upon locally by the employ i n g
companies. 476 The satellite camps provided the main
concentration camps with daily, weekly and monthly
information on the deployment of the work details. 477

Prisoners worked in various areas of Ford-Werke and
offsite, guarded by 16 SS men. 478 Buchenwald records
for Ford-Werke show that in November 1944, unskilled
laborers were assigned to work for two construction 95
95 Page 96 97
70
R e s e a r c h F i n d i n g s A b o u t Fo r d -We r k e U n d e r t h e Na z i R e g i m e
4 7 9 AG B , NS 4/ 29, M i c ro film 32, L abor Assignment Cards,
November 1944 (BW 0001-0064).
4 8 0 ELDE, Z10.559, Oral history of F. W., September 25,1990 (ELDE
0 0 0 0 3 6 5 -0 0 0 0 3 9 0 ; for English translat i o n , see ELDE
0000917).

4 8 1 ELDE, Z10.614, Oral history of K. T., September 13,1995 (ELDE
0 0 0 0 1 1 1 -0 0 0 0 1 2 6 ; for English translat i o n , see ELDE
0000795).

4 8 2 AG B , NS 4/ 29: M i c ro film 32, L abor Assignment Cards,
November 1944 (BW 0001-0064).

4 8 3 ELDE, Oral history of M. G., August 28, 1993 (ELDE 0000966-
0000970). M. G. provided some precise information about the
Buchenwald satellite camp at Ford-Werke, including the names
of the SS commander and certain foremen at Ford-Werke.
However, he stated that he and a contingent of 50 workers
a rri ved at Fo r d -We r ke in September 1943, while the
Buchenwald transportation lists indicate that he arrived in
August 1944. See also ELDE, Z10.614, Oral history of K. T.,
September 13, 1995 (ELDE 0000111-0000126; for English
translation, see ELDE 0000795).

4 8 4 ELDE, Oral history of M. G., August 28, 1993 (ELDE 0000936-
0000970).
4 8 5 ThHStAW, NS 4/ 36a, Inmate Transfer Lists, September 14,
1944, November 14, 1944, November 28,1944 (HSTH 0085,
HSTH 0091, HSTH 0093). The lists show that one inmate from
Ford-Werke was among three Buchenwald prisoners who fled
from Cologne camps on September 14, 1944; the origin of the
other two prisoners could not be determined from the lists.
Another Ford-Werke Buchenwald inmate fled on November 14,
1944; three more fled on November 28.

4 8 6 ThHStAW, NS 4/ 136a, Inmate Transfer List, October 1944
(HSTH 0087); HStAD, Rep. 118/ 1179, Transport K�ln (Ford)
August 10, 1944 (HSAD 0175); T h H S t AW, K z u H a f t A / 2 ,
Buchenwald Prisoner Number Registry, p. 418, no date (HSTH
0027). The October 1944 Transfer List shows the date of death
of prisoner 51506 as October 13, 1944, while Buchenwald
Registry shows his date of death as October 6, 1944. Both are
Buchenwald records but were maintained separately. The
records do not indicate the cause of death.

4 8 7 AG B , NS 4/ 29: M i c ro film 32, L abor Assignment Cards,
November 1944 (BW 0001-0064).

H oweve r, K . T. 's recollection was that "[ t] he people fro m
Ford we re ve ry good to us � We got a lot of soup there,
b read too, but not so mu ch ." 4 8 3

The prisoners from Buchenwald lived in barracks
some 70 to 100 meters (77 to 109 yards) away from
the plant. M. G. remembered the barracks as being
clean, green in color and fenced in. The guardroom,
the kitchen, the toilet and the washroom were at the
center. The men slept in three-tiered bunk beds. He did
not recall the SS guards as brutal but as "very precise
and strict." According to M. G., the food for the inmates
at Ford-Werke was even worse than what he had
received at Buchenwald. Breakfast consisted of coffee
and 200 grams (about 7 ounces) of bread, while dinner
was either spinach with three potatoes or soup of
white-beet leaves. 484

Records show that five concentration camp inmates
assigned to the Ford-Werke satellite camp fled the camp
in 1944. 485 Prisoner Number 51506 died at age 43 in
October 1944, while working at Ford-Werke. He was a
bricklayer of Czech nationality. He had arrived at
Buchenwald on July 21 and was brought to Ford-Werke
with the first group of Buch e n wald
prisoners on or about August 13. 486 During November
1944, one of the men was reported sick during the
entire period. One to three others were always listed as
"in need of re s t " [s ch o nu n g s k r a n k] during that
period. 487

companies in Cologne and that prisoners were also
used by the city for clearing bombs. The prisoners built
concrete air raid shelters and did transport work at
Ford-Werke. 479 In a 1990 interview, F. W., a Buchenwald
prisoner who worked at Ford-Werke in the fall of 1944,
remembered using cranes to unload barges and load
trains. 480 Another Buchenwald prisoner at Ford-Werke,
K. T., recalled in 1995 that a few inmates worked inside
the plant, welding or painting vehicles. K. T. said that he
and most of the others in his Buchenwald group
p e r fo rmed outside lab o r, including packing and
dockside loading, at Ford-Werke. 481

R e p o rts differ concerning the number of hours
wo r ked by Buch e n wald inmates at Fo r d -We r ke.
According to the Buch e n wald work assignment re c o r d s
for November 1944, the prisoners wo r ked for fi ve day s ,
f rom 7 a. m. to 5 p. m . , with a break from 12: 30 p. m . t o
1 p. m . On the sixth day, the men wo r ked for six hours,
f rom 7 a. m. to 1 p. m . , without any bre a k . The fo l l ow i n g
d ay, the men wo r ked from 7 a. m. to 3: 30 p. m . , with a
b reak from 12: 30 p. m . to 1 p. m . After the seventh day,
another cycle would begin, s t a rting with fi ve 10-hour
d ay s. 4 8 2 M . G. , a fo rmer inmate at the Buch e n wa l d
s atellite camp at Fo r d -We r ke, recalled a diffe rent wo r k
s ch e d u l e. In an interv i ew conducted in the 1990s, M . G.
re m e m b e red working 12-hour days in production at
Fo r d -We r ke, f rom 6 a. m. to 6 p. m . He also said the
b reak was 15 minutes long, d u ring which time the
B u ch e n wald lab o rers did not re c e i ve any fo o d . 96
96 Page 97 98
4 8 8 ThHStAW, NS 4/ 136a & 136b, Inmate Transfer Lists, 1944-1945
(HSTH 0012 and 0014).
4 8 9 ThHStAW, NS 4, 135, Work Statistics at Buchenwald, March 8,
1945 (HSTH 0005-0006).

4 9 0 Snyder, Encyclopedia of the Third Reich, p. 44.

4 9 1 NARA, RG 260, Economics Division, Industry Branch, Box 37,
Reel 39.3, C. I. O. S. Target Report 19/ 8 on visit to Ford-Cologne-Niehl
March 10,1945, document date March 23,1945,( NARA
0005652-0005656). Regarding reports of typhus outbreaks
and other health and sanitary problems in Cologne during this
period, see NARA, RG 331, Entry 54, Box 151, File: 17.11,
H i s t o rical Report , First U. S . A rmy, M a r ch 1945 (NA R A
0005265-0005270); RG 338, Entry 42389, Box 3, File: 15 th
Daily Reports 9 Mar-12 May '45, E1H2 Daily Report No. 3,
March 12, 1945 (NARA 0004880-0004881); RG 407, Entry
427, Box 1780, File: 99/ 12-5 March 1945, 12 Army Group
Civil Affairs and Military Government Summary No. 289, March
22, 1945 (NARA 0004566); RG 407, Entry 427, Box 15063,
File: 603-2.1, IPW Report, March 6, 1945 (NARA 0005325);
and RG 331, Entry 54, Box 151, File: 17.11, G-5 Summary No.
281, March 14, 1945 (NARA 0004929-0004930). Another
allegation from the March 10 visit was that foreign workers
were responsible for the destruction and disorder that American
troops found on their arrival. However, reports from later visits
concluded that Ford employees, Germans as well as foreigners,
had been locked in the basement and were allowed out only
under supervision. According to these reports, papers and spare
parts had been strewn about the plant by the shelling and by
unsupervised collection activities of the troops. See WNRC, Acc.

299-68A-0243, Box 540, File: File 43, Roebuck to North Rhine
Military Government, December 15, 1945 (DOJ 0010199-
0010200); NARA, RG 331, Entry 54, Box 151, File: 17.11,
H i s t o rical Report , First U. S . A rmy, M a r ch 1945 (NA R A
0005287); and NARA, RG 338, Entry 41919, Box 53, File: 12
April-29 April 1945, E1H2 Daily Summary, April 30, 1945
(NARA 0004660). Reporting on later visits to the plant, U. S.
military investigators wrote that the Eastern Europeans "were
astonishingly well behaved � while German farmers said the
Eastern workers were stealing their chickens, breaking into their
homes and helping themselves to necessities, and German
middle-class people said that the Russians we re animals,
German complaints were a mixture of hypocrisy, impudence
and subtle pro p ag a n d a ." See Historical Report , ( NA R A
0005266-0005267).

4 9 2 NARA, RG 338, Entry 42389, Box 3, File: 15 th Daily Reports 9
Mar-12 May '45, Detachment E1H2 Daily Report No. 3, March
12, 1945 (NARA 0004880-0004881); NARA, RG 331, Entry
54, Box 151, File: 17.11, Historical Report, First U. S. Army,
March 1945, p. 393 (NARA 0004930); NARA, RG 243, Entry
6, Box 687, File: 77a19 2 of 3, Preliminary Investigation of
German Industries West of the Rhine, March 23, 1945 (NARA
0004498).

4 9 3 HStAD, NW 1048/ 34/ 272, Affidavit by C. E., no date (HSAD
2999-3000).

4 9 4 Billstein and Illner, " You are now in Colog n e. C o m p l i m e n t s." pp. 161-
174.

On Feb ru a ry 27, 1 9 4 5 , s h o rt ly befo re the A m e ri c a n
a rmy liberated Cologne, 48 concentration camp inmat e s
we re transfe rred elsew h e re from the Fo r d -We r ke
s atellite camp. B u ch e n wald transfer lists show that one
p risoner fled from Fo r d -We r ke on March 6, 1 9 4 5 , t h e
d ay the A m e rican army took Cologne. 4 8 8 A memo fro m
the Labor Statistics Office of the Concentration Camp
B u ch e n wald to the Prison Bure a u , d ated March 8, 1 9 4 5 ,
i n d i c ated that a group of men was being assembled at
B u ch e n wald to be sent to Cologne. T h i rty-six of the
men had been part of the original Fo r d -We r ke wo r k
d e t a i l . H oweve r, the memo specified that the men we re
to remain at Buch e n wald "until further notice." 4 8 9 T h e re
is no indication that the transport ever left for Cologne.
On A p ril 10, 1 9 4 5 , B u ch e n wald was liberat e d . 4 9 0

7.8. Liberation at End of War
When American army units arrived at the Ford-Werke
plant in March 1945, they found foreigners
living on the factory grounds, although it is not clear
how many had worked at Ford-Werke and how many
had just taken shelter at the plant during the fighting.
One of the earliest U. S. Army reports, based on a visit

on March 10, 1945, estimated that "500 foreign
workers were living in the factory, mainly in the large
air-raid shelter � Living conditions were foul in the
extreme and most of the Russian women were reported
to be suffering from V. D." This report is the only one to
mention a re p o rted outbreak of ve n e real disease.
Others referred to the typhus that was rampant in
Cologne. 491 Military accounts written over the next few
days reported between 300 and 400 foreigners at the
plant, most of whom were Italians. On March 22,
1945, Maj. F. N. Arnoldy filed a plant report with the
U. S . S t r ategic Bombing Survey stat i n g : "I fo u n d
presence of foreign workers such as Russians, Poles,
Belgians, French, Czech and Dutch. Several hundred
workers of both sexes were gathered in a large room of
the air-raid shelter." 492 C. E., an assistant to plant
physician Dr. Wenzel, claimed that Dr. Wenzel had
established a refuge in the air raid shelter: "During the
fighting for Cologne Dr. Wenzel gathered his orderlies
around him and in a never-tiring effort he cared for the
remaining foreigners, app. 60 in number, as well as
approximately 400 Italians." She also claimed that Dr.
Wenzel perfo rmed operations during this time. 4 9 3
Foreign workers found in Cologne were sent to nearby
" d i s p l a c e d -p e r s o n s " camps operated by the U. S .
Army. 494

Fo r e i g n a n d Fo r c e d L a b o r a t Fo r d -We rk e 97
97 Page 98 99
72
R e s e a r c h F i n d i n g s A b o u t Fo r d -We r k e U n d e r t h e Na z i R e g i m e 98
98 Page 99 100
73
4 9 5 FMC, AR-65-1500, Box 6, File: Germany 1939-1945 (C. E.
Sorensen), Albert to Sorensen, July 11, 1940 (FMC 0003146-
0003148). For an overview, see Lessmann, "Ford Paris im
Zugriff von Ford K�ln 1943."

4 9 6 NARA, RG 169, Entry 500B, Box 1381, Document 155921,
Intelligence Report No. EW-KO 13, March 18, 1945 (NARA
0007104). A postwar summary of activities at Ford's European
subsidiaries during the war indicated that by January 1942, the
Ford plants in Cologne, France, Holland and Belgium were
working interchangeably under the Reich Commissioner, but
that "passive resistance in the occupied countries accounted in
some instances for a reduction in the total estimat e d
production." See FMC, AR-98-213541, Box 201, European
C o m p a ny Histori e s , 1 9 4 0 -1 9 4 6 , June 18, 1946 (FMC
0007443).

4 9 7 NARA, RG 226, Entry 16, Box 946, File: 80648, Ministry of
Economic Warfare, Report on Ford Organisation in Continental
Europe, June 1944, hereafter MEW Report (NARA 0004396);
NARA, RG 407, Entry 368B, Box 1032, Schneider Report, pp.
10-11, September 5, 1945 (NARA 0000012-0000013).

4 9 8 NARA, RG 169, Entry 500B, Box 1381, Document 155921,
Intelligence Report No. EW-KO 13, March 18, 1945 (NARA
0007104).

4 9 9 NARA, RG 226, Entry 16, Box 946, File: 80648, MEW. Report,
June 1944 (NARA 0004399). The Poissy plant was still under
construction when the Germans occupied France.

5 0 0 Ian Ousby, O c c u p at i o n ; the Ordeal of France 1940-1944 (New York:
St. Martin's Press, 1997), pp. 67-68.

S e c t i o n 8
F O R D -W E R K E ' S R E L A T I O N S H I P
W I T H O T H E R F O R D F A C I L I T I E S
I N O C C U P I E D E U R O P E

When German forces ove rran the Netherlands,
B e l g i u m , L u xe m b o u rg and France in a six-we e k
campaign in May and June 1940, their victory gave
them control of all the strategic industrial productive
capacity of Western Europe. Soon afterward, Robert
Schmidt was appointed the commissioner for all Ford
properties in the occupied countries of Belgium, France
and Holland. 495 After the U. S. entry into the war, all of
these subsidiaries were placed under the control of the
R e i ch Commissioner for the Tre atment of Enemy
P ro p e rt y, who appointed Fo r d -We r ke personnel as
custodians to oversee operations. 496 Ford-Werke also
had ties to Ford subsidiaries in other occupied
countries, including Denmark and Greece, as well as
those in countries that were German allies during the
early part of the war, such as Hungary, Romania, Italy
and Finland. According to wartime intelligence reports

and postwar investigations of the firm, Ford-Werke
c o o r d i n ated the production of Ford ve h i c l e s
throughout occupied Europe. 497

8.1. Ford of France
When France declared war on Germ a ny in
September 1939, Ford Motor Company held majority
ownership in Ford S. A. F. (Ford of France). 498 Ford of
France's operations, located at sites in Poissy, Asni�res,
Bourdeaux and Bourges, involved truck assembly and
engine manufacture, and its facilities included assembly
plants, foundries and machine shops. 499 After the
collapse of France in June 1940, the country was
divided into a military occupation zone in the north
and a quasi-independent French civilian government in
the south with its capital at Vichy. 500 99
99 Page 100 101
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R e s e a r c h F i n d i n g s Ab o u t Fo r d -We r k e U n d e r t h e Na z i R e g i m e
5 0 1 NARA, RG 407, Entry 368B, Box 1032, Schneider Report,
Exhibit 203, Memo by Schmidt on custodian of Fo r d
Enterprises France, June 25,1945 (NARA 0000475-0000476);
NARA, RG 169, Entry 500B, Box 1381, Document 155921,
Intelligence Report No. EW-KO 13, March 18, 1945 (NARA
0007104); HFM, Acc. 6, Box 321, File: 1940 Correspondence,
Dollfus to Edsel Ford, November 27, 1940 (HFM 0001457).

5 0 2 HFM, Acc. 6, Box 321, File: 1940 Correspondence, Albert to
Edsel Ford, September 18, 1940 (HFM 0001470-0001471).

5 0 3 WNRC, Acc. 299-68A-0243, Box 536, File W17536, Advisory
Board Meeting Minutes, January 13, 1943 (DOJ 0011119-
0011120; for English translation, see DOJ 0011222).

5 0 4 HFM, Acc. 6, Box 321, File: 1940 -Cologne, Dollfus to Edsel
Ford, August 31, 1940 (HFM 0000124).

5 0 5 HFM, Acc. 6, Box 321, File: 1940 Cor respondence, Dollfus to
Edsel Ford, November 27, 1940 (HFM 0001457-0001459).
In a 1960 interview with historian Mira Wilkins, a former
employee of Ford of France said that a person in Dollfus' shoes
had to be careful: "As a French citizen Dollfus was obligated to
oppose the Germans, as a Ford man he was under obligation to
cooperate with Cologne to protect the assets. After the war
Dollfus was in jail a week or two. Feelings were running high
against anyone who had worked with the Germans, but Dollfus
was just as good a Frenchman as anyone else." Another former
Ford of France employee, also interviewed by Mira Wilkins in
1960, said that Dollfus was released without a trial and later
received an award from the French government for his work
d u ring the wa r. See FMC, A R -9 8 -2 1 3 5 4 2 , F i l e : O r a l
Reminiscence conducted by Mira Wi l k i n s , Jules Gutzeit
Interview, July 20,1960 (FMC 0017366-0017367) and Marcel
Cola Interview, July 13, 1960 (FMC 0017359-0017360).

5 0 6 HFM, Acc. 880, Box 6, File: France, Interview with Maurice
Dollfus, September 13, 1960 (HFM 000868). In a 1947 letter to Ford executive Russell Roberge, Dollfus wrote that Schmidt

tried and sometimes succeeded in taking away machinery, parts and even whole ve h i c l e s , sometimes without prov i d i n g
receipts. Dollfus called Schmidt tactless and said that he acted with "a total disdain of both normal standards and Ford
routine." Dollfus also recounted an attempt by Schmidt to rid the French company of Dollfus in 1943, a move that Dollfus
believed would have endangered, at the very least, Dollfus' freedom. See HFM, Acc. 713, Box 4, File: Correspondence -Foreign
-Cologne -Personnel 1946-1948, Dollfus to Roberge, December 16,1947 (HFM 0003128).

5 0 7 WNRC, Acc. 299-68A-0243, Box 536, File W17536, Advisory
Board Meeting Minutes, January 13, 1943 (DOJ 0011119; for English translation, see DOJ 0011222). Dollfus and Ford of

France came under the scrutiny of the U. S. government. In a 1943 report summarizing an investigation by the Treasury
Department, Dollfus was described as having "worked with the German Authorities so successful [sic] that he substantially
superseded his colleagues of the Ford Motor Company of G e rm a ny [Sch m i d t ] ." P ri m a ri ly during the period after
Schmidt's resignation, Dollfus built the production of Ford of France "higher than it ever had been in peacetime, supplying
trucks and parts to the German Army," according to the report. See NARA, RG 131, Entry 247, Box 131, Ford -Confidential,
Report of Investigation of Ford, Societ� Anonyme Francaise; Machinery Suppliers, Inc.; Matford S. A.; Fordair S. A., by J. John
Lawler, hereafter Lawler Report, pp. 63-64, circa 1943 (NARA 0 0 0 1 4 6 0 -0 0 0 1 4 6 1 ) ; and NA R A , Franklin D. R o o s eve l t
Presidential Library, Morgenthau Diaries, vol. 637, pp. 212-223, Randolph Paul to Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau,
May 25, 1943 (NARA 0004944). See Sections 9.2., 9.3. and 9.5. for more about this investigation.

Immediately following the occupation of France,
G e rman military occupation authorities ap p o i n t e d
R o b e rt Schmidt commissioner of Ford of France
facilities. Alfons Streit, Ford-Werke technical director,
went to Ford of France to retrieve spare parts for Ford
of Belgium. According to Ford of France Managing
Director Maurice Dollfus, Schmidt and his assistant, the
son of Ford-Werke's chairman, Heinrich Albert, went to
the Asni�res plant between June 17 and July 5, 1940,
and took "the best parts of its valuable stock" for Ford
of Belgium and Ford of Holland. During this period,
Ford of France began producing three-ton trucks for
the German military and was supplying parts to Ford of
Belgium and Ford of Holland. 501

After June 1940, Ford of France could no longer
import American or English parts or cars. Accordingly,
Ford-Werke developed a "united program" for the
exchange of goods and machines between Cologne,
Antwerp, Amsterdam and Paris. 502 However, Schmidt
reported difficulties in his relations with Ford of France

management. Although Schmidt had been appointed
commissioner of the facilities, Dollfus convinced the
German authorities in Paris to grant him the authority
to manage the French plants independently. 503 In
August 1940, Dollfus sent a letter to Ford Motor
Company indicating that he had gone to Berlin to meet
with Adolph von Schell (Plenipotentiary for Automotive
Affairs) concerning Ford of France's position. Dollfus
s t ated that he was working well with Sch m i d t . 5 0 4
Dollfus later reported that despite Schmidt's plans to
reorganize Ford European subsidiaries into a single
economic unit under German leadership, Dollfus had
been successful in keeping Ford of France separate. 505
In a postwar interview, Dollfus said Schmidt had acted
"like a pig" in his relations with Ford of France. 506

In January 1941, Schmidt resigned his position as
Ford of France commissioner. He later attributed the
re s i g n ation to his fru s t r ations with the " p a s s i ve
resistance" of the French management. 507 Under orders
of the German military government in France, a Ford- 100
100 Page 101 102
75
Fo r d -We rk e 's R e l a t i o n s h i p wi t h O t h e r Fo r d Fa c i l i t i e s i n O c c u p i e d E u r o p e
5 0 8 NARA, RG 407, Entry 368B, Box 1032, Schneider Report,
Exhibit 203, Memo by Schmidt on custodian of Fo r d
Enterprises France, June 25,1945 (NARA 0000475-0000476);
see also NARA, RG 59, Central Decimal File, 1940-44, Box
1174, File: 351.115, Leahy to Secretary of State, March 17,1942
(NARA 0005411-0005414).

5 0 9 HFM, Acc. 6, Box 329, File: Asni�res, Dollfus to Edsel Ford,
August 21, 1941 (HFM 0001285).
5 1 0 NARA, RG 59, Central Decimal File, 1940-44, Box 1174, File:
351.115, Leahy to Secretary of State, March 17,1942 (NARA
0005411-0005414).

5 1 1 HFM, Acc. 6, Box 329, File: Asni�res, Broz to Edsel Ford and
Sorensen, March 11, 1942 (HFM 0000156); BA-F, RW 24/ 4,
Report of Events, March 8, 1942 (BAF 1307); NARA, RG 84,
Entry 2490, Box 10, File: 711, American Embassy, Vichy, to
Secretary of State, April 4, 1942 (NARA 0006908).

5 1 2 FMC, AR 75-63-430, Box 207, File: France Meeting Minutes
1935-1948, Ford S. A. F. Board Meeting Minutes for June 12,
1942 (FMC 0003419-0003421) and October 19, 1944 (FMC
0003383). For German regulations regarding the definition of
enemy-controlled assets, see BA-L, R 22/ 2815, R e i c h s ge s e t z bl at t
Nr. 37, April 14,1942 (BAL 2706).

5 1 3 NARA, RG 407, Entry 368B, Box 1032, Schneider Report,
Exhibit 203, Memo by Schmidt on custodian of Fo r d
Enterprises France, June 25,1945 (NARA 0000475-0000476).

5 1 4 WNRC, Acc. 299-68A-0243, Box 536, File W17536, Advisory
Board Meeting Minutes, January 13, 1943 (DOJ 0011113 and 0011120-0011121; for English translations, see DOJ 0011218

and 0011222-0011223). The Speer ministry 's goal, a s e x p re s s ly ordered by the F�hre r, was to ensure the full
utilization of the French automotive industry for the German war effort. For reports of sabotage at Ford of France, see Ford-We
r ke Records, Note to fi l e s , September 24, 1942 (FW 0 0 0 1 9 0 8 -0 0 0 1 9 0 9 ) ; F M C, A R -9 8 -2 1 3 5 4 2 , F i l e : O r a l
reminiscence conducted by Mira Wi l k i n s , Marcel Cola
Interview, July 13, 1960 (FMC 0017359-0017360); and HP, AR-61-000418, Box 1, File: 1941, Translation of Report from

Ford S. A. F.: French Recovery Study (HP 0000418).
5 1 5 WNRC, Acc. 299-68A-0243, Box 536, File W17536, Advisory
Board Meeting Minutes, July 1, 1943 (DOJ 0011106; for
English translation, see DOJ 0011232); NARA, RG 407, Entry 368B, Box 1032, Schneider Report, p. 39, September 5, 1945

(NARA 0000040-0000041), Schmidt to Perry, May 28, 1945 (NARA 0000485). Beginning in 1944, Ford-Werke production
reports include information on both the Cologne facility and
the "Ford-West" program; see NARA, RG 243, Entry 6, Box 684, File: 77a2, Automobile Manufacturers Planned and Actual

Production, 1944 (NARA 0003659).
5 1 6 BA-F, RW 24/ 33, Mid-month Report, April 4,1944 (BAF 1417-
1420); NARA, RG 226, Entry 16, Box 946, File: 80684, MEW Report, June 1944 (NARA 0004399).

5 1 7 NARA, RG 407, Entry 368B, Box 1032, Schneider Report, p. 39,
September 5, 1945 (NARA 0000041).
5 1 8 FMC, AR 75-63-430, Box 207, File: France Meeting Minutes
1935-1948, Ford S. A. F. Meeting Minutes, October 19, 1944 (FMC 0003382-0003383 and 0003388).

Werke employee remained at Ford of France. 508 Later
t h at summer, Ford of France sold the facility at
Asni�res. 509 In March 1942, George Lesto, assistant
manager of Ford of France, reported that the Poissy
plant was producing trucks for the German army. 510 In
March and April 1942, the Poissy facility was bombed
by the British Royal Air Force. 511

After the U. S. entry into the war, Ford of France
became administered as an enemy-controlled company,
and on May 26, 1942, Albert was appointed custodian
of the firm, supplanting the French firm's board of
directors. The French board of directors attributed
Albert's appointment to the consolidation of the Speer
armaments ministry in Germany and Speer's attempts
to coordinate French and German production for the
war. 512 Maj. Tannen of the German army acted as
A l b e rt 's assistant in administering the plant. 5 1 3
However, because of continuing difficulties at Ford of
France, including an attempt at sabotage, in January
1943 the Speer ministry took the first step toward
granting Schmidt the "necessary authority" to include
the French subsidiary in the "general Ford plan." 514 This
called for coordinating parts production and assembly
of military trucks and Maultiers between Ford-Werke
and the Ford subsidiary in France as well as subsidiaries

in Belgium and Holland. Under Albert, Ford of France
was made responsible for the production of parts for
2,000 trucks per month for the German army, with
Ford of France, Belgium and Holland each responsible
for assembly of one-third of the total. To accomplish
this and to connect Ford of France with other Ford
entities in Europe, Albert saw to it that men and
m at e rials from Fo r d -We r ke, and labor from Fo r d
facilities in Belgium and Holland, were sent to France. 515

In March 1944, G e rman military authori t i e s
reported that Ford of France was supplying Ford of
Belgium and Ford of Holland with engines and
transmission units, in addition to producing trucks and
motors. British intelligence reports from the same year
indicated Ford of France was manufacturing between
400 and 500 vehicles each month along with 1,000
engines. 516 According to a September 1945 report, the
highest production figure attained by Ford of France
during the war was 900 trucks per month. 517 The
liberation of Paris on August 28, 1944, ended Albert's
custodianship of Ford of France. By October 1944,
Ford S. A. F. was operating under its U. S. parent. 518 101
101 Page 102 103
76
R e s e a r c h F i n d i n g s A b o u t Fo r d -We r k e U n d e r t h e Na z i R e g i m e
5 1 9 BA-L, R 87/ 8292, Albert to Reich Commissioner, June 8,1940
(BAL 5749-5750).
5 2 0 HFM, Acc. 6, Box 321, File: 1940 Cor respondence, Dollfus to
Edsel Ford, November 27, 1940 (HFM 0001456-0001460).
5 2 1 BA-L, R 87/ 8292, Albert to Reich Commissioner, June 8,1940
(BAL 5749-5750); WNRC, Acc. 299-68A-0243, Box 536, File:
W17536, Schmidt to Reich Commissioner, May 15,1944 (DOJ
0011169; for English translation, see DOJ 0011171); NARA,
RG 407, Entry 368B, Box 1032, Schneider Report, Exhibit 196,
Memo by Schmidt on custodianship, June 25, 1945 (NARA
0000464). Prior to the occupation of Belgium by German
troops in 1940, Ford of Belgium received materials and parts
from Ford of Britain (Dagenham) and Ford Motor Company,
and assembled finished cars; see FMC, AR-75-62-616, Box 79,
Custodian Report (FMC 0001044).

5 2 2 NARA, RG 407, Entry 368B, Box 1032, Schneider Report, page
38, September 5, 1945, (NARA 0000040).

5 2 3 Ford-Werke Records, Personnel file of Hans Schmidt, no date
(FW 0020974).

5 2 4 NARA, RG 407, Entry 368B, Box 1032, File: Ford-Werke AG,
GED Report, February 1946 (NARA 0001567).
5 2 5 WNRC, Acc. 299-68A-0243, Box 536, File W17536, Advisory
Board Meeting Minutes, January 13, 1943 (DOJ 0011113-
0011114; for English translation, see DOJ 0011218-0011219);
see also NARA, RG 226, Entry 16, Box 946, File 80684, MEW
Report, June 1944 (NARA 0004399).

5 2 6 F M C, A R -7 5 -6 2 -6 1 6 , B ox 79, Custodian Report (FMC
0001046). Ford of Belgium paid the majority of the expenses
for the additional investments and, after the war, submitted a
number of invoices related to the investments to Ford-Werke for
re i m bu r s e m e n t . Fo r d -We r ke took the position that the
activities were the responsibility of Ford of Belgium. Available
d o c u m e n t ation does not confi rm whether Fo r d -We r ke
eventually paid the invoices, totaling Bfrs 71,813,653.67.

5 2 7 HStAD, NW 1049/ 47910, Denazification File of Werner Pr�tz,
1945-1947 (HSAD 0322-0364).

5 2 8 Ford-Werke Records, Kurscheid to Neuss, January 5,1944 (FW
0003148), B�hl to Streit, February 3, 1944 (FW 0003175).

8.2. Ford of Belgium
Ford Motor Company (Belgium) S. A. ( Ford of
Belgium) was a direct subsidiary of Ford Motor
C o m p a ny befo re the outbreak of war in 1939. 5 1 9
Following the German invasion of Belgium in May
1 9 4 0 , the country was administered by Germ a n
m i l i t a ry authori t i e s , and A l l i e d -owned Belgian
industrial facilities came under the jurisdiction of the
R e i ch Commissioner for the Tre atment of Enemy
Property. From the time of the invasion in 1940, until
the liberation of Belgium in September 1944, Ford of
Belgium was treated as part of a pan-European Ford
organization headed by Ford-Werke. 520

In June 1940, the German military administration
appointed Robert Schmidt as special commissioner for
Ford of Belgium during the occupat i o n , w i t h
instructions to get the utmost out of the Belgian
facilities in terms of German war potential. Soon after
his appointment, Schmidt changed the purpose of the
Antwerp facility, ordering the conversion of Ford of
Belgium from an assembly-only facility for cars to a
full-scale production plant. 521 In accordance with
German military requests, Ford of Belgium built trucks
and manu fa c t u red Ford part s , e s p e c i a l ly those
bottlenecked in Germany. 522 Since Schmidt spent only a
limited amount of time in Belgium, he delegated some
of his authori t y. For example, Hans Sch m i d t
re p resented Fo r d -We r ke 's management board in
Antwerp and oversaw operations there from 1940 to

1944. 523 Alfons Streit, Ford-Werke's technical director
and a deputy member of the management board,
supervised production at Ford of Belgium and Ford of
Holland. 524

At a meeting of the advisory board of Ford-Werke in
Ja nu a ry 1943, R o b e rt Schmidt announced the
expansion of the " u n i fied plan" for Euro p e a n
p roduction that included contri butions from the
Cologne, Amsterdam, Antwerp and L�ttich facilities. To
re l i eve a raw mat e rial bottleneck , he ordered the
establishment of two new facilities in Belgium, a
foundry in Rocour and a forge in Bierset, a suburb of
A n t we rp. 5 2 5 Although these facilities we re legally
considered part of Ford of Belgium, Ford-Werke owned
the mach i n e ry. 5 2 6 Fo r d -We r ke also had its ow n
personnel managing the new facilities. Werner Pr�tz, a
high-ranking Fo r d -We r ke employe e, ove r s aw
o p e r ations at the Bierset fo rge until the A l l i e d
occupation. 527 At the Rocour foundry, Streit directed
most operations, assisted by M. B�hl, another Ford-Werke
employee. 528

During the war, Ford-Werke used Ford of Belgium's
contacts with Switzerland, which had been part of Ford
of Belgium's sales territory during the 1930s. Since
1 9 3 1 , Fo r d -We r ke had purchased items and sold
vehicles and spare parts in Switzerland, t h e re fo re
paying commissions to Ford of Belgium. Schmidt
developed the idea of buying Ford spare parts in
Switzerland for Ford-Werke and for other European 102
102 Page 103 104
77
Fo r d -We rk e 's R e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h Ot h e r Fo r d Fa c i l i t i e s i n Oc c u p i e d E u r o p e
5 2 9 NARA, RG 407, Entry 368B, Box 1032, Schneider Report, p. 41,
September 5, 1945 (NARA 0000043). Gas generators, or gas producers, were alternative fueling devices that used carbon or

wood to fuel a vehicle.
5 3 0 BA-L, R 87/ 8292, Albert to Reich Commissioner, June 8,1940
(BAL 5749-5750).
5 3 1 BA-L, R 87/ 6205, Military Commander for Belgium and
Northern France to Ford of Belgium, March 25, 1944 (BAL 0530), Reich Commissioner to Schmidt, July 7, 1944 (BAL

0535-0536), Finance President of Cologne to Ford-Werke, June 13, 1944 (BAL 0534); FMC, AR-98-213541, Box 131, Perry
Report, September 19,1946 (FMC 0000918).
5 3 2 BA-L, R 87/ 6205, Schmidt to Reich Commissioner, May 15,
1944 (BAL 0527-0528; for partial English translation, see WNRC, RG 299, Acc. 299-68A-0243, W-17536 Part 1 of 1

[DOJ 0011171-0011172]); Reich Commissioner to Schmidt,
July 7, 1944 (BAL 0535-0536).

5 3 3 Ensign Rains, a U. S. military investigator with the Allied
occupation government in Germany, confiscated the shares from Ford-Werke on June 14, 1945. See NARA, RG 260,

Property Division, Property Control and External Assets Branch, Box 546, File: Ford-Werke, Rose to Kagan, September 10,1948
(NARA 0000549-0000550) and Bennett to Property Division, November 24, 1948 (NARA 0000548); see also FMC, AR-98-
213541, Box 131, Perry Report, September 19, 1946 (FMC 0000918).

5 3 4 H F M , A R -9 8 -2 1 3 5 4 1 1 , B ox 49, Oral history of Nestor
Casteleyn, March 26, 1987 (HFM 0001500-0001501).
5 3 5 HFM, Acc. 880, Box 2, File: Belgium, Notes on interview with
Desire De Jonghe, August 5, 1960 (HFM 0000770-0000771).
5 3 6 NARA, RG 243, Entry 6, Box 687, File: Ford Antwer p, Ford
(Belgium) war damage no. 2 , October 7, 1941 (NA R A
0003411-0003421).

5 3 7 NARA, RG 243, Entry 6, Box 687, File: 77a19 3 of 3, Motor
Vehicle Survey of Ford and General Motors Plants at Antwerp,
Belgium, February 26,1945 (NARA 0003264-0003266); Hans
Schmidt to Armaments Commando -Brussels, June 1, 1943
(NARA 0003298-0003301).

5 3 8 NARA, RG 56, Acc. 56-68A-2809, Box 40, File: (500) Rep in
Belgium, Ford Motor Co. (Belgium) S. A., Form TFR-500,
October 31, 1947 (NARA 0004471-0004472).

the factory that was expressed in subtle sabotage of the
trucks being built for the German army. The sabotage
would prevent the trucks from working properly, yet
was not noticeable until they were in use. 534 According
to a postwar account from another employee, the work
force labored "very hard, but slowly" and built fewer
than 60 percent of the truck quota established by the
Germans for the Belgian operation between June 1940
and August 1944. The comparison was made between
35,501 units assembled by Ford of Belgium (with U. S.
components) for the U. S. Army between December
1944 and May 1945, and 11,025 units assembled
previously for the Germans over a five-year period of
the occupation. 535 The Antwerp facility was heavily
damaged by the Allies during the war. The first attack
occurred in October 1941, when five bombs were
dropped in the vicinity of the factory and caused a fire
to break out in the factory hall. 536 The Antwerp facility
was attacked twice in May 1943, causing extensive
damage to the plant's machine shop. 537

D i rect links between Fo r d -We r ke and Ford of
Belgium were severed in September 1944, after the
Allied liberation of Belgium. Ford of Britain assumed
control of the firm and installed its own directors. 538
Ford of Belgium employee O. La Meir, head of the
Service Department, was said to have been a member of
a pro-German, Belgian SS paramilitary group, and left a
few days before liberation, presumably for Germany.
Belgian authorities later arrested James van Luppen,
Ford of Belgium's assistant manager during the war,
and ch a rged him with 17 counts of industri a l

Ford companies, and the German gove rn m e n t
guaranteed payment. Ford-Werke also aided a German
g ove rnment program with Swiss dealers thro u g h
which the dealers agreed to repair 2,000 army trucks
and convert them into gas generators. 529

In 1939, Ford of Belgium had a stock capital of Bfrs
(Belgian francs) 90,000,000, of which a large amount
was owned directly by Henry Ford. 530 In 1944, Ford of
Belgium, under pressure from Schmidt, issued an
additional Bfrs 60,000,000 in Ford of Belgium stock to
be retained directly by Ford-Werke. A postwar report
said that the stock was given in exchange for Ford-Werke's
assistance with expenses for the new foundry
and forge operations. 531 Schmidt justified this plan to
the Reich Commissioner for the Treatment of Enemy
Property in part by claiming that such a move would
"secure German influence over the Antwerp company
for the future." With permission from the Reich
Commissioner, the stocks were issued to Ford-Werke,
making the German company Ford of Belgium's second
largest shareholder. 532 These shares were nullified by
Ford of Belgium after the war, since they had been
issued under pressure. 533

An account provided in the 1980s by an employee of
Ford of Belgium describes "a kind of resistance" within 103
103 Page 104 105
78
R e s e a r c h F i n d i n g s A b o u t Fo r d -We r k e U n d e r t h e Na z i R e g i m e
5 3 9 NARA, RG 59, Central Decimal File 1945-49, Box 1741, File:
356.115, Roberge to Foreign Service Administration, October
13, 1944 (NARA 0005333), Fuller to Secretary of State, April
24, 1945 (NARA 0007375), Keeley to Secretary of State, April
18, 1945 (NARA 0007373). Keeley, the American consul
general in Antwerp, Belgium, noted that van Luppen had not yet
been brought to trial, and that the charges might be dropped,
although Belgian authorities insisted that there had been
collaboration at the Antwerp facility. A U. S. Treasury Department
official attached a note to the Keeley letter, indicating that the
information in the letter should not (emphasis in the original)
be passed on to Ford Motor Company; see Memo from Davids,
May 9, 1945 (NARA 0007372).

5 4 0 FMC, AR-98-213541, Box 131, File: Antwerp Visit 1948,
Translation of Notification from Auditeur Militaire to the
Burgomaster of Antwerp, November 10,1947 (FMC 0007221).

5 4 1 HFM, Acc. 880, Box 2, File: Belgium, Notes on interview with
Desire De Jonghe, August 5, 1960 (HFM 0000770-0000771).

5 4 2 NARA, RG 226, Microfilm M1499, Roll 270, report on N. V.
Nederlandsche Ford Automobiel Fabriek, June 10,1943 (NARA
0004126).

5 4 3 Hans We rner Neulen, " D e u t s che Besatzungspolitik in
Westeuropa � zwischen Unterdr�ckung und Kollaboration" in
Karl Dietrich Bracher et al., eds., Deutschland 1933-1945. N e u e
Studien zurn ationalsozialistischen Herrschaft ( B o n n : D roste Ve r l ag,
1992), pp. 404-425.

5 4 4 BA-L, R 87/ 8292, Albert to Reich Commissioner, June 8,1940
(BAL 5749-5750). Albert wrote that as long as the United
States did not enter the war, an administrator was not necessary.
If the United States did enter the war, Albert asked to be
considered for the position of custodian, not only for Ford of
Holland, but also for Ford of Belgium and Ford-Werke. See also
Section 5.4. for more on custodianship.

5 4 5 FMC, AR-95-213541, Box 131, File: Schmidt -Nazi Accusation,
Memo by Stenger on Schmidt, November 28, 1947 (FMC
0004433).

5 4 6 BA-L, R 177/ 1251, Report on Testing at the N. V. Nederlandsche
Ford-Automobiel Fabriek in Amsterdam, November 30, 1943
(BAL 5391-5474), Bestallungsurkunde, June 13, 1940 (BAL
5585).

5 4 7 NARA, RG 226, Microfilm M1499, Roll 270, Report on N. V.
Nederlandsche Ford Automobiel Fabriek, June 10,1943 (NARA
0004125-0004126).

5 4 8 BA-L, R 177/ 1251, Schmidt to the Reich Commissioner for the
Occupied Dutch Territories, December 11, 1940 (BAL 5568-
5569; for English translation, see BAL 12344-12345). In
October 1942, Ford of Holland was re q u i red to begin
assembling a German army caterpillar truck, using material
f rom Fo r d -We r ke and other German sources. By early
December "not one unit had been completed." In response,
Ford-Werke sent 753 trucks for conversion into caterpillar
vehicles and dispatched more than 100 employees "to make the
best of a bad job." See FMC, AR-98-213541, Box 201,
European Company Histories, 1940-1946, June 18,1946 (FMC
0007446).

