The gas-van is a special product of the Third Reich, it
is a van with a gas-tight cabin/container-box/superstructure mounted on its
chassis/understructure used to kill people by the motor-exhausts led into
that cabin. The designation was coined only later: "Gaswagen [Gas-van] - that was the common word only afterwards/later". [1]
In the contemporaneous documents the designation doesn't
arise. There the words Sonder-Wagen[2], Sonderfahrzeug[3], Spezialwagen[4]
and S-Wagen[5] [Special van, special vehicle] are used. In a letter
dating from April 11th 1942 with hindsight to camouflage the word Entlausungswagen [delousing-van] is used.[6]
There are in all fourteen documents related to that
complex, allowing to assess which types of vans were transformed/rebuilt
into gas-vans and providing technical data on the
container/cabin/superstructure. The documents give informations about the
producers/vendors of the vans, about technical improvements due to
practical experience, about the operation and the operating locations of
different vans, moreover the responsible official services and individuals
in charge of the employment of gas-vans are named. Hence a rather detailed
picture emerges which is, however, not exhaustive/complete as documents are
available only for the timespan/period starting in 1942 when gas-vans were
already in use for the killings of human beings [7].
Based only on the written records not much can be said
about the period when the gas-vans were under development. So the route of
decisions leading to the construction and the operation/usage of these vans
remains unclear/obscure. This state of things may be amended by the results
of the multitude of trials held since 1945.
In the Federal Republic mainly since 1958 the
installation of the Central Agency [Zentrale Stelle der
Landesjustizverwaltungen = ZSL] for the prosecution of
national-socialist crimes in Ludwigsburg and the investigations started by
that agency have enlarged our knowledge about the crimes of the
NS-regime[8]. However, the historian cannot adopt results of trials without
probing them, as jurisdiction and historiographic science are directed by
different purposes [9].
With the historian, witness-testimonies are of formost
importance as they assist in closing gaps left by documents. But due to
their pecularities witness-testimonies may be used as equals to documents
and appraised by the historic research with valid results only if certain
principles are obeyed [10].
The basic principle requires that the link between
testimony and critically validated documents shouldn't be abandoned
whenever possible, that is, the most probable fact must be linked to the
certified fact [11].
There will remain questions which can't be answered
satisfactorily by this method. There are witness testimonies reporting that
during the cleansing/purging of mentally insane in the hospitals in Poland
1939/40 a hermetic sealed trailer with the label "Kaisers-Kaffee-Geschaeft"
[about: Kaiser's coffee shop], with a tractive unit/tractor/towing vehicle
in front was used.
In the trailer, insane persons were killed allegedly by
the introduction of pure carbon-monoxide (CO) from (steel) cylinders [12].
The origin/source of these vehicles cannot be traced back as documents are
lacking. However, there are hints that there is a link between "Kaisers-Kaffee"-vans
and the gas-vans. Therefore we first investigate the few testimonies
related to "Kaisers-Kaffee"-vans and then the development
of the gas-vans.
In a letter dated 1st september 1939, Hitler
entitles/orders his personal/assisting medecin Dr.Karl Brandt and the Reichsleiter Philipp Bouhler of the Führer's chancellery to carry out the Euthanasie -program [13]. The Kriminaltechnisches Institut [KTI] in the Reichssicherheitshauptamt
[RSHA] was ordered to test/explore appropriate killing
procedures/agencies, and reported that the best method to kill would be the
use of CO [14].
Following first experimental gassings in the prison of
Brandenburg/havel in January 1940 - in a hermetic sealed room mentally
insane had been killed with pure CO -, the method was used in all other
"Euthanasie" set-ups/centers. The necessary CO was
acquired by the Führer's chancellery under cover-up/camouflage
indirectly via the KTI, this being based on an agreement between the head
of the Euthanasie-agency, Brack, and Widmann, head of the Referat
V D2 (Chemistry and Biology) [16].
On order by Nebe, head of Amt V [department]
(counter- criminality) in the RSHA, SS-Sturmführer Becker got the
(steel) cylinders at the IG Farben [factory] in Ludwigshafen and delivered
them to the different installations [17]. SS-Sturmbannführer Heess,
head of the KTI, was knowledgeable/knew about the close
relation/collaboration beteen the Führer's chancellery and the KTI [18].