5 4 9 NARA, RG 260, Economics Division, I. G. Farben Control Office,
Box 24, unlabeled file, Schmidt to Albert, December 4, 1941
(NARA 0006997).

c o l l ab o r at i o n . 5 3 9 In November 1947, m i l i t a ry
a u t h o rities in A n t we rp ended an inve s t i g ation of
economic collaboration with the enemy against Ford of
Belgium by dismissing the matter. 540 According to one
postwar account, van Luppen was at first pushed out
from his position, but returned in October 1948. 541

8.3. Ford of Holland
N. V. N e d e r l a n d s che Ford Automobiel Fab riek (Ford of
Holland) was an independent subsidiary of Ford of
B ritain befo re the outbreak of wa r. Ford of Britain held
a 60 percent ownership stake in the company, with the
remaining 40 percent in the hands of Dutch pri vat e
c i t i z e n s. 5 4 2 U n l i ke Belgium, Holland was not subjected to
a military gove rnment after the German invasion in May
1 9 4 0 . I n s t e a d , G e rman officials established a civilian
g ove rnment under the control of the Reich
Commissioner for the Occupied Dutch Te rri t o ri e s ,w h i ch
d i re c t ly re g u l ated Dutch industry. 5 4 3

Despite arguments by Heinri ch A l b e rt that only 24
percent of Ford of Holland's capital was actually enemy -c
o n t rolled [owned by the English], the Reich
Commissioner decided to appoint a custodian for Ford of
H o l l a n d . 5 4 4 As a court e s y, A l b e rt and Schmidt consulted

the manager of Ford of Holland, C. G. F. S t e n g e r, about the
appointment of Schmidt as custodian. Their strategy wa s
to have the individual be a " Ford man," since the
G e rmans had made it known that a custodian would be
appointed in any case. 5 4 5 S chmidt was selected on June
1 3 , 1 9 4 0 . 5 4 6

As custodian, S chmidt immediat e ly began to ch a n g e
the nat u re of Ford of Holland's operat i o n s. To
c o m p e n s ate for the loss of imported parts from the
United States and Gre at Britain (Ford of Holland's
p ri m a ry prewar suppliers), S chmidt conve rted the
Amsterdam facility from an assembly shop to a full
p roduction plant in 1940. 5 4 7 Fo r d -We r ke obtained the
n e c e s s a ry machines from other Ford subsidiaries and
t r a n s p o rted them to Amsterdam as part of a plan to exe rt
a " d e c i s i ve influence" over non-German Fo r d
c o m p a n i e s. 5 4 8 According to Sch m i d t , h oweve r, Ford of
H o l l a n d 's decision to invest ap p rox i m at e ly Dutch Guilder
1,000,000 in expanding the Amsterdam facility to
i n c rease German war potential was entire ly vo l u n t a ry. 5 4 9 104
104 Page 105 106
79
Fo r d -We rk e 's R e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h Ot h e r Fo r d Fa c i l i t i e s i n Oc c u p i e d E u r o p e
5 5 0 BA-L, R 177/ 1251, Report on Testing at the N. V. Nederlandsche
Ford-Automobiel Fabriek in Amsterdam, November 30, 1943
(BAL 5392-5474); Ford-Werke Records, Personnel file of W. S.
(FW 0021713-0021715).

5 5 1 NARA, RG 407, Entry 368B, Box 1032, File: Ford-Werke AG,
GED Report, February 1946 (NARA 0001567).
5 5 2 NARA, RG 59, Central Decimal File 1945-49, Box 1741, File:
356.115, Roberge to Foreign Service Administration, October
13,1944 (NARA 0005333), Hibberson to Haupt, October 17,
1945 (NARA 0005342).

5 5 3 Wilkins and Hill, American Business A b r o a d , p. 348.

5 5 4 FMC, AR 65-71, Box 25, File: Ford International '48 #1,
Summary of Foreign Operations -January 12,1948, Report on
Ford-Werke, October 15, 1947 (FMC 0000135). Austria had
been united with Germany in 1938 and formed part of the
German Reich until the end of the war.

5 5 5 Fo r d -We r ke Records, S cheuffgen to the Vi e n n a
Gauwirtschaftskammer, September 18, 1944 (FW 0001757);
FMC, AR-75-63-430, Box 90, File: Ford-Werke Audit Reports
1 9 4 6 -1 9 4 7 , Audit Report by Knipprath for 1946 (FMC
0016953-0016954).

5 5 6 Ford-Werke Records, Scheuffgen to Vitger, September 17,1944
(FW 0001755); BA-L, R 87/ 6206, Reich Economic Minister to
Ford-Werke, November 10, 1944 (BAL 0832); WNRC, Acc.
2 9 9 -6 8 A -0 2 4 3 , B ox 536, F i l e : W 1 7 5 3 6 , Fo reign Claims
Settlement Commission Proposed Decision No. W-1 8 5 5 9 ,
November 23, 1966 (DOJ 0010737-0010753).

5 5 7 FMC, AR-75-63-430, Box 90, File: Ford-Werke Audit Reports
1946-1947, Audit Report by Knipprath for 1946, November
1947 (FMC 0016953); FMC, AR-65-71, Box 25, File: Ford
International '48 #1, Summary of Foreign Operations -January
12, 1948, Report on Ford-Werke, October 15, 1947 (FMC
0000135). A U. S. military government postwar report indicates
that Ford Salzburg was founded with 499,000 shillings in
capital; see NARA, RG 260, Entry 107, Box 78, Report on Ford
Handels-und Werkst�tten GmbH, p. l, July 8, 1948 (NARA
0007185).

the end of the war. 554 The first subsidiary, Ford-Werke
AG Wien GmbH, was founded in September 1944 in
Vienna with RM 2,000,000 in capital. Shareholders
included Ford-Werke, Robert Schmidt, Erhard Vitger
and Hans Schneider, a Ford of Austria dealer. 555 The
subsidiary began construction of a facility that was
never completed, although the firm continued to exist
as a corporate entity into the postwar period. 556

On March 19, 1 9 4 5 , Fo r d -We r ke founded a second
s u b s i d i a ry, k n own as Ford Motor Handels-und
Werkst�tten Gesellsch a f t , with RM 499, 000 in
c ap i t a l . 5 5 7 To circumvent the German corp o r ate law s
t h at had hampered Fo r d -We r ke 's previous attempt at
founding a subsidiary in Au s t ri a , the stock in the new
c o m p a ny, to be located in Salzbu rg, was initially
d i s t ri buted to Schneider (RM 100,000) and a man
named Hans Stock (RM 3 9 9 , 0 0 0 ) . H oweve r, Fo r d -We
r ke obtained control over Stock 's shares though a
t rustee ag re e m e n t . After the Allied occupat i o n , S t o ck 's
s h a res we re offi c i a l ly transfe rred to Fo r d -We r ke.
D i rectors of the Salzbu rg subsidiary we re listed as
S ch m i d t , Vitger and Anton Scheuffgen (all of whom
we re Fo r d -We r ke manag e r s ) . 5 5 8 The Ford Handels-und
Werkst�tten Gesellschaft branch owned no real estat e.
A large portion of its equipment was obtained after the
equipment was eva c u ated from Ford of Hungary in the
last months of the wa r. In late 1945, Ford Handels-und
Werkst�tten Gesellschaft began repair operations at

B e t ween managing Fo r d -We r ke and his other
European duties, Schmidt was able to spend only
approximately one week per month concentrating on
Ford of Holland operations. As a result, he delegated
much of his authority on day-to-day issues to other
Fo r d -We r ke personnel. 5 5 0 A l fons Streit superv i s e d
production at Amsterdam throughout the war. 551

After the Allies liberated the Netherlands in the fall of
1944, Stenger, the Ford of Holland manager, and three
other Dutch management employees � the assistant
manager, the works manager and the chief clerk � were
arrested on the suspicion of collaboration with the
Nazis. With the German custodianship invalidated and
the former Dutch managers arrested, Ford of Britain
reasserted control over Ford of Holland. Lord Percival
Perry sent G. S. Hibberson, a Ford of Britain employee,
to act as manager and re-establish contact with its
subsidiary. 552 In April 1946, the charges against the four
D u t ch employees we re dro p p e d , and on A p ril 8,
Stenger was reinstated as manager. 553

8.4. Other Ford Facilities
Several Ford subsidiaries in Europe did business with
Ford-Werke during the war. These included smaller
firms in other occupied countries. In addition, there
were several subsidiaries located in countries that were
German allies. Some Ford subsidiaries in neutral
countries also had business contacts with Ford-Werke.

Ford of Austria: To develop its export territories, Ford-Werke
established two subsidiaries in Austria toward 105
105 Page 106 107
80
R e s e a r c h F i n d i n g s Ab o u t Fo r d -We r k e U n d e r t h e Na z i R e g i m e
5 5 8 NARA, RG 260, Entry 107, Box 78, Report on Ford Handels-und
Werkst�tten GmbH, Exhibit 3, Translation of affidavit, July
26, 1945 (NARA 0007208-0007209), Exhibit 7, Memo from
Gray, October 29, 1947 (NARA 0007214).

5 5 9 NARA, RG 260, Entry 107, Box 78, Report on Ford Handels-und
Werkst�tten GmbH, p. 1, July 8, 1948 (NARA 0007185),
Exhibit 17, Extract from statement of Mayer, July 20, 1946
(NARA 0007226), Exhibit 21, Patrick to Ford Motor Company
Salzburg, November 11,1947 (NARA 0007232). Although the
Salzburg facility leased the equipment from the Hungarian
subsidiary, no direct payments were made due to unsettled
political and economic conditions. Instead, money was paid
regularly into a reserve fund for eventual compensation to Ford
of Hungary.

5 6 0 FMC, AR 65-71, Box 25, File: Ford International '48 #1,
Summary of Foreign Operations -January 12,1948, Report on
Ford-Werke, October 15, 1947 (FMC 0000135).

5 6 1 FMC, AR-65-1500, Box 6, File: Ford-Werke No. 3, Business
Report for 1948/ 49 (FMC 0003596).

5 6 2 NARA, RG 165, Entry 463, Box 138, File: CAD 383 (6-23-43)
(1), Report by Knight, June 26, 1945 (NARA 0005223).

5 6 3 FMC, AR-65-1500, Box 2, File: Corporate Record-Foreign
Corporations, M�ller to Edsel Ford, December 1, 1941 (FMC
0014797-0014798).

5 6 4 Neulen, "Deutsche Besatzungspolitik in Westeuropa," pp. 404-
425. In a postwar report to the military authorities and in a
later interview, Schmidt described the different treatment that
G e rman-occupied Denmark re c e i ve d . For example, i t s
government remained in place and there were no confiscations
or custodians, including at Ford of Denmark. "The Germans
had a friendly arrangement with the Danish company." See
NARA, RG 407, Entry 368B, Box 1032, Schneider Report,
Exhibit 212, Memo by Schmidt on Denmark, August 12, 1945
(NARA 0000500); and HFM, Acc. 880, Box 7, File: Germany,
I n t e rv i ew with Robert Sch m i d t , J u ly 18, 1960 (HFM
0000904).

5 6 5 NARA, RG 407, Entry 368B, Box 1032, Schneider Report, p. 40,
September 5,1945 (NARA 0000042).

5 6 6 NARA, RG 407, Entry 368B, Box 1032, Schneider Report, p. 40,
September 5, 1945 (NARA 0000042), Exhibit 212, Memo by
Schmidt on Denmark, August 12, 1945 (NARA 0000500).
M�ller successfully resisted initial Nazi pressure to begin
manufacturing to meet German needs, pointing out that the
facility assembled automobiles for export and that it had a
stockpile of components. When parts ran low and the pressure
to begin manufacturing for the Germans could not be put off,
the Danish company decided to avoid producing "real war
supplies," such as arms and ammunition. See FMC, AR-65-
1500, Box 2, File: Corporate Records -Foreign Corporations,
Memo by M�ller attached to Ford Motor Company A/ S Meeting
Minutes, December 11,1944 (FMC 0014791); and Wilkins and
Hill, American Business A b r o a d , pp. 318-19.

5 6 7 FMC, AR-65-1500, Box 2, File: Corporate Records -Foreign
C o rp o r at i o n s , Memo by M�ller at t a ched to Ford Motor
Company A/ S Meeting Minutes, December 11, 1944 (FMC
0014791-0014792); NARA, RG 407, Entry 368B, Box 1032,
Schneider Report, Exhibit 212, Memo by Schmidt on Denmark,
August 12,1945 (NARA 0000500); NARA, RG 165, Entry 463,
Box 138, File: CAD 383 (6-23-43) (1), Report by Knight, June
26,1945 (NARA 0005223).

a facility in Linz under the control of U. S . m i l i t a ry
o c c u p ation gove rnment offi c i a l s. The company
reconditioned Ford automobiles, handling Fo r d
motors of all types and, to a limited extent,
m a nu fa c t u red Ford spare parts and traded in Fo r d
p ro d u c t s , including overseas export s.

In November 1947,Vitger was assigned the postwa r
custodianship of Fo r d -We r ke 's Au s t rian intere s t s. 5 5 9
But as of October 15, 1 9 4 7 , the Vienna subsidiary wa s
i n a c t i ve and was to be liquidat e d . 5 6 0 Fo r d -We r ke wro t e
d own its investment in Ford Salzbu rg to DM 1 (after
the postwar conversion of the German currency to
D e u t s che Marks) in its June 21, 1 9 4 8 , balance sheet,
e f fe c t i ve ly abandoning the operat i o n . 5 6 1

Ford of Denmark: Despite the fact that 60 percent of
Ford of Denmark's shares were owned by Ford of
B ri t a i n , H . C. M � l l e r, Ford of Denmark's prewa r
manager, retained his position throughout the war,
without the imposition of a Ford-Werke custodian after
the Germans occupied Denmark in 1940. 562 Likewise,
Ford of Denmark continued to elect its own board
members. 563 This was the case because Germany treated
Denmark diffe re n t ly from most other occupied
territories and administered the country indirectly until
the later stages of the war. 564 Vitger, as a Dane, became

Ford-Werke's main contact person with the Danish
manager. 565

Before the German occupation, Ford of Denmark,
located in Copenhagen, had been an assembly plant
dependent on Ford Motor Company, Ford of Britain,
Ford of France and, increasingly, Ford-Werke for parts.
After the occupation, Ford-Werke became the main
supplier of parts to Ford of Denmark, with assistance
from Ford of Holland and Ford of Belgium. Under
orders from the occupying Germans to begin
m a nu fa c t u ri n g, Ford of Denmark obtained the
n e c e s s a ry mach i n e ry from Germ a ny and
C z e ch o s l ova k i a . 5 6 6 Beginning in 1940, Ford of
Denmark manu fa c t u red gas generat o r s , i n c l u d i n g
4,000 units initially intended for Fo r d -We r ke bu t
ultimately delivered to Imbert Generatoren GmbH (a
generator specialist) of Cologne, for use in Denmark
and Germany. 567 In addition to manufacturing gas 106
106 Page 107 108
81
Fo r d -We rk e 's R e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h O t h e r Fo r d Fa c i l i t i e s i n O c c u p i e d E u r o p e
5 6 8 NARA, RG 407, Entry 368B, Box 1032, Schneider Report,
Exhibit 212, Memo by Schmidt on Denmark, August 12, 1945
(NARA 0000500); WNRC, Acc. 299-68A-0243, Box 536, File
W17536, Advisory Board Meeting Minutes, August 17, 1942
(DOJ 0011163; for English translation, see DOJ 0011168).
Although one postwar military report said that Ford-Werke
"directed" the Danish company to do the testing, a 1944 memo
by M�ller describes the testing as one of several agreements
with Ford-Werke. See NARA, RG 407, Entry 368B, Box 1032,
Schneider Report, p. 40, September 5,1945 (NARA 0000042);
and FMC, AR-65-1500, Box 2, File: Corporate Records -Foreign
C o rp o r at i o n s , Memo by M�ller at t a ched to Ford Motor
Company A/ S Meeting Minutes, December 11, 1944 (FMC
0014791-0014792); see also NARA, RG 165, Entry 463, Box
138, File: CAD 383 (6-23-43) (1), Report by Knight, June 26,
1945 (NARA 0005223). After the war, M�ller testified to a
generally cordial relationship with Ford-Werke, stating that
Robert Schmidt "never endeavored to overstep his authority
versus us." See FMC, AR-98-213541, Box 131, File: Schmidt -Nazi
Accusation, M�ller to Cooper, December 10, 1947 (FMC
0006513).

5 6 9 FMC, AR-65-1500, Box 2, File: Corporate Records -Foreign
C o rp o r at i o n s , Memo by M�ller at t a ched to Ford Motor
Company A/ S Meeting Minutes, December 11, 1944 (FMC
0014792-0014793); NARA, RG 165, Entry 463, Box 138, File:
CAD 383 (6-23-43) (1), Report by Knight, June 26, 1945
(NARA 0005223); NARA, RG 407, Entry 368B, Box 1032,
Schneider Report, p. 40, September 5,1945 (NARA 0000042).

5 7 0 FMC, AR-65-1500, Box 2, File: Corporate Records -Foreign
Corporations, Ford Motor Company A/ S Meeting Minutes,
December 11, 1944 (FMC 0014789-0014793).

5 7 1 NARA, RG 59, Central Decimal File 1945-49, Box 1829, File:
364.115, Report on Activity of Ford Motor RT until the 30th
September 1945, November 5,1945 (NARA 0005422); NARA,
RG 407, Entry 368B, Box 1032, Schneider Report, p. 40,
September 5, 1945 (NARA 0000042); FMC, AR-98-213541,
Box 92, File: Reports -Internal, Ford-Werke Managers Report,
Third Quarter 1938, November 11, 1938 (FMC 0007786);
FMC, AR-98-213541, Box 131, Perry Report, September 19,
1946 (FMC 0000931-0000934). Hungarian law did not
permit establishment of companies with only one shareholder.
Fo r d -We r ke 's share of the company (total va l u e
Pengo 800,000) was Pengo 785,000, with the remaining
Pengo 15,000 worth owned equally by Albert, Schmidt and
Vitger. The initial stock issue to Ford-Werke was worth
Pengo 135,000, while the original issues to the three men were
wo rth Pe n g o 5, 000 each (total initial capital va l u e
Pengo 150,000); see Report on Activity of Ford Motor RT until
the 30th September 1945 (NARA 0005422).

5 7 2 NARA, RG 59, Central Decimal File 1945-49, Box 1829, File:
364.115, Report on Activity of Ford Motor RT until the 30th
September 1945, November 5, 1945 (NARA 0005423); Ford-We
r ke Records, Personnel file of Walter Scheffler (FW
0021029-0021032).

5 7 3 Klaus P. F i s ch e r, Nazi Germ a ny : A New History ( N ew Yo r k :
Continuum, 1995), p. 511.
5 7 4 NARA, RG 407, Entry 368B, Box 1032, Schneider Report, p. 40,
September 5, 1945 (NARA 0000042).
5 7 5 NARA, RG 226, Entry 19A, Box 142, Scheffler to Vitger,
November 14, 1944 (NARA 0004392-0004394), Scheffler to Vitger, November 27,1944 (NARA 0004395).

several years as secretary of the management board at
Ford-Werke. 572

As an ally of Germany, Hungary was not occupied by
German forces until mid-1944, when Germany invaded
to prevent Hungary from seeking peace with the Soviet
Union. 573 During 1942 and 1943, Ford of Hungary
plant facilities were expanded to accommodate parts
production and truck assembly. Approximately 5,000
trucks were delivered to the Hungarian army. 574 Ford of
Hungary's management arrangement did not change
substantially until November 1944. When ordered to
l e ave Budapest by German authori t i e s , S ch e f f l e r
selected Edwin Maritz, a Swiss citizen, as director, in
hopes of keeping Ford of Hungary from being
classified as a German corporation by the invading
Soviets. 575 When the siege of Budapest began in early
1945, communication with Maritz was cut off, and
Ford of Hungary 's chief clerk, Ulaszlo Niko l i t s ,
assumed control without Ford-Werke's knowledge or

generators, in 1941 Ford of Denmark began exhaustive
testing of various types of gas generators for Ford-Werke,
which supplied both the generators and the
vehicles. 568 Other wartime manufacturing at Ford of
Denmark included a limited amount of parts for Ford-Werke;
filters and coolers for Imbert; and disinfecting
equipment used by the German army for delousing
purposes. 569 German military officials occupied the
Ford of Denmark plant on November 23, 1 9 4 4 ,
essentially ending independent Danish production. 570

Ford of Hungary: Ford Motor R. T. Budapest (Ford of
Hungary) was a subsidiary of Ford-Werke that was
founded in 1938 in an agreement with the Hungarian
g ove rnment that granted taxation re l i e f. Ford of
Hungary was established to improve sales and service in
Hungary, to better service the trucks supplied to the
Hungarian War Ministry, and "probably at a later date,"
to assemble units that would be supplied to Ford of
Hungary by Ford-Werke. Ford of Hungary was entirely
owned by Ford-Werke and its management, including
A l b e rt , S chmidt and Vi t g e r. 5 7 1 Fo r d -We r ke wa s
responsible for selecting the corporate officers and the
board of directors of Ford of Hungary, and both Albert
and Schmidt were board members. Walter Scheffler
joined Ford of Hungary as its director in 1938 after 107
107 Page 108 109
82
R e s e a r c h F i n d i n g s Ab o u t Fo r d -We r k e U n d e r t h e Na z i R e g i m e
5 7 6 NARA, RG 59, Central Decimal File 1945-1949, Box 3, File
12.3, Squires to Secretary of State, April 20, 1945 (NARA
0005499-0005500).

5 7 7 NARA, RG 59, Central Decimal File 1945-1949, Box 1829, File
364.115, Folsom to Secretary of State, May 13, 1946 (NARA 0005351-0005352).

5 7 8 Wilkins and Hill, American Business A b r o a d , p. 348. After the war,
the Soviets seized the stock of the Hungarian company and gave Ford a 57 percent interest (a rounded figure based on Ford's

ownership share of Ford-Werke), while the Soviet government held 43 percent. Ford could not liquidate its interest because a
stockholders'meeting could be held only in Hungary, and Ford
was not in a position to send representatives there.

5 7 9 Ford-Werke Records, Excerpts from Board Meeting Minutes,
March 2-3,1948 (FW 0003251-0003252); FMC, AR-65-1500, Box 6, File: Ford-Werke No. 3, Business Report for 1948/ 49

(FMC 0003596).
5 8 0 FMC, AR-75-63-301, Box 31, Particulars for Preparation of
Report to Foreign Operations Committee, September 8, 1949
(FMC 0000032); F M C, A R -7 5 -6 2 -6 1 6 , B ox 57, F i l e : I nvestments 1949-1951, S chedules tracing Ford Motor

Company investment in overseas locations, August 21, 1951 (FMC 0003334).

5 8 1 NARA, RG 169, Entry 500B, Box 1381, Document 155921,
Intelligence Report No. EW-KO 13, March 18, 1945 (NARA
0007101-0007106); HFM, Acc. 320, Box 1, File: Ford Motor
C o m p a ny-Romania 1932-1941, Memo from Cooper,
December 24,1940 (HFM 0007438-0007440).

5 8 2 Ford of Britain Records, Ford Motor Company, Ltd., to Ministry
of Economic Warfare, May 17, 1940 (FMCL 0000051), Ford
Motor Company, Ltd., to McCombe, May 25, 1940 (FMCL
0000059-0000063), Memo on Interview at Trading with the
Enemy Branch, April 25, 1940 (FMCL 0000053-0000055);
NARA, RG 226, Entry 16, Box 946, File 80684, MEW Report,
June 1944 (NARA 0004396-0004403). In 1940, Ford of
Romania obtained some of its parts from the United States and
England as well as Germany; see NARA, RG 226, Entry M1499,
Roll 239, Report on Ford Motor Company Installations in
Denmark, Romania, Sweden and Finland, May 1, 1943 (NARA
0004087).

5 8 3 NARA, RG 226, Entry M1499, Roll 239, Report on Ford Motor
Company Installations in Denmark, Romania, Sweden and
Finland, May 1,1943 (NARA 0004087).

5 8 4 NARA, RG 226, Entry 16, Box 946, File 80684, MEW Report,
June 1944,( NARA 0004399).
5 8 5 Ford of Britain Records, Memo on Interview at Trading with the
Enemy Branch, April 25,1940 (FMCL 0000053-0000055).
5 8 6 HFM, Acc. 320, Box 1, File: Ford Motor Company -Romania -1
9 4 2 -4 7 , Meeting Minutes for October 27, 1941 (HFM
0007441-0007442), September 23, 1942 (HFM 0007443-
0007449), January 18, 1943 (HFM 0007450-0007451) and
June 1,1943 (HFM 0007452-0007453).

5 8 7 NARA, RG 226, Entry 16, Box 946, File 80684, MEW Report,
June 1944 (NARA 0004397).

5 8 8 William L. Langer, ed., An Encyclopedia of Wo rld History (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1972), p. 1213.

approval. 576 Ford-Werke never regained control over
Ford of Hungary after the Soviet invasion. In January
1 9 4 6 , the Hungarian Ministry of Industry took
provisional control of the company. 577 After a long
debate over the status of Ford of Hungary shares and
the role of the Soviet government in managing the
company, 578 Ford-Werke decided to divest itself of its
H u n g a rian holdings in 1948. 5 7 9 The Hungari a n
government nationalized the firm in 1949. 580

Ford of Romania: Like Hungary, Romania was allied
with the Axis powers. Because Ford of Britain held
majority shares in Ford of Romania, the Romanian
g ove rnment placed the fi rm under " c o m p u l s o ry
administration," and an Austrian named Wachner was
installed as manager in November 1940. 581 Ford of
Romania, located in Bucharest, was a small plant that
assembled and repaired automobiles and trucks and
distributed Ford products in Romania, Yugoslavia and
B u l g a ri a . T h roughout 1940 and 1941, Ford of
Romania procured most of its manufacturing materials
f rom the Romanian gove rnment and Fo r d -We r ke,
which supplied spare parts as well as truck, car and
tractor components. 582

In 1940, the plant's capacity was 15 cars or 10 trucks
per day. 583 A later intelligence report indicates t h at Fo r d
of Romania's operations also produced 250 tractors per
month in 1940. 5 8 4 Automobiles supplied to the
Romanian gove rnment by Ford of Romania we re used
by the country 's military. 5 8 5 Fo l l owing the Germ a n
i nvasion of the Soviet Union in the summer of 1941,
Ford of Romania operated repair facilities on behalf of
the Romanian army in the Eastern occupied terri t o ri e s.
The largest was in Odessa. The company also operat e d
fa rms used to supply food to these repair shops and the
main plant in Buch a re s t . The repair facility in Odessa
was taken over by the Romanian military in early 1943.
The fa rms we re handed over to the occupat i o n
g ove rnment later in the ye a r. 5 8 6

Ford of Romania was scheduled to deliver 1, 200 ro a d
tractors between May and December 1944. 5 8 7 In lat e
Au g u s t , h oweve r, Romania ag reed to armistice term s
d i c t ated by the A l l i e s , and the Russians occupied
Romania on August 31, 1 9 4 4 . 5 8 8 After the war ended,
the Romanian gove rnment used the Buch a rest plant to
a s s e m ble vehicles that went to the Russians to help meet 108
108 Page 109 110
83
Fo r d -We rk e 's R e l a t i o n s h i p wi t h Ot h e r Fo r d Fa c i l i t i e s i n O c c u p i e d E u r o p e
5 8 9 Wilkins and Hill, American Business A b r o a d , pp. 348-349.
5 9 0 Ford of Britain Records, Memo on interview at Trading with the
Enemy Branch, April 25, 1940 (FMCL 0000053-0000055).
5 9 1 WNRC, Acc. 299-68A-0243, Box 536, File W17536, Advisory
Board Meeting Minutes, January 13, 1943 (DOJ 0011114; for
English translation, see DOJ 0011219).

5 9 2 FMC, AR-84-63-1217, Box 6, File: Policy Committee Meeting-December
15, 1948, Howard to Brand, November 8, 1948
(FMC 0014707).

5 9 3 Langer, ed., An Encyclopedia of Wo rld History, p. 1188.

5 9 4 Ford of Denmark owned 60 percent of Ford of Sweden, which
held 60 percent interest of Ford of Finland; see FMC, AR-75-62-
616, Box 57, File: Investments 1949-1951, Schedule tracing
Ford Motor Company investments in overseas locations, August
21,1951 (FMC 0003337).

5 9 5 NARA, RG 169, Entry 500B, Box 1381, Document 155921,
Intelligence Report No. EW-KO 13, March 18, 1945, (NARA
0007104).

5 9 6 WNRC, Acc. 299-68A-0243, Box 536, File W17536, Advisory
Board Meeting Minutes, January 13, 1943 (DOJ 0011114; for
English translation, see DOJ 0011219).

5 9 7 According to a U. S. intelligence report, Ford of Finland only
serviced cars imported for sale in Finland; see NARA, RG 226,
Entry M1499, Roll 239, Report on Ford Motor Company
Installations in Denmark, Romania, Sweden and Finland, May 1,
1943 (NARA 0004089). According to a British intelligence
report, Ford of Finland obtained its spare parts primarily from
Ford-Werke and some from Ford of Italy in Bologna; see PRO,
FO 837/ 19, MEW Intelligence Weekly Report No. 118, May 11,
1944 (PRO 0000162). American diplomats reported that Ford
of Finland was suspected to have traded extensively with the
enemy; see NARA, RG 131, Entry 247, Box 131, File: Ford
Motor Company, Memo from Hull to American Legation, June
17, 1944 (NARA 0001825-0001826).

5 9 8 NARA, RG 226, Entry 16, Box 946, File 80684, MEW Report,
June 1944, (NARA 0004397 and 0004399). Ford of Finland
may have sold spare parts and gas generator motors to the
Finnish government. See NARA, RG 226, Entry M1499, Roll
336, Financial Report of the Skandinavian Ford Companies for
1941, April 9, 1942 (NARA 0004071).

5 9 9 Langer, An Encyclopedia of Wo rld History, p. 1224.

6 0 0 NARA, RG 60, Entry 285B, Box 79, File General Motors, Report:
Ford Motor Company (Greece) S. A., June 24, 1943 (NARA
0003932).

6 0 1 NARA, RG 169, Entry 500B, Box 1381, Document 155921,
Intelligence Report No. EW-KO 13, March 18, 1945 (NARA
0007101-0007106); NARA, RG 60, Entry 285B, Box 79, File
General Motors, Report: Ford Motor Company (Greece) S. A.,
June 24, 1943 (NARA 0003937).

6 0 2 Langer, An Encyclopedia of Wo rld History, p. 1210.

Romanian re p a r at i o n s. In the fall of 1946, Lord Pe rry
decided to liquidate Ford of Romania. But in June
1 9 4 8 , b e fo re his decision could be implemented, t h e
Romanian gove rnment nationalized the company 's
a s s e t s , ending Fo r d 's connection with the company. 5 8 9

Fo rd of Italy : Ford of Italy dealt in tractors, w h i ch we re
p ri m a ri ly for ag ricultural use in Italy, although it did
e x p o rt some vehicles to Romania. 5 9 0 Fo r d -We r ke wa s
not gre at ly invo l ved in Ford of Italy 's operat i o n s , s i n c e
its production did not "quite fi t " into Fo r d -We r ke 's
p roduction sch e m e. 5 9 1 In 1948, the business sold 83
t r a c t o r s , 15 cars (to the Vatican and diplomats) and spare
p a rt s. The company was wholly owned by Fo r d
I nvestment Co. , L t d . 5 9 2

Fo rd of Finland: In June 1941, Finland joined Germ a ny
in declaring war against the Soviet Union, and later that
year also declared war on Gre at Bri t a i n . 5 9 3 Ford of
Finland was a subsidiary of Ford of Denmark, w h i ch
was majori t y -owned by Ford of Bri t a i n . 5 9 4 Ford of
Finland did not have a German custodian, and its
m a n agement stru c t u re remained the same as befo re the
wa r. 5 9 5 In Ja nu a ry 1943, Fo r d -We r ke 's board of adv i s o r s
noted that the German fi rm had close ties to Ford of
Finland through shipments of vehicles and spare part s. 5 9 6
Allied intelligence re p o rts va ried somew h at in
d e s c ribing activities at Ford of Finland. 5 9 7 According to

a British intelligence re p o rt from June 1944, Ford of
F i n l a n d , as of July 1942, was assembling 645 tru cks per
m o n t h , re p a i ring tractors and manu fa c t u ring gas
g e n e r at o r s. The re p o rt said that Ford of Finland was to
h ave re c e i ved 275 tru cks from Germ a ny in the spring of
1 9 4 4 . D u ring the spring of 1944, the re p o rt said, Fo r d
of Finland recorded a 62. 11 percent increase in the sale
of spare part s , with imports from Germ a ny being the
main reason that Ford of Finland was able to meet the
d e m a n d . 5 9 8 On March 3, 1 9 4 5 , h oweve r, F i n l a n d
d e c l a red war on Germ a ny. 5 9 9

Fo rd of Gre e c e : Ford Motor Company Greece S. A. was a
w h o l ly owned subsidiary of Ford of Bri t a i n , with a
s e rvice plant established in Athens in 1936. 6 0 0 Ford of
G reece had a German manag e r. Ford and Ford of Bri t a i n
shipped cars and tru cks to Ford of Greece in 1939 and
1 9 4 0 ; Fo r d -We r ke also exported tru cks to Ford of
G reece during those ye a r s. 6 0 1 G reece surre n d e red to
G e rm a ny in A p ril 1941. 6 0 2 In Ja nu a ry 1943, S ch m i d t
re p o rted that the Athens repair facility had been " p l a c e d
under the commission of Fo r d -We r ke," and he noted
t h e re had been difficulties in obtaining food for the 109
109 Page 110 111
6 0 3 WNRC, Acc. 299-68A-0243, Box 536, File W17536, Advisory
Board Meeting Minutes, January 13, 1943 (DOJ 0011114; for
English translation, see DOJ 0011219).

6 0 4 NARA, RG 226, Entry M1499, Reel 348, U. S. Office of Strategic
Services (OSS) Report no. 8587, October 30, 1943 (NARA
0004067); NARA, RG 226, Entry 16, Box 946, File 80684,
MEW Report, June 1944 (NARA 0004398).

6 0 5 Langer, An Encyclopedia of Wo rld History, p. 1210.

6 0 6 FMC, AR-98-213541, Box 92, File: Reports -Internal, Internal
Reports, Manager's Report to Directors -Third Quarter 1938,
November 11, 1938 (FMC 0007784).

6 0 7 NARA, RG 407, Entry 368B, Box 1032, Schneider Report, p. 41,
September 5, 1945 (NARA 0000043). The "Black List" was
known officially as the Proclaimed List of Certain Blocked
Nationals. It was a list of persons and firms, often in neutral
countries, who were working with or for Axis nations or
individuals whose receipt of U. S. exports was considered
detrimental to national defense. Those listed were prohibited
from trading with U. S. interests. For more information about
the Proclaimed List, see Greg Bradsher, H o l o c a u s t -E ra A s s e t s, a
Finding Aid to Records at the National A r c h i ves at College Pa rk ,M a r y l a n d
(College Pa r k , M a ry l a n d : N ational A r ch i ves and Records
Administration, 1999), pp. 1044-1045 and 1057-1058.

6 0 8 NARA, RG 407, Entry 368B, Box 1032, Schneider Report, p. 41,
September 5, 1945 (NARA 0000043); FMC, AR-75-62-616,
Box 57, File: Investments 1949-1951, Schedule tracing Ford
Motor Company investments in overseas locations, August 21,
1951 (FMC 0003331).

6 0 9 FMC, AR-98-213541, Box 92, File: Reports -Internal, Internal
Reports, November 11, 1938, Manager's Report to Directors -Third
Quarter 1938, November 11, 1938 (FMC 0007784).

6 1 0 FMC, AR-75-62-616, Box 27, File: Condensed Balance Sheets
and Statements of Income of Non-Consolidated Affiliates � Oct.
1 9 4 7 , Palumbo to Bre e ch , December 31, 1947 (FMC
0002220).

6 1 1 FMC, AR-98-213541, Box 3, File: Lord Perry -Lisbon -January/
June 1943, Nadal to Cooper, June 11, 1943 (FMC
0008230-0008232). Nadal was reporting to Ford of Britain
following the visit to Lisbon by Schmidt in June 1943. In
1937, Sir Percival Perry of Ford of Britain had ordered all
associated companies to immediately refer any contacts from
Ford-Werke to England; see NARA, RG 407, Entry 368B, Box
1032, Schneider Report, Exhibit 60C, Perry to Albert, March
10, 1937 (NARA 0000171-0000172). Overtures to sell Ford-Werke
vehicles and parts were made to Ford of Portugal in 1941
and in August and October 1942, but were rejected. See FMC,
A R -9 8 -2 1 3 5 4 1 , B ox 15, F i l e : M i s c. , Nadal to Hampson,
October 23, 1941 (FMC 0011381); and NARA, RG 84, Entry
3126, Box 62, File 866.16, Nadal to Hibbard, February 6,1942
(NARA 0005657). In January 1943, Schmidt reported to the
Fo r d -We r ke board that Po rtugal was totally under U. S .
influence, and that Spain depended on England; see WNRC, Acc.
2 9 9 -6 8 A -0 2 4 3 , B ox 536, File W 1 7 5 3 6 , A dv i s o ry Board
Meeting Minutes, January 13,1943 (DOJ 0011114; for English
translation, see DOJ 0011219).

R e s e a r c h F i n d i n g s A b o u t Fo r d -We r k e U n d e r t h e Na z i R e g i m e
o r d e red 10 Eifel units from Fo r d -We r ke (introducing the
model to Po rtugal) to liquidate credit accrued fro m
commissions for Fo r d -We r ke delive ries to Spain. 6 0 9
B e t ween 1942 and 1945, Ford of Po rtugal could not
re c e i ve sufficient mat e rial due to the war and bl o cke d
c u rrency re g u l at i o n s. As a re s u l t , d u ring those years Fo r d
of Po rtugal suffe red losses on operations amounting to
Escudos 4, 737, 525. 6 1 0 Fo r d -We r ke made several effo rt s
to persuade Ford of Po rt u g a l 's management to buy part s ,
t ru cks and small cars from the German company and
other European plants under Fo r d -We r ke 's contro l
d u ring the wa r, but to no ava i l . Ford of Po rt u g a l 's
m a n ager told Schmidt in 1943 that he fully shared the
c o n c e rns of the Spanish company regarding the potential
consequences of doing business with Fo r d -We r ke. H e
was so concern e d , in fa c t , t h at he had not even replied to
m e s s ages from Fo r d -We r ke. 6 1 1

p l a n t 's 60 wo r ke r s. 6 0 3 According to Allied intelligence
re p o rt s , the Athens facility did some partial assembly. 6 0 4
The Allies occupied Athens on October 3, 1 9 4 4 ,
e f fe c t i ve ly ending German control over Ford of
G re e c e. 6 0 5

Fo rd of Spain: P rior to the wa r, Fo r d -We r ke did some
business with Ford of Spain, l o c ated in Barcelona, bu t
t r a n s p o rt difficulties limited the transactions. 6 0 6 I n
1 9 4 3 , S chmidt tried to develop the sale of spare part s
and establish repair operations in Spain. But the Spanish
Ford dealers refused to buy the German pro d u c t s
because they did not want to be put on the A m e ri c a n
B l a ck List that would cut off A m e rican supplies that we re
vital to Spain. 6 0 7

Fo rd of Po rt u ga l : I n c o rp o r ated in Ja nu a ry 1932, t h i s
c o m p a ny was located in Lisbon and was a subsidiary of
Ford of Spain (Barcelona). 6 0 8 In 1938, Ford of Po rt u g a l 110
110 Page 111 112
85
6 1 2 On U. S. government investigations into possible violations
regarding trading with the enemy, see The Alien Property Custodian:
A Legi s l at i ve Chronological History and Bibl i ogra p hy of the Trading with the
E n e my A c t , 50 U. S. Code A p p. 1 -4 0 , and the Office of the Alien Propert y
C u s t o d i a n , 1 9 1 7 -1 9 5 2 , U. S. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary,
82nd Congress, 2nd Session; and Bradsher, H o l o c a u s t -E ra A s s e t s, a
Finding Aid to Records at the National A r c h i ves at College Pa rk ,M a r y l a n d,
pp. 1044-1045 and 1057-1058.

6 1 3 NARA, RG 131, Entry 247, Box 131, Lawler Report, pp. 1-3,
circa 1943 (NARA 0001397-0001399), Exhibit 13, Cole to
Secretary of State, July 11,1942 (NARA 0001485-0001487).

S e c t i o n 9
I M P A C T O F T H E WA R O N
C O M M U N I C A T I O N S

had relations with countries under Axis control. 612
In July 1942, the American Consulate in Algiers
notified the U. S. State Department that the head office
of Ford-Afrique, a subsidiary of Ford of France, recently
had been transferred from France to Algeria, creating a
new Ford subsidiary in Africa. The transfer had taken
place with the approval of the authorities in occupied
France. This dispatch led the Treasury Department to
investigate Ford Motor Company files to determine the
extent of Ford's relationship and control over its French
subsidiary. Among the records examined in Dearborn
were the personal files of Edsel Ford and Charles
Sorensen. 613 (See Section 9.5. for more about this
matter.)

9.2. Direct Communications Between
Ford and Ford-Wer ke, 1939-1941

Ford Motor Company corresponded peri o d i c a l ly
with its German subsidiary throughout the late 1930s
and up to the U. S. entry into the war in December
1941. Research to date has located more than 180
letters exchanged between Ford and Fo r d -We r ke
pertaining to a variety of business matters in the period

9.1. U. S. Government Regulations
Governing Communications

With the rise of international tensions in the late
1930s, the U. S. government began examining the
economic activities of U. S. firms and their European
subsidiaries. Following the German occupation of
Western Europe in 1940, U. S. government monitoring
increased dramatically in conjunction with efforts to
freeze French, Belgian and Dutch assets to prevent them
f rom falling into German hands. After Germ a ny
declared war on the United States on December 11,
1941, government officials from the Departments of
S t at e, Tre a s u ry, Justice and Commerce conducted
numerous investigations of U. S. companies suspected to
have violated the 1917 Trading with the Enemy Act
through foreign trade or overseas communications. The
Trading with the Enemy Act was intended to prevent
any economic activity that could benefit enemy powers.
Accordingly, it prohibited U. S. firms from having any
contact with enterprises in occupied Europe, as well as
those located in neutral countries but known to have 111
111 Page 112 113
86
R e s e a r c h F i n d i n g s A b o u t Fo r d -We r k e U n d e r t h e Na z i R e g i m e
6 1 4 These include reports on: controls over the automotive industry
imposed by the Nazi government; see HFM, Acc. 38, Box 50,
File: Germany 1938, Albert to Sorensen, December 15, 1938
(HFM 0000294); requests for the loan of skilled draftsmen for
the Cologne plant; see FMC, AR-65-1500, Box 6, File: Germany
1939-1945 (Sorensen), Schmidt to Sorensen, June 22, 1939
(FMC 0003166-0003168); correspondence relating to parts
shipments; see HFM, Acc. 712, Box 12, File: Speedometer,
Purchasing Department to Stahlberg, July 27, 1938 (HFM
0005328); and quarterly reports on business operations; see
FMC, AR-75-62-616, Box 2, File: Germany-Cologne 1938-
1948, Manager's Report to Directors, 2nd Quarter 1939,August
1,1939 (FMC 0015443-0015452).

6 1 5 NARA, RG 407, Entry 368B, Box 1032, Schneider Report,
Exhibit 146A, Meeting Minu t e s , A p ril 20, 1938 (NA R A
0 0 0 0 3 6 8 -0 0 0 0 3 6 9 ; for English translat i o n s , see NA R A
0005881-0005884).

6 1 6 NARA, RG 260, Economics Division, I. G. Farben Control Office,
Box 24, unlabeled file, Memo on conversation with CIC -Cologne,
June 11, 1945 (NARA 0006985); FMC, AR-65-1500,
Box 6, File: Germany 1939-1945 (Sorensen), Schmidt to Gnau,
May 4, 1939 (FMC 0003170). Albert came to New York to
discuss a proposal to build a foundry at Ford-Werke. The
proposal was not approved. Albert concluded that Henry Ford
had received advice, possibly from the government, not to get
involved in the expansion at that time because of Germany's
situation. See NARA, RG 56, Acc. 56-69A-4707, Box 81, File:
I n t e rro g at i o n s , M i s c. , R e p o rt on Discussion with A l b e rt ,
September 18,1945 (NARA 0007154).

6 1 7 At the request of Schmidt, Tallberg returned to Germany from
May to September 1940; see HFM, Acc. 65, Box 72, File:
Tallberg (214) Final 72-1, Reminiscences of V. Y. Tallberg, July
1956 (HFM 0004862-0004865).

6 1 8 HFM, Acc. 415, Box 1, File: Ford-Werke Audit Reports, Power to
Moekle, Loughran and Roberge, October 12, 1939 (HFM
0003846). Vitger said that he would attempt to maintain
c o m mu n i c ations with Ford Motor Company via Ford of
Denmark.

6 1 9 F M C, A R -6 5 -1 5 0 0 , B ox 6, F i l e : G e rm a ny 1939-1945
(Sorensen), Albert to Sorensen, November 27, 1939 (FMC
0003161-0003163). See also Albert to Sorensen, July 11,1940
(FMC 0003146-0003148), in which Albert wrote that he could
report only on Ford-Werke's "most pressing problems," since
there were "restrictions imposed on communicating with
foreign countries."

6 2 0 See, for example, FMC, AR-65-1500, Box 6, File: Germany
1939-1945 (Sorensen), Tallberg to Gnau, July 6, 1940 (FMC
0 0 0 3 1 3 9 -0 0 0 3 1 4 0 ) ; H F M , A c c. 6 , B ox 321, F i l e : 1 9 4 0
Correspondence, Albert to Edsel Ford, July 11, 1940 (HFM
0001475-0001477), Albert to Edsel Ford, September 18, 1940
(HFM 0001470-0001471); HFM, Acc. 6, Box 329, File: 1941
Ford-Werke, Schmidt to Edsel Ford, September 19,1940 (HFM
0000553-0000555).

6 2 1 F M C, A R -6 5 -1 5 0 0 , B ox 6, F i l e : G e rm a ny 1939-1945
(Sorensen), Albert to Sorensen, September 18, 1940 (FMC
0003144-0003145).

to Sorensen on November 27, 1939, explaining that
new government rules and regulations had been issued
which limited "giving information to foreigners, even
if and when they belong to the organisation of the
company as members of the board or as shareholders.
The essence of these rules is that we practically have to
confine ourselves to the most important items of the
balance sheet. Everything else cannot be mentioned in
the reports." 619

In spite of these restrictions, representatives of Ford
and Ford-Werke communicated on issues relating to the
European occupation in the wake of German military
successes in spring 1940. Ford received several reports
c o n c e rning the conditions of Ford plants in the
occupied countries of Holland, Belgium and France. 620
In addition, Albert wrote to Sorensen on September 18,
1940, regarding the appointment of Carl Krauch, I. G.
Farben chairman, to the Ford-Werke Board of Directors,
replacing I. G. Farben general manager Carl Bosch, who
had died earlier that year. 621

The number of communications between Ford and
Ford-Werke diminished significantly in 1941, although
regular correspondence between the two entities
continued until the U. S. entry into the war. Robert
Schmidt wrote to Edsel Ford on January 10, 1941, in
regard to the situation in the occupied areas. At the end

between 1938 and 1941. 614 In April 1938, Charles
Sorensen and Sir Percival Perry traveled to Germany to
attend the Ford-Werke board meeting of April 20,
1938. It was the last prewar Ford-Werke board meeting
with an A m e rican or British member pre s e n t . 6 1 5
Heinrich Albert and Alfons Streit, Ford-Werke technical
director, traveled to the United States in early 1939 to
meet with Henry and Edsel Ford and Sorensen. 616 The
last A m e rican working at Fo r d -We r ke, Va l e n t i n e
Tallberg, the Cologne plant's chief engineer at the time,
was strongly advised to leave Germany by American
diplomatic officials shortly before the German invasion
of Poland in September 1939. 617

C o rrespondence between Ford and Fo r d -We r ke
became more restricted once the war began in Europe.
Ten days after the German invasion of Poland, Erhard
Vitger visited Ford of Denmark to discuss exports, raw
materials agreements and other matters, and advised
that "it would not be possible to mail any more reports
to Dearborn, nor to England." 618 Likewise, Albert wrote 112
112 Page 113 114
87
I mp a c t o f t h e Wa r o n C o mmu n i c a t i o n s
6 2 2 NARA, RG 131, Entry 247, Box 131, Lawler Report, Exhibit 5,
Schmidt to Edsel Ford, January 10, 1941 (NARA 0001472).
6 2 3 HFM, Acc. 6, Box 344, File: Telegrams 1941, Edsel Ford to
Schmidt, January 30,1941 (HFM 0000026).
6 2 4 NARA, RG 407, Entry 368B, Box 1032, Schneider Report,
Exhibit 46, Vitger to Craig, May 13, 1941 (NARA 0000141);
HFM, Acc. 6, Box 329, File: Subject File -1941 -Ford Motor Co.
-Cologne, Albert to Edsel Ford, April 1,1941 (HFM 0000581).

6 2 5 HFM, Acc. 1, Box 173, File: FMC -Branch -Foreign -Germany
-1914-1945 and Undated (173-27), Sorensen to Schmidt,
N ovember 12, 1 9 4 1 , S chmidt and A l b e rt to Sore n s e n ,
November 17,1941 (HFM 0006820-0006821).

6 2 6 Ford-Werke Records, Wibel to Schmidt, November 28, 1941
(FW 0001820), Schmidt to Wibel, November 25, 1941 (FW
0 0 0 1 8 2 1 ) , S chmidt to Wi b e l , October 16, 1941 (FW
0 0 0 1 8 2 2 ) , Loughran to Sch m i d t , October 30,1941 (FW
0001829), Schmidt to Loughran, October 20, 1941 (FW
0001830), Schmidt to Loughran, September 13, 1941 (FW
0001832-0001833).

6 2 7 Ford-Werke Records, Wibel to Schmidt, November 28, 1941
(FW 0001820). An internal Ford Motor Company Patent
Department memo in 1944 indicated that there had been no
communications with Ford-Werke since 1941: "Since the war,
we have had no contact whatever with the German Ford
company and no information has been transmitted by us to the
German Ford company or persons acting for them." See NARA,
RG 60, Entry 285B, Box 67, File: Ford -Yokohama, McRae to
Roberge, May 20, 1944 (NARA 0003873). After the war,
Schmidt wrote to Lord Perry, confirming that contact by cable
and letter was made with Edsel Ford and Charles Sorensen only
until the "outbreak of war with the USA prevented further
negotiations." See NARA, RG 407, Entry 368B, Box 1032,
Schneider Report, Exhibit 204, Schmidt to Perry, May 28,1945
(NARA 0000481-0000482). In an interview with U. S. military
authorities, Oscar Bornheim, a former employee of Ford-Werke,
claimed that Erhard Vitger was a confidant of Henry
Ford and had "been in communication via radio-telephone
with [Ford Motor Company] subsequent to 1942." Bornheim
stated further that Vitger had informed him that Ford of
Hungary had also been in contact with Ford Motor Company.
H oweve r, t h e re is no direct evidence of this, and U. S .
Department of Justice officials concluded that no further
investigation was warranted; see NARA, RG 60, Entry 114,
Classification 146-39, Box 4, File: 146-39-24, Hoover to Clark,
December 16, 1944 (NARA 0003163) and Clark to Hoover,
January 22, 1945 (NARA 0003165).

6 2 8 NARA, RG 60, Entry 114, Classification 146-39, Box 4, File:
146-39-24, Bookstaver to McInerney, August 5, 1943 (NARA
0003159). In a postwar interview, Dollfus called Edsel Ford "a
remarkable man. I became one of his friends. I liked him and
I think he liked me. Edsel was open to the French mind." See
FMC, Acc. 880, Box 6, File: France Interviews, Interview with
Maurice Dollfus, September 13, 1960 (HFM 0000864). See
also HFM, Acc. 6, Box 321, File: Asni�res, Edsel Ford to Dollfus,
September 12, 1938 (HFM 0001268) and Dollfus to Edsel
Ford, September 23,1938 (HFM 0001267).

6 2 9 HFM, Acc. 6, Box 314, File: Subject File 1939 -Ford Motor Co.
-Subsidiary Asni�res, Memo by Moekle on conferences with
Dollfus, March 17,1939 (HFM 0007256-0007257); Dollfus to
Edsel Ford, May 9, 1939 (HFM 0007266); Dollfus to Edsel
Ford, May 15,1939 (HFM 0007259).

6 3 0 HFM, Acc. 6, Box 314, File: Subject File 1939 -Ford Motor Co.
-Subsidiary Asni�res, Dollfus to Edsel Ford, April 6,1939 (HFM
0007262).

6 3 1 HFM, Acc. 6, Box 321, File: 1940 Cor respondence, Dollfus to
Edsel Ford, November 30, 1940 (HFM 0001455), Box 329,
File: Asni�res, Dollfus to Edsel Ford, March 10, 1941 (HFM
0001311).

of the correspondence, Schmidt assured Edsel Ford that
he would keep him "posted of developments." 622 Edsel
Ford replied to Schmidt on January 30, 1941, to
express his appreciation of Schmidt's "good work on
behalf of coordination of Ford plants" and his effort to
reinstate Ford of France managers. 623 Albert wrote to
Edsel Ford, and Vitger wrote to B. J. Craig, secretary-treasurer
of Ford Motor Company, concerning the
i n c rease in Fo r d -We r ke 's capital ap p roved at the
s h a reholders meeting of March 24, 1 9 4 1 . 6 2 4 O n
November 12, 1941, Sorensen sent a telegram to

Schmidt asking if Cologne and the associated plants
were operating, and if all were well. Schmidt and
Albert sent a reply five days later reporting that all Ford
plants were operating and all managers and executives
we re we l l . 6 2 5 In the autumn of 1941, S ch m i d t
exchanged a series of cables with W. R. Loughran of
Ford's purchasing department and A. M. Wibel of Ford
Motor Company in New York about licensed use of
gears in Holland, Belgium and Germany. 626 A message
from Wibel about the gears on November 28, 1941,
was the last known direct communication between
Ford and Ford-Werke until after the war. 627

9.3. Communications Between For d
and Ford of France, 1939-1941

M a u rice Dollfus, m a n aging director of Ford of
France, kept up a constant flow of correspondence with
Edsel Ford and Charles Sorensen, from whom he
received assistance and advice. 628 In March 1939, while
Dollfus was a guest at Edsel Ford's home in Florida, the
three executives met on Edsel Ford's boat to discuss
m a nu fa c t u ring aircraft engines for the Fre n ch
government. 629 Dollfus continued to refer to those
"happy days" 630 in communications with Edsel Ford
after the fall of France in June 1940. 631 Other topics of
correspondence included production and the status of
m a ch i n e ry as well as matters of bu s i n e s s 113
113 Page 114 115
88
R e s e a r c h F i n d i n g s A b o u t Fo r d -We r k e U n d e r t h e Na z i R e g i m e
6 3 2 For an ove rv i ew of commu n i c ation between Ford Motor
Company and Ford of France, see NARA, RG 131, Entry 247,
B ox 131, L awler Report , circa 1943 (NARA 0001394-
0001465).

6 3 3 HFM, Acc. 6, Box 321, File: Asni�res, Dollfus to Edsel Ford, July
18,1940 (HFM 0000103-0000104).
6 3 4 NARA, RG 60, Entry 114, Classification 146-39, Box 4, File:
146-39-24, Foreign Funds Control memo, May 25, 1943
(NARA 0003168-0003169).

6 3 5 HFM, Acc. 6, Box 321, File: Asni�res, Dollfus to Edsel Ford,
August 31, 1940 (HFM 0000123-0000125).

6 3 6 Fo r d -We r ke Records, Tr avel Report by von Gusmann on
Spain/ Portugal, August 23, 1941 (FW 0001805); see also
NARA, RG 407, Entry 368B, Box 1032, File: Ford-Werke AG,
GED Report, February 1946 (NARA 0001564).

6 3 7 NARA, RG 131, Entry 247, Box 131, File: Ford Motor Company,
American Embassy, London, to Secretary of State, September 21,
1943 (NARA 0002022-0002023).

6 3 8 Fo r d -We r ke Records, Tr avel Report by von Gusmann on
S p a i n / Po rt u g a l , August 23, 1941 (FW 0001805). Fo r
information about Ford of Britain's role, see Ford of Britain
Records, Memo attached to letter from secretary of Ford Motor
Company Ltd. to McCombe, May 23, 1940 (FMCL 0000060-
0000063, especially 0000061). The memo indicated that
letters were sent to the management of Ford of Spain, Ford of
Portugal and Ford of Italy to inform them that no business
involving trading with the enemy should take place except in
special circumstances, which in all cases should be referred to
the chairman of Ford of Britain before any contracts were
negotiated.

6 3 9 FMC, AR-98-213541, Box 15, File: Miscellaneous, Nadal to
Hampson, October 23, 1941 (FMC 0011381). After the war,
the British government noted that Ford-Werke's attempts to use
diplomatic channels to do business with Ford of Portugal had
been unsuccessful. See NARA, RG 407, Entry 368B, Box 1032,
File: Ford-Werke AG, GED Report, February 1946 (NARA
0001564).

Ford of Spain in 1939 in an attempt to redirect business
toward England and the United States and away from
Ford-Werke. 636 Furthermore, Ford of Britain, which
remained in contact with Ford of Spain throughout the
war, instructed Ford of Spain in 1940 not to pursue
trade relations in enemy territory. 637 In 1941, von
Gusmann visited Ford of Spain and Ford of Portugal for
the purpose of selling components from Ford-Werke.
However, he reported that he had found the Ford of
Spain re p re s e n t at i ves " e x t re m e ly unfo rthcoming in
respect to business-related information." In his report
of the visit with Guilherme Nadal, manager of Ford of
Portugal, von Gusmann noted: "Even though it wasn't
openly admitted, it may well be the case that they had
been instructed by Britain to refrain from doing
business with Cologne." 638 Still, Ford-Werke continued
to try to generate business with Ford of Portugal. In a
letter to Ford of Britain, Nadal reported that Ford of
Portugal executives had been invited to an automotive
exhibition in Vienna. When the Portuguese managers
declined, Ford-Werke had the German legation in
Lisbon forward a communication to Ford of Portugal
indicating that the German company was in a position
to supply Taunus cars. 639

9.5. Communications Between For d
and Ford of France, 1942-1944

From December 1941 through October 1942, the
U. S . S t ate Department fa c i l i t ated commu n i c at i o n
between Ford Motor Company and Ford of France by

administration, such as company organization, mergers
and pricing. 632 Dollfus wrote to Edsel Ford on July 18,
1940, to inform him that Ford of France had delivered
a large number of spare parts as well as trucks and
passenger vehicles to the German authorities, who had
"shown clearly their wish to protect the Ford interest as
much as they can." 633 Sorensen replied on August 19,
1940, stating that Ford was pleased to know that Ford
of France could still conduct business despite the war. 634
Dollfus sent a letter to Edsel Ford, dated August 31,
1940, informing him that Ford of France's entire
p roduction had gone to the German authori t i e s.
Dollfus also advised Edsel Ford that he had met with
Adolph von Schell, the German official responsible for
the motor industry, and that Henry and Edsel Ford's
attitude "of strict neutrality [had] been an invaluable
asset for the protection of [their] companies in
Europe." 635

9.4. Communications with For d
Subsidiaries in Neutral Countries,
1939-1941

Both Ford Motor Company and Fo r d -We r ke
continued to have contact with subsidiaries in neutral
countries during the war years, although there is no
indication of communication with each other through
these subsidiaries. According to a travel report by
A l fons von Gusmann, head of Fo r d -We r ke 's
government liaison office, three Ford officials visited 114
114 Page 115 116
89
I mp a c t o f t h e Wa r o n C o mmu n i c a t i o n s
6 4 0 See, for example, NARA, RG 59, Central Decimal File 1940-44,
Box 1174, File: 351.115, Tuck to Secretary of State, September
21, 1942 (NARA 0005407); HFM, Acc. 6, Box 335, File: Ford
Motor Company -Asni�res, Long to Edsel Ford, June 3, 1942
(HFM 0001350), Long to Edsel Ford, September 19, 1942
(HFM 0001341) and Edsel Ford to Long, October 8, 1940
(HFM 0001340).

6 4 1 NARA, RG 131, Entry 247, Box 131, Lawler Report, Exhibit 15,
Dollfus to Edsel Ford, January 28, 1942 (NARA 0001492-
0001493). See also Exhibit 13, Cole to Secretary of State, July
1, 1942 (NARA 0001485-0001487); and HFM, Acc. 6, Box
329, File: Asni�res, Dollfus to Edsel Ford, March 10, 1941
(HFM 0001308-0001311).

6 4 2 NARA, RG 59, Central Decimal File 1940-44, Box 1174, File:
351.115, Leahy to Secretary of State, March 17, 1942 (NARA
0005411-0005414). In the spring of 1942,Ford of France also
communicated with Ford Motor Company through the U. S.
Embassy in an attempt to acquire a visa for Lesto to travel to the
United States to meet with company executives. However, in a
communication to the U. S. Embassy in Vichy on May 19,1942,
Secretary of State Cordell Hull wrote that Ford Motor Company
"questions desirability of Lesto visit at this time issuance of visa
is not (repeat not) authorized." See NARA, RG 84, Entry 2490,
Box 10, File: 711, Hull to U. S. Embassy, Vichy, May 19, 1942
(NARA 0006916).

6 4 3 HFM, Acc. 6, Box 335, File: Asni�res, Translated memo from
Lesto, June 9, 1942 (HFM 0000154). In a postwar interview,
Lesto described himself as the liaison man between the Ford
French company [Ford of France] and the German authorities.
Lesto said that he had gone to Dearborn to meet with Edsel Ford
early in the war and was moved by Edsel Ford's insistence that
the Fre n ch company remain independent. The wo r d s
"independent operations" in a letter from Edsel Ford were "a
Bible" for Lesto and others at the French company during
wartime. Lesto said those words were invoked to counter some
of the actions that Robert Schmidt wanted to take after he had
been given control over Ford operations in occupied Europe.
See FMC, AR-98-213542, Interview with Georges Lesto, June 9,
1960 (FMC 0017372-0017373).

6 4 4 HFM, Acc. 6, Box 335, File: Asni�res, Dollfus to Edsel Ford, June
6, 1942 (HFM 0000152-0000153).
6 4 5 HFM, Acc. 6, Box 335, File: Asni�res, Edsel Ford to Dollfus, July
17, 1942 (HFM 0000151).
6 4 6 NARA, RG 131, Entry 247, Box 131, Lawler Report, circa 1943
(NARA 0001454).

delivering letters via the American Embassy at Vichy. 640
Research to date has located a total of 13 messages sent
from Ford of France to Ford between January and
October 1942, and five messages from Ford to Ford of
France during this same period. Dollfus wrote to Edsel
Ford on January 28,1942, and reported," I had and still
have difficulties arising from the state of war, I am
doing my best and I obtained a [sic] support from the
French government in order to preserve the interests of
the American shareholders." 641 On March 17, 1942, an
official at the American Embassy in Vichy wrote to the
Secretary of State to convey a message to Edsel Ford
from Georges Lesto, assistant manager of Ford of
France, about a Royal Air Force (RAF) attack on the
Poissy plant, which was producing trucks for the
German army. 642 In a memorandum dispatched via the
U. S. Embassy in Vichy on June 9, 1942, Lesto informed
Edsel Ford that the French government had guaranteed
payment of war damages and that the future of the
French company was secure. 643

Dollfus wrote to Edsel Ford on June 6, 1942,
thanking him for a cable asking about the health and
status of the company in the aftermath of the bombings
that had damaged the plant on March 8 and April 2 and
3. (He mentioned that one more bomb since then had
caused little damage.) Dollfus wrote that he had tried

to send a letter after the first bombing, but doubted that
it had been received. Everyone was in good health and
good spirits. Communication had been difficult, he
wrote, but he had been able to disperse the machinery
and equipment throughout the country, and he hoped
that when peacetime came, the organization would be
able to carry on as well or better than it had previously.
Dollfus said he had a letter from the Fre n ch
government promising that money and material would
be advanced in addition to full payment for damages.
Because correspondence was limited, Dollfus hoped
that Edsel Ford would show the letter to his father and
to Charles Sorensen. 644 Edsel Ford wrote back to Dollfus
on July 17, 1942, and stated that he was pleased to
know that the organization was in "good health" and
that Dollfus was "carrying on the best way possible
under the circumstances." Edsel Ford added, "I have
shown your letter to my father and to Mr. Sorensen, and
they both join me in sending best wishes to you and
your staff, and the hope that you will continue to carry
on the good work that you are doing." 645 The U. S.
Treasury Department, in an investigation begun after
Ford of France set up a new African subsidiary (See
Section 9.1.), cited this sentence as proof of Edsel Ford's
approval of Dollfus' actions to increase the activity of
Ford of France on behalf of the Germans. 646 However,
the U. S. Justice Department found that the Treasury
report contained "a good deal in the way of opinion,
argument and conjecture . . . " The Justice Department
determined that the language of Edsel Ford's letter was 115
115 Page 116 117
90
R e s e a r c h F i n d i n g s Ab o u t Fo r d -We r k e U n d e r t h e Na z i R e g i m e
,
6 4 7 NARA, RG 60, Entry 114, Classification 146-39, Box 4, File:
146-39-24, Bookstaver to McInerney, August 5, 1943 (NARA
0003159-00003162).

6 4 8 NARA, RG 60, Entry 114, Class 146-39, Box 12, File: 146-39-
24, Clark to Hoover, January 22, 1945 (NARA 0003165).
6 4 9 HFM, Acc. 6, Box 335, File: Asni�res, Unsigned, undated note to
Edsel Ford, translated January 2, 1943 (HFM 0001336) and
telegram from Edmunds to Lepine, December 23, 1942 (HFM
0001337).

6 5 0 HFM, Acc. 285, Box 2661, File: Edsel Ford Sympathy Letters
363-10 F, Dollfus to Henry Ford, June 1,1943 (HFM 0004091-
0004092).

6 5 1 NARA, RG 60, Entry 114, Classification 146-39, Box 4, File:
146-39-24, Bookstaver to McInerney, August 5, 1943 (NARA
0003160).

6 5 2 FMC, AR-98-213541, Box 14, File: Misc., Ubach to Cooper,
November 12, 1943 (FMC 0008243-0008246).

6 5 3 NARA, RG 84, Entry 3126, Box 76, Memo on visit to Portugal
of the manager of the Ford Motor Company plant at Cologne,
Germany, June 9,1943 (NARA 0003830-0003832).

6 5 4 NARA, RG 84, Entry 3223, File: Fi-Fo, Altaffer to Reagan, June
1, 1942 (NARA 0000886-0000888), Sholes to Harrison, June
1 , 1942 (NARA 0000891-0000892); NA R A , RG 260,
Economics Division, I . G. Farben Control Offi c e, B ox 24,
unlabeled file, Translated memo from Buchwald to Gestapo,
Feb ru a ry 25, 1943 (NARA 0006991-0006994); B A -L , R
87/ 6208 Audit Report by Knipprath for 1943 (BAL 7623);
NARA, RG 131, Entry 247, Box 131, File: Ford Motor Company,
Anglo-Egyptian censorship report, January 17, 1944 (NARA
0002013-0002014).

"so general as to constitute nothing more than a polite
expression of appreciation from a superior to one who
has acted as a loyal subordinate." (See Section 9.3. for
more detail on the relationship between Dollfus and
Edsel Ford.) Moreover, the Justice Department noted,
the death of Edsel Ford [in May 1943] made any
discussion as to criminal liability purely academic. 647
The assistant attorney general assigned to the case
concluded that while the 1942 letters did appear to
have been a violation of the Trading with the Enemy Act
(See Section 9. 1. regarding this law ) , c ri m i n a l
p roceedings would not be adv i s abl e, and furt h e r
investigation was not justified. 648

After November 11, 1 9 4 2 , when the Germ a n s
completed their occupation of France and the U. S.
Embassy at Vichy closed, incidences of communication
between Ford Motor Company and Ford of France
became increasingly rare. On December 23, 1942,W. K.
Edmunds of Ford Motor Company in Edgewater, New
Jersey, forwarded an unsigned note for Edsel Ford from
Ford of France. The letter, forwarded to A. J. Lepine,
Edsel Ford's assistant, indicated that Dollfus had been
able to keep Ford assets intact, despite difficulties. 649
The research has uncovered only one message sent
from Ford of France to Ford from that point in 1942,
until the liberation of France in August 1944: On June
1, 1943, Dollfus sent a condolence letter to Henry Ford
via Portugal after learning about the death of Edsel
Ford. At the end of his message, Dollfus stated that he
was uncertain whether or not the letter would reach
Dearborn. In fact, it was not received in Dearborn until
November 10, 1943. 650 No wartime communication
has been found from Ford Motor Company to Ford of

France after Edsel Ford's July 17, 1942, letter to
Dollfus. 651

9.6. Ford-Wer ke Communications with
Neutral Countries, 1942-1944

Throughout the later years of the war, Ford-Werke
continued to have contact with Ford representatives in
neutral countries. Ford-Werke representatives visited
Ford of Spain several times in 1942 and again in 1943
to discuss the possibility of selling parts to the Spanish
subsidiary. 652 Robert Schmidt and his assistant, Carl
Paul, visited Portugal in June 1943 and met with Ford
of Portugal managers to offer parts built at Ford-Werke.
The Portuguese managers, however, explained that "all
their requirements were met by the United States and
England." During that visit, Schmidt stated that Ford-Werke
had set up an export branch in Switzerland for
the purpose of trading with neutrals. As soon as
S chmidt and Paul depart e d , the Ford of Po rt u g a l
managers reported the visit to the American Legation in
Lisbon. 653 Ford-Werke also had contact with Ford
agents in Switzerland and Turkey relating to business
dealings. 654

9.7. Ford Communications with
Neutral Countries, 1942-1944

Ford and Ford of Britain also maintained contact
with subsidiaries located in neutral countries. In early
1943, Edsel Ford had the State Department forward a
message to Ford of Sweden stating that Ford of Sweden
should not pay any dividends to Ford of Denmark
(which owned 60 percent of Ford of Sweden) until 116
116 Page 117 118
91
I mp a c t o f t h e Wa r o n C o mmu n i c a t i o n s
6 5 5 NARA, RG 59, Central Decimal File 1940-44, Box C131, File:
840.51, Roberge to Cunningham, March 3, 1943 (NARA
0005486). For a summary of the subsidiary relationships, see
FMC, AR-75-62-616, Box 57, File: Investments 1949-1951,
Schedule tracing Ford Motor Company investments in overseas
locations, August 21, 1951 (FMC 0003337).

6 5 6 NA R A , RG 131, E n t ry 247, B ox 473, F i l e : E u ro p e a n
Enforcement Activity, Foreign Funds Control Monthly Reports
on European Enforcement Activities, May 27, 1944 (NARA
0004960) and July 1, 1944 (NARA 0004961); see also NARA,
RG 131, Entry 247, Box 131, File: Ford Motor Company, Hull
to American Legation in Stockholm, June 17, 1944 (NARA
0001825-0001826).

6 5 7 NARA, RG 131, Entry 247, Box 131, File: Ford Motor Company,
Hull to American Legation -Stockholm, June 24, 1944 (NARA
0001827), American Legation -London to Secretary of State,
September 19, 1944 (NARA 0001799-0001801).

6 5 8 NA R A , RG 131, E n t ry 247, B ox 131, F i l e : Ford Motor
C o m p a ny, Winant to Secre t a ry of Stat e, August 22, 1 9 4 4
( NARA 0001760-0001761), Winant to Secre t a ry of Stat e,
September 14, 1944 (NARA 0001755-0001757), Winant
to Secre t a ry of Stat e, September 21, 1944 (NARA 0001754).

See " Ford of Spain" in Section 8. 4. for more on the P roclaimed List.
6 5 9 NARA, RG 59, Central Decimal File 1945-1949, Box 1741, File:
356.115, Roberge to Foreign Service Administration, October 13, 1944 (NARA 0005330), Letter to American Mission,

Bucharest, February 23, 1945 (NARA 0005337), Letter to A m e rican Mission, H e l s i n k i , September 18, 1945 (NA R A
0 0 0 5 3 3 8 ) , Letter to A m e rican Mission, F l o re n c e, I t a ly, September 18, 1945 (NARA 0005339), Letter to American
Mission, Amsterdam, Holland, September 18, 1945 (NARA 0005340).

6 6 0 NARA, RG 84, Entry 2452A, Box 276, File: Correspondence,
Lesto to Wood, January 18, 1945 (NARA 0005174).
6 6 1 FMC, AR-75-62-616, Box 26, File: Belgium stock, Cooper to
Roberge, July 8, 1947 (FMC 0002249).

6 6 2 FMC, AR-65-66, Box 1, unlabeled file, Roberge to Dollfus,
December 26, 1944 (FMC 0000664-0000665).
6 6 3 HFM, Acc. 285, Box 2828, File: 363-78 France 1945-1946,
Dollfus to Ford Motor Company, March 15, 1945 (HFM 0005852).

conditions in that German-occupied country we re
further "clarified." He also had a cable sent to Ford of
Britain's Lord Percival Perry to request that Ford of
Britain, which owned 60 percent of Ford of Denmark,
send the same instructions to Ford of Sweden via the
British Foreign Office. 655

As part of an effort to construct an economic
blockade against German-occupied Europe, the U. S.
g ove rn m e n t 's Fo reign Funds Control Euro p e a n
E n forcement Division appealed to Ford Motor
Company in spring 1944 to send a request to Ford of
Sweden to cease importing automobiles from Ford of
Denmark. Ford of Britain was asked to send the same
message to Ford of Sweden. In addition, Ford was
instructed to send a request to Ford of Finland, a
subsidiary of Ford of Sweden, to discontinue trading
with the enemy. 656 Ford of Britain and Ford sent the
messages as requested. 657

Ford agents in Switzerland contacted Ford of Britain
in 1944 about a plan to manufacture or import parts,
but Ford of Britain responded that it did not wish to
take part in this scheme, nor did it approve of the Swiss
agents' using the Ford brand name. Also in 1944, the
manager of Ford of Belgium's Zurich office, which had
been placed on the Proclaimed List for not severing
relations with Germany, contacted Ford of Britain. The
manager, who had not received salary or travel expenses

from Ford of Belgium, requested payment from Ford of
Britain, which answered that it would not be able to
honor the request. 658

9.8. Restoration of Communications
with Europe

The Allied forces liberated France in late August
1944. In October 1944, Russell Roberge, the Ford
e xe c u t i ve who managed the company 's fo re i g n
bu s i n e s s , w rote to the U. S . Fo reign Serv i c e
Administration to ask about the status of subsidiaries in
formerly occupied territories. The State Department,
on behalf of Fo r d , w rote to va rious A m e ri c a n
d i p l o m atic offices ab road seeking info rm ation on
Fo r d 's operations in areas fo rm e r ly under A x i s
control. 659 Maurice Dollfus visited Ford in Dearborn in
December 1944, and provided information about Ford
of France. 660 Also in December 1944, James van
Luppen, Ford of Belgium's assistant manager, visited
Ford of Britain, bringing with him a diary of wartime
events affecting Ford of Belgium. 661

In late December 1944, Henry Ford II requested that
Dollfus report on conditions at Ford-Werke, since no
information had been received about the Cologne plant
since 1941. 662 Responding to Henry Ford II's request,
on March 15, 1 9 4 5 , Dollfus sent a telegram to
Dearborn about the Ford-Werke plant and machinery,
and promised a more detailed survey at a later date. 663 117
117 Page 118 119
92
U. S. Army officials asked Ford to send a manager
from Ford of Britain to Cologne. This resulted in the
visit of three Ford of Britain representatives, led by sales
manager Charles Thacker, who remained in Cologne for
approximately 10 days in May 1945. U. S. Army officials
accompanied the Ford of Britain delegation in
inspecting the Ford-Werke Cologne plant. 664 Around
the same time, U. S . m i l i t a ry authorities re q u e s t e d
permission from Gen. Dwight Eisenhower to allow
A m e rican corp o r ate and industrial re p re s e n t at i ve s ,
including Roberge, to travel to Europe to assess the
motor vehicle situation there. 665

On May 28, 1945, Robert Schmidt sent a report to

Lord Perry of Ford of Britain informing him of the
h i s t o ry of the Cologne plant during the wa r. 6 6 6
Beginning in June 1945, Thacker, as a representative of
Ford of Britain, began managing Ford-Werke, under the
supervision of the Allied military government. 667

The first known direct communication between
Ford-Werke and Ford after the war was a letter written
by Erhard Vitger to Roberge on November 18, 1946,
explaining that Sir Stanford Cooper and Sir Patrick
Hennessy of Ford of Britain had visited Ford-Werke and
t h at Vitger hoped to visit Ford of Britain at
Dagenham. 668

R e s e a r c h F i n d i n g s A b o u t Fo r d -We r k e U n d e r t h e Na z i R e g i m e

6 6 4 NARA, RG 338, Entry 42389, Box 3, File: 15 Army G-5 MG
Summaries, Summary No. 96, May 11,1945 (NARA 0004887-
0004888); NARA, RG 331, Entry 34, Box 142, File: 353.02,
Gurow to Clark, May 13, 1945 (NARA 0005259); NARA, RG
260, Property Division, Property Control and External Assets
Branch, Box 546, File: Ford-Werke, Rains to File, July 25,1945
(NARA 0003557-0003558).

6 6 5 NARA, RG 331, Entry 34, Box 142, File: 353.02, Marshall to
Eisenhower, May 15,1945 (NARA 0005260).

6 6 6 NARA, RG 407, Entry 368B, Box 1032, Schneider Report,
Exhibit 204, Schmidt to Perry, May 28,1945 (NARA 0000477-
0000488).

6 6 7 Ford-Werke Records, Personnel File of T. K. (FW 0021510-
0021511); see also NARA, RG 260, Economics Division, I. G.
Farben Control Office, Box 24, Unlabeled file, Rains to FEBCO
Branch, July 25,1945 (NARA 0006947).

6 6 8 HFM, Acc. 713, Box 4, File: Cologne Food Situation 1947,
Vitger to Roberge, November 18, 1946 (HFM 0003515-
0003518). 118
118 Page 119 120
93
6 6 9 Nevins and Hill, Fo r d : Decline and Birth 1933-1962, p. 290.
6 7 0 Langer, An Encyclopedia of Wo rld History, p. 1194.
6 7 1 Nevins and Hill, Fo r d : Decline and Rebirt h , 1 9 3 3 -1 9 6 2 , p. 289;
Billstein and Illner, " You are now in Colog n e. C o m p l i m e n t s." pp. 181-
188; HFM, Acc. 880, Box 7, File: Germany, Interview with
Erhard Vitger, July 15, 1960 (HFM 0000887).

6 7 2 NARA, RG 331, Entry 54, Box 151, File 17.11, First U. S. Army
Report, March 1945, p. 158, E1H2 Report 1, March 10, 1945
(NARA 0004915); NARA, RG 338, Entry 42389, Box 3, File: 15
U. S. Army MG Attachments, E1H2 Report 3, March 12, 1945
(NARA 0004880-0004881), E1H2 Report 13, March 22,1945
(NARA 0004879). See also Billstein and Illner, " You A re Now in
C o l og n e. C o m p l i m e n t s." p. 173.

6 7 3 NARA, RG 338, Entry 42389, Box 3, File: 15 U. S. Army MG
A t t a ch m e n t s , E1H2 Report 16, M a r ch 25, 1945 (NA R A
0004882).

6 7 4 NARA, RG 331, Entry 54, Box 284, File: 223.32 1st U. S. Army
Field Reports, G-5 Summary Report, March 23, 1945 (NARA
0004906-0004907).

S e c t i o n 1 0
E N D -O F -W A R A N D P O S T W A R
M I L I T A R Y G O V E R N M E N T
S U P E R V I S I O N

Ford-Werke and other industrial facilities in Cologne
we re initially administered by A m e rican military
authorities after U. S. forces captured the city in March
1945. Following the creation of the Allied Control
C o u n c i l , e s t ablished later that ye a r, G e rm a ny wa s
divided into four occupation zones administered by
F re n ch , A m e ri c a n , B ritish and Russian military
g ove rn m e n t s. N o rth Rhine-We s t p h a l i a , i n c l u d i n g
Cologne, became part of the British Zone, and Ford-Werke
became the responsibility of British officials,
who began regulating operations at the plant in the
summer and fall of 1945. 6 6 9 The Allied military
o c c u p ation of West Germ a ny ended with the
establishment of the German Federal Republic in May
1949. 670

10.1. Initial Period of U. S. Military
Control, March-June 1945

In Feb ru a ry 1945, A m e rican troops began adva n c i n g
into the we s t e rn regions of Germ a ny, t oward Cologne.

A rmy units pushed into Cologne on March 5. As the
t roops moved fo r wa r d , t h ey exchanged art i l l e ry with
the Germans on the opposite bank of the Rhine, in the
p rocess shelling the Fo r d -We r ke plant. On March 6, t h e
A m e ricans took possession of the plant. 6 7 1

During the first few weeks after the fighting ended,
o f ficers from the Supreme Headquarters A l l i e d
Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) Civil Affairs Division,
responsible for administering Cologne, inspected the
plant several times. 672 On March 25, 1945, Maj.
Skinner, a military government property control officer,
met with Robert Schmidt to discuss possibl e
production at the plant. 673 By the end of the month,
U. S. military officials reported that the Ford-Werke
facility had been requisitioned to service A rmy
vehicles. 674 119
119 Page 120 121
94
R e s e a r c h F i n d i n g s Ab o u t Fo r d -We r k e U n d e r t h e Na z i R e g i m e
6 7 5 NARA, RG 260, Economics Division, I. G. Farben Control Office,
Box 24, Unlabeled file, Memo from Rains and Naiden, June 9,
1945 (NARA 0006986); NARA, RG 165, Entry 96, Box 2, File:
Volume V, Memo to Hatcher, July 1945 (NARA 0005076-
0005082).

6 7 6 NARA, RG 60, Entry 285B, Box 74, TIDC Project 12, p. 23, July
14, 1945 (NARA 0003116); NARA, RG 60, Entry 285B, Box
72, File: IND-30, Report on Reparations from the German
Automotive Industry, May 1945 (NARA 0003065).

6 7 7 NARA, RG 338, Entry 42868, Box A905, File: 004, Memo on
operation of Ford Motor plant, May 12,1945 (NARA 0004875-
0004876).

6 7 8 NARA, RG 338, Entry 42389, Box 3, File 15 Army MG
Detachments, E1H2 Report, April 25, 1945 (NARA 0004885),
Summary No. 96, May 11, 1945 (NARA 0004888), Summary
No. 97, May 12, 1945 (NARA 0004891).

6 7 9 NA R A , RG 260, P ro p e rty Division, P ro p e rty Control and
External Assets Branch, Box 546, File: Ford-Werke, Memo from
Rains, July 25,1945 (NARA 0000580-0000581).

6 8 0 PRO, FO 1046/ 86, Property Control Instruction No. 13, August
27,1945 (PRO 0000125-0000126).

6 8 1 PRO, FO1046/ 526, Memo from Property Control Branch to
Chairman, Control Board Economic Sub-Commission, October
5, 1946 (PRO 0000127-0000129); NARA, RG 260, Executive
Office, Box 635, Military Law No. 52, April 19, 1945 (NARA
0 0 0 5 5 2 4 -0 0 0 5 5 2 7 ) ; NA R A , RG 260, P ro p e rty Division,
Directors Office, Box 6, File: Ford-Werke, Clay to Beckworth,
April 7, 1948 (NARA 0002469).

6 8 2 Ford-Werke Records, Rolfe to Vitger, September 26,1945 (FW
0020376-0020380).
6 8 3 Wilkins and Hill, American Business A b r o a d , p. 345. Despite Albert's
implication in the July 1944 uprising against Hitler and Albert's
subsequent arrest by the Germ a n s , the Allied occupat i o n
government was suspicious of his wartime record, especially
his association with the A rendt plant. (See Section 6. 9.
regarding Arendt.) Vitger said in a postwar interview that the
A m e rican officers told him [Vi t g e r ] : "[ W] e must have
somebody who does what we want, and who is responsible
only to us. We know you very well, and we believe that you
would be the right man for this." See FMC, AR-98-213541, Box
V, Oral History of Erhard Vitger by D. B. Tinnin, April 1987 (FMC
0000575).

6 8 4 Ford-Werke Records, Rolfe to Vitger, September 26, 1945 (FW
0020376-0020380). See also FMC, AR-98-213541, Box 131,
Perry Report, September 19, 1946 (FMC 0000940); and Ford-Werke
Records, Business Report for 1944,1945 and 1946 (FW
0003689).

6 8 5 PRO, FO 1013/ 2359, North Rhine Province Finance Report for
November 1945 (PRO 0000138).