The "Kaisers-Kaffe"-van operated
through the same principle as the gas-chambers of the "Euthanasie"-
installations. CO was guided into a trailer through hoses from a cylinder
which was fixed to the tractor. This was, hence, a gas-chamber on wheels
[19]. Witnesses report that since september 1939 the Sonderkommando
Lange [Special command/task force] killed mentally insane people in
such vans in pommeranian, eastern-prussian and polish hospitals [20].
The name of that command is derived from the name of its
head, SS-Sturmführer and Kriminalrat Herbert Lange. The
letter from the Higher SS- and Police leader Koppen to the SS-Gruppenführer Sporrenberg elucidates the operationing/work of that command in Soldau:
"The special command being under my command for
particular tasks was sent to Soldau during the time from 21.5 to 8.6.1940
in accord with the RSHA and has evacuated 1588 insane persons from the
transition-camp during that time." [21]
A vehicle of that kind was brought with Lange either
from the RSHA (the testimonies by Gustav Sorge [22] and the important role
of the Gruppe II D, technical matters, in the RSHA in the later
development of the gas-van [23] back this assumption, or he organized its
production in collaboration with the RSHA [24].
Alfred Trenker, deputy head of the Stapo bureau
(state police) in Posen testified that Lange had told him in summer 1940,
he, Lange, had to travel to Berlin and the RSHA several times because of
"conferences/meetings about the suitable type of gassing-vans"
[25].
These testimonies let suppose that the operationing of
the "Kaisers-Kaffee"-vans was optimized for the purpose of
the Sonderkommando Lange, which had probably the taks to practically
test these vehicles. Apparently, they didn;t operate adequately (Lange
mentioned something to that extent against Trenker [26]) and the Sonderkommando
Lange was disbanded/ got leave soon after their task in Soldau.
Starting from that time, there aren't found any reports about the
operations/usage of that kind of vehicles.
The exchange of letters/correspondence about the still
due payments in connection with the Sonderkommando Lange, which
lasted till february 1941, shows that as well Himmler knew about the whole
affair. In a letter by Koppe to Karl Wolff, head of the personal staff of
the Reichsführer SS, dated 22. February 1941, it is mentioned,
"that you by order of the Reichsführer SS would decide about
the payments of the transportation costs" [27].
From the date of the first usage, we may infer that
"Kaisers-Kaffee"-vans were prepared beginning in the end
of 1939 till midyear 1940 with assistance of the Führer's chancellery and
the RSHA.
On 15 and 16th August 1941 Himmler was in Baranowitschi
[English spelling?] and Minsk [28] And inspected an action of
[liquidation/execution] by shooting in the area of Einsatzgruppe B [29].
The attending Higher SS- and Police-Leader in Center
Russia ["Russland Mitte"] von dem Bach-Zelewski reported later,
Himmler was moved/shaken apparently by this action.[30]
After that, Himmler had visited a hospital/sanatorium
for mentally insane people and afterwards ordered the Leader of Einsatzgruppe
B, Nebe, to search/investigate means, fit to shorten the suffering of
the people as far as possible [31], as he had concluded from the experience
with the execution by shooting "that shooting wasn't yet the most
human way" [32].
He [i.e. Nebe] should send "a report" about
those investigations. Himmler addressed Nebe, as the KTI, subordinated to
the 'Amt V', had excelled in the investigation/development of killing
procedures during the "Euthanasia" program, so that their
experiences could be employed now. Nebe was simultaneously head of that
'Amt V' [department] in the RSHA. Relying on this position, in beginning
September he ordered Widmann to come to Minsk with explosives and two
metal-hoses/tubes [33].
Widmann had had discussed this order with his immediate
boss/superior Heess. This elucidates that apart of the stress for the
execution squads/commands, a further reason was given for the following
experiments:
"It was discussed with Heess also about the usage
of [poisonous] gas in the killing of mentally insane persons, especially
about the impossibility to transport the CO-cylinders in Russia." [34]
The CO-cylinders would have been necessary, if one was
intending to use "Kaisers-Kaffe"-vans or gas-chambers as
they were used in the "Euthanasia" program.