6 8 6 FMC, AR-98-213541, Box 131, Perry Report, September 19,

From April to June 1945, Ford-Werke operated
under the authority of military government property
control officers attached to the SHAEF Civil Affairs
Division. 675 According to U. S. military reports, the plant
was "being operated by or for the army." 676 Army
ordnance officers we re assigned to superv i s e
production activities, and all requisitions for parts and
materials had to be approved by the 15 th Army Property
C o n t rol Offi c e r. 6 7 7 A m e rican officials establ i s h e d
re g u l ations gove rning employment at the plant,
arranged for skilled laborers to be allocated to Ford-Werke
and helped relocate workers from elsewhere in
the Cologne region. Army officers also helped salvage
parts and machinery for use at the facility. 678

10.2. British Military Go vernment
Control of Ford-Wer ke

With the creation of the Allied Control Council,
Cologne was occupied by units of the British 21 st Army
Group, and British officials from the Finance Division
Property Control Branch took over responsibility for

Ford-Werke operations. 679 In August 1945, the British
Property Control Branch outlined a formal program to
take control of all foreign-owned property in the
British Zone. The program's principal aim was to
protect these properties until the owners could resume
control. In the case of manufacturing plants such as
Ford-Werke, the plan called for the appointment of a
custodian, who would protect the assets and report to
the Property Control Branch. 680 The legal basis for these
measures stemmed from Military Law No. 52, which
granted the military government wide-ranging powers
to seize and control German industrial facilities. 681

On September 26, 1945, Ford-Werke employees
were told that the plant was being placed under
military government control. 682 Heinrich Albert had
asked to be appointed custodian, but the occupation
government refused, and instead appointed Erhard
Vitger. 683 Nonetheless, Albert was permitted to become
custodian of Fo r d -We r ke 's assets in Berlin. 6 8 4 I n
N ovember 1945, the British Military Gove rn m e n t
Headquarters for North Rhineland announced that
Fo r d -We r ke had begun operating under its
supervision. 685

According to Vitger, directors and shareholders had
no official authority under British military government
control. 686 Additionally, Ford Motor Company needed 120
120 Page 121 122
95
E n d -o f -Wa r a n d Po s t w a r Mi l i t a r y G o v e r n me n t S u p e r v i s i o n
1946 (FMC 0000914). See also Ford-Werke Records, Meeting
Minutes, December 16,1947 (FW 0003967-0003971), which
notes that under the terms of Military Law No. 52, shareholders
could not meet without the approval of military authorities.

6 8 7 See correspondence in NARA, RG 59, Central Decimal File
1 9 5 0 -1 9 5 4 , B ox 1064, F i l e : 262.1141 (NARA 0005594-0005611).

6 8 8 PRO, FO 1013/ 2364, North Rhine-Westphalia Finance Report,
September 30, 1946 (PRO 0000132); WNRC, Acc. 299-68A-0243,
Box 540, File 43 -Ford-Werke -K�ln -FMC (18/ 3)
(516/ g), Letter from Chief of Financial Division, Property
Control Branch, November 15, 1945 (DOJ 0010335).

6 8 9 FMC, AR-98-213541, Box 131, Perry Report, September 19,
1946 (FMC 0000924-0000927); Fo r d -We r ke Records,
Business Report for 1944, 1 9 4 5 , 1946 (FW 0003689-
0003690); FMC, AR 65-71, Box 25, File: Ford International '48
#1, Summary of Foreign Operations -January 12,1948, Report
on Ford-Werke, October 15, 1947 (FMC 0000135).

6 9 0 NARA, RG 84, Entry 2527X, Box 1, File: Trade and Industry,
Industry and Trade Committee Meeting Minutes for August 28
and August 31,1945 (NARA 0004813-0004817).

6 9 1 FMC, AR-98-213541, Box 131, Perry Report, September 19,
1946 (FMC 0000924); Ford-Werke Records, Financial Ledger -December
1944-December 1946, Memo from Vitger, October
31, 1946 (FW 0008008); PRO, FO 1039/ 808, Memo from
King, July 18, 1947 (PRO 0000027).

6 9 2 NARA, RG 260, Executive Office, Box 635, Military Law No. 53,
August 1, 1945 (NARA 0005528-0005531); NARA, RG 260,
Economics Division, B ox 101, F i l e : 451-2 Folder #2,
Machinery and Optics Section to Industry Branch, January 14,
1946 (NARA 0004484). See also FMC, Briefing Binder K,
Interview with Malcolm McDonald, no date (FMC 0004379-
0004380). He stated that production orders from Ford of
Britain for Ford-Werke had to be placed through the Allied
Control Council, and that trucks produced at the plant could be
distributed only to certain approved dealers in Germany.

6 9 3 WNRC, Acc. 299-68A-0243, Box 537, Book 12 -I. b 1946 (1),
Invoice No. 2883/ 5840, February 13,1946 (DOJ 0001445).
6 9 4 Approval for the purchase was obtained in June 1948, after
Vitger filed an appeal and the military government relaxed its
investment restrictions; see correspondence in NARA, RG 260,
Property Division, Director's Office, Box 6, File: Ford-Werke
(NARA 0002457-0002469); and HFM, Acc. 713, Box 5, File:
Correspondence -Vitger -1948, Vitger to Roberge, June 24,
1948 (HFM 0003466-0003467).

6 9 5 NARA, RG 338, Entry 42389, Box 3, File: 15 U. S. Army MG
A t t a ch m e n t s , E1H2 Report 16, M a r ch 25, 1945 (NA R A
0004882); NARA, RG 338, Entry 42868, Box A905, File: 004,
Memo on operation of Ford Motor plant, May 12,1945 (NARA
0004875-0004876), File: A. G. File, Flanigan to Commanding
General, XXII Corps, April 2, 1945 (NARA 0004874).

6 9 6 WNRC, Acc. 299-68A-0243, Box 540, Book 62 -II. c -1945,
Invoice No. RA 1545, June 29, 1945 (DOJ 0009553), Invoice
No. RA 1571, July 6, 1945 (DOJ 0009567), Invoice No.
789590, August 15, 1945 (DOJ 0009545).

the permission of the military government to transfer
title of company stock. 687 British military government
re g u l ations also placed tight re s t rictions on trave l
within Germany. In November 1945, shortly after the
plant was placed under control, military authorities
refused permission for Alfons von Gusmann and Albert
to visit from Berlin, noting that Vitger seemed to be
doing well managing the plant. 6 8 8 Fo r d -We r ke 's
p o s t war production activities also we re closely
regulated by British military authorities. While the
plant continued to repair and service military vehicles,
it also began producing new trucks under contract with
the British occupation government, which had the
authority to determine who received the trucks. 689 As
the American military had done, British authorities
arranged for the transfer of parts and machinery from
other German factories to Ford-Werke to increase the
plant's production. 690

The British military government determined steel
quota allocations for Ford-Werke and regulated prices
charged for spare parts manufactured at the plant. 691
B ritish officials closely re g u l ated trade with other
occupied zones within Germany. Foreign currency
accounts were frozen and foreign trade was prohibited

without approval of military authorities. 692 The British
military government restricted any further investment
in the properties under their control. In 1946, Ford-Werke
had to obtain approval before it could purchase
roofing materials for plant repairs. 693 And, in November
1947, the Property Control Branch denied a request
from Vitger to purchase 312,655 square meters (3.37
million square feet) of land adjoining the Cologne
facility for construction of a spare parts assembly
plant. 694

10.3. Production During the
Military Occupation

Ford-Werke resumed limited operations shortly after
Cologne was occupied by U. S. troops. Following a visit
to the plant by U. S. property control officers on March
25, 1945, Ford-Werke began servicing and repairing
U. S . m i l i t a ry ve h i c l e s. Fo r d -We r ke also began
overhauling captured German trucks for use by Allied
forces. 695 After British occupation troops arrived in
Cologne, Ford-Werke also provided repair services for
the British military. 696 According to author Hanns-Peter 121
121 Page 122 123
96
R e s e a r c h F i n d i n g s Ab o u t Fo r d -We r k e U n d e r t h e Na z i R e g i m e
6 9 7 Hanns-Peter Rosellen, Fo r d -S c h r i t t e : Die Wi e d e raufstieg der Fo r d -We rk e
K�ln von 1945 bis 1970 (Frankfurt: Zyklam-Verlag, 1987/ 88), p.
16.

6 9 8 WNRC, Acc. 299-68A-0243, Box 540, Book 62 -II. c -1945,
Summary of war damage claims, 1945-1946 (DOJ 0009511).
The summary lists a total of RM 190,718.91, of which
RM 41,763 was for hours not worked due to air raids. Initially,
the claims were submitted directly to the U. S. and British
occupation forces. Later, the claims were submitted to the
Occupation Office in Cologne. Several of the claims apparently
were disapproved for lack of sufficient proof or other reasons
related to the filing requirements.

6 9 9 NARA, RG 338, Entry 42868, Box A905, File: 004, Memo on
operation of Ford Motor plant, May 12,1945 (NARA 0004875-
0004876).

7 0 0 Billstein and Illner," You A re Now in Colog n e. C o m p l i m e n t s." pp. 181-
188; HFM, Acc. 713, Box 4, File: Cologne 1946, Thumbnail
Sketch of Activities at Ford-Werke, June 12, 1946 (HFM
0 0 0 3 5 0 3 ) ; F M C, A R -9 8 -2 1 3 5 4 1 , B ox 131, Pe rry Report ,
September 19, 1946 (FMC 0000918).

7 0 1 NARA, RG 338, Entry 42868, Box A905, File: 004, Memo on
o p e r ation of Ford Motor plant, M ay 12, 1945 (NA R A
0004875).

7 0 2 NARA, RG 260, Economics Division, Industry Branch, Box 37,
Reel 39.3, E1H2 report on FMC in France, Belgium and
Germany, June 15, 1945 (NARA 0005636).

7 0 3 NA R A , RG 260, P ro p e rty Division, P ro p e rty Control and
External Assets Branch, Box 546, File: Ford-Werke, Memo from
Rains, July 25, 1945 (NARA 0000580).

7 0 4 NARA, RG 165, Entry 96, Box 2, Volume V, Report from
Committee to Reappraise the Automotive Situation in ETO and
MTO, July 1945 (NARA 0005082).

7 0 5 Ford-Werke Records, Business Report for 1944, 1945, 1946
(FW 0003690).
7 0 6 NARA, RG 59, Central Decimal File 1945-49, Box 6820, File:
862.659, Murphy to Lyon, April 19, 1946 (NARA 0005506);
PRO, FO 1039/ 808, Memo from Portas, December 31, 1946
(PRO 0000023).

7 0 7 FMC, AR-98-213541, Box 131, Perry Report, September 19,
1946 (FMC 0000919).

708 FMC, AR 65-71, Box 25, File: Ford International '48 #1,
Summary of Foreign Operations -January 12, 1948, Thornton
to Crusoe, October 22, 1947 (FMC 0000129); Ford-Werke
R e c o r d s , Business Report for 1944, 1 9 4 5 , 1946 (FW
0003690).

production levels had reached more than 60 vehicles
per month. 703 However, after visiting the plant two
weeks lat e r, a U. S . War Department committee
i nve s t i g ating the European automotive industry
reported that Ford-Werke's current production was
only 12 vehicles per month, though it was planning to
increase to 100. 704 In addition to manufacturing spare
parts and continuing to service and repair British
military vehicles, the facility produced 2,443 vehicles
by the end of 1945. 705

Under general plans for German industry developed
by the Allied Control Council in 1946, Ford-Werke was
scheduled to be the only automobile manufacturer in
the British Zone with an anticipated annual production
quota as high as 20,000 autos and 18,000 trucks. 706
Although the plant's full production capacity was an
e s t i m ated 1,750 tru cks per month, Fo r d -We r ke 's
monthly production rate in mid-1946 was 550-600
vehicles because of "the acute shortage of steel, tyres,
and wood." 707 Ford-Werke produced 4,649 trucks
during 1946, in addition to reconditioning motors for
the British occupation gove rn m e n t . 7 0 8 D e s p i t e
encountering difficulties due to shortages of materials
and power to operate the plant, Ford-Werke was able to
generate a profit in 1946. Ford of Britain employee
Cyril B. Lonsdale, who was assigned to Cologne during
this period, attributed much of Ford-Werke's 1946

Rosellen, American and British authorities regarded the
Ford-Werke plant as their own and demanded that
Ford-Werke repair military vehicles for free. 697 Ford-Werke
eventually submitted war damage claims totaling
RM 148,956 for repair work undertaken on behalf of
the British and American military, and for trucks and
tools requisitioned from the plant. 698 (See Section 11.4.
for more information on war damage claims.)

On April 27, 1945, the U. S. military command
headquarters for the Cologne region authorized the
plant to begin assembling trucks from existing spare
p a rt s. 6 9 9 On V-E Day, M ay 8, 1 9 4 5 , Fo r d -We r ke
produced its first postwar vehicle, a truck for the U. S.
Army. Ford-Werke's truck production remained limited
during the next months because of damage to the plant
and a shortage of raw materials and parts. 700 As it began
truck production, Ford-Werke management estimated
that around 500 trucks could be assembled from
existing supplies. 701 In June 1945, U. S. Civil Affairs
Division officials in Cologne reported that the plant had
made about 250 trucks but was quickly running out of
necessary parts. The military officers proposed to
p ro c u re the needed supplies from stocks store d
elsewhere in Germany and from Ford facilities in
France and Belgium. 702 At the beginning of July 1945,
U. S. military officials noted that the facility was more
active than it had been a month earlier, and that 122
122 Page 123 124
97
E n d -o f -Wa r a n d Po s t w a r Mi l i t a r y G o v e r n me n t S u p e r v i s i o n
7 0 9 HFM, Acc. 713, Box 4, File: Cologne -Dagenham File Re:
Germany 1947, Memo from Lonsdale, May 28, 1947 (HFM
0004209). Lonsdale indicated that Ford of Britain's ability to
insert British personnel into Cologne at such an early date
enabled Ford-Werke to restart operations at Cologne "before
any other factory in the Motor Industry in Germany."

7 1 0 Reich, The Fruits of Fa s c i s m , p. 133.

7 1 1 FMC, AR 65-71, Box 25, File: Ford International '48 #1,
Summary of Foreign Operations -January 12, 1948, Thornton
to Crusoe, October 22, 1947 (FMC 0000129); HP, Acc. 61-
000417, Box 1, German War Recovery Study -1950, pp. 136-
139 (HP 0000324-0000327).

7 1 2 NARA, RG 260, Property Division, Director's Office, Box 6, File:
Ford-Werke, Vitger to Property Control Branch, November 29,
1947 (NARA 0002459-0002464).

7 1 3 Ford-Werke Records, Summary of Ford of Germany Production
1 9 2 6 -1 9 7 7 , Feb ru a ry 9, 1978 (FW 0003910), H i s t o ri c a l
Developments 1925-1969 (FW 0002877).

7 1 4 Ford-Werke Records, Chronology of Ford-Werke, 1945-1948
(FW 0020401).
7 1 5 FMC, AR-98-213541, Box 131, Palumbo, Survey of German
Motor Vehicle Industry, A p ril 15, 1948 (FMC 0000863-
0000864). See also Reich, The Fruits of Fa s c i s m , pp. 144-146.

success to the goodwill of British military authorities.
He cited a 1945 arrangement whereby Ford of Britain
re p re s e n t at i ves we re allowed into the Cologne
operations to facilitate the early rehabilitation of the
factory. Also, he noted, Ford-Werke benefited from the
c o o p e r ation of military authorities in obtaining
materials. 709 According to political scientist Simon
R e i ch , Fo r d -We r ke 's "good re l ationship with the
military government" was an advantage for the firm
and led to Fo r d -We r ke 's receiving mach i n e ry
confiscated by the military authorities from the Krupp
concern. 710

P roduction levels dropped in 1947 because of
continued "difficulties in obtaining an adequate flow of
supplies." 711 Steel allocations to the plant dropped
sharply during the first three quarters of the year, to an
average of 710 tons per month, compared with 1,280

tons per month in 1946. In November 1947, Erhard
Vitger submitted a request to the British military
government for the purchase of land from the city of
Cologne to be used as the site of a foundry and forge
needed to manufacture parts that were in short supply
and therefore were limiting Ford-Werke's output. 712
Total truck production for the year amounted to about
2,600 vehicles. 713 In addition, the plant reconditioned
more than 26,000 motors for German, British and
Canadian vehicles. 714 During 1947, Ford-Werke faced
i n c reased competition from other automobile
manufacturers in Germany. In the British zone, the
Volkswagen facility in Wolfsburg was operating with a
m o n t h ly production rate of ap p rox i m at e ly 1,000
passenger cars. Opel's plant at Brandenburg in the
Russian zone was producing 1,500 to 2,000 trucks per
month, while the Opel plant at Russelsheim in the
American zone was manufacturing about 200 trucks
per month. By the end of the year, the Russelsheim
plant had begun passenger car production. 715

Ford-Werke production levels climbed in 1948 and
1949, the last two years of the military occupation. In

Overview of Ford-Wer ke Postwar Production, May 1945-1949
Sources: Ford-Werke Records, Business Report for 1944, 1945, 1946 (FW 0003689-0003691), Summary of Ford of Germany
Production 1926-1977, February 9, 1978 (FW 0003910).

Three-ton Trucks Taunus Cars Half-ton Vans Yearly Total
May-Dec 1945 2,443 2,443
1946 4,649 --4,649
1947 2,600 --2,600
1948 5,731 182 144 6,057
1949 3,823 11,109 2,425 17,357
Total production
May 1945-1949 19,246 11,291 2,569 33,106 123
123 Page 124 125
98
R e s e a r c h F i n d i n g s Ab o u t Fo r d -We r k e U n d e r t h e Na z i R e g i m e
7 1 6 Ford-Werke Records, Chronology of Ford-Werke, 1945-1948
(FW 0020403-0020405).
7 1 7 Ford-Werke Records, Historical Developments 1925-1969 (FW
0002878), Summary of Ford of Germany Production 1926-
1977, February 9, 1978 (FW 0003910).

7 1 8 Ford-Werke Records," Our Production Program Ford Cologne,"
1949 (FW 0005591).
7 1 9 FMC, AR-98-213541, Box 52, File: Audit Report -July 28,
1949, Hibberson-Platt Report, July 28, 1949, and August 1949
(FMC 0000813); Ford-Werke Records, Summary of Ford of
G e rm a ny Production 1926-1977, Feb ru a ry 9, 1978 (FW
0003910).

7 2 0 NARA, RG 260, Economics Division, Industry Branch, Box 37,
Reel 39.3, C. I. O. S. Target Report 19/ 8 on visit to Ford-Cologne-Niehl
March 10,1945, document date March 23,1945,( NARA
0005651-0005656).

7 2 1 RG 407, E n t ry 427, B ox 15071, F i l e : 603-2. 13 Civilian
i n t e rro g ation on Ford fa c t o ry, M a r ch 11, 1945 (NA R A
0005309).

7 2 2 NARA, RG 243, Entry 6, Box 687, File: 77a19 2 of 3, Arnoldy
to Hoglund, March 22,1945 (NARA 0004497-0004499). The
U. S. Strategic Bombing Survey also investigated other Ford
plants in Belgium; see reports in NARA, RG 243, Entry 6, Box
687, File: 77a19 3 of 3, March 1945 (NARA 0003257-
0003335.

7 2 3 NARA, RG 331, Entry 54, Box 151, File 17.11, First U. S. Army
Report, March 1945, p. 158, E1H2 Report 1, March 10, 1945
(NARA 0004915); NARA, RG 338, Entry 42389, Box 3, File: 15
U. S. Army MG Attachments, E1H2 Report 3, March 12, 1945
(NARA 0004880-0004881), E1H2 Report 13, March 22,1945
(NARA 0004879).

7 2 4 NARA, RG 338, Entry 42389, Box 3, File: 15 U. S. Army MG
A t t a ch m e n t s , E1H2 Report 16, M a r ch 25, 1945 (NA R A
0004882).

7 2 5 NARA, RG 331, Entry 54, Box 284, File: 223.32 1st U. S. Army
Field Reports, G-5 Summary Report, March 23, 1945 (NARA
0004906-0004907); NARA, RG 338, Entry 42389, Box 3, File:
15 Army G-5 MG Summaries, Summary No. 96, May 11,1945
(NARA 0004887-0004888).

7 2 6 NARA, RG 260, Economics Division, I. G. Farben Control Office,
Box 24, unlabeled file, Memo from Naiden and Rains, June 9,

March 1948, Henry Ford II visited the plant for a board
meeting and drove the 10,000th vehicle to come off
the assembly line since the end of the war. 716 That
autumn, the plant began manufacturing the Taunus, the
first passenger car produced there since the war. In
addition to the Ta u nu s , Fo r d -We r ke began
manufacturing a half-ton van. A total of 326 passenger
vehicles were manufactured by the end of the year.
D u ring 1948, Fo r d -We r ke also produced 5, 731
trucks. 717 In 1949, Ford-Werke introduced a new,
smaller 1 1 �2 -to two-ton tru ck to complement its
p roduction of three-ton ve h i c l e s. 7 1 8 In general,
h oweve r, plant production larg e ly shifted towa r d
passenger vehicles rather than trucks. Total production
at the plant in 1949 amounted to 3,823 trucks, 11,109
Taunus cars and 2,425 half-ton vans. 719

10.4. Military Go vernment
Investigations of the Plant

U. S . m i l i t a ry forces began their first inve s t i g ations of
the Fo r d -We r ke facility short ly after occupying Cologne.
On March 10, 1 9 4 5 , a combined British and A m e ri c a n
intelligence team inve s t i g ated the plant and re p o rted on
its condition, the dispersal of fa c t o ry equipment befo re
the U. S . a rri va l , and the fo reign wo r kers and " d i s p l a c e d
p e r s o n s " who remained encamped in the Fo r d -We r ke air
raid shelter. 7 2 0 M i l i t a ry intelligence officers interro g at e d
G e rman wo r kers and refugees who had wo r ked at the
p l a n t . 7 2 1 On March 15, 1 9 4 5 , M a j . F. N. A rn o l dy of the

U. S . S t r ategic Bombing Survey visited Fo r d -We r ke to
s u rvey the effects of the U. S . bombing campaign in
C o l o g n e. A rn o l dy also interv i ewed Robert Schmidt at his
home and gat h e red info rm ation about plant operat i o n s ,
the mach i n e ry dispersal and Fo r d -We r ke suppliers. 7 2 2

In addition to these intelligence-gat h e ring effo rt s , t h e
fa c t o ry was visited several times between March and May
1945 by re p re s e n t at i ves of the E1H2 Civil A f fairs Unit
re s p o n s i ble for administering Cologne. The military
o f ficials interv i ewed Fo r d -We r ke management and
re p o rted on conditions at the plant, including the health
of fo reign wo r kers and refugees found there. 7 2 3 O f fi c i a l s
also inve s t i g ated a re p o rt by Schmidt that U. S . t roops had
t a ken RM 1,000, 000 from a Fo r d -We r ke office soon after
the occupation of Cologne. 7 2 4 F i n a l ly, Civil A f fairs offi c e r s
s u rveyed the plant to determine what was needed to
b ring the Fo r d -We r ke facility into production to serv i c e
Allied military ve h i c l e s. 7 2 5

In mid-June 1945, L t . Neil Naiden and Ensign Edw i n
R a i n s , who we re assigned to the U. S . M i l i t a ry
G ove rnment Finance Division, began a larg e r
i nve s t i g ation of Fo r d -We r ke. The officers traveled to
C o l o g n e, and after consulting with local U. S . m i l i t a ry
g ove rnment offi c i a l s , i n t e rv i ewed Erhard Vitger and
S chmidt regarding Fo r d -We r ke 's activities during the
wa r. Naiden and Rains rev i ewed Fo r d -We r ke intern a l
documents and took several files away with them. 7 2 6 U. S . 124
124 Page 125 126
99
E n d -o f -Wa r a n d Po s t w a r Mi l i t a r y G o v e r n me n t S u p e r v i s i o n
1945 (NARA 0006986-0006988), Memo on conversation with
Vitger, June 11, 1945 (NARA 0006980-0006981), Memo on
conversation with Schmidt, June 13, 1945 (NARA 0006983-
0006984).

7 2 7 The Ford of Belgium shares were not returned to Ford-Werke;
see correspondence relating to these shares in WNRC, Acc. 299-
68A-0243, Box 540, File 43 -Ford-Werke -K�ln FMC (18/ 3)
(516/ g) (DOJ 0010256-0010291). See also Section 8.2.

7 2 8 NARA, RG 260, Economics Division, I. G. Farben Control Office,
Box 24, unlabeled file, Memo from Gosling, June 19, 1945
(NARA 0006973), Handwritten memo to Cleary, circa 1945
( NARA 0006979); NA R A , RG 260, Economics Division,
Decartelization Branch, Box 92, File: Industrialists, List of
G e rman civilian pri s o n e r s , N ovember 19, 1946 (NA R A
0002443).

7 2 9 NARA, RG 407, Entry 368B, Box 1032, Report on preliminary
investigation of the Ford-Werke, AG (External Assets -Germany)
by Rains and Naiden, June 21, 1945 (NARA 0001173).

7 3 0 NARA, RG 260, Economics Division, I. G. Farben Control Office,
Box 24, unlabeled file, Handwritten statements by Schmidt, July 1945 (NARA 0007012-0007024) and from Ford-Werke to

Schneider, August 27, 1945 (NARA 0006958).

7 3 1 NARA, RG 407, Entry 368B, Box 1032, RG 407, Schneider
Report, September 5, 1945 (NARA 0000001-0000540). See also NARA RG 260, Economics Division, I. G. Farben Control

Office, Box 24, unlabeled file, Ford section omitted from report s u b m i t t e d , circa July-September 1945 (NARA 0006956-
0006957).
7 3 2 Reinhold Billstein, Neubeginn ohne Neordnung. Dokumente und Materialien
zur politischen Weichenstellung in den Westzone nach 1945 (Cologne: Pahl-Rugenstein, 1984), pp. 36-88.

7 3 3 Irmgard Lange, ed., Entnazifizierung in Nordrhein-Westfalen: Richtlinien,
A n we i s u n ge n , O rga n i s ation ( S e i bu rg : R e s p u bl i c a -Ve r l ag, S e i bu rg, 1976), pp. 11-23.

m i l i t a ry officials inspected Fo r d -We r ke 's safe deposit box
at the Deutsche Bank branch in Cologne and re t ri eve d
Ford of Belgium share cert i fi c ates wo rth Bfrs
6 0 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 . 7 2 7 On June 19, 1 9 4 5 , U. S . m i l i t a ry
a u t h o rities decided to arrest Sch m i d t , and he was take n
to Frankfurt to be "held for questioning in connection
with the I. G. Farben inve s t i g at i o n " and not released until
September 8, 1 9 4 5 . Rains requisitioned Sch m i d t 's car
for his own use. 7 2 8

On June 21, 1 9 4 5 , Rains produced a re p o rt
s u m m a rizing the " P re l i m i n a ry Inve s t i g ation of Fo r d -We
r ke." The re p o rt provided an ove rv i ew of Fo r d -We r ke
h i s t o ry during the Nazi era and included re fe rences to
p rewar activities, the use of forced labor and Sch m i d t 's
role in overseeing Ford plants in occupied Euro p e. 7 2 9 I n
J u ly and August 1945, U. S . m i l i t a ry authorities continu e d
their inve s t i g ation of Fo r d -We r ke. Rains interro g at e d
S ch m i d t , and Schmidt pre p a red memos describing Fo r d -We
r ke activities. U. S . m i l i t a ry inve s t i g ators collected
f u rther documents from Fo r d -We r ke. 7 3 0 On September
5 , 1 9 4 5 , H e n ry Sch n e i d e r, U. S . Forces European T h e at e r
Finance Branch , submitted a longer re p o rt on the
i nve s t i g ation of Fo r d -We r ke. S ch n e i d e r 's re p o rt
d e s c ribed Fo r d -We r ke 's wa rtime activities in gre at e r
d e t a i l , d e s c ribing prewar raw mat e rials ag re e m e n t s ,
wa rtime pro d u c t i o n , use of forced labor and Fo r d -We
r ke 's re l ationship with other Ford subsidiaries in

occupied Euro p e. The re p o rt also included a larg e
collection of Fo r d -We r ke internal documents at t a ched as
e x h i b i t s. 7 3 1

10.5. Denazification at Ford-Wer ke
M i l i t a ry gove rnment authorities conducted seve r a l
i nve s t i g ations at Fo r d -We r ke as part of a broader effo rt to
re m ove prominent individuals who had been active Nazi
p a rty members or support e r s. The general aims of the
d e n a z i fi c ation program for Germ a ny we re established in
Feb ru a ry 1945 at the Yalta Confe re n c e, w h i ch called fo r
the eradication of all vestiges of National Socialism fro m
G e rman life. S h o rt ly after the occupation of Cologne,
U. S . m i l i t a ry officials began dismissing civil servants and
other public officials who had served during the Nazi
e r a . 7 3 2 At the Potsdam Confe rence in July 1945, the A l l i e s
ag reed to allow each zone to develop its ow n
d e n a z i fi c ation pro c e d u re s. After the cre ation of the
B ritish Zone in the summer of 1945, o f ficials from the
P u blic Safety Special Branch took over responsibility fo r
a d m i n i s t e ring the denazifi c ation program in Cologne. 7 3 3

D u ring the first months of the Allied occupat i o n ,b o t h
U. S . and British military officials collected info rm at i o n
about high-ranking members of Fo r d -We r ke
m a n ag e m e n t . In June 1945, Counter Intelligence Corp s
(CIC) officers provided re p o rts on Erhard Vi t g e r, R o b e rt
S ch m i d t , We rner Buch wa l d , A l fons Streit and Hans
L � ck m a n n . ( S t reit and L�ckmann we re deputy members
of the Fo r d -We r ke management board [Vorstand] ) . ( S e e
Section 10. 2. for info rm ation on the military
g ove rn m e n t 's appointment of Vitger as postwa r
custodian of the plant later in 1945.) On June 11, t h e
CIC officials re p o rted that they had not yet been able to
p rove that Schmidt was an "ardent Nazi," but we re
working toward his arre s t , w h i ch occurred about a we e k 125
125 Page 126 127
100
R e s e a r c h F i n d i n g s A b o u t Fo r d -We r k e U n d e r t h e Na z i R e g i m e
7 3 4 NARA, RG 260, Economics Division, I. G. Farben Control Office,
Box 24, unlabeled file, Memo on conversation with CIC -C o l o g n e, June 11, 1945 (NARA 0006985), Memo fro m

Gosling, June 19, 1945 (NARA 0006973).
7 3 5 NA R A , RG 260, P ro p e rty Division, P ro p e rty Control and
External Assets Branch, Box 546, File: Ford-Werke, Memo from Rains, July 25, 1945 (NARA 0000581). There is a possibility

that Schmidt may have been arrested briefly in April 1945. Arrest ledgers from the U. S. 15th Army indicate that a "Robert
Schmidt" was detained between April 11 and April 17; however, the documents give no other information, and there are no
other references to Robert H. Schmidt's being arrested in April 1945. See NARA, RG 338,15th Army records, Box A923, Book
MP/ MIC Blotter 25, arrest ledger entry, Apri1 1945 (NARA 0004901).

7 3 6 H S t A D, NW 1049/ 76620, Memo from Pro p e rty Contro l
Officer of Military Government to Ford-Werke, September 14,
1945 (HSAD 0802), Appeal to Cologne Regional Government,
September 10,1946 (HSAD 0836-0841).

7 3 7 FMC, AR-75-62-616, Box 79, Custodian Report (FMC 0001018
and 0001020); FMC, AR-98-213541, Box 131, File: Cologne
Organization and Management, Management -1925-1946
(FMC 0000682). Buchwald, the wartime counterintelligence
officer and an employee of Ford-Werke, was removed by the
Military Government in June 1945, arrested and held for nine
months. Ford-Werke canceled his contract. After he was
released from military intern m e n t , he went through the
denazification process for approval to work as an independent
economic adviser, and was cleared. See NARA, RG 260,
Economics Division, I . G. Farben Control Offi c e, B ox 24,
unlabeled file, Memo on conversation with CIC -Cologne, June
11, 1945 (NARA 0006985); HStAD, NW 1049/ 46784, Report
of Chief Inve s t i g at o r, H e a d q u a rters Military Gove rn m e n t ,
December 3, 1946 (HSAD 0212; for English translation, see
HSAD 0215), Tr a n s l ation of Notice from Fo r d -We r ke to
B u ch wa l d , June 26, 1945 (HSAD 0217), B u ch wald to
Burgermeister der Gemeinde Runderoth, May 3, 1946 (HSAD
0 2 2 3 ; for English translat i o n , see HSAD 0225) and
Questionnaire Work Sheet, November 6, 1946 (HSAD 0216).
Streit, who held the title of "works manager" at Ford-Werke in
1945, was later re-employed by Ford-Werke; as of 1953, he was
engineering assistant to the technical director. See HFM, Acc.
505, Box 1, File: Ford International Executive News Letter, Vol.
V, No. 2, May 1953 (HFM 0003369).

7 3 8 F M C, A R -7 5 -6 2 -6 1 6 , B ox 79, Custodian Report (FMC
0001019-0001020). The names of the people who held the
positions listed above are: Dieter Peitmann, E. Eackenberg,
Werner Pr�tz, Emil Pf�ller, Georg Zahn, Ernst Schulten, Hubert
Pick, G. F. Riedt and Rudolf Lang.

7 3 9 FMC, AR-98-213541, Box 131, File: Cologne Organization and
Management, Management -1925-1946 (FMC 0000682).

7 4 0 WNRC, Acc. 299-68A-0243, Box 540, File 96/ 4 -Ford-Werke
AG 160015, Letter from Albert, April 4,1946 (DOJ 0010395).

7 4 1 PRO, FO 1013/ 1686, Allied Control Authority Directive No. 24,
January 12, 1946 (PRO 0000001-0000018). Robert Schmidt
had been appointed Wehrwirtschaftsf�hrer in 1941; see BA-F,
RW 20/ 3, Entry in War Diary, Muenster, April 22-28, 1941
(BAF 1168). See also Section 5.2.

included Buch wald and Stre i t . 7 3 7 Other key employe e s
who we re re m oved held the fo l l owing positions: t h e
heads of the lab o r at o ry and costing depart m e n t , t h e
assistant works manager, the assistant head of the
construction department, a sales clerk, a buyer, a
fo re m a n , the chief clerk and the assistant ch i e f
inspector. 738 L�ckmann left Ford-Werke of his own
accord in October 1945. 739 Alfons von Gusmann, Ford-Werke's
government liaison representative in Berlin,
was re m oved at the instigation of U. S . m i l i t a ry
authorities in April 1946. 740

The British military government implemented a
more formal denazification program in 1946. On
January 12, 1946, the Allied Control Council issued
Directive No. 24, which identified the Nazi officials and
s u p p o rters who we re to be re m oved from their
p o s i t i o n s. The dire c t i ve specifi c a l ly included all
business leaders who had been appointed Military
Economic Leaders [Wehrwirtschaftsf�hrer] during the
war. 741 On January 17, 1946, the British military
government issued General Directive No. 1, which
established denazification juries made up of politically
reliable Germans to review individual cases, although
the military government retained veto control over the
proceedings. In August 1946, British military officials
issued further instructions relating to the denazification
p ro c e d u re. All Germans with jobs or seeking
employment were required to complete a questionnaire
[Fragebogen] summarizing their personal history and
political affiliations for the denazification committee.
The committees assigned individuals to one of the
following categories: 1) Verbrecher (war criminals),
2) �belt�ter (major wrongdoers/ high-ranking Nazi
party members); 3) weniger bedeutende �belt�ter

l at e r. 7 3 4 In July 1945, the new ly appointed Bri t i s h
resident officer at the plant, M a j . F y fe, i n d i c ated that he
was " t rying to do a house-cleaning job at Fo r d " t o
re m ove Nazi support e r s. 7 3 5 After Sch m i d t 's release fro m
p rison in September 1945, he was specifi c a l ly fo r b i d d e n
to have further connection with Fo r d -We r ke
m a n agement by order of the military gove rn m e n t . 7 3 6
(See Section 10.7. for info rm ation on Robert Sch m i d t 's
re h i ri n g. )

At the request of the military gove rn m e n t , s eve r a l
Fo r d -We r ke employees we re re m oved from their
positions in 1945. In addition to Sch m i d t , the list 126
126 Page 127 128
101
E n d -o f -Wa r a n d Po s t w a r Mi l i t a r y G o v e r n me n t S u p e r v i s i o n
7 4 2 L a n g e, E n t n a z i f i z i e rung in Nordrhein-We s t fa l e n, p p. 25-59 and 223-2
4 1 .
7 4 3 FMC, AR-98-213541, Box 131, Perry Report, September 19,
1946 (FMC 0000938-0000941); see also FMC, AR 98-213541,
Oral History of Erhard Vitger by D. B. Tinnin, April 1987 (FMC
0000582-0000584).

7 4 4 Ford-Werke Records, Rolfe to Vitger, March 1, 1947 (FW
0003893); PRO, FO 1046/ 4, North Rhine-Westphalia Finance
Report, February 28, 1948 (PRO 0000130-0000131).

7 4 5 While Vitger was in Dearborn in June 1947, he summarized the
wartime and postwar controls over Ford-Werke and pointed out
that at present," the Company has no Board." See FMC, AR 65-
71, Box 25, File: International 1947 #1,Vitger to Roberge, June
25,1947 (FMC 0000100-0000102); and Ford-Werke Records,
Vitger to Roberge, August 22,1947 (FW 0003871).

7 4 6 Vitger attended a July 1947 meeting of the Ford Motor
C o m p a ny Fo reign Operations Committee in Dearborn , w h e re
it was decided that A l b e rt would not be re-elected to the board,
and that he would be offe red a re t i rement fee of RM 1 0 0 , 0 0 0
in recognition of his service to the company, should he ag re e
to re t i re. Upon his re t u rn to Germ a ny, Vitger told A l b e rt of the
p rinciple that members of the org a n i z ation should re t i re at the
age of 65. A l b e rt , who was then 73, ag reed to step down and
w rote a letter to that effe c t . See HFM, A c c. 7 1 3 , B ox 4, F i l e :
Meeting with Vi t g e r, Meeting Minutes July 1, 1947 (HFM
0 0 0 1 1 2 3 ) ; Fo r d -We r ke Records, Vitger to Roberg e, August 22,
1947 (FW 0003871) and A l b e rt to Vi t g e r, August 22, 1 9 4 7
(FW 0003874). S o rensen said that he re c e i ved a few letters
f rom A l b e rt after the wa r, and that he was a " ruined man,"
although Sorensen considered him "one of the fo rg o t t e n
g re at s " of Ford Motor Company. See HFM, A c c. 6 7 , C h a r l e s
S o rensen Oral Reminiscences (Excerp t s ) , no dat e, ( H F M
0 0 0 1 3 7 6 -0 0 0 1 3 7 7 ) . In a 1960 interv i ew conducted with the
assistance of his niece, A l b e rt explained that one of his sons
was killed by the Russians on the last day of the wa r, his home

was bombed, and he lost eve rything in Berlin. After the wa r,
he had re g rouped and resumed his law practice. At the time of
the interv i ew, his memory was failing and he had virt u a l ly
fo rgotten his English. He was 86 years old and living in
Wi e s b a d e n . See HFM, A c c. 8 8 0 ,B ox 7, F i l e :G e rm a ny, Notes on
i n t e rv i ew with Heinri ch A l b e rt , J u ly 26, 1960 (HFM
0 0 0 0 8 8 0 ) .

7 4 7 Letters of re s i g n ation we re re c e i ved from or on behalf of Carl
K r a u ch , Hans H�nemeyer and Wilhelm B�tzkes in the peri o d
b e t ween the July 1947 meeting in Dearborn and the December
1 6 ,1 9 4 7 ,m e e t i n g. See Fo r d -We r ke Records, B � t t cher to Vi t g e r
[ for Krauch ] , September 4, 1947 (FW 0003875), H � n e m eye r
to Vi t g e r, N ovember 7, 1947 (FW 0003873) and B�tzkes to
Vi t g e r, N ovember 15, 1947 (FW 0003876).

7 4 8 Fo r d -We r ke Records, Meeting Minu t e s , December 16, 1 9 4 7
(FW 0003967-0003971); Wilkins and Hill, American Business
A b r o a d , p. 3 4 7 .

7 4 9 W N R C, A c c. 2 9 9 -6 8 A -0 2 4 3 , B ox 540, File 43 -Fo r d -We r ke -K�ln
-FMC (18/ 3) (516/ g), C l ay to Beck wo rt h , no date (DOJ

(minor wro n g d o e r s / m i d -l evel party members); 4 )
Pa rt e i g � n g e r ( p a rty support e r s / l ow -l evel part y
m e m b e r s ) ; and 5) entlastete Personen ( c l e a re d
persons). In 1947, the British government revised the
program to grant more responsibility to the German-led
denazification committees. Most proceedings in the
Cologne area were completed by the end of 1948,
although some appeal cases continued until the early
1950s. 742

The denazification committee established at Ford-Werke
by the British military authorities operated for
four hours daily and reported its findings to a central
German panel in Cologne that advised the military
government. About 40 plant and administrative staff
workers were arrested by the Allies, although some of
the employees were released and later re-employed by
the company. 743

10.6. Decontrol of Ford-Wer ke
Military government controls over Ford-Werke were
gradually removed beginning in 1947. In March 1947,
following a request from Erhard Vitger, who was the
appointed custodian, the British Pro p e rty Contro l
Office granted permission for Ford-Werke to hold a
general shareholders meeting in order to elect a board
of directors and resume "conducting its internal affairs
on more normal lines." The British military authorities
n o t e d , h oweve r, t h at under the law, Fo r d -We r ke
remained subject to military government control, and
new board members had to be approved. 744 So, with
permission granted and the conditions set forth, Ford-Werke
began making plans to hold its first postwar
general shareholders meeting. 745 The meeting was held
on December 16, 1947. A decision had been made by
Dearborn executives not to retain Albert as a member of
the Board of Directors of Ford-Werke. 746 The other
remaining members all resigned before the December
16 meeting. 747 Ford Motor Company executives Henry
Ford II, Ernest Breech and Russell Roberge were among
the new members elected to the board of directors.
Carl W. Hauss, a law partner of Albert and one of the
n ew members of the board, was elected as its
chairman. 748

In June 1947, the British military government had
instituted a program to allow fo reign owners of
industrial facilities in Germany to regain control over
their property by petitioning the local Property Control
Boards. 749 The question of applying for decontrol was 127
127 Page 128 129
102
R e s e a r c h F i n d i n g s A b o u t Fo r d -We r k e U n d e r t h e Na z i R e g i m e
0 0 1 0 2 1 5 ) ; F M C, AR 65-71, B ox 25, F i l e : Ford Intern at i o n a l
'48 #1, S u m m a ry of Fo reign Operations -Ja nu a ry 12, 1 9 4 8 ,
T h o rnton to Cru s o e, Ja nu a ry 6, 1948 (FMC 0000125). T h e
initial deadline for ap p l i c ation was December 31, 1 9 4 7 ,
although this was later extended to March 31, 1 9 4 8 .

7 5 0 Fo r d -We r ke Records, Meeting Minu t e s , December 16, 1 9 4 7
(FW 0003967-0003971).
7 5 1 F M C, AR A R -7 5 -6 2 -6 1 6 , B ox 72, F i l e : Fo r d -We r ke 1945-1947
D e c o n t ro l , R o b e rge to Secre t a ry of Stat e, N ovember 1947
(FMC 0005579-0005580).

7 5 2 F M C, AR 65-71, B ox 25, F i l e : Ford Intern ational '48 #1,
S u m m a ry of Fo reign Operations -Ja nu a ry 12, 1 9 4 8 ,T h o rn t o n
to Cru s o e, Ja nu a ry 6, 1948 (FMC 0000125). See also FMC, A R
6 8 -8 9 9 , B ox 8, F i l e : G e rm a ny War Damage Claim Book
( 1 9 6 4 ) , Ladd to Duncan, June 30, 1964 (FMC 0010256-
0 0 1 0 2 5 9 ) ; and FMC, AR 75-63-430, B ox 91, F i l e : Fo r d -We r ke
Finance -Ta xes 1927-1953, G o rn i ck to Bogdan, August 25,
1948 (FMC 0001129-0001134). Among the tax implicat i o n s
to be considered we re the year of the re c ove ry of the
i nvestment and the fair market value of the pro p e rty on the
d ate of re c ove ry.

7 5 3 Fo r d -We r ke Records, E x c e rpts from Board Meeting, M a r ch 2-
3 , 1948 (FW 0003251-0003252).

7 5 4 F M C, A R -6 1 -4 1 6 ,B ox 4, F i l e : XVII Germ a ny War Loss Recove ry
S t u d i e s , L o r aw to Goulden, December 22, 1954 (FMC
0 0 1 6 7 0 8 -0 0 0 1 6 7 1 1 ) . Within Ford Motor Company, t h e re wa s
some disag reement with this assessment of when the company
resumed control of its Germ a ny fa c i l i t y ; see FMC, AR 75-63-4
3 0 , B ox 91, F i l e : Fo r d -We r ke Finance -Ta xes 1927-1953,
G o rn i ck to Bogdan, August 25, 1948 (FMC 0001129-
0 0 0 1 1 3 4 ) .

7 5 5 H S t A D, NW 189/ 1071, Fa rn b o rough to Justizministeri u m ,
October 14, 1948 (HSAD 2138-2139).
7 5 6 FMC, AR-98-213541, Box 131, Official Register of Trading
Associations, March 7,1950 (FMC 0004308).

7 5 7 HStAD, NW 1049/ 76620, Property Control Officer to Ford-Werke,
September 14, 1945 (HSAD 0802).

7 5 8 H S t A D, NW 1049/ 76620, Appeal to Cologne Regional
Government, September 10,1946 (HSAD 0836-0841).

discussed during the December 16, 1947, meeting. The
decision was left to Ford Motor Company, as the
majority shareholder in Ford-Werke. 750 At the outset,
Ford executives were divided over the advisability of
petitioning the British military authorities to regain
control of Ford-Werke. In November 1947, Roberge,
general manager of the Ford International Division, had
complained to the U. S. State Department that Ford-We
r ke was still managed by the postwar plant
custodian, Vitger, who was ultimately responsible to the
military authorities. 751 In January 1948, however,
Charles Thornton, Ford's director of planning, noted
that there were tax implications to be considered, since
the company had written off Ford-Werke as a war loss
in 1941. 752 (See Section 12.4. for more information on
this matter.)

At a Ford-Werke board meeting held in March 1948
and attended by Henry Ford II, the board of directors
decided to apply for decontrol of the Cologne facility. 753
In May 1948, Vitger was granted power of attorney to
represent Ford's interests in Ford-Werke. His authority
to do this was accepted by British officials in Cologne.
Vitger traveled to the United States in May 1948, and
remained there until August to re c e i ve furt h e r
instructions from Ford. He returned to Cologne on
August 8, 1948, to assume the position of general
manager at Ford-Werke. According to a 1954 memo

from the Ford Motor Company Office of Tax Affairs, the
d ate of Vi t g e r 's re t u rn to Cologne marked Fo r d 's
"recovery" of its investment in Ford-Werke. 754

In October 1948, it was agreed that all future legal
actions involving Ford-Werke were to be settled in
German courts, rather than in military government
courts. 755 In December 1949, the Superior Court in
Cologne formally ended the custody order that had
placed Ford-Werke under control of a designated,
official Nazi government representative as of May 15,
1942. 756

10.7. Rehiring of Robert Schmidt
When Robert Schmidt was released by military
authorities on September 8, 1945, a memo from the
m i l i t a ry gove rnment info rmed Fo r d -We r ke that
Schmidt should "take no part in the management of
Ford Motor Company" until an investigation into his
wartime activities was complete, effectively removing
Schmidt from his position as a member of the Ford-Werke
management board. 757 On November 8, 1945,
the military gove rnment offi c i a l ly ordered the
termination of Schmidt's employment at Ford-Werke. 758

One of the issues raised during the course of the
investigation was whether Schmidt was a member of
the Nazi party. A statement by one individual to the
effect that Schmidt was a party member spurred the
investigation. U. S. military authorities examined files as
well as photographs taken at the plant when high-level
Nazi officials were visiting, and interrogated several 128
128 Page 129 130
103
E n d -o f -Wa r a n d Po s t w a r Mi l i t a r y G o v e r n me n t S u p e r v i s i o n
7 5 9 HStAD, NW 1049/ 76620, Investigation Report, June 8, 1945
(HSAD 0800). A letter from the Regional Economic Advisor to
the Nazi Regional Leader refers to Schmidt as a "Party member."
See WNRC, Acc. 299-68A-0243, Box 536, File: W17536,
Regional Economic Advisor to Lammers, February 7, 1942
(DOJ 0011043-0011044; for English translation, see DOJ
0011045-0011046). However, further research, including a
search of Nazi party membership records, produced no other
documentation to support this statement.

7 6 0 HFM, Acc. 713, Box 4, File: Cologne Personnel 1946-1948,
Memo from Albert on denazification of Schmidt, August 23,
1946 (HFM 0003132-0003133); FMC, AR-98-213541, Box
1 3 1 , F i l e : S chmidt -Nazi A c c u s at i o n , M�ller to Cooper,
December 10, 1947 (FMC 0004430); H S t A D, N W
1 0 4 9 / 7 6 6 2 0 , Letter from Mach t i n g, H e rmanns and
Hirschmann, October 3, 1945 (HSAD 0846-0847), Ueber to
Schmidt, November 15, 1945 (HSAD 0860-0861).

7 6 1 HStAD, NW 1049/ 76620, Investigation of Schmidt by C. G.
Reinhard, February 11, 1947 (HSAD 0817).

7 6 2 HStAD, NW 1049/ 76620, Fragebogen -Arbeitsblatt, July 23,
1946 (HSAD 0788).
7 6 3 H S t A D, NW 1049/ 76620, Appeal to Cologne Regional
Government, September 10, 1946 (HSAD 0836-0841).
7 6 4 HStAD, NW 1049/ 76620, Denazification Review Board for
Cologne, November 7,1946 (HSAD 0806-0807), Investigation
of Schmidt by C. G. Reinhard, February 11, 1947 (HSAD 0816-
0820).

7 6 5 HStAD, NW 1049/ 76620 Statement of Panel, October 17,1947
(HSAD 0789).

7 6 6 HFM, Acc. 713, Box 4, File: Cologne Personnel 1946-1948,
Schmidt to Henry Ford II, October 6, 1947 (HFM 0003104-
00003105), Vitger to Roberge, December 14, 1947 (HFM
0003126-0003127).

7 6 7 FMC, AR-98-213541, Box 131, File: Schmidt -Nazi Accusation,
T h a cker to Cooper, December 8, 1947 (FMC 0006514-
00006515), Memo from Stenger on Schmidt's role during
Occupation, November 28, 1947 (FMC 0006516-0006517).

witnesses. They came to the conclusion on June 8,
1945, that "[ a] lthough not a Nazi-Party member, his
position has kept him in constant touch with leading
N a z i -m e m b e r s." 7 5 9 As denazifi c ation pro c e e d i n g s
continued to look at the question of Schmidt's alleged
party membership, a number of individuals, including
Heinrich Albert and a group of Ford-Werke employees,
submitted written statements affirming that he was not
a member of the party, and in fact had anti-Nazi
sentiments. 760 The question was investigated again by
B ritish military authori t i e s , who concluded on
February 11, 1947, "It would appear the accusation
against Schmidt [sic] confined later to the allegation
that he wore the Nazi party badge, but photographs are
available at this office showing him on events of official
character without such badge. It is felt there is little
probability that Schmidt was actually a Party member,
and unless adverse information comes from Document
Center US Army Berlin, it is feared that such allegation
cannot forthwith be maintained." 761

The initial finding of the Denazification Committee
investigating Schmidt in July 1946 placed him in
C at e g o ry 3 (minor wrongdoer or mid-level part y
member), denying him the right to return to a position
at Ford-Werke. 762 He immediately filed an appeal,
which was rejected. On September 10, 1946, Schmidt
filed a second appeal. 763 The Denazification Review
Board recommended that Schmidt's appeal be upheld,
and investigator C. G. Reinhard reported that if no
concrete reason could be cited for Schmidt's dismissal,

it would be overturned. 764 On October 17, 1947,
S ch m i d t 's appeal was ap p rove d , and he was re -categorized
as Category 5 (cleared person). 765

In a letter to Henry Ford II in October 1947, Schmidt
asked to be reinstated at Ford-Werke. Erhard Vitger
raised an objection to Sch m i d t 's re i n s t at e m e n t ,
claiming, "Though there is no doubt that Mr. Schmidt
is a very able businessman, I am afraid he is lacking that
s p i rit of absolute loyalty and tru s t wo rt h i n e s s." 7 6 6
Charles Thacker, manager of Ford of Belgium, and C. G. F.
Stenger, manager of Ford of Holland, both submitted
statements regarding Schmidt's efforts on behalf of
Ford employees during the war. However, Thacker,
who had been one of the first Ford of Britain managers
to arrive at Ford-Werke after the fall of Cologne (before
he was assigned to Belgium), noted potential practical
problems involved in bringing Schmidt back: "I do not
believe that Vitger and Schmidt would ever work
together as a team. Vitger harbours a very strong
feeling of resentment against Schmidt because of his
treatment of him during the war and even after
liberation. I am of the opinion that the bad feeling
between them has existed for a long time." 767

No action was taken immediately after Schmidt's
1947 request for reinstatement. However, Ford officials
started to consider the possibility of rehiring him as
they struggled with strategies for addressing what they
p e r c e i ved as weak management at Fo r d -We r ke,
especially on the part of Vitger. An undated and 129
129 Page 130 131
104
R e s e a r c h F i n d i n g s A b o u t Fo r d -We r k e U n d e r t h e Na z i R e g i m e
7 6 8 FMC, AR 67-13, Box 2, File: Cologne 1949-1954, Notes on
Germany, no date (FMC 0010782-0010783).
7 6 9 HFM, Acc. 880, Box 7, File: Germany, Interview with Robert
Schmidt No. 2, July 22, 1960 (HFM 0000909); Ford-Werke
Records, Scheuffgen to Vitger, March 6,1950 (FW 0004361).

7 7 0 F M C, A R -9 8 -2 1 3 5 4 1 , B ox 131, F i l e : Cologne Po s t wa r
Development, Wieland to Howard, January 24, 1950 (FMC
0000701).

7 7 1 Ford-Werke Records, Campbell to Andrews, February 20,1958
(FW 0004428-0004442). In an oral history interview in
1987, Vitger said that in the mid-1950s Ford Motor Company
began to experience problems that it attributed to the policy of
having Ford companies around the world headed by foreign
nationals. "[ T] he American parent company felt they and their

aims and objectives were not always fully understood. And it
had therefore been decided that every Ford Company around
the world should be headed by an American." See FMC, AR-98-
213541, Box V, Oral History of Erhard Vitger by D. B. Tinnin,
April 1987 (FMC 0000605).

7 7 2 After retirement, Vitger settled in Switzerland, using his title of
"Danish Consul," and lived into his 90s. See FMC, AR-98-
213542, Box Go, Oral History of Zella Goad, June 5 and 9,
1990 (FMC 0017088-0017090).

7 7 3 FMC, AR-85-26299, Box 10, File: Ford-Werke 1954 -1958,
Minutes of Extraordinary General Meeting, March 27, 1958
(FMC 0013294).

7 7 4 Fo r d -We r ke Records, S u m m a ry of Payments in favor of
Schmidt, November 15,1962 (FW 0004275).

unsigned report titled "Notes on Germany" states,
"Everybody, including Dr. Hauss [the new chairman of
Fo r d -We r ke 's board of dire c t o r s , as of December
1947], still thinks that Robert Schmidt is the most
capable man that has ever been associated with the
German Ford organization. While he was widely
criticized for having been pro-Nazi, our Managers in
Holland and Belgium state categorically that this was
not so and that on the contrary his attitude during the
war had been extremely correct � The main obstacle to
his return to the company seems to be that Vitger is
flatly opposed to his coming back and has categorically
declared his unwillingness to work with him." A
handwritten comment on the report says," Why not see
h i m ," with a notation of his address and phone
number. 768

In January 1950, Schmidt returned to Ford-Werke as
technical adviser. 769 The move had Dearborn's support:
In a re p o rt pre p a red on Ja nu a ry 24, 1 9 5 0 , Fo r d
International executive A. J. Wieland heralded Schmidt's

return as an expedient solution to some of Ford-Werke's
most pressing problems, including the need to
improve quality, decrease cost and bring down material
handling expenses. Wieland concluded, "I would say
that the organization is not very strong but that with
R. H. Schmidt carrying the technical direction of the
plant we have time for a further study to determine
how to increase the effectiveness of the organization
generally." 770

Schmidt and Vitger retired from their positions on
the management board at Ford-Werke in 1958. 771 They
were each given a generous compensation package,
including a two-year consulting agreement, a pension,
an expense allowance and annuity pay m e n t s. I n
addition, both Vitger 772 and Schmidt were elected as
members of the board of dire c t o r s. 7 7 3 S ch m i d t
continued to serve on the board of directors and as a
consultant until his death in a car accident on October
24, 1962. 774 130
130 Page 131 132
105
7 7 5 Ford-Werke Records, Claim for Loss of or Damage to Property
Sustained by Fo r d -We r ke During Wa rt i m e, no date (FW
0004746).

7 7 6 WNRC, Acc. 299-68A-0243, Box 536, File W17536. Ford-Werke
to Regierungspr�sident -Cologne, December 16, 1942;
(DOJ 0010980-0010981; for English translation, see DOJ
0010982).

7 7 7 FMC, AR 75-62-616, Box 72, File: Ford-Werke Decontrol 1945-
1947, Draft Inventory of War Damages to Ford-Werke, no date
(FMC 0005797).

7 7 8 NARA, RG 84, Entry 3126, Box 76, Memo on visit to Portugal
of the manager of the Ford Motor Company plant at Cologne,
Germany, June 9, 1943 (NARA 0003830-0003832). This
document is a U. S. Department of State -Foreign Service
debriefing of Schmidt's Portuguese contacts, G. Nadal and O.
Margues, who were co-managers of Ford Lusitana, Lisbon.
Schmidt said he wondered whether the plant was purposely left
undamaged.

7 7 9 Ford-Werke Records, Vitger to Albert, August 19, 1944 (FW
0002370).

S e c t i o n 1 1
WA R D A M A G E T O F O R D -W E R K E

11.1. Damage Between 1939 and
Autumn 1944

Between 1939 and the autumn of 1944, the Ford-Werke
facility in Cologne received only superficial
damage, even though Allied bombing raids destroyed
much of the rest of the city. According to a postwar
report, Ford-Werke suffered its first air raid damage
during the night of May 30-31, 1942. 775 Damages from
that night were included in an itemized war damages
claim Ford-Werke submitted to the highest official of
the Administrative District in Cologne on December 16,
1942, listing RM 419,622.09 in repair costs and
damage to vehicles, parts, material and buildings from
April through September 1942, with most of the
damage listed as having occurred on May 31. The list
included repairs for damage to the tarred roofs of office
huts and to the glass roof and steel structure of the new
assembly shop from the fallback of German anti-aircraft

" s p l i n t e r s " (most like ly a term for shrap n e l ) . 7 7 6
However, most of the damage suffered by Ford-Werke
in the early years of the war was to spare parts stored in
warehouses outside the main plant and to materials in
transit from suppliers, according to a draft inventory of
d a m ages pre p a red sometime after March 1945. 7 7 7
During a visit to Ford's Portuguese operations in June
1943, Robert Schmidt reported that despite the serious
devastation in Cologne caused by Allied bombings, the
Ford-Werke plant had not been directly hit or otherwise
damaged. 778

11.2. Damage Between Autumn 1944
and March 1945

According to a letter from Erhard Vitger to Heinrich
Albert, the main plant was damaged by two bombs on
August 19, 1944, with damage mostly limited to
broken glass. 779 U. S. Army Air Forces records indicate
that Ford-Werke was specifically targeted several weeks 131
131 Page 132 133
106
R e s e a r c h F i n d i n g s A b o u t Fo r d -We r k e U n d e r t h e Na z i R e g i m e
7 8 0 Air Force Historical Office, Bolling Air Force Base, Microfilm
R8808, Air Force Target Documentation Forms, September 27,
1944-October 18,1944 (HAI 0000005-0000012).

7 8 1 NARA, RG 243, Entry 6, Box 687, File: Ford Cologne, Report on
Air Raid History, no date (NARA 0003249). Author Karola Fings writes that bombs largely missed the main plant, falling

on the forced labor camp and killing an unknown number of people. See Karola Fings, M e s s e l ager K�ln. Ein KZ-Au�enlager im
Z e n t rum der Stadt (K�ln: 1996), p. 154.
7 8 2 WNRC, Acc. 299-68A-0243, Box 536, Book 5 �I. ae, Tauchert
and Koenig to Scheuffgen, October 5, 1951 (DOJ 000318); FMC, AR 75-62-616, Box 72, File: Ford-Werke Decontrol 1945-

1947, Draft Inventory of War Damages to Ford-Werke, no date (FMC 0005798).

7 8 3 WNRC, Acc. 299-68A-0243, Box 536, File Reports -Financial,
Campbell to Monaghan and Attachment 2a-2, June 10, 1965 (DOJ 0010832 and 0010850); FMC, AR-75-62-616, Box 79,

Custodian Report (FMC 0000992-0000994); FMC, AR 75-62-617, Box 11, File: Cologne 1936-1947, Balance Sheet for June
30, 1946 (FMC 0008398).
7 8 4 NARA, RG 260, Economics Division, Industry Branch, Box 37,
Reel 39.3, C. I. O. S. Target Report 19/ 8 on visit to Ford-Cologne-Niehl March 10,1945, document date March 23,1945,( NARA

0005651-0005653); NARA, RG 243, Entry 6, Box 687, File: 77a19 2 of 3, Arnoldy to Hoglund, March 23, 1945 (NARA
0004498); RG 407, Entry 427, Box 15071, File: 603-2.13 Civilian interrogation of Ford factory, March 11, 1945 (NARA
0005309).
7 8 5 Weinman, Das nationalsozialistische Lage r s y s t e m , p. 407; FMC, AR-98-
213546, Box 2, File: History of Plant -All Aspects, 1925-1946, Vitger Report, September 24, 1946 (FMC 0002129-

0002131); NARA, RG 243, Entry 6, Box 687, File: 77a17, Intelligence Report No. EW-KO 12, March 18 and 19, 1945
(NARA 0004549-0004550); FMC, AR-75-62-616, Box 79, Custodian Report (FMC 0001036-0001038); ELDE, Z10.633,
Oral history of T. N., September 12, 1996 (ELDE 0000233-0 0 0 0 2 5 5 ; for English translat i o n , see ELDE 0000553-0000554);
ELDE, Z10.623, Oral history of A. O., September 13, 1996 (ELDE 0000474-0000497; for English translation, see
ELDE 0000602-0000604).

7 8 6 NARA, RG 243, Entry 6, Box 687, File: 77a19 2 of 3, Arnoldy
to Hoglund, March 23, 1945 (NARA 0004497); Billstein and
Illner, " You are now in Colog n e. C o m p l i m e n t s." p. 186. See also HFM,
Acc. 880, Box 7, File: Germany, Interview with Erhard Vitger,
July 15, 1960 (HFM 0000887).

7 8 7 NARA, RG 407, Entry 427, Box 123732, File: 382-2.2, G-2
Daily Messages, April 5 and 10, 1945 (NARA 0005292-
0005294).

7 8 8 NARA, RG 260, Economics Division, Industry Branch, Box 37,
Reel 39.3, C. I. O. S. Target Report 19/ 8 on visit to Ford-Cologne-Niehl
March 10, 1945 document date March 23, 1945 (NARA
0005651-0005656). Other reports agree; see, for example,
NARA, RG 338, Entry 42389, Box 3, File: 15th Daily Reports 9
Mar-12 May '45, Detachment E1H2 Daily Report No. 3, March
12, 1945 (NARA 0004880-0004881); and NARA, RG 243,
Entry 6, Box 687, File: 77a19 2 of 3, Arnoldy to Hoglund,
March 23, 1945 (NARA 0004497).

7 8 9 NARA, RG 407, Box 15063, File: 603-2.1 Q2 Production
Reports 2-4/ 1945, G-2 Periodic Report, March 6,1945 (NARA
0005322).

plant. 784 Ford-Werke established a camp of 500 people
at a former spinning mill site in another town and
evacuated some workers, including foreign laborers, by
truck at night. 785 As the fighting intensified, American
troops on the west bank of the Rhine exchanged fire
with the retreating German troops on the east bank. 786
The 82nd Airborne Division reported that the plant was
"plastered with artillery fire" and that a German flak
wagon fired 15 rounds of shells on the plant, setting it
on fire. 787 However, when representatives of the U. S.
military government visited Ford-Werke on March 10
and 11, 1945, they found that despite considerable
superficial damage from the bombs and shells, the plant
was structurally sound � in "excellent condition." 788

11.3. Postwar Assessment of Damages
The initial impression of the U. S. military was that
Fo r d -We r ke had been abandoned and was " b a d ly
shattered." 789 An American who had served as a
technical adviser to Ford of France had a similar
reaction when he arrived at Ford-Werke on a U. S. Army
mission: "My first visit � left me with the impression
that the plant was badly destroyed." But when he
re t u rned the fo l l owing day and made an actual
investigation, he "found very little damage had been
caused by actual bombing or shelling . . . The biggest
damage was done by the rains and weather, because
nearly all of the windows in both roof and sides were

later, on October 2 and 18, 1944. 780 According to the
records of the U. S. Strategic Bombing Survey, damage
from the October 18 raid centered on the proving
grounds and labor camp area. 781 A postwar Ford-Werke
departmental communication mentions the destruction
of six "accommodation huts" in 1943 or 1944. A
report prepared sometime after March 1945 estimates
the amount of damage done by the October raids to be
approximately RM 1,175,000. 782 (See Section 7.6.6. for
information on worker casualties.)

In early March 1945, the plant became part of the
f ront lines. A rt i l l e ry shells destroyed the plant's
recreation hall and some shed buildings, while wooden
office buildings and the garage caught fire. 783 Some
equipment and records had been moved out of the 132
132 Page 133 134
107
Wa r D a ma g e t o Fo r d -We rk e
7 9 0 HFM, Acc. 507, Box 17, File: Cologne, Visit to Cologne Plant
around April 20th by Frank Cort (HFM 0001033). See also
Wilkins and Hill, American Business A b r o a d , p. 341.

7 9 1 NARA, RG 260, Economics Division, Industry Branch, Box. 37,
Reel 39.3, C. I. O. S. Target Report 19/ 8 on visit to Ford-Cologne-Niehl
March 10,1945, document date March 23,1945 (NARA
0005651-0005656).

7 9 2 F M C, A R -7 5 -6 2 -6 1 6 , B ox 79, Custodian Report (FMC
0000992).
7 9 3 FMC, AR 75-62-616, Box 72, File: Ford-Werke Decontrol 1945-
1947, Draft Inventory of War Damages to Ford-Werke, no date
(FMC 0005797-0005798).

7 9 4 FMC, AR-98-213541, Box 131, Perry Report, September 19,
1946 (FMC 0000915).

7 9 5 FMC, AR-98-213541, Box 131, Perry Report, September 19,
1946 (FMC 0000916-0000918). The report points out that the
intended dispersal of all the equipment was not finished due to
the "intensification of the war."

7 9 6 Rosellen, Fo r d -S c h r i t t e , pp. 17-18.

7 9 7 Ford-Werke Records, Lanfer to Ford-Werke, January 2, 1967
(FW 0005951-0005952); HP, Acc. 61-000417, Box 1, German
War Recovery Study, 1950, pp. 78-81 (HP 0000266-0000269);
WNRC, Acc. 299-68A-0243, Box 540, Affidavit of Guckel,
Ja nu a ry 7, 1967 (DOJ 0010651-0010655); F M C, A R -9 8 -213541,
Box 52, File: Audit Report -July 28,1949, Hibberson-Platt
Report, July 28, 1949, and August 1949 (FMC 0000830-
0 0 0 0 8 3 1 ) . In November 1940, the German gove rn m e n t
enacted a law permitting companies to file claims fo r
reimbursement of direct losses suffered in Germany as a result
of the war.

7 9 8 The 1946 financial records re p o rt a fi g u re of
RM 11,929,802.78; see Ford-Werke Records, Financial Ledger,
December 1944-December 1946, M o n t h ly Stat e m e n t ,
December 31, 1946 (FW 0007939). A 1947 audit reports a
figure of RM 12,154,982.41; see FMC, AR-75-63-430, Box 90,
F i l e : Fo r d -We r ke Finance 1946-1947, Audit Report by
Knipprath for 1947 (FMC 0016915).

shattered." 790 When members of a combined U. S. and
B ritish intelligence team visited the plant, t h ey
discovered that the main building had suffered little
structural damage. The blast from bombs and shells
caused extensive superficial damage, and hardly any
glass remained intact. No gas, electricity or water was
available, which made an investigation difficult. One
large building housing stores and offices had been
gutted. 791

The postwar custodian, Erhard Vitger, suggested in a
report that most of the damage, which he attributed to
artillery fire, was done to less crucial buildings � sheds
w h i ch housed the Receiving Depart m e n t , t h e
Experimental Department, the Laboratory and repair
s h o p s. A d d i t i o n a l ly, Vi t g e r 's re p o rt called for the
replacement of the damaged "Garage." The recreation
h a l l , wooden office buildings and 12,000 square
meters (129,167 square feet) of the "wooden buildings
(formerly used as foreigner camp)" were described as
destroyed by artillery fire. 792

According to a postwar inventory of the plant, the
fighting around the plant during the push through
Cologne "caused damage to bu i l d i n g s , fa c t o ry
equipment, fixtures, cables, and materials, etc., stored
in the fa c t o ry in the amount of ab o u t
RM 3,000,000." 793 This figure is supported by an
inventory report prepared for Ford Motor Company by

the Office of Lord Percival Perry, who had served on
Ford-Werke's board of directors before the war. Lord
Perry's report, written in September 1946, stressed that
"damage to the main factory by artillery and mortar fire
towards the end of the war, proved to be extensive but
superficial." 794

Since mu ch of the plant equipment had been
dispersed before the air raids in October 1944, little of
the fa c t o ry mach i n e ry was destroyed during the
fighting. The initial dispersal costs were covered by
RM 8,000,000 Ford-Werke received from the German
government. (See Section 6.8. for more information on
dispersal.) According to Lord Perry's 1946 report, this
payment also was used to finance the reinstallation of
the machinery after the cessation of hostilities in the
Cologne area. 795 Critical production parts were stored
on river barges, most of which sank during the Allied
advance. After the war, U. S. forces helped to raise the
barges and salvage some of the materials. 796

11.4. War Damage Claims
During the early years of the war, the German
government allowed firms to claim compensation for
damage inflicted during Allied bombing raids. Like
many other firms damaged during the war, Ford-Werke
chose to submit claims to the local war damages
offices. 797 Postwar reports differ slightly as to the exact
total of the wartime claims made by Ford-Werke, but
most sources place the figure at approximately RM 12
million. 798 According to records from the city of 133
133 Page 134 135
108
R e s e a r c h F i n d i n g s A b o u t Fo r d -We r k e U n d e r t h e Na z i R e g i m e
7 9 9 Ford-Werke Records, Lanfer to Ford-Werke, January 2, 1967
(FW 0005951-0005952); WNRC, Acc. 299-68A-0243, Box
540, Affidavit of Paul Guckel, January 7, 1967 (DOJ 0010651-
0010655). The 1946 financial records indicate that only
RM 333,437 (approximately $133,000) was received; see
Fo r d -We r ke Records, Financial Ledger, December 1944-December
1946, Monthly Statement, December 31,1946 (FW
0007940) and FMC, A R -8 3 -6 9 -8 8 3 , B ox 1, F i l e :
Correspondence 1955-1960, Campbell to Frank, November 17,
1955 (FMC 0014471). Guckel explained the discrepancy as
consisting of "other 1941 and 1942 amounts receipt of which
has not been traced." See Ford-Werke Records, Guckel to
Hammond, January 3, 1967 (FW 0005948-0005949).

8 0 0 WNRC, Acc. 299-68A-0243, Box 540, Affidavit of Paul Guckel,
January 7, 1967 (DOJ 0010651-0010655).

8 0 1 WNRC, Acc. 299-68A-0243, Box 536, File W17536, Albert to
Reich Commissioner, January 20, 1943 (DOJ 0010985; for
partial English translation, see DOJ 0010986); Ford-Werke
Records, Memo from Schmidt on Business Report, July 27,
1944 (FW 0000148-0000149); B A -L , R 87/ 6209, Au d i t
Report by Knipprath for 1941 (BAL 7497). This mortgage was
actually a refinanced version of a previous loan for RM 8
million from Deutsche Industriebank and Deutsche Bank that
had appeared on Ford-Werke's balance sheets in 1941.To meet
the government's demand for surety, the balance of RM 6.8
million was transformed from a loan on credit into a mortgage,
or "land encumbrance," for which land owned by Ford-Werke
was used as collateral.

8 0 2 WNRC, Acc. 299-68A-0243, Box 536, File W17536, Advisory
Board Meeting Minutes, July 1,1943 (DOJ 0011105-0011106;
for English translation, see DOJ 0011231-0011232); Ford-Werke
Records, Financial Ledger, January 1942-September
1944, Balance Report, February 28, 1943 (FW 0007556).
Neither wartime nor postwar financial records report that the
company received any war damage funds from the German
government after 1942; see Ford-Werke Records, Financial
L e d g e r, Ja nu a ry 1942-September 1944 (FW 0007011-
0 0 0 7 8 9 0 ) ; and FMC, A R -7 5 -6 3 -4 3 0 , B ox 90, F i l e : Au d i t
Reports 1946-1947, Audit Report by Knipprath for 1946 (FMC
0016957). The loan appears on the July 1944 balance sheet but
does not appear in August 1944; see Ford-Werke Records,
Balance Report, July 31, 1944 (FW 0007068) and Balance
Report, August 31,1944 (FW 0007020-0007049).

8 0 3 An amendment to the War Claims Act of 1948 � Public Law 87-
846, signed on October 22, 1962 � allowed claims to be
accepted for losses incurred by American interests in Germany
or other countries during the war. See FMC, AR 68-899, Box 8,
File: Germany War Damage Claim Book (1969), Krause to
Campbell, February 5, 1963 (FMC 0010381-0010385).

8 0 4 FMC, AR-83-69-883, Box 1, File: Hungary, Final Decision in the
Matter of the Claim of Ford Motor Company Against the
G ove rnment of Hungary, J u ly 7, 1959 (FMC 0014242-0014243);
Wilkins and Hill, American Business A b r o a d , pp. 348-
349. After the war, the Russians seized a 43 percent share of
Ford of Hungary. In 1948, the Hungarian gove rn m e n t
nationalized the company.

8 0 5 FMC, AR-83-69-883, Box 1, War Damage Claims -Roumania
and Hungary, Duncan to Shalvoy, September 2, 1960 (FMC
0 0 1 4 4 7 7 ) , Campbell to Shalvoy, October 6, 1960 (FMC
0014476). An October 1960 internal memo from a Ford
attorney regarding the Romanian claim stated: "Check in the
amount of $2,405.49 may exhaust the funds now available in
the claims fund." Research to date has not confirmed the dates
or total amounts received.

the U. S. government for war damages at several of its
European subsidiaries in accordance with the War
Claims Act of 1948. 803 On July 17, 1959, the Foreign
Claims Settlement Commission awarded Fo r d
$377,508 for war losses and damage to Ford of
Hungary. 804 On the same day, the commission awarded
Ford $370,414 for war losses and damage to Ford of
Romania, although it is unclear how much of the award
was actually paid. 805 (These were separate from the
earlier postwar claims made to the U. S. and British
military governments and the British occupation forces
in Germany. See Section 10.3.)

In the 1960s, the U. S. government implemented a
war damages claim program that allowed Ford to
submit war damage claims to the U. S. government on
behalf of Ford-Werke. The U. S. claims were not allowed
to cover damages already compensated by the German

Cologne, Ford-Werke received a total of RM 361,181
from these war damages claims submitted in 1941 and
1942. 799

In 1942, the German government prohibited war
damage claims by companies with 25 percent or
greater foreign ownership. 800 In order to preserve its
right to war damage compensat i o n , Fo r d -We r ke
e n t e red into an ag reement with the Germ a n
government in March 1943. Under the terms of the
agreement, the German government allowed Ford-Werke
to continue filing claims for compensation,
despite American majority ownership of the firm's
stock. In return, Ford-Werke offered its property as
collateral in the form of a mortgage in the amount of
RM 6.8 million. 801 However, Ford-Werke's agreement
with the government stipulated that government funds
were to be used only if Ford-Werke was unable to
afford the repairs on its own. There is no indication
that Ford-Werke made use of any German government
funding to repair damages during the last years of the
war. By August 1944, Ford-Werke had repaid the
loan. 802

After the war, Ford Motor Company filed claims with 134
134 Page 135 136
government. 806 In 1965, Ford submitted a claim to the
commission for $7,050,052 in war losses and damage
to Ford-Werke and Ford-Werke subsidiaries in Austria.
The damage amount listed on the claim form totaled
$12,461,427. Of this amount, Ford asked to be
reimbursed $7,050,052, which represented 56.575
percent of the total and was based on Ford's ownership
of 56.575 percent of Ford-Werke. (See Appendix E.) 807
The commission reviewed the Ford claim and reduced
it to $522,526 (after deducting tax benefits resulting
from the losses) on grounds that some of the claims or
claim amounts listed by Ford were not compensable
under the terms and conditions of the law. 808 On April

5 , 1 9 6 7 , after a lengthy ev i d e n t i a ry and ap p e a l s
process, the commission agreed to increase the amount,
and awarded $785,321 to Ford for its share of
allowable losses sustained by Ford-Werke and Ford of
Austria during the war. 809 The money was to be paid
by the U. S. Department of the Treasury from the War
Claims Fund. At the time the award was made, the
commission estimated there was enough money in the
fund to permit distribution of 80 to 90 percent of the
money to claimants, although it was not determined
whether payment would be made in 1967 or later. 810
Research to date has not confirmed when or how much
of the award was paid.

109

Wa r D a ma g e t o Fo r d -We rk e
8 0 6 WNRC, Acc. 299-68A-0243, Box 536, File W17536, Foreign
Claims Settlement Commission Final Decision No. W-18559,
April 5, 1967 (DOJ 0010667-0010674).

8 0 7 WNRC, Acc. 299-68A-0243, Box 540, File: Claim of Ford
Motor Company, Campbell to Fo reign Claims Settlement
Commission, January 14,1965 (DOJ 0010550-0010554). The
damage claim was broken down into individual categories,
including destruction of or damage to buildings ($ 1,006,416);
loss and/ or damage to machinery and/ or materials (inside
Ford-Werke, $417,056; in outside storage areas, $3,479,971;
and in transit from suppliers, $224,399); and claims for
materials supplied to German military and civil authorities for
which payment was not received ($ 5,339,964). Of the amount
claimed for "buildings destroyed," about 45 percent was for
Ford of Austria. Of the amount listed under "other losses,"
about 17.6 percent was for Ford of Austria.

8 0 8 WNRC, Acc. 299-68A-0243, Box 536, File W17536, Foreign
Claim Settlement Commission Proposed Decision No. W-18559,
November 23, 1966 (DOJ 0010741-0010753). The
commission initially disallowed or reduced certain claims on
grounds that the expenses did not conform to the requirements
or time periods specified in the law. Examples of disallowed or
reduced claims include wages paid during aid raids, freight
costs for merchandise destroyed in transit, and property losses
based on postwar replacement costs, rather than value at the
time of the loss.

8 0 9 WNRC, Acc. 299-68A-0243, Box 536, File W17536, Foreign
Claims Settlement Commission Final Decision No. W-18559,
A p ril 5, 1967 (DOJ 0010667-0010674), Memo fro m
Monaghan to McGuire, March 23,1967 (DOJ 0010678).

8 1 0 FMC, AR-98-213541, Box 43, File: War Claim, Germany,
Executive Communication to Henry Ford II and Miller, April 21,
1967 (FMC 0006140). 135
135 Page 136 137
110
R e s e a r c h F i n d i n g s Ab o u t Fo r d -We r k e U n d e r t h e Na z i R e g i m e 136
136 Page 137 138
111
8 1 1 Overy, War and Economy in the Third Reich, p. 6.
8 1 2 HFM, Acc. 572, Box 16, File: Germany 1930s, Business Report
for 1933 (HFM 0006407).

8 1 3 Coopers & Lybrand Records, Ly b r a n d , Ross Bro s. &
Montgomery to Henry Ford II, March 19,1948 (CL1 0000316-
0000318); HFM, Acc. 713, Box 11, File: Corporate Structure-European
Operations, Preliminary Report, February 20, 1948
(HFM 0002645-0002647); FMC, AR-98-213546, Box 2, File:
History of Plant -All Aspects, 1925-1946, Vitger Report,
September 24,1946 (FMC 0001966).

8 1 4 HFM, Acc. 572, Box 16, File: Germany 1930s, Business Report
for 1935 (HFM 0006295), Business Report for 1936 (HFM
0006309).

8 1 5 NARA, RG 407, Entry 368B, Box 1032, Schneider Report,
Exhibit 54, Memo by Schmidt on rubber and raw material
agreement, August 3, 1945 (NARA 0000157), Exhibit 65,
Memo by Schmidt on rubber deal closed in June 1936, August
3, 1945, (NARA 0000194).

8 1 6 FMC, AR-75-63-430, Box 90, File: Ford-Werke Finance 1938-
1948, Business Report for 1938 (FMC 0017016-0017017);
NARA, RG 407, Entry 368B, Box 1032, File: Ford-Werke AG,
GED Report, February 1946 (NARA 0001566).

8 1 7 HFM, Acc. 572, Box 16, File: Germany 1930s, Business Report
for 1933 -Balance Sheet, December 31, 1933 (HFM 0006411
and HFM 0006415); FMC, AR-75-63-430, Box 90, File: Ford-Werke
Finance 1938-1948, Business Report for 1938 -Balance
Sheet, December 31,1938 (FMC 0017024 and FMC 0017027).

S e c t i o n 1 2
F I N A N C I A L O V E R V I E W
O F F O R D -W E R K E

along with foreign exchange limitations experienced in
Germany at the time, made production difficult. 814
However, raw materials agreements beginning in 1936
a l l owed Fo r d -We r ke to continue production by
obtaining materials through Ford Motor Company. 815
By the late 1930s, economic growth resulted in a rising
demand for vehicles, and Ford-Werke expanded its
capacity and increased its investment in machines and
equipment, making the company the fourth leading
vehicle manufacturer in terms of passenger car sales in
Germany. 816 Total assets grew 69 percent in this period,
from RM 25,805,407 in 1933 to RM 43,543,533 in
1938 (from $7,875,268 to $17,488,781). Net income
was RM 1,698, 690 ($ 518, 405) in 1933, a n d
RM 913,359 ($ 366,840) in 1938. 817

By 1940, government regulations prohibited new

12.1. Brief Financial History
From the time of its incorporation in 1925, Ford-Werke
experienced periods of prosperity as well as
instability as a result of management decisions and the
prevailing economic and political environments. The
period from 1933 to 1938 marked the beginning of
the era in Germany when demand for cars increased. 811
Consumers demanded smaller vehicles, prompted by
the dire circumstances created by the Great Depression.
In 1933, Ford-Werke completed a major upgrade of its
machinery to facilitate the manufacturing of a new line
of vehicles to meet this demand. 812 During this same
period, Ford-Werke's earnings deficit grew to almost
RM 9,000,000, which forced Ford-Werke to reorganize
and change its capital structure in 1934. 813 By 1935,
Fo r d -We r ke had begun an ag g re s s i ve export i n g
program around the world. Raw material shortages, 137
137 Page 138 139
112
R e s e a r c h F i n d i n g s A b o u t Fo r d -We r k e U n d e r t h e Na z i R e g i m e
8 1 8 FMC, AR-75-63-430, Box 90, File: Ford-Werke Finance 1938-
1948, Business Report for 1939 -Balance Sheet, December 31,
1939 (FMC 0017070), Profit and Loss Account for 1939 (FMC
0017073); FMC, AR-65-1500, Box 6, File: Ford-Werke No. 3,
Business Report for 1944, 1 9 4 5 , 1946 -Balance Sheet,
December 31, 1945 (FMC 0003800); FMC, AR-98-213541,
Box 131, Perry Report, September 19, 1946 (FMC 0000917-
0000918).

8 1 9 FMC, AR-98-213541, Box 131, Perry Report, September 19,
1946 (FMC 0000921-0000924). Production had peaked in
1938 at 33,730 vehicles, according to FMC, AR-98-213541,
Box 131, Palumbo, Survey of German Motor Vehicle Industr y,
April 15,1948 (FMC 0000906).

8 2 0 FMC, AR-65-1500, Box 6, File: Ford-Werke No. 3, Business
Report for 1944, 1945, 1946 -Balance Sheet, December 31,
1945 (FMC 0003808); FMC, AR-75-62-616, Box 55, File:
Ford-Werke Business Report for Annual Report -1953, Balance
Sheet for 1953 (FMC 0016021), Profit and Loss Account for
1953 (FMC 0016022); FMC, AR-75-63-430, Box 90, File:
Ford-Werke Finance 1949-1953, Business Report for 1951
(FMC 0016886-0016887).

8 2 1 FMC, AR-75-63-430, Box 90, File: Ford Werke Finance 1938-
1948, Business Report for 1938 (FMC 0017023), Business
Report for 1939 (FMC 0017069); FMC, AR-98-213546, Box 2,
File: History of Plant -All Aspects, 1925-1946, Vitger Report,
September 24,1946 (FMC 0001974).

8 2 2 FMC, AR-98-213546, Box 2, File: History of Plant -All Aspects,
1 9 2 5 -1 9 4 6 , Vitger Report , September 24, 1946 (FMC
0001966); FMC, AR-75-62-617, Box 11, File: Cologne 1936-
1947/ Copenhagen 1919-1925, Depreciation 1940-1941 (FMC
0008436); FMC, AR-75-63-430, Box 90, File: Ford-Werke
Finance 1938-1948, Business Report for 1939 (FMC 0017068-
0 0 1 7 0 7 4 ) , Business Report for 1940 (FMC 0017008-
0017014), Balance Sheet and Profit and Loss Statement for
1941 (FMC 0017039), Balance Sheets for 1942 (FMC
0017041), 1943 (FMC 0017030) and 1945 (FMC 0017036-
0017037); FMC, AR-65-1500, Box 6, File: Ford-Werke No. 3,
Business Report for 1944, 1 9 4 5 , 1946 (FMC 0003790-
0003801); BA-L, R 87/ 6209, File: Ford-Werke Cologne Vol. 5,
Audit Report by Knipprath for 1941 (BAL 7481); BA-L, R
8135/ 7393, File: Report of the Economic Auditor Department,
Audit Report by Knipprath for 1942 (BAL 3281).

passenger car production, and Ford-Werke converted to
truck production to supply vehicles to the German
government. Sales rose every year from 1940 through
1943, but fell in 1944 and 1945 in the turmoil that
accompanied the end of the war. In addition to taxes
imposed by the Nazi regime, and a wide array of
government controls on production and prices both
before and during the war, balance sheets and results of
operations also were affected by war damages and other
costs associated with the conflict. Ford-Werke's total
assets grew from RM 60, 470, 956 in 1939 to
R M 68, 859, 397 in 1945. Net income wa s
R M 1,287, 876 in 1939, and net loss wa s
RM 3,433,091 in 1945. 818 (See Section 12.2. for more
detail on impact on assets, and see Section 12.3. for
more information on the effect on income.)