When the blasting/explosion of a bunker in Minsk, into
which mentally insane persons had been brought, didn't show the intended
result/success, an experiment with the metal hoses, which Widmann had
carried with him, was undertaken in the sanatorium for mentally insanes/asylum
of Mogilew, which Himmler had visited also [35]. About this, Widmann
testified on 11th January 1960:
"Nebe has ordered to close the windows with
brick-work and to leave two openings for the gas-pipes on that afternoon
... When we arrived, first one of the hoses, which had been with me in the
car, was fixed/connected. The connection was made to a passenger vehicle.
In the openings of the wall, there were pieces of pipes/tubes were
situated, where/onto which one could easily affix the hoses ... After five
minutes, Nebe came out and said, there wasn't any effect yet.
"Also after eight minutes, he couldn't observe any
effect and asked, what had to be done now. Nebe and I convinced ourselves,
that the car was too weak. Hence, Nebe ordered/caused/made the second hose
to be fixed to the van [to transport troops] of the Ordnungspolizei.
Then it took only a few minutes, Till the people lost consciousness. One
left [the motors of] both cars running for about another ten minutes."
[36]
The incident just described is also reported in the
deposition by the Russian doctor N.N.Akimova of 18th November 1946, who
gives as date of the experiment the 186h September [37]. Hence/therefor,
Widmann and his aides must have been in Minsk and Mogilev from 13th to 21st
September [38]. The relation between these experiments and Himmler's visit
and order is revealed/given/elucidated in another deposition by Widmann:
" Nebe wanted to discuss the matter with me, as he said, that he had
to report it to Himmler." [39]
Nebe must have learned by these two experiments, that
only the idea to kill with exhaust gases, which most probably was his own,
was feasible [40].
But the Einsatzgruppen, for the usage of which
the new more "humane" killing method was searched/investigated,
couldn't use/handle a gas-chamber with fixed location, in which people were
killed by exhaust-gases. They had to be mobile, to fulfill their task [41].
Based on these considerations and the past experience, a plan/project
emerged the KTI to build gas-vans. Nebe and Heess proposed this to their
commander Heydrich, head of the security police and the SD [42].
Widmann testified about this:
"I was informed by Heess shortly about the result
of his report in the Prinz-Albrecht-street [Heydrich's
head-quarter]. He told me, that vans would be built/constructed, into which
exhaust gases would be led/introduced, instead of the recent application of
CO-cylinders." [43]
It becomes apparent, that "Kaisers Kaffe"-vans,
which were known in the KTI, had been the model for the gas-vans - mobile,
gas-tightly sealed, close boxes. However, because of the technical
difficulties, the pure CO couldn't simply be replaced by exhaust-gases. A
new construction was necessary which unified traction unit, trailer and the
source of the poisonous gas.
Heydrich's immediate superior/boss was Himmler since the
decree of 27th September 1939. Therewith the circle is closed.
Heydrich had supposedly heard about the experiments in
advance, and was therefore in the "secret", otherwise it couldn't
be understood, why Nebe and Heess contacted/approached him. Heydrich was
also in a position to lend the necessary technical support to the KTI. He
approached SS-Obersturmführer Rauff, head of group/department II D3
(technical matters), with its subgroup/sub-department being led by SS-Hauptsturmführer Pradel. He [Pradel] testified in his trial that Rauff had told him: "
This is an order by Heydrich which has to be carried out." [44]
In this sense, we may also understand Rauff's deposition
on 28th June 1972 in Santiago de Chile:"I think, it is impossible that
Pradel undertook the development of the gas- vans on his own. He must have
had an order either by me or someone with a higher position."[45]
Wentritt, head of the repairing-shop/park in Referat
II D3a testified concerning this:
"Still in 1941, I was summoned to the head of the
group/department, Major Pradel. He declared/told me that the execution
squads in action suffered often from nervous break-down (respectively were
close to it), so that a more humane killing method should be used. We
needed therefore - as Pradel stated closed/sealed vans/motor vehicles."[46]
Pradel ordered Wentritt to test/investigate whether it
was possible to lead motor-exhausts in the closed/sealed superstructure of
a van. When Wentritt answered this in the affirmative, Pradel communicated
the positive/affirmative answer to Rauff and got back with the order to
contact Heess. Heess detailed, how such a van had to be constructed and how
it should operate.