Immediately after the war, each of the occupied
zones was allotted production quotas by the military
occupation governments. Ford-Werke was granted the
largest quota of steel in German industry in 1946 and
the largest production quota in the German automotive
industry at that time. Ford-Werke was given preference
in quota assignments due to its speedy reorganization.
Despite the favorable allocations, sales and production
in 1946 were constrained by shortages of supplies. 819

In the early 1950s, postwar consumer demand was
exceeding capacity, and significant investments were
made to increase the productive capability of the facility
and reduce per-vehicle costs. Within two years, Ford-

Werke was experiencing increases in production and
lower per-vehicle costs. Ford-Werke's total assets were
RM 70,092,054 in 1946, and DM 102,575,719 in
1953. (In 1948, the currency was converted from
Reichsmarks to Deutsche Marks. See Section 12.2.)
Net income was RM 650, 935 in 1946, a n d
DM 689,907 in 1953. 820

12.2. Balance Sheet Information
Ford-Werke's assets and liabilities as reported in the
financial statements for the periods ending 1939,
1945, June 20 and 21, 1948, (before and after the
currency conversion from Reichsmarks to Deutsche
Marks) and 1953 are presented in Appendix F, Ford-Werke
Balance Sheets. Assets generally increase when
capital is invested in a company, either through loans or
i nvested earn i n g s , in order to meet pro d u c t i o n
demands. In Ford-Werke's case, assets increased in
1939 as a result of loans from banks. 821 In 1941, Fo r d -We
r ke re c e i ved RM 12 million from a stock offe ri n g
t h at was used to finance working capital needs and
additional increases in pro p e rt y, plant and equipment.
These assets we re depre c i ated at accelerated rates duri n g
the wa r, reducing income accordingly. 8 2 2

The currency devaluation that took place after the
war is of significance and is an issue to be considered
in reviewing Ford-Werke balance sheets. Shortly before
and during the wa r, G e rman financial authori t i e s
printed a large number of bank notes to ease payments
for supplies. As a result, paper money in circulation 138
138 Page 139 140
113
F i n a n c i a l Ov e r v i e w o f Fo r d -We rk e
8 2 3 FMC, AR-65-71, Box 25, File: International 1947 #1, Vitger to
Roberge, June 19, 1947 (FMC 0000069-0000071).
8 2 4 FMC, AR-65-71, Box 25, File: International 1947 #1, Vitger to
Roberge, June 19, 1947 (FMC 0000069-0000071); FMC, AR-98-
213541, Box 52, File: Audit Report -July 28, 1949,
Hibberson-Platt Report, July 28, 1949, and August 1949 (FMC
0000796-0000798).

8 2 5 FMC, AR-75-63-430, Box 90, File: Germany Audit Reports
1948-1949, Audit Report by Knipprath for 1948 as of June 20,
1948 (FMC 0006720-0006721), Audit Report by Knipprath on
Deutsche Mark Opening Balance Sheet, June 21, 1948 (FMC
0001228-0001229).

8 2 6 FMC, AR-75-63-430, Box 90, File: Germany Audit Reports
1950, Audit Report by Knipprath for 1950 (FMC 0001284),
File: Ford-Werke Finance 1938-1948, Business Report for 1950

(FMC 0017048); FMC, AR-98-213546, Small Accessions Box 2,
File: Report 1950s (A-K), Vitger to Andrews, April 30, 1957
(FMC 0002375).

8 2 7 FMC, AR-98-213546, Small Accessions Box 2, File: Report
1950s (A-K), Vitger to A n d rew s , A p ril 30, 1957 (FMC
0002375); FMC, AR-75-63-430, Box 90, File: Ford-Werke
Finance 1949-1953, Business Report for 1951 (FMC 0016886-
0016887).

8 2 8 FMC, AR-75-62-616, Box 55, File: Ford-Werke Business Report
for Annual Report -1953, Business Report for 1953 (FMC
0016001; for English translation, see FMC 0016015).

8 2 9 FMC, AR-75-63-430, Box 90, File: Ford-Werke Finance 1946-
1947, Audit Report by Knipprath for 1947 (FMC 0016927).

increased 18 times the normally required amount.
Additionally, nearly all financial institutions (i. e., banks
and insurance companies) were required to invest their
money in government bonds and/ or securities. With
the collapse of the Nazi regime, these bonds and
s e c u rities we re re n d e red essentially wo rt h l e s s , a s
opposed to securities whose value was backed by assets
such as land, buildings or machinery. 823

In response to these difficulties, Allied military
authorities instituted a currency reform and related
devaluation in June 1948. Under the Law of Monetary
Reform, the German currency was converted from
Reichsmarks (RM) to Deutsche Marks (DM). German
companies had to devalue their monetary assets and
liabilities, but were allowed to revalue their inventories,
property, plants and equipment. As a result, Ford-We
r ke 's cash balances, accounts re c e i vable fro m
customers and amounts payable to suppliers, all of
which had increased significantly during the war, were
devalued by 90 percent or more, based on the amounts
at the time (June 1948). 824 Most buildings, machinery,
equipment and inventory balances were revalued at
higher amounts estimated to be their fair value at the
time, as allowed by the Law of Monetary Reform. The
net result of adjusting these accounts was a reduction in
reserves and other stockholder equity accounts. 825

In 1950, capital investments were made for the
p u rpose of expansion, m o d e rn i z ation and
reconstruction. There was an increase of DM 477,509
in the buildings account for expansions to the factory
building, the administration building, and the assembly
and storage halls. Also in 1950, repairs and

re c o n s t ruction from war damage we re completed.
Additions to machinery and equipment were also
attributable to factory modernization and equipment
u p g r a d e s. 8 2 6 In 1951, demand for Fo r d -We r ke 's
products exceeded plant capacity. To accommodate the
need for greater production capability, an assembly
facility, a machine hall, a store and distributing depot
were constructed. 827 In 1953, additions and transfers
totaling approximately DM 12 million were made in
property, plant and equipment to modernize the Ford-Werke
plant and to improve the buildings, machinery
and equipment to meet consumer demands. Due to the
expansion of the facility, the production of passenger
cars increased by 11 percent in 1953, and the total
production increased from 40,334 vehicles in 1952 to
44,009 vehicles in 1953. 828

12.3. Results of Operations/ Net Income
Presentation of the results of operations (i. e., profit
and loss, or income statement) in the publ i s h e d
financial statements that were found regarding Ford-Werke
varies significantly from current U. S. or German
standards. Many accounts were combined to report
only a "net" amount in the financial statements. Sales
(referred to as "turnover") were not always included in
the audited income statements of Fo r d -We r ke.
"Trading income" was a more prominent performance
measurement and was defined as sales less the cost of
operations. The cost of operations included materials,
m a nu fa c t u ring overhead and miscellaneous other
ch a rges that we re associated with pro d u c t i o n ,
excluding salaries and wages. 829

Net income (sales minus all expenses) was affected
by a wide array of taxes levied on corporations by the 139
139 Page 140 141
114
R e s e a r c h F i n d i n g s A b o u t Fo r d -We r k e U n d e r t h e Na z i R e g i m e
8 3 0 FMC, AR-98-213546, Box 2, File: History of Plant -All Aspects,
1 9 2 5 -1 9 4 6 , Vitger Report , September 24, 1946 (FMC
0002030-0002031 and 0002038).

8 3 1 HFM, Acc. 572, Box 16, File: Germany 1930s, Business Report
for 1933 (HFM 0006415), Business Report for 1935 (HFM
0006304); FMC, AR-98-213541, Box 131, Palumbo, Survey of
G e rman Motor Vehicle Industry, A p ril 15, 1948 (FMC
0000900).

8 3 2 HFM, Acc. 572, Box 16, File: Germany 1930s, Business Report
for 1937 (HFM 0006330); FMC, AR-75-63-430, Box 90, File:
Ford-Werke Finance 1938-1948, Business Report for 1938
(FMC 0017028), Business Report for 1939 (FMC 0017074);
FMC, AR-98-213541, Box 131, Palumbo, Survey of German
Motor Vehicle Industry, April 15, 1948 (FMC 0000900); FMC,
AR-98-213541, Box 40, File: Ford of Europe Chronology,
Information on Ford-Werke AG, circa 1986 (FMC 0005940).

8 3 3 These numbers represent net income after the subtraction of
reserves. Net income including the reserves was RM 1,213,359
in 1938 and RM 3,169,386 in 1943. See FMC, AR-75-63-430,
Box 90, File: Ford-Werke Finance 1938-1948, Business Report
for 1938 (FMC 0017027-0017028), Business Report for 1939
(FMC 0017073-0017074), Business Report for 1940 (FMC
0017011-0017012), Balance Sheet as at December 31, 1941
(FMC 0017039), Balance Sheet as at December 31, 1942 (FMC
0017041) and Balance Sheet and Profit and Loss Statement for
1943 (FMC 0017030).

8 3 4 Ford-Werke Records, Vitger to Albert, March 22, 1943 (FW
0002492).

8 3 5 FMC, AR 65-1500, Box 6, File: Ford-Werke No. 3, Business
Report for 1944, 1945, 1946 -Balance Sheet for 1944 (FMC 0003795-0003796); FMC, AR-75-63-430, Box 90, File: Ford-Werke

Finance 1938-1948, Balance Sheet for 1945 (FMC 0017033); FMC, AR-98-213541, Box 131, Palumbo, Survey of
G e rman Motor Vehicle Industry, A p ril 15, 1948 (FMC 0000883-0000909).

8 3 6 HFM, Acc. 572, Box 16, File: Germany 1930s, Business Report
for 1933 (HFM 0006414-0006415), Business Report for 1934 (HFM 0006428-0006429), Business Report for 1935 (HFM

0 0 0 6 3 0 3 -0 0 0 6 3 0 4 ) , Business Report for 1936 (HFM 0 0 0 6 3 1 6 -0 0 0 6 3 1 7 ) , Business Report for 1937 (HFM
0006329-0006330); FMC, AR-75-63-430, Box 90, File: Ford-Werke Finance 1938-1948, Business Report for 1938 (FMC
0 0 1 7 0 2 8 ) , Business Report for 1939 (FMC 0017073-0 0 1 7 0 7 4 ) , Business Report for 1940 (FMC 0017011-0017012),
Balance Sheet for 1941 (FMC 0017039), Balance Sheet for 1942 (FMC 0017041), Balance Sheet for 1943 (FMC
0017029-0017030), Balance Sheet for 1945 (FMC 0017036-0017037), Business Report for 1948 at June 20, 1948 -Profit
and Loss Account for 1948/ I (FMC 0006723-0006724); BA-L,

when it was RM 913,359, until 1943, when it reached
RM 2,169,386. 833 The work force was increasing
during much of this time period, while salaries and
wages as a percentage of sales remained relatively flat.
In a monthly balance sheet report to Heinrich Albert in
March 1943, Erhard Vitger noted that the ratio of
operating overhead to manufacturing wages could no
longer be compared with earlier figures because the
large proportion of foreigners in the work force had
changed the average hourly rate from approximately
RM 1.50 earlier to approximately RM 1.30. 834 (See
Section 7.5. for information on wages paid to foreign
and forced workers at Ford-Werke.) In 1945, trading
income rose to 51 percent of sales. However, a 2
percent of sales (approximate) net loss was recorded for
1944, and a 10 percent of sales (approximate) net loss
for 1945. The net loss amounts were RM 2,731,689 in
1944, and RM 3,433,091 in 1945. 835 These losses were
the result of extraordinary charges that included losses
from war damages, and amounts that were deemed not
collectible from the German government and from
other Ford subsidiaries.

Income fluctuation during the years 1933 through
1953 is shown on the following chart, Net Income and
Trading Income as a Percentage of Sales, Ford-Werke,
1933-1953. 836 (See Appendix G, Ford-Werke Results of
Operations, 1933-1953, for detailed income statements
for the period.)

German Reich between 1939 and 1945. In order to
reduce some of the tax burden, Ford-Werke set aside
allowable reserves, reducing income subject to taxes.
Government-imposed price and sales controls began in
1936 and were adjusted at various times thereafter. The
c o m b i n ation of taxes and controls affected sales,
trading income and production levels in the late 1930s
and throughout the war. 830 Between 1933 and 1935,
trading income rose from 21 percent of sales to 29
percent of sales as a result of increased sales and
production. 831 After price controls were enacted in
1936, trading income fell to 15 percent of sales in
1937 and 1938, and reached 16 percent of sales in
1939. Net income was approximately 1 percent of sales
during all four years. In 1938, Ford-Werke ranked
second in the production of trucks in Germany, and
third in passenger car production and exports. While
sales were at their highest levels, trading income and
net income as a percentage of sales were flat � again,
reflecting the effect of price controls. 832

Subsequent changes in taxes and controls, combined
with adjustments in production and other changes at
Ford-Werke, resulted in generally increased trading
income as a percentage of sales after 1939. Net income
reported by Ford-Werke grew every year from 1938, 140
140 Page 141 142
115
F i n a n c i a l O v e r v i e w o f Fo r d -We rk e
R 87/ 6209, File: Ford-Werke Cologne Vol. 5, Balance Sheet for 1941 (BAL 7515); BA-L, R 8135/ 7393, File: Report of the
Economic Auditor Department, Balance Sheet for 1942 (BAL 3309); FMC, AR-65-1500, Box 6, File: Ford-Werke No. 3,
Business Report for 1944,1945,1946 -Balance Sheets for 1944 and 1946 (FMC 0003795-0003796 and FMC 0003812-
0003813), Business Report for 1947 -Balance Sheet for 1947 (FMC 0003574-0003575), Business Report for 1948/ 49 -Balance
Sheet for 1948/ 49 (FMC 0003601-0003602); FMC, AR-75-63-430, Box 90, File: Ford-Werke Finance 1938-1948,
Business Report for 1950 (FMC 0017055), File: Ford-Werke Finance 1949-1953, Business Report for 1951 (FMC 0016894-
0016895), Translation of Business Report for 1952 (FMC 0016881); FMC, AR-75-62-616, Box 55, File: Ford-Werke
Business Report for Annual Report -1953, Profit and Loss Account for 1953 (FMC 0016022).

8 3 7 F M C, A R -7 5 -6 2 -6 1 6 , B ox 57, F i l e : I nvestments 1951-52,
Mellema to Edwa r d s , Ja nu a ry 25, 1952 (FMC 0003293-
0 0 0 3 3 0 6 ) ; F M C, A R -7 5 -6 2 -6 1 6 , B ox 23, F i l e : E u ro p e a n
Countries -Investment Ledger, Ford-Werke AG, no date (FMC
0000346-0000350); Coopers & Lybrand Records, Lybrand,
Ross Bros . & Montgomery to Henry Ford II, March 19, 1948
(CL1 0000311-0000321); H F M , A c c. 7 1 3 , B ox 11, F i l e :
Corporate Structure -European Operations, Preliminary Report,
February 20, 1948 (HFM 0002639-0002647); FMC, AR-75-
63-430, Box 91, File: Ford-Werke Finance Shares 1941-1949,
Report and Supplement on Development and Composition of
Fo r d -We r ke Share Cap i t a l , R e p o rt circa December 1945,
Supplement January 30, 1950 (FMC 0001502-0001524).

8 3 8 Public Laws, Ch. 619, October 12,1942, Sec. 156; FMC, AR-98-
213541, Box 131, File: Ford Germany Finance and Quotas,
Memo from Gornick to Bogdan, August 25, 1948 (FMC
0011573-0011574).

8 3 9 FMC, AR-65-92, Box 1, File: Annual Reports, Ford Motor
Company Annual Report for 1946 (FMC 0013463 and FMC
0013479-0013480).

law provided for the recovery of the fair market value of
the property after it was recovered.) 838 In 1943, in
accordance with the act, Ford recorded its investment in
Ford-Werke as a total loss by establishing a reserve
account equal to its investment balance (approximately
$8 million) retroactive to fiscal year 1941 earnings. 839
In 1954, Ford restored its investment in Ford-Werke to
the company books in the amount of approximately

12.4. Capital Structure and Dividend
Analysis

Ford Motor Company's ownership in Ford-Werke
evolved from nearly 100 percent of the stock at the
outset to varying proportions of direct and/ or indirect
ownership over the ye a r s , based on va ri o u s
international structures that were in place. 837 After the
United States entered the war in December 1941,
Congress passed the Revenue Act of 1942, permitting
companies with property or investments in enemy
countries to write off their investments as of the date
the United States declared war on that country. (The

Net Income and Trading Income as a Percentage of Sales
Ford-Wer ke, 1933-1953

Notes: Net income is sales minus all expenses. Trading income is sales less the cost of operations, excluding salaries and wages. 141
141 Page 142 143
116
R e s e a r c h F i n d i n g s Ab o u t Fo r d -We r k e U n d e r t h e Na z i R e g i m e
8 4 0 FMC, AR-61-416, Box 4, File: XVII Germany War Loss Recovery
S t u d i e s , L o r aw to Goulden, December 22, 1954 (FMC
0016708-0016711).

8 4 1 On August 8, 1948, Vitger took over the active management of
Ford-Werke under "Power of Attorney" approved on or about
May 26,1948, by the British control authorities. From May 26,
1948, to August 8, 1948, Vitger was in the United States
receiving instructions from Ford Motor Company on how to
conduct the affairs of Ford-Werke. See FMC, AR-61-416, Box 4,
File: XVII Germany War Loss Recovery Studies, Loraw to
Goulden, December 22,1954 (FMC 0016708-0016711).

8 4 2 HFM, Acc. 6, Box 262, File: 1930 Berlin, Shareholders Meeting
Minutes, March 27, 1930 (HFM 0006552-0006555). See also
FMC, AR-75-63-430, Box 91, File: Ford-Werke -Dividends,
Vitger to Roberge, August 15,1947 (FMC 0002977).

8 4 3 FMC, AR-75-63-430, Box 91, File: Ford-Werke -Dividends,
Dividend Particulars, August 15, 1939 (FMC 0002981). See
also HFM, Acc. 713, Box 11, File: Corporate Structure -European
Operations, Preliminary Report, February 20, 1948
(HFM 0002641-0002645). Soci�t� d'Investissements, Ford
Luxembourg, was a holding company formed in 1930 to hold
Ford of Britain's shares of Ford-Werke.

8 4 4 Board Minutes for Soci�t� d'Investissements, Ford Luxembourg,
show that RM 810,000 in dividends for 1930 was due from
Ford-Werke to the Luxembourg company, with RM 430,931 of
that amount having been paid by late 1931. See HFM, Acc. 313,
Box 1, File: Ford Luxembourg, Meeting Minutes for September
1 7 , 1931 (HFM 0003143), December 21, 1931 (HFM
0003145) and March 2,1932 (HFM 0003148).

8 4 5 FMC, AR-75-63-430, Box 91, File: Ford-Werke -Dividends
1 9 3 9 -1 9 5 4 , Dividend Pa rt i c u l a r s , August 15, 1939 (FMC
0 0 0 2 9 8 1 ) , Vitger to Roberg e, August 15, 1947 (FMC
0002977).

8 4 6 FMC, AR-75-63-430, Box 91, File: Ford-Werke -Dividends,
Dividend Pa rt i c u l a r s , August 15, 1939 (FMC 0002981-
0002982); FMC, AR-75-63-430, Box 91, File: Ford-Werke
Finance Shares 1941-1949, R e p o rt and Supplement on
Development and Composition of Ford-Werke Share Capital,
Report circa December 1945, Supplement January 30, 1950
(FMC 0001502-0001524).

8 4 7 FMC, AR-75-63-430, Box 91, File: Ford-Werke -Dividends
1939-1954, Memo on restriction of dividends, circa 1948
(FMC 0002973-0002974), Vitger to Roberge, August 15,1947
(FMC 0002977-0002979).

8 4 8 FMC, AR-65-92, Box 1, File: Annual Reports, Ford Motor
Company Annual Report for 1950 (FMC 0013868); FMC, AR-75-
63-430, Box 91, File: Ford-Werke -Dividends 1939-1954,
Memo from CRK, December 6, 1951 (FMC 0002942).

8 4 9 FMC, AR-75-63-430, Box 90, File: Audit Reports 1948-49,
Audit Report by Knipprath for 1948 as of June 20,1948 (FMC
0001230); FMC, AR-75-63-430, Box 91, File: Ford-Werke
Dividends -1939-1954, Memo from CRK, December 6, 1951
(FMC 0002942).

8 5 0 FMC, AR-75-63-430, Box 91, File: Ford-Werke -I. G. Farben
1948, Winter to Prance, October 17, 1951 (FMC 0001405),
File: Ford-Werke -Dividends 1939-1954, Memo from CRK,
December 6, 1951 (FMC 0002942). The exchange rates are
from Banking and Monetary Stat i s t i c s, 1 9 1 4 -1 9 4 1 (Washington:
Federal Reserve Banks and the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System), p. 1038 (CL1 0001070-0001072).

8 5 1 In an interview with historians Allan Nevins and Frank Ernest
Hill in 1952, Lord Percival Perry described the decision to sell
a large block of shares to I. G. Farben in 1929. Perry was head
of Ford of Britain, which in 1929 had recently assumed a larger
role in ownership and oversight of Ford-Werke: "When you
come to Germany, you do it very differently. The best way to get
in to the German public, as a public, is to issue not all the shares
but a big block of them [to] I. G. Farben � the biggest
industrial undertaking in Germany. �We did issue a big bloc k

t h rough 1943 also we re bl o cke d . 8 4 7 No furt h e r
dividends were declared until 1950. 848

In 1951, the blocked dividends from the years 1938
through 1943 were devalued by 90 percent in the
currency conversion from Reichsmarks to Deutsche
Marks. 849 In the same year, Ford used those previously
blocked dividends (amounting to about $60,000 in
1951 dollars, after the conversion) to underwrite part
of the cost of acquiring all of the Ford-Werke stock held
by the German corporation I. G. Farbenindustrie AG
(I. G. Farben). 850 I. G. Farben owned about 5.3 percent of
Ford-Werke's stock in 1951, having acquired a 15
percent share in 1929, when Fo r d -We r ke wa s
recapitalized and Carl Bosch, I. G. Farben's general
manager and chairman of the board, was elected to
Ford-Werke's board of directors. 851 After the war, when

$557,000, estimated to be the fair value. 840 This was
done after a determination that for tax purposes, the
date of recovery of the property was August 8, 1948. 841

Ford-Werke's first dividends to shareholders were
declared for 1929, and were payable in March 1930. 842
At the time, Luxembourg was the only Ford entity with
a direct interest in Fo r d -We r ke. 8 4 3 Although the
dividends were declared, payments were delayed or
incomplete because Ford-Werke had to request special
permission from the German government to make the
payments. 844

The next dividends were not declared until 1938. 845
At that time, Ford controlled, through a combination of
direct and indirect ownership, 81 percent of the Ford-Werke
stock. 846 The 1938 dividends were held by Ford-Werke
in a blocked account and were not paid because
the German government prohibited their distribution
outside Germ a ny. Dividends declared from 1939 142
142 Page 143 144
I. G. Farben was placed in liquidation proceedings, Ford
decided to purchase I. G. Farben's shares of Ford-Werke
to avoid having the shares sold to the public or remain

with I. G. Farben in the event of reorganization instead
of liquidation. 852 The shares were purchased by Ford
from I. G. Farben's liquidators. 853

117

F i n a n c i a l Ov e r v i e w o f Fo r d -We rk e
of shares to I. G. Farben. That was the shortest way I knew of
getting into the German public. � The German public were
very heavy shareholders in I. G. Farben." See HFM, Acc. 65, Box
52, File: 65, Interview with Lord Percival Perry, March 28,1952
(HFM 0004805-0004806). I. G. Farben's ownership share of
Ford-Werke, while never greater than 15 percent, fluctuated
somewhat during the period from 1929 to 1951. See FMC, AR-75-
63-430, Box 91, File: Ford-Werke Finance Shares 1941-
1 9 4 9 , R e p o rt and Supplement on Development and
Composition of Fo r d -We r ke Share Cap i t a l , R e p o rt circa
December 1945, Supplement Ja nu a ry 30, 1950 (FMC
0001502-0001524), File: Germany Cologne -Ford-Werke
Finance Shares -Dividends 1939-1954, McKee to Wieland,
January 4, 1951 (FMC 0002960A); FMC, AR-68-624, Box 18,
File: Cologne Permanent Shares and Equity (1), Ford Motor
Company Ownership of Ford-Werke Stock, November 17,1959
(FMC 0012641). Carl Bosch was elected to the Ford-Werke
Board of Directors on May 17, 1929, and remained a board
member until his death in April 1940, when he was replaced by
Carl Krauch, the new I. G. Farben chairman; see Appendix B.

8 5 2 FMC, AR-75-63-430-88, File: Blocked Accounts, Bogdan to
Wieland, August 21, 1950 (FMC 0017856).

8 5 3 FMC, AR-75-63-430, Box 91, File: Ford-Werke Finance Shares
1 9 5 1 -1 9 5 3 , Winter to Prance, October 17, 1951 (FMC
0002750). 143
143 Page 144 145
118
R e s e a r c h F i n d i n g s Ab o u t Fo r d -We r k e U n d e r t h e Na z i R e g i m e 144
144 Page 145 146
The findings in this report are the result of an
e x h a u s t i ve search for pertinent records in the
possession of Ford Motor Company and of numerous
public archives in the United States, Germany and Great
Britain. Descriptions of the 98,000 pages of source
material have been entered into a searchable database
that reflects the material's date and source, subject
matter, content and other relevant data. The database
and document collection are being donated, except
where prohibited by privacy laws or regulations of the
o riginal re p o s i t o ri e s , to Henry Ford Museum &
G re e n field Vi l l ag e, an independent, n o n p ro fi t
educational institution unaffiliated with Ford Motor
Company. At the museum, the donated collection and
database will be made available to the public through
the Benson Ford Research Center, an archival repository.

In addition to the materials located through the
document search, the research team relied extensively
on published sources. A bibliography of the most
relevant published sources is attached in Appendix I.

Ford Motor Company 's goal in instituting this
research project was to conduct a deep search for
additional facts to supplement the historical record.
Every effort was made to perform a thorough and
c o m p re h e n s i ve search . As additional info rm at i o n
comes to light, Ford Motor Company will update the
document collection and the database at the Benson
Ford Research Center. The material collected as a result
of this re s e a r ch project will provide a signifi c a n t
resource for understanding the history of this period
and of Ford-Werke under the Nazi regime.

119

S e c t i o n 1 3
D I S P O S I T I O N O F
R E S E A R C H F I N D I N G S 145
145 Page 146 147
120
R e s e a r c h F i n d i n g s A b o u t Fo r d -We r k e U n d e r t h e Na z i R e g i m e 146
146 Page 147 148
121 147
147 Page 148 149
122 148
148 Page 149 150
Sources and Notes: FMC, AR-98-213541, Box 131, File: Cologne Organization and Management, List of Board Members 1925-1943,
1947 (FMC 0000679-0000680); FMC, AR-98-213546, Box 2, File: History of Plant -All Aspects, 1925-1946,Vitger Report, September
24, 1946 (FMC 0001967-0001968); FMC, AR-65-1500, Box 6, File: Ford-Werke No. 3, Business Report for 1944, 1945, 1946 (FMC
0003778-0003813), Business Reports for 1947,1948 (FMC 0003565 and 0003579); FMC, AR-75-63-430, Box 60, Ford-Werke Annual
Reports, 1949-1953, Business Report for 1951 (FMC 0016884), Business Report for 1952 (FMC 0016871); FMC, AR-75-63-430, Box
90, File: Ford-Werke Finance Reports 1953, Business Report for 1953 (FMC 0001138). On May 15, 1942, the German government
abolished the authority of the board of directors and appointed a board of advisors consisting of the German members of the old board.
These members � Albert, B�tzkes, H�nemeyer and Krauch � resigned before the first postwar meeting on December 16, 1947.
(Sorensen, the other surviving board member from before the war, left the company in early 1944.) See FMC, AR 65-71, Box 25, File:
International 1947 #1, Vitger to Roberge, June 25, 1947 (FMC 0000100-0000102); Ford-Werke Records, Albert to Vitger, August 22,
1947 (FW 0003874), B�ttcher to Vitger, September 4,1947 (FW 0003875), H�nemeyer to Vitger, November 7,1947 (FW 0003873),
B�tzkes to Vitger, November 11, 1947 (FW 0003876); and Nevins and Hill, Ford: Decline and Rebirth, 1933-1962, pp. 259-260.

123

A p p e n d i x B
B O A R D O F D I R E C T O R S �
F O R D -W E R K E , 1 9 2 5 -1 9 5 3
Name Tenure
Albert, Heinrich F. � Germany 1930-1947; chairman 1937-1947
B�tzkes, Wilhelm (German Industrial Bank) � Germany 1940-1947
Bosch, Carl (I. G. Farben chairman) � Germany 1929-1939; died April 27,1940
Breech, Ernest R.� U. S. 1947-1952
Carlson, George 1925
Cooper, Sir Stanford � U. K. 1947,1951-1952
Craig, B. J. � U. S. 1925-1927
Davies, Sir John Thomas � U. K. 1929-1938
Ford, Edsel B.� U. S. 1925-1941; chairman 1925-1929; died May 1943
Ford, Henry � U. S. 1926-1927
Ford II, Henry � U. S. 1947-1952
Greiss, Frank 1951-1953
Gressard, Adolf � Germany 1953
Harrington, James J.� U. S. 1925
Hauss, C. W. � Germany 1947-1953; chairman 1947-1953
Hoppe, Ernst 1951-1953
H�nemeyer, Hans � Germany 1940-1947
Kalveram, Wilhelm 1951
Kanzler, Ernest C.� U. S. 1926
Krauch, Carl (I. G. Farben chairman) � Germany 1940-1947
Lehideux, Francois � France 1951-1952
Meyer, Kaj 1953 (manager)
Perry, Sir Percival � U. K. 1929-1939; chairman 1929-1937
Roberge, R. I.� U. S. 1947
Schmidt, Georg � Germany 1939-1940; died February 26,1940
Schurig, Alwin � Germany 1929-1939; died August 31,1940
Sjoberg, Sydney Thor 1926
Sorensen, Charles E.� U. S. 1930-1941
Waltermann, Hermann � Germany 1953
Wieland, Arthur J.� U. S. 1951-1952 149
149 Page 150 151
124
R e s e a r c h F i n d i n g s A b o u t Fo r d -We r k e U n d e r t h e Na z i R e g i m e 150
150 Page 151 152
Corporate Entity Quantity and Product
Ford Motor Company 4,400 gliders
8,700 B-24 bombers
57,900 Pratt & Whitney aircraft engines
2,400 MX engine assemblies
87,400 generators
52,300 superchargers
17,000 jettison fuel tanks
1,700 M-4 tanks
1,000 M-10 tanks
27,000 tank engines
12,500 armored cars
10,500 Fodors (military automobiles)
13,900 universal carriers
12,800 amphibian jeeps
282,400 jeeps
128,800 trucks

Ford of Britain 13,900 tracked vehicles
184,600 wheeled vehicles
262,000 V-8 engines
137,500 tractors

Ford of Canada 380,000 military vehicles including universal carriers,
trucks, artillery tractors, transport units and scout cars

Ford of India 122,400 military vehicles
Ford of South Africa 34,900 military vehicles including cars, trucks and
delivery wagons

Ford of New Zealand 5,200 military vehicles including trucks, staff cars and tractors
5,720,500 grenades
2,370,500 mortar shells
1,448,200 ordnance fuses

Note: All figures rounded to nearest hundred.
Sources: Hilary St. George Saunders, Ford at War (London: Harrison & Sons, circa 1947), p. 90 and Brief Statistics; FMC, Vertical File,
File: World War II Production, Ford Motor Company's U. S. War Production Effort, 1941-1945, December 3, 1998 (FMC 0018716-
0018717), Report on Ford Motor Company of Canada, January 26,1999 (FMC 0018718).

125

A p p e n d i x C
F O R D ' S C O N T R I B U T I O N S T O T H E
A L L I E D WA R E F F O R T , 1 9 3 9 -1 9 4 5 151
151 Page 152 153
126
R e s e a r c h F i n d i n g s Ab o u t Fo r d -We r k e U n d e r t h e Na z i R e g i m e 152
152 Page 153 154
The following table presents a breakdown of the data
used to create the bar chart, Labor Trends at Ford-Werke,
in Section 7.3. This table was compiled from two
sources:

1. Financial Ledger : The first is a financial ledger
from Ford-Werke internal records. The ledger
contains monthly balance sheets re p o rt i n g
employment statistics for the period from 1941 to
1944. In some cases these statistics are broken
into different categories of foreign workers at the
plant; in other cases, there are no breakdowns. 854

2. Staff Reports: In a few instances, the ledger
figures were supplemented by numbers from
periodic staff reports prepared by Ford-Werke

production departments. These staff reports were
located in a collection of British Royal Air Force
bombing survey records at the Imperial War
Museum in London. 855

These sources generally agree on the numbers of
foreign workers reported each month. Where the
reported numbers differ widely, only the figures from
the ledger have been included in this table. (For a fuller
discussion of the inconsistencies between the ledger
figures and the staff reports, and a description of the
methodology used to calculate each worker category in
this table, see the explanatory material that follows the
table.)

127

R e s e a r c h F i n d i n g s A b o u t Fo r d -We r k e U n d e r t h e Na z i R e g i m e
8 5 4 Fo r d -We r ke Records, Financial Ledger, Ja nu a ry 1942-September
1944 (FW 0007011-0007890). These figures
also appear in a later report prepared by the postwar
custodian, Erhard Vitger; see FMC, AR-75-62-616, Box 79,
Custodian Report, (FMC 0001022-0001026).

A p p e n d i x D
N U M B E R S O F W O R K E R S
A T F O R D -W E R K E

J A N U A R Y 1 9 4 1 -D E C E M B E R 1 9 4 4

8 5 5 The figures for Russian workers in April 1942 come from
IWM, FD 4369/ 45, Folder B, handwritten staff report, April
27 and May 4, 1942 (IWM 0000297). The figures for
"Other Foreign Workers" from May through July 1942 come
from IWM, FD 4369/ 45, Folder B, staff reports from May 15
to July 17, 1942 (IWM 0000283-0000292). 153
153 Page 154 155
128
R e s e a r c h F i n d i n g s Ab o u t Fo r d -We r k e U n d e r t h e Na z i R e g i m e
Note: The entry "n. a." indicates that there was not enough information available to provide meaningful statistics.

Note: Regarding December 1944 figures on the table, the ledger does not specify the nationality of these workers, referring to them only
as "foreign civil workers." The placement of the line item, the term "civil" and the actual number of workers, however, are all consistent
with their identification as Russian civilian workers. Little other information could be found on the work force during the period from
October through December 1944, when Ford-Werke was dispersing equipment and some workers to other locations. See Ford-Werke
Records, Financial Ledger, December 1944-December 1946, Balance Sheet, December 31, 1944 (FW 0008273).

Date Russian Italian Other POWs Total Total Percentage or POWs Foreign Foreign Work Force (%) of
Eastern Workers Workers Foreign Workers Workers
Jan 1941 --n. a. n. a. n. a. 3863 n. a. Feb 1941 --n. a. n. a. n. a. 3810 n. a.
Mar 1941 --n. a. n. a. n. a. 3724 n. a. Apr 1941 --n. a. n. a. n. a. 3732 n. a.
May 1941 --n. a. n. a. n. a. 3651 n. a. Jun 1941 --n. a. n. a. n. a. 3647 n. a.
Jul 1941 --n. a. n. a. n. a. 3663 n. a. Aug 1941 --n. a. n. a. n. a. 3581 n. a.
Sep 1941 --n. a. n. a. n. a. 3605 n. a. Oct 1941 --n. a. n. a. n. a. 3609 n. a.
Nov 1941 --n. a. n. a. n. a. 3500 n. a. Dec 1941 --n. a. n. a. n. a. 3476 n. a.
Jan 1942 --n. a. n. a. n. a. 3435 n. a. Feb 1942 --n. a. n. a. n. a. 3471 n. a.
Mar 1942 --n. a. n. a. n. a. 3500 n. a. Apr 1942 314 -n. a. n. a. n. a. 3594 n. a.
May 1942 320 -94 94 508 3978 12.8 Jun 1942 621 -101 92 814 4182 19.5
Jul 1942 610 -103 90 803 4143 19.4 Aug 1942 567 -n. a. 91 n. a. 4104 n. a.
Sep 1942 570 -n. a. 89 n. a. 4172 n. a. Oct 1942 715 -n. a. 89 n. a. 4512 n. a.
Nov 1942 679 -n. a. 83 n. a. 4613 n. a. Dec 1942 677 -n. a. 85 n. a. 4648 n. a.
Jan 1943 677 -448 86 1211 4625 26.2 Feb 1943 670 -575 84 1329 4579 29.0
Mar 1943 711 -488 81 1280 4816 26.6 Apr 1943 671 -518 80 1269 4855 26.1
May 1943 751 -526 79 1356 4998 27.1 Jun 1943 749 -n. a. 79 n. a. 4985 n. a.
Jul 1943 753 -n. a. 79 n. a. 5115 n. a. Aug 1943 743 -696 -1439 5137 28.0
Sep 1943 749 -570 -1319 5108 25.8 Oct 1943 900 -489 -1389 5306 26.2
Nov 1943 777 568 478 -1823 5783 31.5 Dec 1943 789 559 458 -1806 5711 31.6
Jan 1944 788 552 465 -1805 5600 32.2 Feb 1944 789 554 420 -1763 5298 33.3
Mar 1944 790 533 420 -1743 5198 33.5 Apr 1944 786 505 400 -1691 5175 32.7
May 1944 795 486 527 -1808 5138 35.2 Jun 1944 870 497 536 -1903 5223 36.4
Jul 1944 881 490 549 -1920 5199 36.9 Aug 1944 882 496 554 -1932 5208 37.1
Sep 1944 n. a. -n. a. -n. a. n. a. n. a. Oct 1944 n. a. -n. a. -n. a. n. a. n. a.
Nov 1944 n. a. -n. a. -n. a. n. a. n. a. Dec 1944 865 -n. a. -n. a. n. a. n. a. 154
154 Page 155 156
� The figures reported in "Other Foreign Workers"
were taken from the footnoted figure reported in
the financial ledger monthly balance sheets under
the " Wo r kers paid hourly wag e s " c at e g o ry
described above. (Where the footnote was absent
� from January 1941 through December 1942,
and for June and July 1943 � no figures for "Other
Fo reign Wo r ke r s " a re provided in this tabl e
because the ledger does not provide enough
i n fo rm ation to diffe re n t i ate between We s t e rn
foreign workers and German workers.) 860

� The numbers in the " Total Fo reign Wo r ke r s "
column were computed by adding the numbers
reported under Russian or Eastern Workers, Italian
P OW s , P OWs and Other Fo reign Wo r ke r s , a s
described above. (Again, no figures for "Total
Foreign Workers" are provided in the table when
the ava i l able data does not include pre c i s e
information for that month.)

� "Percentage of Foreign Workers" was calculated by
comparing "Total Foreign Workers" and "Total
Work Force" figures, when available. Values were
rounded to the nearest 0.1 percent.

Comparing the Figures in the Financial
Ledger and the Staff Reports

There is a notable inconsistency in the employment
figures for "Other Foreign Workers" in the financial
ledger and in the production department staff reports.
In particular, from late 1943 to early 1944, the staff
reports indicate an additional 250 to 350 workers
categorized as "Other Foreign Workers," compared
with the financial ledger.

129

A p p e n d i x D
8 5 6 The terms " R u s s i a n " and " E a s t e rn " often we re used
interchangeably in Germany throughout the war to describe
workers from all parts of the Soviet Union. From February
1 9 4 3 , Fo r d -We r ke 's monthly financial statements began
classifying all civilian workers from the East, including
Russians, as Eastern workers.

8 5 7 Although the Italian workers who arrived in November 1943
were technically POWs, they were treated differently from the
Western POWs and accounted for separately. In August 1944,
Italian POWs were reclassified as ordinary foreign (Western)
workers and accounted for in the monthly balance sheets as
such. See FMC, AR-75-62-616, Box 79, Custodian Report
(FMC 0001023).

8 5 8 Fo r d -We r ke Records, Financial Ledger, Ja nu a ry 1942-September
1944 (FW 0007011-0007890).
8 5 9 Note that the figure for Russian workers in April 1942 comes
from IWM, FD 4369/ 45, Folder B, handwritten staff report,
April 27 and May 4, 1942 (IWM 0000297).

8 6 0 The figures for May through July 1942, however, came from
IWM, FD 4369/ 45, Folder B, staff reports from May 15 to
July 17, 1942 (IWM 0000283-0000292).

Additional Notes and Methodology
Regarding Appendix D
The numbers in the table primarily reflect data from
Ford-Werke's financial ledger. However, the categories
of workers in the table are not identical to those in the
ledger. Therefore, the following explanation will be
helpful in understanding the method used to tabulate
the information in the table.

� Financial Ledger Ca t e g o ri e s: The ledger divides
Ford-Werke employees into four broad categories
based on function and mode of compensation.
These categories are: n
Salaried technical workers n
Salaried business executives n
Wo r kers paid hourly wages (Beginning in
Ja nu a ry 1943, the monthly balance sheets
s h owed a footnote for this cat e g o ry,
i n d i c ating that this fi g u re included a
re p o rted number of " fo reign wo r ke r s." T h i s
most like ly re fers to We s t e rn wo r ke r s ,
although the ledger does not say this
e x p l i c i t ly.) n
Others (Beginning in May 1942, this last
c at e g o ry included a separate line item fo r
E a s t e rn wo r kers and POW s. A line item fo r
Italian POWs ap p e a red in November 1943.)

� Appendix D Columns: The figures in the columns
for Russian or Eastern Workers, 856 Italian POWs 857
and POWs 858 were taken directly from the figures
re p o rted under the " O t h e r " c at e g o ry in the
financial ledger's monthly balance sheets. 859

� The figures reported in the "Total Work Force"
column of the table were calculated by adding
monthly figures from all four categories in the
monthly balance sheets. 155
155 Page 156 157
unexcused workers from the rolls in January 1944. 862
By May 1944, foreign worker figures in the staff reports
are consistent with the numbers in the financial ledger.
However, due to uncertainty regarding the departure
dates of the missing foreign workers, no attempt was
made to correct numbers from the financial ledger
using the numbers from the staff reports.

As a result, the table's "Total Work Force" statistics
from late 1943 and early 1944 may include a number
of foreign workers who were no longer employed at
Ford-Werke.

130

Several personnel department staff reports indicate
that these extra workers appear to be "absentee" foreign
workers who are formally listed as being assigned to
Ford-Werke but who have not reported to work. This
group includes Western workers who failed to return
from vacation. 861

In the financial ledger, however, these absent foreign
workers appear not to have been included in the
footnoted number of "Other Foreign Workers."

According to personnel department staff reports
from early 1944, Ford-Werke began removing the

R e s e a r c h F i n d i n g s A b o u t Fo r d -We r k e U n d e r t h e Na z i R e g i m e

8 6 1 See IWM, FD 4369/ 45, Folder E, Scheid to Armaments
Ministry, July 22, 1943 (IWM 0000759-0000760).

8 6 2 See, for example, IWM, FD 4369/ 45, Folder A, staff report
summaries, January 21, January 28 and February 4, 1944
(IWM 0000394, IWM 0000397 and IWM 0000400). 156
156 Page 157 158
Form 846 (Form submitted by claimants to the U. S. government)
Description of Damages Amount of Claim Claim in
RM DM U. S. Dollars

Buildings destroyed 1,232,139 23,512 $ 495,319
Damage to buildings 1,301,279 111,392 511,097

Total Buildings 2,533,418 134,904 1,006,416

Loss and/ or damage to
machinery and material in
outside storage areas 8,699,926 3,479,971

Materials lost in transit from
suppliers 560,997 224,399

Machinery and material
damaged in the Ford-Werke
plant 1,078,614 1,205 417,056

Claims for materials supplied
to German authorities
without payment 13,349,909 5,339,964

Other losses 5,043,117 2,017,247
Less adjustments:
Items that are included in the
above totals but are ineligible
under the War Claims Act (59,063) (23,625)

Total Other Property 28,673,501 1,205 11,455,011
Total amount of claim 31,206,919 136,109 12,461,427

Ford Motor Company's stock
ownership percentage in
Ford-Werke (56.575%), rounded 56.58%
Total amount claimed $ 7,050,052

Source: DOJ 0010550: 299 Foreign Claims Settlement Commission, Claim of Ford Motor Company
under Title II of the War Claims Act of 1948, as amended by Public Law 87-846.

A p p e n d i x E
WA R D A M A G E C L A I M S

Notes: The amount listed for "Buildings destroyed" includes RM559,211.16 ($ 223,684.47) for buildings in Austria. The amount listed
for "Other losses" includes RM 885,881.50 ($ 354,352.60) for losses of equipment and materials in Austria. See WNRC, Acc. 299-68A-0243,
Box 540, File: Claim of Ford Motor Company, List of Damages and Losses (DOJ 0010551 and DOJ 0010554).

131 157
157 Page 158 159
132
R e s e a r c h F i n d i n g s Ab o u t Fo r d -We r k e U n d e r t h e Na z i R e g i m e 158
158 Page 159 160
Sources: Ford-Werke Audited Financial Statements and Business Reports, specifically FMC 0017068-0017070, FMC 0003798-0003801,
FMC 0006720-0006721, FMC 0001229, FMC 0016021.

1939 1945 06/ 20/ 48 06/ 21/ 48 1953
RM RM RM DM DM
Converted
ASSETS
Total Cash 1,231,101 22,625,941 24,251,449 1,651,869 6,490,669
Inventory 21,187,127 15,002,737 9,486,455 13,747,007 39,949,904
Other Current Assets 19,364,775 21,462,787 7,962,101 1,266,927 14,384,244
Fixed Assets, Net 18,129,190 9,073,269 11,728,423 21,541,807 41,700,898
Other Assets 1 1 1 1 1
Investments 558,762 694,662 500,003 50,003 50,003

Total Assets 60,470,956 68,859,397 53,928,432 38,257,614 102,575,719

LIABILITIES
Current Liabilities (31,354,602) (26,031,783) (7,742,583) (1,896,009) (26,404,111)
Unclaimed Dividends (122,094) (3,280,416) (711,690) (71,169) (441,049)
Accrued Liabilities (249,457) (566,264) (671,896) (715,516) (516,646)
Reserve for Uncertain
Liabilities � Tax (1,049,178) -(1,072,151) (130,602) (103,367)
Reserve for Uncertain
Liabilities � Special ----(8,600,000)
Reserve for Uncertain
Liabilities � Other (3,894,582) (4,767,036) (4,202,006) (244,318) (22,300,826)

Total Liabilities (36,669,913) (34,645,499) (14,400,326) (3,057,614) (58,365,999)

SHAREHOLDERS' EQUITY
Capital Stock (20,000,000) (32,000,000) (32,000,000) (32,000,000) (32,000,000)
Statutory (Legal) Reserve (2,000,000) (3,600,000) (3,600,000) (1,800,000) (5,200,000)
Free Reserve -(3,000,000) (3,000,000) (1,400,000) (4,500,000)
Retained Earnings (1,801,043) 4,386,102 (928,106) -(2,509,720)

Total Liabilities and Equity (60,470,956) (68,859,397) (53,928,432) (38,257,614) (102,575,719)

A p p e n d i x F
F O R D -W E R K E
B A L A N C E S H E E T S

133 159
159 Page 160 161
134
R e s e a r c h F i n d i n g s Ab o u t Fo r d -We r k e U n d e r t h e Na z i R e g i m e 160
160 Page 161 162
135 161
161 Page 162 163
136 162
162 Page 163 164
137 163
163 Page 164 165
R e s e a r c h F i n d i n g s A b o u t Fo r d -We r k e U n d e r t h e Na z i R e g i m e
138 164
164 Page 165 166
Every page of every document collected in this research effort has had a unique number affixed to it. Each
number has a prefix that indicates the archival repository or research file from which it originated. The following
list explains the prefixes and lists the names of the original repositories.

AGB or BW � Archiv der Gedenkstaette Buchenwald
BA-F � Bundesarchiv/ Milit�rarchiv -Freiburg (branch of the German federal archives in Freiburg)
BA-K � Bundesarchiv -Koblenz (branch of the German federal archives in Koblenz)
BA-L � Bundesarchiv -Lichterfelde (German federal archives in Berlin)
CL1 � Coopers & Lybrand (predecessor to PricewaterhouseCoopers)
DOJ � [ U. S.] Department of Justice Fo reign Claims Settlement Commission files (See also W N R C,
where files are stored)

ELDE � NS-Dokumentationszentrum der Stadt K�ln (also known as the ELDE House or EL-DE House, a
documentation center holding records relating to Cologne's experiences during the Nazi era)

FMC � Ford Motor Company
FMCL � Ford Motor Company Ltd. (Ford of Britain)
FW � Ford-Werke, Cologne
GER � Published sources in Germany, as well as primary materials from several smaller German archives
HAI � Primary source material from smaller repositories in the Washington, D. C., area
HAStK or HASK � Historisches Archiv der Stadt K�ln (Cologne city archives)
HFM � Henry Ford Museum & Greenfield Village Research Center
HP � Highland Park Records Storage, Ford Motor Company
HStAD or HSAD � Nordrhein-westf�lisches Hauptstaatsarchiv, D�sseldorf (central state archives branch for the
Cologne region)

IWM � Imperial War Museum
LOC � [U. S.] Library of Congress
NARA � [U. S.] National Archives and Records Administration

139

R e s e a r c h F i n d i n g s Ab o u t Fo r d -We r k e U n d e r t h e Na z i R e g i m e
A p p e n d i x H

G L O S S A R Y O F
R E P O S I T O R Y S O U R C E S 165
165 Page 166 167
140
PRO � Public Record Office (national archives of Great Britain)
ThHStAW or HSTH � Th�ringisches H a u p t s t a at s a r ch i v, Weimar (central state arch i ves branch for the Weimar region in
G e rm a ny)

VDA � Verband der Automobilindustrie (Automobile Industry Association in Germany)
WNRC � [U. S.] Washington [D. C.] National Records Center (See also DOJ, where files originated)

R e s e a r c h F i n d i n g s A b o u t Fo r d -We r k e U n d e r t h e Na z i R e g i m e

Note: In addition to pri vacy laws and r egulations restricting the a vailability of documents from repositories in German y, the originals of some of the documents being donated to Henr y
Ford Museum & Greenfield Village may not be a vailable to the public from the source repositories. This applies in particular to: Coopers & Lybrand (CL1); U. S. Department of Justice
Foreign Claims Settlement Commission files (DOJ); Ford Motor Company (FMC); Ford Motor Company Ltd. (Ford of Britain) (FMCL); Ford-Werke , Cologne (FW); and Highland Park
Records Stor age -Ford Motor Company (HP). Research materials from the VDA are a vailable only to members of that or ganization. 166
166 Page 167 168
141
R e s e a r c h F i n d i n g s A b o u t Fo r d -We r k e U n d e r t h e Na z i R e g i m e
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170 Page 171 172
A N I N D E P E N D E N T A S S E S S M E N T
O F T H E

F O R D M O T O R C O M P A N Y
R E S E A R C H P R O J E C T
O N F O R D -W E R K E

U N D E R T H E N A Z I R E G I M E

A report prepared by:
Lawrence Dowler , Ph. D.

For
Ford Motor Compan y
November 2001

Lawrence Dowler Associates
124 Daniel Avenue
Guilford, Conn. 06437
203-458-1072
ldowler@ ix. netcom. com 171
171 Page 172 173
ii
An Independent Assessment of the Ford Motor Company Research Project on Fo r d -We rke Under the Nazi Regi m e 172
172 Page 173 174
Executi ve Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
I. The For d Archi ves Research Project . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Challenge to Ford and the Company's Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3
Ford's Unprecedented Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3
Separate Processes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4
Revealing the Project's Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4
Public Access to the Collection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5
Creating the Collection: An Overview of the Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5
II. Moti vation and Implications for Undertaking
the For d Archi ves Research Project . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .10
Practical and Social Implications of the Project . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11
III. Assessing the System of Access . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13
Description of the System of Access . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13
The Database . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13
Chronology of Events . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .14
White Papers: Topical Guides to the Collection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .14
Report on the Research Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15
IV. Assessing the For d Archi ves Research Project . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17
Managing and Staffing the Project . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17
Decisions for Success . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .18
Expanding the Scope of the Project and Delays Along the Way . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19
V. Assessing the Collection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .23
The Collection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .23
Gaps in the Collection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .23

iii

An Independent Assessment of the Ford Motor Company Research Project on Fo r d -We rke Under the Nazi Regi m e
T A B L E O F C O N T E N T S 173
173 Page 174 175
iv
Research Opportunities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .24
VI. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .27
Appendix A:
Monitoring the Research Project . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .29
Appendix B:
Procedures for Processing Documents from German Archives
and Preparing Information for Entering into the Project Database . . . . . . . . . . . . . .31

An Independent Assessment of the Ford Motor Company Research Project on Fo r d -We rke Under the Nazi Regi m e 174
174 Page 175 176
Introduction
This assessment is the culmination of an
independent thre e -year analysis of the objective s ,
methods, and results of Ford Motor Company's 3 1 �2 -year
project to assemble copies of documents about the use
of forced labor by Ford Motor Company's plant in
C o l o g n e, G e rm a ny during World War II. I have
evaluated the thoroughness and objectivity of Ford's
attempt to document these events and I have examined
in some detail the process and methods employed by
the Ford Archives Research Project to "find the facts"
about this and related issues. Appendix A provides a
summary of how I monitored the work of the Ford
Archives Research Project over the past three years. In
my review of this process, I have been guided by the
following questions:

� Is the research plan and process consistent with
Ford's announced objective, which is to find out
what happened at Ford-Werke during the war?

� Has the effo rt to locate documents been
uncompromising and made without regard to any
adverse consequences to Ford Motor Company?

� Are the proposed procedures for making this
evidence available to anyone who wishes to study
it adequate to this purpose?

� How will people gain access to the collection and
be able to use it?

� What does the collection contain, what is its
potential for re s e a r ch , and what items of
significance are missing from the collection?

This report is divided into five main parts, which are
supplemented by a conclusion and appendices:

I. The For d Archi ves Research Project examines
the work of the Project and how it has
attempted to fulfill Ford Motor Company's
initial promise to find the facts about what
actually happened at Ford-Werke during World
War II. Two topics are examined in this section
of the report: first, the challenge to Ford Motor
Company and the company's response; second,
the methods and pro c e d u res for locat i n g
documents and the critical factors involved in
assembling the collection.

II. M o t ivation and Implications for
Undertaking the Ford A rc h ives Resear c h
P r o j e c t e x p l o res Fo r d 's motives fo r
u n d e rtaking this project and examines its
potential implications for other institutions,
including corporations, and for general society
as well.

E X E C U T I V E S U M M A R Y 175
175 Page 176 177
2
III. Assessing the System of Access discusses how
the collection will be made accessible to the
public and what tools have been created for
using it.

IV. Assessing the For d Archi ves Research Project
examines the critical factors affecting the
p ro j e c t , including those that expanded its
scope, delayed its completion, and enabled the
project to be successful.

V. Assessing the Collection discusses the scope
and content of the collection � what is in the
c o l l e c t i o n , w h at is not, and what is the
collection's potential for research?

Findings
I have seen everything I requested and met freely
with everyone from project staff to corporate executives
and I am personally convinced that Ford Motor
Company has not only fulfilled its original promise "to
find out what happened," but has traveled an extra mile
in doing so. Ford developed and implemented a plan
and committed to a process that was consistent with its
announced objective of finding the facts. The following
fi ve findings are part i c u l a r ly revealing about the
conduct of the entire project and the company 's
determination to learn the truth about a difficult and
painful period in its history:

� The effort to locate documents has been made
without compromise and without regard to
possible adverse consequences to the company.
The resulting collection was assembled not only
from Ford's own archives but also from multiple
sources on two continents. Few, if any, American
companies have ever conducted an arch i va l
research project of this magnitude.

� At the very beginning of the project, the company
made the critical decision to separate the legal and
fa c t -finding pro c e s s e s. T h u s , the fa c t -fi n d i n g
process was not driven or tightly connected to the
legal arguments of the company, as it generally is
when corp o r ations are invo l ved in litigat i o n .
Putting the fact-finding process on a separate track
gives additional credence to the company's initial

claim that it intended to find out what really
happened.

� The Ford Archives Research Project has created an
unparalleled system of access that offers a variety
of paths into the collection, providing both item-level
access and the historical context for the
documents in the collection. The database �
which is key to using the collection � follows a
legal model, resulting in a database that is a marvel
for retrieving information.

� The Ford Archives Research Project developed a
report on research findings that maps the major
themes covered by the collection and indicates the
c o l l e c t i o n 's strengths and a few gaps in the
documentation; it also permits the facts to speak
for themselve s , even when the evidence is
ambiguous or contradictory. It is possible that
additional evidence will be discovered in the
future, but it is unlikely that the basic story told by
this collection will change appreciably as a result
of any future discoveries.

� Ford decided at the outset to give the collection to
an independent institution � before it was even
known what "facts" might be uncovered � and
make the data available, without restriction, to
anyone who wished to see it. Moreover, I believe
Ford's initial decision to find the facts, whatever
they were, and its ongoing commitment to open
access we re critical to the dedication of the
independent historians and archivists who worked
on this project. This dedication is reflected in the
richness of the collection these historians and
archivists have created.

Fo r d 's decision to " find the fa c t s " about what
happened at Ford-Werke during World War II and make
the results of this search accessible to everyone sets a
high standard for how corporations, especially global
corporations, will now have to respond to inquiries
about past policies and practices. Ford's thorough and
uncompromising response to questions about the use
of forced labor at Ford-Werke during World War II will
make it more difficult for corporations to avoid public
scrutiny on the grounds that they do not have an
archive.

An Independent Assessment of the Ford Motor Company Research Project on Fo r d -We rke Under the Nazi Regi m e 176
176 Page 177 178
Challenge to Ford and the Company' s
Response

In Feb ru a ry 1998, the British Bro a d c a s t i n g
Corporation aired a program charging Ford Motor
Company with using forced labor at its Ford-Werke
plant in Cologne, Germany during World War II. On
March 4, 1998, a class-action suit was filed against Ford
Motor Company and Ford-Werke. The suit claimed that
Ford's senior management during World War II had
some control over its German plant and that Ford
profited substantially from the use of forced labor.

Although Ford moved to have the suit dismissed,
Ford also announced that it had "instituted an active
and deeper search of Ford archives in the United States
to see if there are additional facts available than those
used by earlier historians. We are also instituting a
similar search in Germany� When we receive the
results of this effort, we will proceed from there." 1
With this announcement, Ford publicly committed to
an aggressive effort to gather documentary evidence
about this period � regardless of potential adverse
consequences to the company. Ford management made
several additional decisions to ensure the integrity and
t h o roughness of the " fa c t -fi n d i n g " e f fo rt ; t h e s e
decisions were uncommon, perhaps unique, for any
organization or institution, especially an international

corporation. Some of these decisions may have far-reaching
implications for other institutions that go well
beyond the initial charges and response of Ford Motor
Company.

Ford's Unprecedented Response
As part of its stated mission to search its archives,
Ford decided to find the facts, regardless of how they
reflected on the company, instead of commissioning a
history.

Ford's response is unusual because its management
chose not only to find the facts and create a collection
of documents, but also because the company decided to
open the collection to the public. Generally, companies
confronted with questions about their past hire a
consultant to investigate the matter or write a history,
but rarely is the public invited to consider the evidence
upon which the report is based. Authorized histories or
reports, the standard response of both American and
German automobile manufacturers, are nearly always
based on privileged access to the archives. No matter
how many assurances are given as to the independence
of the scholar, or how brilliant the resulting book or

3
1 Statement by John Rintamaki, March 4, 1998. At the time, he
was Ford Motor Company secretary. He has since been named
chief of staff, Ford Motor Company.

S e c t i o n I
T H E F O R D A R C H I V E S
R E S E A R C H P R O J E C T 177
177 Page 178 179
4
report, inevitably, there is suspicion that something has
been withheld or that the interpretation has been
altered to the benefit of the employer. 2 This is not to say
that an institution, be it a university, a corporation, or
even a church, does not have good reasons for wanting
a history reflecting its own perspective and self-image.
This type of biased approach, however, casts suspicion
on even the most innocent of organizations. To avoid
this taint, it is especially important for the evidence
documenting these activities and events to be open to
public scrutiny.

Separate Processes
Ford also committed to a dual process that would
maintain separate tracks, one for any litigation resulting
from the class-action suit and the other for the "fact-fi
n d i n g " re s e a r ch project that , Ford stat e d , wo u l d
continue regardless of the outcome of the class-action
suit. Again, this decision was unusual. Ordinarily, legal
prerogatives govern a company's response to a legal
action. Certainly, the specific evidentiary needs of the
legal team did, as we shall see, have a significant impact
on the Ford Archives Research Project's fact-finding
work and, even more, on the design of the system for
retrieving documents from the growing collection. But
the dual process did indeed remain separate and
distinct throughout the project, and at no time was
evidence put aside or discounted because it might raise
questions or cre ate difficulties for Fo r d 's law ye r s.
Evidence turned up by an aggressive research effort
might be helpful to Ford lawyers, but it might also have
been subject to discovery by lawyers litigating against
Ford if these actions had gone to trial. In fact, historical
research continued long after all of the legal charges
against Ford had been dismissed.

Traditionally, it is a matter of policy that corporations
do not keep their records any longer than is legally
required. The assumption is that without evidence,

liability is limited. Certainly, aggressively looking for
records from half a century ago is, f rom this
perspective, inadvisable. The truth, however, is that the
ability of any institution to destroy records in the hope
of avoiding responsibility for past actions is extremely
problematic; the complex web of evidence supporting
corporate memory is almost impossible to eliminate.
Someone, often when it is least expected, will uncover
the evidence, incriminating or not, at another agency or
government office. The long life of evidence even after
50 years and a world war is amply demonstrated by the
mass of materials unearthed by this project.

Revealing the Project's Scope
In the beginning of the pro j e c t , when Fo r d
announced its intention to find the fa c t s , n e a r ly
everyone assumed that few documents could have
survived the war. Moreover, it was presumed two fires
at the Cologne plant � one during and one after the
war � had destroyed most of the documents covering
the operation of Ford-Werke during this period. In the
end, however, the Ford Archives Research Project has
created a collection of more than 98,000 pages of
documents; more than 25,000 are from Ford-Werke.
To be sure, there are gaps in the record, but it is, by any
measure, a major collection that thoroughly documents
the operation of Ford-Werke both during the war and
under postwar military government supervision.

Although more documents survived than the Ford
Archives Research Project team had initially anticipated,
finding them was not easy. After six weeks of intensive
searching in the Ford Archives in Dearborn, it became
apparent that the facts of the case would be difficult to
determine and a more thorough investigation would be
re q u i re d . Although adverse publicity and the
allegations of the class-action suits created pressure on
the company to find the facts quickly, the Ford Archives
Research Project team decided to explore any lead that
might shed light on the use of forced labor by Ford-Werke
during the war. This was an important decision
t h at had fa r-re a ching implications for the pro j e c t
because it not only made the project more complicated
and costly, but it also increased substantially the time it
took to locate documents. In the end, more than 30
archival repositories in Germany, England, and the
United States were consulted, several quite extensively,

An Independent Assessment of the Ford Motor Company Research Project on Fo r d -We rke Under the Nazi Regi m e
2 See, for example, the charges of Michael Burleigh in "Beetles in
Brown Shirts?" History To d ay, 42 (November 1992), pp. 11-13.
Michael Pinto-Duschinsky, "Selling the Past," Times Litera r y
S u p p l e m e n t (October 23, 1998), pp. 16-17, also offers a critical
commentary of historians working for companies accused of
complicity in the Holocaust; it spawned a heated series of
charges and countercharges in "Letters to the Editor" of the T L S
for November 6, 1998; November 27, 1998; December 18,
1998; and January 8,1999. 178
178 Page 179 180
to produce the 98,000 pages of documents that now
comprise this collection.

Public Access to the Collection
Ford decided to give the resulting collection to an
independent repository and make it available to anyone
who wishes to study these documents for themselves. A
comprehensive database and other kinds of finding aids
were created to facilitate the use of the collection. These
will be described in greater detail later in this report.
What is important and really notable, however, was the
company's decision to provide open access to the
collection � this decision was made even before the
collection was assembled and without regard to its
implications for the company. This may have been a
smart response to critical media, but it is also a
response that carries the risk of revealing information
that any institution in these same circumstances might
very well wish to keep confidential.

Creating the Collection: An Overview of
the Process

This section discusses the methods and the process
employed by the Ford Archives Research Project to
create a collection of photocopied documents about
Ford Motor Company's activities during the period of
the Third Reich and the Allied Occupation.

On March 10, 1998, Elizabeth Adkins, manager of
Ford's Archives Services, was appointed to lead an
investigation into Ford-Werke during World War II. As
project manager, she was charged with developing a
work plan to carry out this investigation. In addition to
the company's internal records, she was instructed to
examine records held by Ford's German and English
subsidiaries and relevant records held by repositories in
England, Germany, the United States, or anywhere else
that might shed light on what actually happened during
the war. It was an enormous undertaking that went
well beyond an examination of Ford's own records.

During the course of the project a number of issues
have been investigated, but the following are the
principal lines of inquiry:

� The use of foreign and forced labor at Ford-Werke.

� Military production at Ford-Werke.
� Ford-Werke's role in the wartime economy.
� The finances of Ford-Werke during the war.
� Nazi economic policies and controls over the auto
industry and Ford-Werke.

� Communications between Ford and Ford-Werke
during the war.

� German industrial mobilization and preparation
for the war.

� Working conditions at the plant during the war.
� Damage suffered by the plant during the war.
� Information relating to assaults, injuries, or deaths
at the plant during the war.

� Postwar military government supervision of Ford-Werke.

Initially, two teams were assembled in Dearborn, one
to search the Ford Archives and also the company's
central records depository, and the second to examine
the records that had been given to Henry Fo r d
M u s e u m 's Research Center in 1964. A d d i t i o n a l
workers were employed to supplement the Archives
staff, and as many as 45 workers were hired by the
Archives during the most intensive periods of research.
In addition to the materials in the Archives, Records
Center, 3 and Henry Ford Museum, there were 300 cubic
feet of unorganized records with no finding aid, called
the European Corporate History Project, which had to
be sorted and analyzed. These were records that had
been assembled for a history of Fo r d 's Euro p e a n
operations � a project that was never completed. The
records were sent to Dearborn from England when the
European Corporate History Project office was closed.
Archives staff and 10 paraprofessionals launched a
crash effort to go through these European records and
create an inventory. To keep track of this growing body
of evidence and also make it available at the end of the
project, original documents were photocopied. From

Th e Fo r d A r c h i v e s Re s e ar c h Pr oj e c t
3 Staff of the Ford A r ch i ves selects the records that have
permanent historical value from the inactive files and records
stored at Ford's central records depository. 179
179 Page 180 181
6
these inauspicious beginnings in March 1998, this
enormous project to "find out what happened" was
launched.

The basic methodology for the undertaking was
developed during the first four months of the project.
Errors inevitably occurred and had to be corrected, but
the basic methodology and the accompanying database
were in place by the end of April 1998; a substantially
refined version was completed two months later. Three
sweeps through the Archives' holdings enabled staff to
create a list of records that might be relevant. The goal
was to distinguish what was known from what they
needed to know, and identify where this missing
information might reside. As a result of this process, 22
categories, or themes, were identified initially to help
guide the search through the records in the Ford
Archives and the Henry Ford Museum. The number of
categories was refined and modified over time to
incorporate nearly 100 subcategories under the 22
primary themes. These subject headings also became
the basis for developing a database to keep track of the
ongoing work; the database is the key to using the
collection and will be invaluable to researchers as well.
What emerged was a method for tracking work and
assigning a unique number to identify each page of a
document, a system that became increasingly important
as the number of documents increased, as well as the
number of locations where the documents existed. The
methodology and database were refined over time as
part of an ongoing process, engaging staff in Dearborn,
Washington, D. C., England, and Germany, which, as we
shall see, has contributed to the quality of the entire
project.

In April 1998, after the basic research methods and
database, including subject categories, were established,
a third research team was assembled in Washington. The
focus of this team was the vast holding of the U. S.
National Archives, including captured German war
records that were microfilmed after the war. Ford
contracted with The Wi n t h rop Gro u p, a bu s i n e s s
archives consulting firm, to hire a team leader. Ford
also contracted with History Associates Inc., a business
history consulting firm with substantial experience in
searching federal records and "applied" history projects
� research aimed at tracking records about a public

issue or event, often involving litigation. The historians
hired for this team included individuals fluent in
German and experienced in Holocaust-era research and
economic history. Perhaps most important was the
hiring of historians experienced in using public records
and conducting research at the National Archives.

Because the National A r ch i ves uses a diffe re n t
organizing and numbering system than that used by the
Ford Archives, the Ford Archives Research Project staff
made some modifications to the Ford database, and
some changes were incorporated into the research
methods employed for the project.

The need to coordinate the work of the Dearborn
and Washington teams also created an opportunity to
eva l u ate and improve re s e a r ch methods and the
database of document descriptions. One result of this
evaluation was that the teams created a quality control
review system for every document description entered
into the database. See Appendix B for a detailed
description of this system.

One of the most vexing problems in this entire
project has been the investigation of the financial
operation of Ford-Werke during the war. Although two
fires had destroyed many records at the Cologne plant,
the Ford Archives Research Project did locate many
financial records when the plant was thoro u g h ly
searched in 1999 and early in 2000. Once located,
however, interpreting these financial records was a
problem. First, the accounting and tax systems used in
Germany were different from those used in the United
States. Second, these systems were not rigorously
a d h e red to during the wa r. F i n a l ly, t h e re we re
numerous issues concerning depreciation schedules,
monetary exchange rates, and a host of regulations
governing the use of assets in Germany during the war.
In short, the entire issue of wages, profits, and other
financial matters is extremely complex. For this reason,
Ford hired Pri c ewaterhouseCoopers to assist in
understanding the financial records of the peri o d
uncovered by the Ford Archives Research Project. The
PricewaterhouseCoopers team worked closely with the
other teams in interp reting evidence as it wa s
discovered, a collaboration that has been important to
the research teams' understanding of the organization

An Independent Assessment of the Ford Motor Company Research Project on Fo r d -We rke Under the Nazi Regi m e 180
180 Page 181 182
and operations of Ford in Germany as well as in
Dearborn.

In August 1998, preliminary surveys were made of
records storage areas at Ford offices in Dagenham and
Warley in England and in Cologne, Germany. Members
of the research team also visited the Public Record
Office in England and the EL-DE House in Cologne, a
documentation center dedicated to Cologne's history
during the war. A second visit to Cologne occurred in
September. These visits produced only a small number
of re c o r d s , but in November a member of the
Washington team returned to England and conducted
searches at Ford's offices in Warley, the Public Record
Office in Richmond, and the Imperial War Museum in
London. Ford-Werke in Cologne was visited again in
December and a number of files, including financial
records, were located.

Even as all of this work was going on in Dearborn,
Washington, England and Germany, it was clear that the
search of German archives would be critical to the
success of the entire project. After contacting a number
of institutions and individuals, The Winthrop Group
identified a team of historians in Germany to do
archival research. In April 1998, Ford contracted with
a German firm, the Lower Saxony Institute for Regional
Historical Research, to assemble a team of historians
and archivists to survey selected German repositories.
The Institute is a new organization affiliated with the
University of Hanover, and provides project-based or
applied historical research for institutions for both non-profit
and corporate organizations. After two meetings
in Hanover, which included members of the U. S. teams,
a German historian from the Lower Saxony Institute,
with extensive experience in archival research and
Nazi-era history, conducted an initial survey of German
repositories. He wrote summaries of his findings for
each repository he visited and issued a report in
October 1998. As part of this re p o rt and in
consultation with another historian who is a specialist
in forced labor, he proposed a plan for the second phase
of the project. This report provided the basis for a
meeting in Hanover in early December with members
of the U. S. teams to discuss the proposed plan. While
these two German historians were initially the principal
researchers in this part of the research project, four

additional researchers were later added to the German
team.

The search of German records has been critical to the
success of the project, but it has also been difficult
because of the substantial challenges of working in
German repositories. Generally, one must apply well in
advance to receive permission to use the archives and
be assigned space to do research. Photocopying is also
much more difficult in Germany than in the United
States; the task must be performed by repository staff
and can take many months to complete. Additionally,
privacy laws in Germany are quite stringent and differ
from those in the United States, further complicating
and slowing the pace of research. In short, although a
thorough search of German archives was essential,
c o o r d i n ating this effo rt was complicated and it
substantially increased the time it took to complete the
re s e a r ch . In addition, the process of coding,
t r a n s l at i n g, and pre p a ring the worksheets and
information to enter into the database was, as one can
see from Appendix B, both complex and time
consuming. It took nearly 18 months, from January
1999 until mid-summer 2000, to complete this phase
of the work.

Another reason for the time taken to complete the
G e rman part of the project was the finding of
additional materials at Ford-Werke. In my Interim
R e p o rt of December 1998, I proposed making a
thorough search of the Cologne plant even though it
seemed unlikely that much had survived two fires and
the ravages of war. In August 1999, members of the
re s e a r ch teams from Dearborn and Wa s h i n g t o n
conducted extensive interviews with plant managers
and staff, w h i ch proved to be important fo r
understanding how the plant's records were organized
and where any surviving records from the war years
might be located. A careful survey of the extensive
records stored at the plant turned up more than 25,000
p ages of documents, including financial re c o r d s ,
personnel records, and production files, but very little
information about forced labor. Perhaps even more
important, the survey and subsequent searches ruled
out the likelihood that any materials at Ford-Werke had
been missed.

The For d A r c h i v e s Re s e ar c h Pr o j e c t 181
181 Page 182 183
8
An Independent Assessment of the Ford Motor Company Research Project on Fo r d -We rke Under the Nazi Regi m e 182
182 Page 183 184
The distinguished archivist Herman Kahn once
observed that "one way of defining historical research
is to say that it consists in considerable measure of
reading other people's mail." 4 Justice Hugo Black
destroyed all his "bench notes" rather than let them be
used too soon by insensitive historians. A journalist's
publication of excerpts from minutes of U. S. Cabinet
meetings in the Eisenhower Administration so enraged
members of Congress, who were denied access to the
minutes on the grounds that such access would be a
violation of "executive privilege," that keeping minutes
of Cabinet meetings was discontinued. 5 And more than
one president has no doubt wished he had never tape-recorded
conversations and meetings for the sake of
posterity. What is true for individuals, even Cabinet
members, is also true for that legal personage, the
corporation. Lawyers who worry about liability and
even more about the effect of adverse publicity on
corporate profits often take a dim view of open access
to archives. The recent litigation involving tobacco
companies is only the most recent of many examples of
the danger of archives.

All companies have records, which they must retain
for legal and financial reasons and to document
business transactions, protect proprietary claims, meet
government requirements on a variety of personnel
m at t e r s , and record decision-making activities.
Relatively few companies, however, maintain archives

t h ey are willing to make ava i l able to outsiders.
Corporations sell more than products; they also sell an
image or identity that directly affects public perceptions
of their products and services. It is not surprising,
therefore, that many corporations do not make their
records or archives accessible to the public and those
that do carefully control and limit access to them. Just
as members of the Cabinet objected to seeing their
candid comments in print, so, too, and for the same
reasons, the deliberations of officers of universities and
corporations are generally closed for a period of time,
ranging from 25 to 75 years. At Harvard University, for
example, records of the corporation � the governing
body of the university � are closed for 50 years and
other files, for example, student files, are not accessible
without the permission of a student. The issue of
restrictions is not about the right of any institution �
a corporation, university, church, or an individual � to
place certain restrictions on their archives; the real issue
is the type of restriction and how long it should apply.
On this issue, honest people often disagree.

Institutions, including universities, governments and
corporations, have used various methods to protect the
privacy of individuals and the free and open exchange

9
4 Herman Kahn," Who Shall Have Access?" Yale A l u m n i m ag a z i n e,
35, No. 6 (March 1972), pp. 6-11.
5 Ibid.

S e c t i o n I I
M O T I V A T I O N A N D I M P L I C A T I O N S
F O R U N D E R T A K I N G T H E F O R D

A R C H I V E S
R E S E A R C H P R O J E C T 183
183 Page 184 185
10
of opinions in management forums. While some
groups limit access based on the time restrictions
d e s c ribed prev i o u s ly, others opt for rev i ew of a
re s e a r ch e r 's notes or photocopies of ori g i n a l
documents. Corporations such as Ford have used all of
these techniques. Until recently, the Ford Archives, for
example, closed for 75 years any "records of such
n at u re that their disclosure� might re a s o n ably be
expected to prove harmful to Ford Motor Company." 6
This makes it all the more noteworthy that in creating
the research collection on Ford during World War II this
policy was not only waived, but the company has now
changed the Archives Access Policy and eliminated the
old restrictions.

Moti vation
Why has Ford gone to the trouble and expense of
trying to find out what happened at Ford-Werke during
the war? The class-action suit against Ford claimed that
Ford was in contact with Ford-Werke throughout the
war and was therefore aware of what was going on.
The charge, however, seems to contradict the account of
this period in Nevins and Hill's authorized history of
the company. 7 What did become clear to me was that
no one at Ford now knows in detail what actually
happened during the war. So, at one level, the answer
to the question of why bother uncovering the truth is
that senior management wanted to get to the bottom of
this discrepancy and determine what actually
happened. Indeed, these managers believed they had a
responsibility to do so.

Moreover, it is clear that Ford is committed to its
own history. The senior managers with whom I spoke
seemed to be remarkably aware of Ford's role in history
and committed to pre s e rving it. In 1951, Fo r d
e s t ablished the Ford A r ch i ve s , one of the fi r s t
corporations in America to establish such a collection.

Thirteen years later, Ford gave much of its historical
archives to Henry Ford Museum's Research Center
(generally known to the public as Henry Ford Museum
& Greenfield Village). Remarkably, these archives were
given to the museum (which, despite its name, is
independent from Ford Motor Company) with no
conditions placed on their use.

Business leaders often argue that decisions made for
financial or business reasons cannot be bound by social
or moral strictures. The rules of the marketplace, as
George Soros puts it, are essentially amoral and not the
same as those we may choose to act upon in our
personal lives. 8 Companies must behave as businesses
and cannot be expected to act from humanitarian
motives; to do so is to allow an advantage to one's
competitors. This is hard rhetoric and an even harder
reality, for as the historian Peter Hayes has observed
about a German company during the war, "when
political changes condition profit making in ways that
tend to have immoral results, a capitalist system will
prove strikingly malleable." 9 But if this is so, then the
capitalist system might also be malleable for moral
p u rp o s e s. S u ch corp o r ate accountab i l i t y, h oweve r,
requires a degree of public scrutiny and the honing of
collective memory to guide the actions of corporations,
g ove rn m e n t s , and individual citizens. In short ,
c o rp o r ate accountability re q u i res open access to
archives. Ford has chosen to provide such open access.

Still, to confront the uncertainty of its past with the
e n o rmous emotional burden implicit in the term
"forced labor" is highly unusual for any institution, but
especially a corporation concerned about corporate
image and, of course, legal liability. I asked the
question many times � why did you go looking for
evidence that might not reflect well on Ford? I heard
all of the reasons I have already described, but, in the
e n d , p e r h aps the most compelling reason is that

An Independent Assessment of the Ford Motor Company Research Project on Fo r d -We rke Under the Nazi Regi m e

6 "Access Policy: Ford Motor Company Archives."
7 Allan Nevins and Frank E. Hill, Fo r d : Decline and Rebirt h , 1 9 3 3 -1
9 6 2 (NewYork: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1963). See also, Mira
Wilkins and Frank E. Hill, American Business Abroad: Ford on Six
Continents (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1964).

8 George Soros, The Crisis of Global Capitalism: Open Society Endange re d
(NewYork: Public Affairs, 1998), pp. xv-xvii, 43-46. Although
Soros acknowledges the unsentimental rules that guide money-making,
he is not an apostle of the marketplace as the ultimate
arbiter of social values. In fact, his book is an impassioned
appeal for collective action to preserve what he calls an "Open
Society."

9 Peter Hayes, Industry and Ideology : IG Farben in the Nazi Era
(Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1987),
p. 381. 184
184 Page 185 186
management says it must stand behind the Ford name.
Whatever did or did not happen more than 50 years
ago during a war must not be the excuse that prevents
current management from doing the right thing; the
i n t e g rity and image of Ford or, for that mat t e r,
individuals or governments, must not forever be held
hostage to its past. In effect, Ford seems to have
decided that it is not only a business, but also a citizen
of the world, a decision with implications that go far
beyond Ford's immediate objective of finding the facts
about what happened at Ford-Werke during the war.

Practical and Social Implications
of the Project

A December 6, 1998, editorial in the New York Times,
although hardly friendly to Ford, did raise the level of
p u blic discourse about corp o r ate responsibility by
looking beyond the claims made against American
companies in Germany during World War II. The
editorial, while arguing for corporate responsibility for
past actions, also recognizes that corp o r at e
responsibility is an ongoing pro blem and
acknowledges the complexity of relationships between
international corporations and dictatorial regimes. "It
is unrealistic," according to the Times, "to expect that
corporations will refrain from trade or investment with
bad governments. But they should hold themselves to
some guidelines. Their own practices should not be
abusive, even if local laws allow it." 10 Fair enough. But
the guidelines are not always so easy to see; the
complexity of operating in different cultures, with
different political, economic, and legal systems, does
not always translate seamlessly into re s p o n s i bl e
corporate practice. This is not meant to excuse the
abuses by American and foreign corporations described
in the editorial, but it is an acknowledgement that
historical reality is often complex and information at
the time may be less than perfect.

To understand decisions of the past, one must
examine the evidence contained in arch i ve s. It is
p e r h aps wo rth re m e m b e ring that one of the pri m a ry
reasons corp o r ations adopted systematic or scientifi c
m a n agement pro c e d u res in the 19th century was to
replace individual memory with org a n i z at i o n a l
m e m o ry. The development of the circular letter and

l ater rule books and manuals we re attempts to
e s t ablish control through commu n i c at i o n ; these we re
the tools for establishing org a n i z ational authori t y,
re g i s t e ring decisions and policies, and providing the
g rounds for c o rp o r ate memory. 1 1 I f, h oweve r,
corporate records are forever exempt from public
access, then a significant segment of society's collective
memory is lost. Responsible practice depends on
public scrutiny of corporate decision-making; access to
corporate records is essential for this purpose. If, as
many corporations insist, they have no archives, then
both public scrutiny and corporate citizenship are
denied.

The implications of denied access may not be
immediately apparent and go far beyond an assessment
of an unpleasant era many would like to fo rg e t .
C o rp o r at i o n s , e s p e c i a l ly mu l t i n ational corp o r at i o n s ,
exert enormous influence in the world today. The
decisions they make, even with the best of intentions,
affect the lives of people everywhere. The traditional
rules imposed by nation-states are no longer sufficient
to regulate the actions of international organizations.
In an age when in the course of a few months 40
percent of the population of Asia can suddenly be
reduced to poverty by economic forces that no one
truly understands, we may well wonder how humanity
can avoid making unwise decisions, let alone informed
or moral ones. 12 Now more than ever, multinational
corporations, some with wealth exceeding all but a
handful of nations, make decisions that affect us all.
Collective memory, not laws or the legal system, sets the
guidelines for responsible corporate behavior in an
international setting.

We tend to port r ay memory as a re t ri eval or
re p re s e n t ation of the world and conventionalize the
past to make it fit our own experi e n c e. M o re re c e n t ly,
h oweve r, some re s e a r chers have begun to look at
m e m o ry as an act that we part i c i p ate in together,
e n abling a community to pre s e rve a version of the

M o t i v at i on an d I mp l i c at i on s f o r Un d e r t a ki ng t he For d A r c h i v e s Re s e ar c h Pr o j e c t
1 0 E d i t o ri a l , " C o rp o r ations and Conscience," New Yo rk Ti m e s
(December 6,1998), p. 16.
1 1 Joanne Yates, Control Through Communicat i o n : The Rise of System in
American Manage m e n t (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1989), pp. 10-12, 66-71.

1 2 Soros, pp. 135-146. 185
185 Page 186 187
12
p a s t . And what we as a society choose to remember is
p re s e rved in arch i ve s , l i b r a ri e s , mu s e u m s , and cultural
a rt i fa c t s. The act of re m e m b e ring is cap t u red in
families and institutions, including corp o r at i o n s , a n d
in the evidence contained in arch i ves and librari e s. 1 3
It is no accident that after the collapse of Eastern
Europe, the first thing people did was to seize the
archives; it was an attempt to reclaim their identity.
Archives are essential to our collective memory; they
represent who we are.