On Rauff's order, Pradel and Wentritt visited the Gaubschat-factory/company
in Berlin-Neukoelln, which was specialized in the production of
sealed/closed box- superstructures [47] where they pretended, that they
needed the vans to transport the dead victims/corpses of a spotted fever
epidemic.
They made an agreement that the RSHA should deliver the
chassis to the factory "which had to put a box- superstructure on top
of them." [48]
The order was given directly by Rauff, probably in a
letter/in-written form [49]. But Pradel's attempt to purchase chassis was a
failure, so that an intervention by Rauff was necessary. He testified on
19th October 1945: "In so far as I can recall I only supplied 5 or 6
[[chassis]]." [50][English in original]
When the chassis had been delivered to the Gaubschatt
company, Wentritt informed himself several times about the on-going
construction work and fetched the first van himself. He provided this van
with the following alterations in the workshop of Referat II D 3a,
as the matter was classified as "geheime Reichssache"[highest
level of secrecy]:
"At the exhaust-pipe an exhaust-hose was fixed
which was led from the exterior to the bottom of the van. In this van we
drilled a hole with diameter of about 58-60 mm, the diameter of the
exhaust-pipe. Into the interior of the van, above the hole, we welded a
metal pipe (exhaust pipe), which was connected or could be connected to the
exhaust-hose. Upon starting the motor, the exhaust went into the
exhaust-pipe and from there into the exhaust-pipe in the interior of the
van, where the [exhaust-]gas was spread." [51]
On Pradel's order, Wentritt brought this van, so
prepared, to the KTI, where gaseous samples were taken in the box-
superstructure. The chemist Leiding, collaborator in the KTI, testified:
"I once entered that van with a gas-mask. I had the
order/task to take air-samples. Those air- samples were hence analyzed in
the laboratory."
Why these analyses were necessary may be understood from
Widmann's deposition on 12th January 1960:
"The objective of that analysis was, by the way, to
find out how long it took to reach a CO- concentration of 1% in the van. At
this CO- contents, deep unconsciousness and then death occur in a short
time (3rd stage of CO poisoning). One intended to prevent the first and
second stage of CO-poisoning. The first stage is numbness and nausea, the
second stage is marked by states of agitation/irritation."[53]
Short time late, an experimental gassing took place in
the concentration camp Sachsenhausen ( the KTI had there a
workshop/atelier). At the gassing, Heess, the two chemists Leiding and
Hoffmann, and beyond some SS-officers attended. Widmann wasn't present
[54].
Following Krausnick/Wilhelm, he was in Kiew on about
X[?]th November [55]. The experimental gassing in Sachsenhausen must have
taken place on that date. Regarding the events in Sachsenhausen, Leiding
testified:
"I understood only later the intended purpose of
the van, in which I had taken an air sample. One day, I was summoned to
travel to Sachsenhausen ... and there was a van, which was equal or like
that, which I had seen in the yard of the Reichskriminalpolizeiamt.
The number of men, which entered into the van, may have
been around/about 30 ...
The corpses had, as we chemists found out/observed the
typical pink outlook of men, who had died of a CO-poisoning." [56]
Heess reported the success of the experimental gassing
not only to Pradel [57], but he wrote a report together with Widmann, which
was supposedly delivered to Heydrich [57]. Hence the prototype of the
gas-vans was developed/ready and tested. The remaining vans, ordered at the
Gaubschat factory, were as well altered into gas-vans now [59].
The course of events described here is corroborated by
the analogous proceedings/activities in 1942. Since April there were
plans/schemes in Reerat II D 3a, how to improve the gas-vans, how to
expand/augment the killing capacity and how to facilitate their
operationing/handling. [60] The proceeding was analogous to the development
of the prototype. The matter was debated first internally, then Rauff gave
an order for a van with the planned alterations to the Gaubschat factory.
This one should be tested practically and only after that a decision should
be taken on the vans to be altered further.[61]
When starting with the date of the experimental gassing
at Sachsenhausen and considering the time necessary to rebuild the vans to
be about 8-14 days [62] and the time to bring the vans to the locations of
operations [63], we may conclude, that the first gas-vans could be used
only in the end of November of beginning December 1941.
The first usage of a gas-van may be traced down in the
operation area of Einsatzgruppe C [64] with the Sonderkommando 4a in Poltawa. Eye-witnesses report that a gas-van was used there in November
1941 in the killings of the Jews [65]. The van is described as follows:
"The gas-van was used in the same place [[i.e.
there were also shootings]. Each time about 30 people were carried in them.
As far I know, the passengers were killed by exhaust-gases led into
it." [66]
The usage of gas-vans by the already known Sonderkommando
Lange is testified for the 8th December in Chelmno [67].
Hence, not only in the experimental phase, but as well
in the operationing, experienced staff was employed. In Chelmno, two
smaller vans were operationing first. Gustav Laabs, the driver of one of
the vans, testified:
"Later I found out, that the vans were American 3-
tons-trucks. ... The interior of their box- container was, as I later saw
4m in length to 2m in width. ... In the gas-van, I drove, ... about 50
people were gassed." [68]
Still before Christmas 1941 two smaller gas-vans were
brought from Berlin to Riga [69]. These were the smaller "Daimond"-vans,
which were named/mentioned in a letter by SS-Hauptsturmführer Truehe to Rauff on 15th July 1942 [70].
In the operation area of Einsatzgruppe D [71] the
presence of a gas-van, which could carry about 50 persons, is
testified/assured by testimony for the end of 1941.
This date may be certified by the deposition of SS-
Untersturmführer Becker. He was transferred to the RSHA in December
1941 after a conference/consultation between Himmler and Brack [73].
Hence, Himmler observed/had in mind/supervised the
operations of the gas-vans further. In the RSHA, Ruff ordered him (Becker)
to travel to the East to investigate/observe the operationing of the
gas-vans. Becker testified about this:
"He [[Rauff]] said, that gas-vans were already in
place or sent to the different Einsatzgruppen."[47]
This must have taken place shortly before 14th December,
as Becker couldn't begin his travel, intended for that day, because of an
accident; so his travel was postponed until in beginning 1942 [73]. The
projected date of Becker's inspection travel may have been meaningful only
if the gas- vans had been sent to the Einsatzgruppen shortly before
it.
So it is assured/certain that gas-vans were used
beginning with the end of November or beginning December 1941 [76].
The Higher SS- and Police-Leader Jeckeln testified in
1945:
"In December 1941, when I reported orally the
completion of Himmler's order to execute by shooting the Jews of the Ghetto
in Riga to him, Himmler told me that shooting was too complicated an
action. In the shootings, one needed troops who were able to shoot, and
that it had a bad influence on the men. So, said Himmler further, it would
be best to destroy/liquidate/kill the people with gas-vans, which upon his
order had been built in Germany."[77]
The six gas-vans, described so far, (one with Einsatzgruppe
C, two in Chelmno, two in Riga, one with Einsatzgruppe D), which
were operating until end of 1941, Had two features in common, the exterior
appearance and the number of people they could carry [78].
The vans were smaller, 3-tons-trucks, with a
superstructure of about 4m in length, in which 30-50 persons could be
carried [79].
The same description fits on the vans, in which
air-samples were taken in the yard of the KTI, and which were later tested
in Sachsenhausen. Leiding and Hoffmann testify unanimously, that the vans
were 3-tons transporters in which thirty men were killed [80].
According to Rauff and Wentritt, firstly five or six
chassis had been purchased and delivered to the Gaubschat factory [81].
Hence, in 1941, first six vans with 3-tons weight have been prepared/built
and were operating starting in November or December. These are the vans of
the "first series"[82] with at least two different types of
chassis, "Daimond" [83] and "Opel-Blitz" [84].
That one used vans with different types is related to
the difficulties with the purchase of the chassis in the beginning [85].