The loss of archives, that is, the loss of the evidence
that records the past, is not just a loss to scholars who
try to interpret history and, to the extent that the past
has any bearing on the present, help us to understand
ourselves. The loss of that part of corporate memory
embedded in archives is the loss also of what historian
David Lowenthal calls "heritage," that is, the attempt to
look at history with some purpose in mind. In the
words of Lowenthal, "All of us � as individuals, as
n at i o n s , as ethnic and other entities" i n c l u d i n g
corporations � "adapt the past to our presumed
advantage. Such acts undeniably deform history for
heritage aims; and heritage is further corrupted by
being popularized, commoditized, and politicized." 14

The existence of archives and the very idea of
collective memory are not just academic exercises.
What is saved and not saved in archives has real
consequences for society. One of the defi n i n g
questions of our time is how social institutions and
va l u e s , including economic institutions and
organizations, can adapt in a period of increased

globalization and accelerating change? How do we
understand the consequences of our actions without a
viable record of those institutions that are principal
agents in these changes? Archives � the evidence of
our collective memory � is the part of our experience
we must examine as we attempt to adapt our
institutions to these new conditions.

As I have indicated, corporations have good reasons
to be cautious about granting unconditional access to
their records, which is why so many companies do not
maintain archives. They have much to lose and, in the
short run, little to gain. But can any institution in a
civilized society be exempt from public scru t i ny ?
Individuals, in the United States at least, have recourse
for recovering from the government information that
has been limited or denied to them; no such right
appears to exist in the case of individuals seeking
information from corporations. Yet the influence of
corporations on our lives is equal or greater than that of
government itself. Ford Motor Company's response to
the current inquiry about forced labor during the war
is remarkable for being the right decision at this time,
and quite possibly the right decision for any time.
Ford's decision suggests that it wants to be more than
just a business, the creature of competitive interests
alone. It aspires also to be a citizen of the world. Ford's
decision to create a collection and make it accessible
may make it untenable in the future for corporations to
be excused from public scrutiny because they do not
have an archive.

An Independent Assessment of the Ford Motor Company Research Project on Fo r d -We rke Under the Nazi Regi m e

1 3 D avid Middleton and Derek Edwa r d s , e d s. , C o l l e c t i ve
R e m e m b e r i n g (London: Sage Publications, 1990).
1 4 David Lowenthal, Possessed by the Pa s t : The Heritage Crusade and the
Spoils of History (NewYork: The Free Press, 1996), p. 87. 186
186 Page 187 188
Ford chose to make any evidence it discovered as a
result of its investigation available to the public. It was
d e c i d e d , t h e re fo re, to turn over this arch i ve �
technically, a collection, since it comprises copies of
materials drawn from a number of sources � to an
independent repository. The new collection, "Ford-Werke
Under the Nazi Regime," will be housed at the
Research Center at Henry Ford Museum. The collection
will be accessible to anyone who wishes to examine it.

Description of the System of Access
The value of any collection depends not only on the
quality of its contents and occasionally its proximity to
the researcher, but also on the quality and reliability of
the finding aids and tools for using it. At one time, it
was believed that arch i ves might save money by
reducing the space needed to store records; microfilm
was the new technology that would provide a solution
to this age-old problem. Microfilm, like other forms of
miniaturization, could of course save space (assuming
one could discard the originals). It soon became clear,
however, that the greatest cost was not storing a
collection, but describing, or cataloging, it to enable
readers with varied backgrounds asking unexpected
questions to search it. With this in mind, Ford spared
no expense and expended great effort to create a system
of access that offers multiple paths into the Ford-Werke
collection.

The "system of access" p re p a red by the Fo r d
Archives Research Project includes an exceptionally
rich database that is searchable in a variety of ways, and
a set of eight topical papers, referred to by the Ford
Archives Research Project as white papers, that draw on
and cite specific documents in the collection.
Additionally, a chronology provides summaries of the
documents in chronological order; it is a time line of
the history of Ford-Werke. A report on the research
findings, drawing on the white papers, provides an
ove rv i ew of the entire collection. F i n a l ly, a n
independent re p o rt by Pri c ewat e r h o u s e C o o p e r s
analyzes in considerable depth the financial issues
concerning Ford-Werke during World War II; these
findings richly inform the report on the research
findings. The database, the report on the research
fi n d i n g s , the white pap e r s , and the ch ro n o l o g y
constitute a system of access for nav i g ating the
collection; they are an extraordinary set of tools for
locating individual items and, at the same time, for
viewing each item within its historical context. Each
part of the system of access is described below.

The Database
To manage and improve access to the collection of
documents assembled by the Ford Archives Research
Project, a database was created that will make it possible
to locate specific documents in a variety of ways. The

S e c t i o n I I I
A S S E S S I N G T H E S Y S T E M
O F A C C E S S 187
187 Page 188 189
14
database is the key to the collection. It is a guide, not
only to what is in the collection, but also to what has
been evaluated and is not included in the collection.
For each item in the collection, the database includes
information about the repository where it was found,
as well as the item's record group, file folder and
document number. The database is searchable by the
title of the document, Bates number 15 , subject, date,
repository, genre, and also by date and genre, for
example, "1938 report." In addition, one can conduct
a free-text search on any of the descriptions in the note
field. Equally important, and perhaps uniquely so, one
can see which sources the research teams examined
without finding info rm at i o n . By showing these
"failed" sources, the database will help a researcher
avoid spending time on fruitless searches. On the other
hand, a skeptical reader will be able to retrace the steps
of the research teams to verify their accuracy or reveal
their biases in selecting and rejecting materials for the
c o l l e c t i o n . Files that cannot be included in the
collection for reasons of pri vacy and Germ a n
constitutional law have surro g ate records with
summary descriptions and the location of the originals;
they can be examined in the German repository where
they are housed. The database may not eliminate the
need to visit German archives, but it will be the starting
place for any inquiry even remotely related to the topics
covered in the collection.

The database is unusual in providing a level of detail
in a surrogate record that permits one to retrieve
information without having to look at the original
documents, many of which are in German. Also,
instead of the traditional archival approach of ordering
information by provenance or function, the database
c re ated by the Ford A r ch i ves Research Project is
s t ru c t u red in a way that permits one to re t ri eve
everything on, say, Belgium, or a coded subject or
keyword in the note field. The process of translating
and summarizing documents and coding them for
subjects (described in Appendix B) provides a level of
detail rarely found in archival inventories or guides.
The level of detail added significantly to the complexity
of the project and the time required to complete it, but

it also provides unparalleled access to the collection for
any researcher.

Chronology of Events
The approximately 600 pages of the chronology
document the history of Ford-Werke from 1907, the
date of Ford's first imports to Germany, to 1967. The
chronology is based on the documents in the collection
and includes overviews of activities and events drawn
from the summaries prepared for the database. A few
historical gaps have been filled in from secondary
sources, for example, the entry under January 30,
1 9 3 3 , s t at e s : "The radio interrupts its re g u l a r
programming shortly after noon to break the news that
Adolf Hitler has been appointed Chancellor." This
i n fo rm ation was not included in any of the
repositories, but it is pertinent to the Ford-Werke
context. Thus, the chronology provides a time line of
the activities and events concerning Ford-Werke keyed
to the documents in the collection; it provides a useful
outline of the events of the period and will be
particularly useful to anyone interested only in events
occurring at a particular time. It also provides a
unifying framework for both the collection in general
and the report on research findings, discussed on the
next page, which are organized around topics that
overlap one another chronologically.

White P apers: Topical Guides to the
Collection

A series of white papers, or topical papers, based on
the documents in the collection, were prepared by
members of the Ford Archives Research Project as a way
of focusing on the central themes of the project. The
white papers provide a historical context and
framework for integrating the documents drawn from
multiple sources for each topic. They also provide a
way for slicing a large and complex mass of documents
into manageable pieces. Eight white papers were
produced over the course of the project. They are:

1. Historical Research on the Activities of Ford-Werke
AG During the Second World War. This
report discusses all of the repositories visited
during the project and includes a list of the
collections that were examined.

An Independent Assessment of the Ford Motor Company Research Project on Fo r d -We rke Under the Nazi Regi m e
1 5 A Bates number is a control number that uniquely identifies
each page of every document in the collection. 188
188 Page 189 190
2. Ford Motor Company and Fo r d -We r ke AG
Communications During the Second World War.

3. Key People in the History of Fo r d -We r ke,
Cologne.

4. War Damage to Ford Facilities in Europe.
5. Po s t war Military Gove rnment Supervision of
Ford-Werke.

6. Ford-Werke in the Nazi Era, 1933-1945. This
p aper incorp o r ates several themes, m i l i t a ry
production and its role during the war, Nazi
economic policies and controls over the auto
industry, and Ford-Werke's relations with other
Ford facilities in occupied Europe.

7. Fo r d 's Contri bution to the Allied War Effo rt
During World War II.

8. Fo reign and Forced labor at Fo r d -We r ke AG
During World War II.

In addition, PricewaterhouseCoopers has prepared a
report that provides in-depth coverage of finances of
Ford-Werke before, during, and just after the war.

Report on the Research Findings
A report on the research findings titled Research
Findings About Ford-Werke Under the Nazi Regime
provides an overview of the activities and events of the
period documented by the collection. Although the
re p o rt consciously tries to avoid interp re t ation or
conclusions, it does provide historical background for
the activities and events documented by the collection.

In this sense, the report, like the white papers, aims to
be objective and tries to avoid any interpretation of the
ev i d e n c e. The goal is to let the facts speak fo r
t h e m s e l ve s , as it we re, even when documents
occasionally contradict one another. This objective has
largely been achieved, although one might argue that
"objectivity" is negated by the very selection of the
documents to be included in the report. In any case,
the report, like the collection itself, does not flinch
from presenting conflicting evidence, and includes
those documents that do not reflect favorably on Ford-Werke.
For example, the report contains conflicting
t e s t i m o ny about conditions of fo reign and fo r c e d
workers at Ford-Werke, especially regarding medical
treatment. The evidence on some topics is scarce and
can be quite ambiguous. To Ford's credit, the ambiguity
and complexity has been preserved and is reflected
both in the collection and in this report on the research
findings.

The re p o rt fo l l ows the arch i val tradition of
providing a context for understanding the documents
within the collection. The report includes extensive
c i t ations to specific documents that gre at ly assist
readers wanting to know more or examine in detail a
particular topic. Reading through the entire report
provides an overall sense of the content and the scope
of the collection; browsing the table of contents or
selected portions of the report lets the reader determine
whether there are materials in the collection that are
worth further investigation. The report is an important
and useful contribution to the system of access to the
collection.

As s e s s i n g t he Sy s t e m o f A c c e s s 189
189 Page 190 191
16
An Independent Assessment of the Ford Motor Company Research Project on Fo r d -We rke Under the Nazi Regi m e 190
190 Page 191 192
Managing such a complex project was an ongoing
challenge for the Ford Archives Research Project. The
sheer size and scope of the project, with five research
teams on two continents, dealing in two languages,
different cultures, and multiple archival repositories �
each with their own procedures and rules � required
l e a d e r s h i p, f l e x i b i l i t y, and good commu n i c at i o n .
Delays prevented the project from being completed as
quickly as expected or hoped. Intense press scrutiny
created periodic demands on Ford Archives Research
Project staff members to search for documents to
support a public response by Ford to one allegation or
a n o t h e r. Fo r d 's legal department deve l o p e d
requirements for the project (discussed later in this
report) that resulted in the creation of a remarkable
database. However, the development of the database
added significantly to the cost and time it took to
complete the project. Pressure to make the collection
available quickly, especially during the first year, was
p e r h aps inev i t abl e, but Ford did not permit the
exigencies of legal issues or public re l ations to
undermine its primary objectives of being thorough
and finding the facts.

Managing and Staffing the Project
Ford assembled a highly professional staff to conduct
this project. Elizabeth Adkins, Ford's manager of
Archives Services, who planned and was responsible for

implementing the project, has extensive experience in
m a n aging corp o r ate arch i ve s. Because this wa s
essentially an archival project, her experience has been
crucial to the project's success. She has a small,
competent staff at the Ford Archives in Dearborn,
w h i ch was supplemented by a number of
paraprofessionals in the early stages of the project and
professional historians, who were hired over the course
of the project.

To quickly put together teams in Washington and
Germany, Ms. Adkins turned to The Winthrop Group
and History Associates Inc. Winthrop provided the
team leader, an archivist with extensive experience in
corporate archives and knowledge of federal records, to
m a n age the Washington team. H i s t o ry A s s o c i at e s
p rovided the historians for the Washington team,
including an economic historian, a historian who has
worked extensively with federal records on a number of
research projects, and a native German specialist in the
history of Nazi Germany. This was a highly skilled
group, with historical knowledge, research experience,
p ro fe s s i o n a l i s m , and independent judgment that
contributed enormously to the thoroughness of the
entire project.

The German team was under the direction of a Ph. D.
in modern history who has worked on many research
projects on Nazi-era history. Another historian, a

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A S S E S S I N G T H E
F O R D A R C H I V E S
R E S E A R C H P R O J E C T 191
191 Page 192 193
18
specialist in forced labor and compensation issues,
served as an adviser on the initial survey and joined the
project in January 1999. The German team also had the
advice of an archivist who is a member of a long-term
project to research the Nazi era. She has investigated
forced labor and provided advice about the nature of
archival materials on forced labor.

Although the manager of Ford's Archives Services
was responsible for leading the Ford Archives Research
Project, Ford also relied on outside historians and
archivists to staff the project. PricewaterhouseCoopers
assigned an experienced accountant to lead its effort to
assist the Ford Archives Research Project in identifying
and understanding the financial records of this period.
To provide historical advice, Ford hired Dr. Simon
Reich, a political scientist who has conducted extensive
re s e a r ch on the automotive industry in Germ a ny
during and after World War II and is particularly
knowledgeable about Ford Motor Company. He advised
the Ford Archives Research Project about potential
German sources and has helped to ensure that no
important archival sources were overlooked. Finally, as
indicated in the beginning of this report, I was hired to
provide an independent assessment of the archival
methods and procedures for creating the collection and
how the public would be able to retrieve information
from it. I have a Ph. D. in history and more than 25
years of experience administering archives and libraries
at Harvard and Yale universities. I was also asked to
va l i d ate the independence of the entire pro j e c t .
Appendix A outlines the steps I followed in monitoring
the project.

Decisions for Success
I cannot emphasize enough the tremendous scope
and size of this project and how much work the Ford
Archives Research Project has done in a very short
period of time. This was an enormous undertaking.
During the past 3 1 �2 years, 45 people have, at various
times, been employed on the project. More than 8,000
cubic feet of materials were reviewed at the Ford
Archives and records facilities, Henry Ford Museum's
Research Center, and the National Archives. The guides
and indexes to these materials were analyzed first to
determine whether they contained relevant materials.

Staff went through the boxes of material that looked
promising and photocopied any relevant content for
inclusion in the collection. In all, more than 5,000
boxes of material were examined � not including the
German archives, where documents are retrieved by
folder, not by carton.

As project manager, Elizabeth Adkins had to balance
the varied and sometimes conflicting expectations of
several professions, some within the company, with the
multiple needs of five research teams scattered across
two continents. She responded to these pressures by
creating a remarkably open environment that fostered
communication and engaged a very diverse staff in an
iterative process that contributed enormously to the
success of the entire project.

The sheer volume of archives that the Ford Archives
Research Project had to examine and the quantity of
documents that had to be photocopied, described,
categorized, and entered into the database required a
flexible process that could evolve over time. The
research team's flexibility and willingness to adapt
methods to the particular circumstances of each
situation have been critical to the success of the project.
Fear of losing control over the process and inordinate
e x p e c t ations for completing the project in a few
months might easily have resulted in the adoption of
prescriptive procedures. If the Ford Archives Research
Project had resorted to a less flexible process, the result
would have been a disaster. Staff excessively devoted to
following a blueprint is unlikely to take risks or follow
their hunches in seeking evidence. The more open and
iterative process adopted by the Ford Archives Research
P roject ensured that the principal focus was on
collecting the evidence and not on obsessive ly
scrutinizing the methodology and adhering to a plan.

With five teams turning up documents, it was
essential to track what was being discovered and where
each piece fit into the collection. To this end, weekly
conference calls to compare notes and offer leads were
conducted among members of the Dearborn and
Washington teams with the occasional participation of
the PricewaterhouseCoopers team. All of the team
members with whom I spoke ag reed that these
exchanges were essential to the ongoing work of the

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192 Page 193 194
project. Because the Dearborn teams began work two
months before the Washington team, they could direct
the Washington team to look for certain materials. This
helped the Washington team to alert staff working at
the National Archives to be on the lookout for certain
kinds of information; this assistance proved invaluable
in locating important documents. These ongoing
discussions were also important in helping to refine the
database, prepare the research reports, and develop
e f fe c t i ve subject cat e g o ries and quality contro l
procedures, which are described in Appendix B.

It soon became apparent to the research teams that to
locate and photocopy the most important documents
from a huge quantity of records meant that they could
not try to identify every last shred of evidence. Thus,
the teams, e s p e c i a l ly those working on the va s t
holdings of the National Archives and the microfilm of
German archives, adopted the 80/ 20 rule, the idea that
20 percent of the archives would produce 80 percent of
the evidence. This is an archival approach to gathering
ev i d e n c e. In contrast, s cholars typically wish to
eva l u ate and interp ret each document. For the
archivist, the aim is to copy any relevant document,
rather than read and evaluate each piece of evidence.
For example, one would photocopy a statement by
Robert Schmidt, Custodian of Ford-Werke, about a
meeting he attended in Portugal during the war, rather
than try to determine whether the statement is true or
an embellishment. This practical accommodation for
managing the project was qualified by the desire of
Ford's legal team to be more exhaustive in the pursuit
of all potential sources of evidence. Nevertheless, the
80/ 20 rule proved to be an essential strategy for
dealing with an enormous quantity of records. If the
Ford Archives Research Project has done its job well, the
basic story of Ford-Werke during the war will not be
appreciably altered by the discovery of new documents
in the future.

The inevitable tension between the archival � just
the facts � approach and the historians' desire to
pursue every lead and interpret the evidence required
members of both professions to adjust their principles
and resist some inclinations of their respective fields.
The German historians, for example, who were very
disciplined in their approach to documentary evidence,
were less familiar with the kind of wholesale approach

to research that aims to document a particular issue,
often stemming from litigat i o n , t h at has become
i n c re a s i n g ly common in the United Stat e s. T h e
difference in the two approaches is illustrated by the
fact that the new National Archives facility in College
Park, Maryland (Archives II) has an entire area devoted
to servicing the requests of lawyers, reporters, and
others for large quantities of documents about a
s p e c i fic issue or eve n t . T h e re is simply nothing
comparable to the National Archives' service in German
archives, where a "qualified" scholar must write �
sometimes with an introduction � to reserve a place
for doing research in each archive. These differences in
culture, archival practices, and notions of the law, along
with more stringent requirements for confidentiality
and privacy in Germany, increased the time it took to
complete the project.

Pe r h aps the most notewo rt hy impact of Fo r d 's
decision to open the collection to the public has been
its positive influence on the way members of the five
teams approached their work. The level of involvement
and commitment to the project by historians and
archivists who contracted with Ford was substantially
greater than one might have expected if there had not
been a commitment to make the evidence available to
the public. The highly emotional nature of the issues in
this research was bound to raise fears about Ford's
commitment to reveal evidence that might not reflect
well on the company. What I discovered, however, was
that the team members all demonstrated a level of
commitment to, and engagement in, the research that
equaled the importance of the issues under
investigation. At no time during the course of my
investigation has anyone at Ford or anyone involved in
the Ford Archives Research Project suggested or given
any indication that they would avoid evidence or
c e rtain issues because the disclosure might be
e m b a rrassing to Fo r d . In sum, I believe Fo r d 's
commitment to open access has been critical to the
quality of work and personal involvement of project
staff and, ultimately, to the quality of the collection.

Expanding the Scope of the Project and
Delays Along the Way

The scope of the research project expanded over the
course of time, and inevitable delays were encountered.

Assessi ng the Ford A r c h i ves Research Project 193
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20
Searching was refined over time as researchers learned
more about Ford-Werke and Germany during the war.
The team conducted selective oral history interviews to
supplement the documentary evidence or enri ch
knowledge about issues for which there was little
documentation. When the researchers examined the
Ford-Werke plant, turning up more documents than
they expected to find, they decided to copy everything
p e rtaining to Ford during the war and not just
documents that fit the primary criteria of the research
project. Their rationale was that information about the
operation of Ford-Werke during this period was scarce,
hence any and all documents ought to be preserved.
A c t u a l ly, although the personnel and other
administrative files discovered during the search of
Ford-Werke contained little information about forced
l ab o r, t h ey we re, n eve rt h e l e s s , quite helpful fo r
understanding the operation and conditions of the
plant during the war.

Not only was the scope of the project and the
volume of documents that were copied and processed
daunting, but the Ford Archives Research Project had to
consider diffe rent perspectives within Ford Motor
Company and balance these against the primary fact-finding
mission of the project. The company's legal
team was obviously interested to know about any
documents or evidence that might have a bearing on
pending legal mat t e r s. The legal team there fo re
p romoted searches in certain record groups that
historians on the research teams deemed a lower
priority. Ford's Public Affairs staff had to respond to
media charges that were often sweeping and inaccurate.
The work of collecting and photocopying documents
on two continents and, even more, creating a system to
provide access to it, clearly committed the archivists
and historians to a slower pace than their colleagues in
the company might expect. Balancing the needs of
each group was an ongoing challenge; to its credit, the
company and the Ford Archives Research Project never
lost sight of its primary objective to find out what
happened in Germany during the war.

The legal challenges to Ford did extend the time it
took the Ford Archives Research Project to complete its
work. However, Ford's lawyers never changed the
direction of the search for documents by the Ford

Archives Research Project. Counsel made no requests
to verify or deny specific facts about issues of forced
labor or communications between Ford and Ford-Werke
during the war. Legal concerns did have an
impact on the project in setting a tone or general
direction for thoroughness: Legal teams requested that
researchers look for documents that historians would
consider less valuable. For example, research staff
examined all of the files of the U. S. Embassy in Great
B ri t a i n , not just the files that mentioned Fo r d .
Voluminous embassy files in the records of the State
Department for several countries � France, Portugal,
Spain, and Sweden � were searched, even though it
seemed unlikely they would provide much information
about Ford-Werke; and, in fact, they did not. The value
of conducting such a thorough search was that there
would be no surprises in the future. Consequently, the
legal influence on the search was driven less by the
expectation of finding useful documents and more by
the intention of ensuring that the records of certain
agencies and offices had been thoroughly searched,
even if the search revealed nothing new. The legal goal
was to "get everything" in certain quarters in contrast
to the 80/ 20 rule; the result was to lengthen the time
spent looking for documents that seemed unlikely, from
an historian's perspective, to produce new information.
But it also ensured nothing was missed that might later
alter the story told by the collection.

Throughout the course of the project, but especially
d u ring the first 18 months, media re p o rts put
enormous pressure on Ford to respond to accounts and
allegations, diverting Ford Archives Research Project
staff from their work. News stories about Ford's use of
forced labor, descriptions of conditions of workers
during the war, reiteration of old charges about Henry
Fo r d , e s p e c i a l ly ch a rges of anti-Semitism and his
acceptance of the Grand Cross (the highest honor the
German government could bestow upon a non-German
citizen during the Nazi regime), and other sensational
charges had Public Affairs personnel working overtime.
Often they had to check with the Archives to verify facts
or look up documents to correct misinterpretations or
charges that simply had no basis in fact. A few
examples will illustrate the way media stories diverted
the Ford Archives Research Project from its principal
mission.

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One story claimed that Ford-Werke plant manager
Robert Schmidt, who was later named custodian by the
Supreme Court of Cologne, was a member of the Nazi
party. This statement was based on a letter in the files
of the United States Department of Justice and was well
known to project staff, but they had never been able to
confirm it with other sources, such as the official
membership files of the Nazi party in Cologne.
Moreover, a thorough search for this evidence after the
war by Allied military authorities was also unable to
verify Schmidt's membership in the Nazi party. It is
unlikely Schmidt could have been appointed custodian
in May 1942 without the approval of the Nazi party,
even if he never offi c i a l ly became a member.
Nevertheless, the sensational nature of the accusation,
especially after Schmidt was rehired by Ford after the
war, required Ford Archives Research Project staff to
devote time once again to a search for anything that
might shed light on this claim.

On another occasion there were reports that 40
b abies died at Fo r d -We r ke during the wa r.
Investigation revealed that this was the number of
infants who died in Cologne and not the number of
infant deaths at the Ford plant. Again, staff had to spend
time looking for information to respond to and correct
these public allegations by the press.

Another sensational story reported that Ford Motor
Company was implicated in the horrors of Auschwitz.
A member of the German re s e a r ch team wa s

immediately dispatched to Auschwitz, where it was
learned that the only mention of Ford contained in a
newly released index of documents at Auschwitz was a
letter ordering a part for a truck. This fact was hardly
worthy of a headline, but this kind of media attention
buffeted and diverted Archives staff throughout the first
18 months or so of the project and further delayed its
completion.

While research to support legal and public relations
requirements contributed to the complexity and length
of the pro j e c t , the aspect of the project most
responsible for complicating and expanding it was the
creation of a database based on legal, rather than
a r ch i va l , p ri n c i p l e s. The system of access to the
collection, described previously, is a hybrid system
derived from legal practice, historical methods, and
archival principles. The database follows a legal model
that summarizes documents and provides access to each
item in the collection. The model enables busy lawyers
to quickly locate specific documents during litigation.
But because historians, instead of paralegal staff wrote
the notes and summaries, the descriptions tend to be
briefer than the more detailed summaries a lawyer
might expect from their paralegal staff. For archivists,
such a system is an unimaginable luxury. Despite the
cost in time and effort of developing such a database,
this system of access will provide both scholars and
casual users with unparalleled access, by a variety of
criteria, to individual items in a large and complex
collection.

Assessi ng the Ford A r c h i ves Research Project 195
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22
An Independent Assessment of the Ford Motor Company Research Project on Fo r d -We rke Under the Nazi Regi m e 196
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The collection created by the Ford Archives Research
Project represents an exhaustive effort to find the facts
about the operation of Ford-Werke during the war and
postwar military control, the use of forced labor at the
Cologne plant, and Fo r d -We r ke 's re l ations with
Dearborn during the war. As stated previously, it is
entirely possible that additional documents eventually
will be discovered in Germany or elsewhere, but it is
unlikely that any new evidence will change significantly
the basic story told by this collection. Scholars may
i n t e rp ret the evidence by the light of their ow n
experiences, convictions, and historical understanding,
but any future study must begin with the collection of
Ford in Germany in World War II.

The Collection
The evidence assembled in this collection is
indispensable for a study of Ford-Werke for this period.
The collection's contents include materials on the
history of Ford-Werke, Nazi economic policies and
their control over the automotive industry, German
industrial mobilization and preparations for war, Ford
and the wartime economy, and military production at
Ford-Werke. Also included is significant information
about foreign and forced labor in Germany during the
war, Ford-Werke's relationship with other Ford facilities
in occupied Europe, and communications between
Ford-Werke and Ford Motor Company headquarters in

Dearborn. Finally, significant material on the end of the
war and postwar military occupation, war damage to
Ford-Werke, and the finances of Ford-Werke during the
war and the postwar period rounds out the collection.

Gaps in the Collection
The collection has some gaps in its content. In spite
of an exhaustive search of the records in Dearborn, the
U. S. National Archives, Ford-Werke, and numerous
archives in Germany, there are several topics for which
the lack of documentation is disappointing. One of the
key issues for the Ford Archives Research Project was to
find out what happened to foreign workers at Ford-Werke.
The collection provides good data about the
number of workers, but information about individuals
is very limited. Some personnel files for German
employees were found at Ford-Werke, but no file exists
on forced workers, and little information on them
appears to have survived the war. Much of what is
known about the workers has come from oral history
interviews, long after the war, and, as one might
e x p e c t , t h e re is conflicting testimony about local
conditions.

The Ford Archives Research Project might have
found info rm ation about forced lab o r, i n c l u d i n g
i n fo rm ation about Fo r d -We r ke 's ap p l i c ation fo r
workers, at the Cologne Labor Office. However, the

S e c t i o n V
A S S E S S I N G T H E C O L L E C T I O N 197
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24
An Independent Assessment of the Ford Motor Company Research Project on Fo r d -We rke Under the Nazi Regi m e
office was bombed during the war and the records
were apparently destroyed. Following the path that had
previously been pursued by Allied military government
i nve s t i g ators immediat e ly after the wa r, the Fo r d
Archives Research Project tried to find some remnant of
these records in Cologne, but found very little.

Research at Ford-Werke also revealed conflicting
reports about the number of workers at the end of the
war. Allied forces reported numbers that are higher
than those cited by official Ford accounts. It is possible
that the U. S. Army's numbers are only rough estimates
of the number of people they found as they entered the
Cologne plant. In the confusion of the last days of the
war people simply found shelter where they could,
which may explain why the Army's numbers were
higher than the company 's records suggested.
Unfortunately, there appears to be no way of knowing
how many of the people the Army found at Ford-Werke
were actually forced workers and how many were
refugees or even if the company's figures were accurate.

Research Opportunities
With the exception of someone writing a history of
Ford-Werke during the war, having the collection at
Henry Ford Museum's Research Center may not save a
researcher a trip to Germany. 16 However, the scope of
the collection and the power of the database and other
finding aids make it the starting place for researching a
number of topics concerning Germany during the war.
In addition to serving as a comprehensive resource for
the study of Ford Motor Company and Ford-Werke
during the war years, this collection constitutes a very
significant and important historical resource for several
other topics, as outlined in the following paragraphs.

Anyone interested in the question of how industry
(not just Ford) operated under the Nazi regime will
find a gold mine of information in this collection.
Although there may have been unique aspects about
Ford's relationship to the Nazi regime, principally
because it was a fo reign company, the collection
provides substantial documentation about Nazi general

economic and industrial policies and their effect on
companies. During the war, foreign companies such as
Ford operated under the management of a custodian
appointed by the Nazi party. This and other aspects of
the company's experience of operating during the war
are amply represented in this collection.

Although documentation about individual forced
workers at Ford-Werke is limited and the collection says
little about how workers were recruited or forced to go
to Germ a ny, the collection contains import a n t
information about the policies and actual use of forced
labor in Germany during the war. Working and living
conditions could vary from one plant to another and
from one region of Germany to another, but the
collection does provide a good picture of the role of
forced labor in German industry in general, and Ford-Werke
in particular, during this period.

American attitudes toward the use of forced labor is
another topic on which this collection is quite
illuminating. The complexity of the entire issue of
forced labor and the ambiguous relationship of a
fo reign company, s u ch as Fo r d , to the Germ a n
government is evident in the collection. So, too, is the
plight of German managers and workers who had to
negotiate between the demands of the Nazi regime and
their own survival. Based on the evidence in this
collection, the experiences of both companies and
individuals appear to have been more complex than
their critics assume.

The history of emerging international corporations
is also complex, and is well documented in this
collection. The early history of globalization and all of
its attendant complications is one of the more
interesting strengths of the collection. Ford began
producing automobiles in Germany in 1925 and in
Cologne in 1931; it also had a number of plants and
operations throughout Europe. At the time, Ford was
becoming a global corporation and had to negotiate
among different governments, legal practices, and tax
codes, as well as a variety of customs and employment
practices for labor and management. The collection
documents the struggle of one company to find a niche
in an important industry that was rapidly becoming a
global enterp ri s e, a development that was furt h e r
complicated by a world at war. The evidence points to

1 6 Although forced labor is thoroughly documented in the
collection, because of German privacy laws, some documents
relating to individuals can be examined only in the German
repositories. 198
198 Page 199 200
a far more complex history than many have assumed.
Instead of a monolithic corporation with each foreign
plant tightly controlled by Dearborn, the documents
reveal an organizational structure in which the parent
company had to accommodate itself to local and
sometimes hostile conditions. The relationship of
parent and local companies was complicated by the

p a rent company 's re l ationships with its other
p roduction fa c i l i t i e s , w h i ch we re operating in
neighboring and often competing countries within the
same regional market. Many of the early issues of
globalization and international competition faced by
Ford and others of this period resonate even more
today.

Assessing the Collecti on 199
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26
An Independent Assessment of the Ford Motor Company Research Project on Fo r d -We rke Under the Nazi Regi m e 200
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S e c t i o n V I
As I began to write this report, I became increasingly
aware that Ford Motor Company's effort to document
these events and make them public could have major
i m p l i c ations for the way all corp o r ations and
institutions will have to conduct themselves in the
future. Public reaction to the revelation of forced labor
and the atrocities of the Nazi regime has led some
observers to rush to judgment � even when the
evidence is less than compelling. But in trying to find
documents that might reveal what actually happened
during the war, Ford has done more than just find the
facts. By acknowledging its own history during a
complex and ambiguous period of history, Ford has set
a standard that could influence other companies to
open their records to public scrutiny in the future.

Few companies in the United States have created
archives that are accessible to the public. This lack of
access is a serious defi c i e n c y, made worse in an
increasingly global economy. Corporate history is not
just a matter of academic curiosity, but a matter of
p u blic policy with implications for people in
environments where national policies and laws are
often less binding than the forces of global
competition. Perhaps an understanding of the complex
events concerning the use of forced labor at Ford-Werke
during World War II will help us all � governments,
corporations, and individuals � negotiate the difficult
path between economic opportunity and social justice.

C O N C L U S I O N

27 201
201 Page 202 203
28
An Independent Assessment of the Ford Motor Company Research Project on Fo r d -We rke Under the Nazi Regi m e 202
202 Page 203 204
I carefully monitored the work of the Ford Archives
Research Project from September 1998 to the end of
July 2001. During that time, I had full access to all the
documentation that was produced by the Ford Archives
Research Project, I had numerous opportunities to meet
with research team staff in Dearborn, Washington, and
Germany, and I visited all three sites on two or more
o c c a s i o n s. M o re ove r, I had ongoing, o p e n
communication with Elizabeth Adkins, the manager of
the project and manager of the Ford Archives Services,
and the manager of the Washington team, as well as
s everal of the principal historians from History
Associates who worked in the Washington office.

I visited Ford Motor Company in September 1998
and met with Ford senior management, Public Affairs
personnel, and attorneys from the Office of General
Counsel. I visited the archives, met with the research
teams, reviewed the research reports, and examined
various categories and samples of records. I visited
Henry Ford Museum's Research Center, which will
house and service the collection, and also spent time
examining the dat abase that was cre ated for the
collection and had an opportunity to examine at
random the documents that were assembled. I met
twice with the Washington team and visited the
N ational A r ch i ves and Records A d m i n i s t r ation in
College Pa r k , M a ry l a n d , w h e re so mu ch of the
Washington team's work was conducted. I thoroughly

reviewed the methods and procedures used by the
Washington team in coordination with the Dearborn
team, and reviewed research plans and progress reports
of these teams, as well as those of the German team.

In November 1998, after several telephone
conversations, I met with Dr. Simon Reich, a political
scientist at the University of Pittsburgh, who made
extensive use of the Ford Archives as part of his study
of the World War II-era automobile industry in
Germany. Because of his knowledge of the German
automobile industry during the war and especially
because he had done extensive research in the Ford
Archives, I believed that Dr. Reich might be very helpful
in identifying potential sources to search, especially in
Germany. He agreed to become a consultant to the Ford
Archives Research Project.

In December 1998, I spent a week in Germany and
attended joint meetings of the German and American
teams to discuss the plans and procedures for the search
of the German archives. On the basis of this review and
in my interim report, completed in December 1998, I
recommended a thorough search of Fo r d -We r ke.
Preliminary searches of the plant did not reveal much
information, and the prospect of finding additional
materials did not seem particularly promising, but I
thought it was important to determine this through a
careful inspection of the plant. The project manager

A p p e n d i x A
M O N I T O R I N G T H E
R E S E A R C H P R O J E C T 203
203 Page 204 205
30
agreed with this opinion and in August 1999, the
project manager, several members of the Ford Archives
Research Project, and I returned to Germany and
interviewed senior managers at the plant in an effort to
locate any records that might have survived the war. I
witnessed the pre l i m i n a ry examination of seve r a l
record storage areas at the Cologne plant. This set the
stage for a thorough review of the Ford-Werke files by
Ford Archives Research Project staff, the result of which
was the uncove ring of a significant number of
documents, including financial documents from the
war years and records about the operation of the plant.

In the course of my investigation, I read a number of
books and articles pertaining to World War II, especially
regarding the use of forced labor in Germany, and I also
discussed the project with several histori a n s. I n
addition, I visited the U. S. Department of Commerce
Library in Washington and the Harvard University and
Yale University libraries to examine resources that I

thought might be fruitful for the project. At Harvard, I
checked guides to the Harvard University Archives and
visited the Houghton Library, which did have one
potentially relevant collection. At Yale University's
Manuscripts and Archives department, I checked two
collections that I thought might have materials � they
did not � and also looked at the catalog and met with
the archivist of the Fo rtunoff Video A r ch i ve fo r
Holocaust Testimonies. In part, this effort aimed to
discover potential sources among the personal papers
of people who were involved in the war, especially the
Allied Occupation, and to determine whether any of
these people were in possession of useful collections.
For this purpose, I also checked the Research Libraries
Network (RLIN), a national database of collections held
by repositories throughout the country. None of these
efforts produced any new evidence, but I was able to
e l i m i n ate these potential sources from furt h e r
consideration.

An Independent Assessment of the Ford Motor Company Research Project on Fo r d -We rke Under the Nazi Regi m e 204
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The following is an outline of the procedures used to
p rocess documents re t ri eved and copied from a
number of German repositories and to track and enter
i n fo rm ation into the master file dat ab a s e. T h e
procedures evolved over time as personnel changed and
procedures were refined. This outline will give the
reader a sense of the complexity of this entire project
� especially the practical and logistical difficulty in
assembling documents from multiple repositories, each
with its own policies and conditions for using and
photocopying documents in its collections. Working in
two languages was an ongoing problem. Finally,
document summary and subject coding methods
changed as new information became available and new
questions affected what information was highlighted or
summarized. This was an iterative process that required
ongoing revisions.

Following the research plan, researchers in Germany
mark for copying the relevant documents. After the
orders are completed, researchers check the order to be
sure the right materials have been copied.

Photocopied materials are sent to the German Project
Office in Hanover, where the office's research notes
database is updated. One copy of each document is
made. The original copy and a worksheet with the
essential information about the document and where it
came from are sent to the Washington office. The

second copy is retained in Hanover and is filed by
record group and file number for each repository.

In Washington, the copied German documents are
checked by a researcher fluent in German, to ensure the
worksheet matches the copies and includes the correct
record group number, file number, name of repository,
title of record, etc. The German files are usually
subdivided into multiple documents and additional
worksheets are prepared. At the beginning of the
research effort, the German worksheet was not the
same as the one used in Washington (because of
l a n g u age diffe re n c e s ) , so info rm ation had to be
reentered and the information translated into English.
By the time of the meeting in Dusseldorf, Germany at
the end of 1998, however, the German team included
bilingual staff and they could use the same work form
used in Washington. However, the German team
continued to take their notes in German, which then
had to be translated into English for the master file
database. A key part of this process was ensuring that
the translations were consistent, especially references to
the document provenance information, e. g., title of
record group, official name of German government
offices, etc. Working at the document level was
complicated by the fact that a file of several documents
might all belong together, but at other times they might
all be separate and distinct, as would be the case with
correspondence.

A p p e n d i x B
P R O C E D U R E S F O R P R O C E S S I N G
D O C U M E N T S F R O M G E R M A N
A R C H I V E S A N D P R E P A R I N G
I N F O R M A T I O N F O R E N T E R I N G I N T O
T H E P R O J E C T D A T A B A S E 205
205 Page 206 207
32
A Bates number is assigned to each page of a
document. This is a control number that uniquely
identifies each page of the documents in the collection.
The Bates number is recorded on the worksheets.

Documents and worksheets are copied in the
Washington Project Office. The original copy is sent to
Dearborn. A file folder is prepared for the Washington
office and the documents are filed first by repository,
then by Bates number.

In the Washington office, the German documents are
reviewed for a second time and a summary of each
document is prepared in English. There are three parts
to this critical process. First, establish the date of the
document. Second, describe the document type, for
e x a m p l e, m e m o, l e t t e r, re p o rt , e t c. and other
information, for example, author/ recipient of a letter.
Third, prepare a summary of the content for entry into
the database. Also, direct quotes and other specific
information are given specific reference by citing the
Bates number.

The Washington project manager rev i ews the
worksheets and the content summary, notes, etc. The
document is revised if necessary.

The Washington project manager also does the
subject coding. For documents relating to financial
matters, additional coding is provided. Coding for
financial mat e rials has been provided by
PricewaterhouseCoopers, the consulting organization
on financial records of the project.

At this point, the information is keyed into the
database in Washington from the worksheets.

Information entered into the database is checked
again by the Washington project manager to ensure the
accuracy of the information.

Additions to the database are e-mailed to Dearborn
(initially done weekly, this later became a periodic task)

to be rev i ewed by the project manag e r, E l i z ab e t h
Adkins. The reviewed materials and suggested changes
are sent back to Washington. For the most part,
changes involved supplying additional information for
document summaries to help users who might need
more explanation for some references.

C o rrections/ additions suggested by the pro j e c t
manager are made by the Washington Project Office.

Database entries are printed and filed with original
copies in Dearborn and the Washington entries are
merged with the Dearborn database. Until the very end
of the project, two databases, with slightly different
formats, are maintained, one in Dearborn and one in
Washington.

L a s t ly, the Washington project manager and an
historian from History Associates conduct a quality
control review of database entries. Quality control was
an ongoing process conducted after re s e a r ch wa s
completed in Washington and again after research was
completed in Germany. The purpose of this final review
was to ch e ck for consistency in collection titles,
translated names, etc., and also to cross-check the
master file database with research notes to ensure that
all the research was recorded.

The entire process for building the dat ab a s e,
checking and cross checking entries was, as this outline
suggests, a painstaking procedure, made more so by the
detailed structure of the database. In large measure, this
detailed database followed a legal model that was
further complicated by the need to create the collection
from multiple sources on two continents and in two
languages. The resulting computer-accessible database,
w h i ch will be ava i l able at Henry Ford Museum's
Research Center, will provide a powerful search engine
that will be enormously beneficial to scholars.

An Independent Assessment of the Ford Motor Company Research Project on Fo r d -We rke Under the Nazi Regi m e 206
206 Page 207 208
Mor e than 30 arc hiv al r epositor ies w e r e
searc hed dur ing the course o f this pr oject.
Appendix H, Glossar y o f Repositor y Sources
and Bib liogra ph y , lists the major arc hiv al
sources .

Descr iptions of the documents collected
ha v e been enter ed into a searc ha b l e da ta base .
The documents and the da ta base ar e being
donated to Henr y F ord Museum &
Gr eenf ield V illage , a n independent, nonpr of it
educa tional institution unaff ilia ted with F ord
Motor Compan y .

At Henr y F o rd Museum & Gr eenf ield
V illage , the documents a nd the da ta ba se will
be av a ila b le to the pub lic a t the Benson F ord
Researc h Center :

Benson F ord Researc h Center
Henr y F o rd Museum & Gr eenf ield V illage
20900 Oakw ood Boule v ard
P . O . Bo x 1970
Dearbor n, Mic higan 48121-1970
U . S. A.
tel: 1.313.982.6070
f ax: 1.313.982.6244
http: / / www . hfmgv . or g / r esearc h/

Source:

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