The sources and testimonies report as well that larger vans, type "Saurer"
were rebuilt/altered into gas-vans [86]. These were trucks with 8 tons with
a box- superstructure with 5.8m length and 1.7m height, which could carry
up to one hundred people [87]. In a note in the files of Referat II D3a on 23th June 1942 is remarked: "According to transaction/proceeding II
D3a - 1737/41, an order on 30 special superstructures for chassis delivered
was given to Gaubschat company. 20 vehicles are already finished and have
been delivered." [88]
Conforming with the high number of vans ordered, the
order must have been given late in 1941 [89]. That the whole order was
related only to Saurer-vans is certified by a note on 27th April 1942,
which relates to the transaction-number 1737 [90]. The sketches/blueprints
enjoined show that "proposals for a fast discharge equipment@ were
only provided for the Saurer vans.
As construction plans for such an equipment were
provided only for this type of van - they should be added/built into the
vans already in operation subsequently - we may conclude, that the whole
order for thirty chassis consisted of Saurer-vans. This consideration is
corroborated by a letter from Becker to Rauff on 16th May 1942:
"While the vans of the first series can be used in
not too bad weather, the vans of the second series (Saurer) are completely
immobile in rainy weather." [92]
It becomes apparent, that Becker distinguishes between
two series of vans; moreover, the description "Saurer" for the
vans of the second series is only meaningful, if all vans in this series
were of them same type. Hence , the Referat II D 3a issued an order
and delivered the Saurer-chassis to equip them with the
superstructures/boxes/containers in the end 1941 and in April 1942 already
20 of them had been delivered [93].
The sources and witnesses say that gas-vans of the
Saurer- type were operating only in January 1942 [94], i.e. later than the
smaller vans.
Considering the necessary time for the construction
works [95], the order 1737 cannot be issued before December 1941. Becker's
distinction relates therefore not only to the size of the vans, but as well
to the date of their construction and of their operationing. This means
that for starting six smaller vans had been built and were used, but
already since December 1941, one only built larger vans of the Saurer-
type, firstly, as one intended to provide each Sonderkommando of the
different Einsatzgruppen with at least one van, and secondly to
expand and extend the gassing capacity.
That the latter aim was foremost is shown by the note of
27th April 1942, which discusses several possibilities ("tip-up
equipment for the box-superstructure", "facility to tip-up the
bottom-grate", "facility to move in and out the
bottom-grate") to achieve a quicker discharge of the 'cargo' (=gassed
people) [97]. Even when it turned out that the large vans couldn't be used
in the open ground in all weather it wasn't thought of using smaller vans
as in the beginning, only the box-superstructure should be slightly
shortened [98].
Referat II D 3a was not only responsible for
technical matters but as well for the operationing/handling of the
vans/transportation park of the security police and consequently for the
gas-vans.
This is elucidated not only by the official tasks of the Referat, but as well by the work of SS-Untersturmführer Becker [99]. On Rauff's order he travelled to the Einsatzgruppen to
supervise the operationing/handling of the gas-vans and to mend occurring
faults/difficulties [100].
According to his own statements, he was thus travelling
from mid January to September 1942 [101]. During this time, he was in
perpetual connection with Rauff, and reported continuously about his
supervising/observations and his actions/work [102]. His reports provided
basis of "technical alterations/improvements" which should be
applied in the construction of vehicles which were still to be built [103].
Becker's intervening wouldn't have been necessary if the
group Rauff had been responsible only for the
production/construction/preparation of the vans. Becker's task shows that
the group II D3 was as well responsible for the operationing/maintenance/handling
of the vans. This is as well certified by the sources.
On 15th June 1942, the Commanding Leader of the Security
Police and of the SD in Ostland [administrative district in occupied
SU, comprising parts of Lithuania, Poland, Byelorussia - around Vilna,
Baranowicze, Minks, Sluzk] addressed a request to Rauff for an additional
van of Saurer-type [104].
In the same place, he ordered "another 20
exhaust-hoses to be send along, as the existing were already untight".
From Becker's report we may infer that the failure of a van had to be
reported by wireless telegraph to the Amt II D and that the vans had
to be sent to Berlin in the case of more involved repairs[105]. The note in
the file on 5th June 1942 reports that a gas-van was exploded in Chelmno.
This incident caused Rauff to order new experiments on gas- samples by the
KTI.
In the same place, the "services affected by this
[got] special instructions" and smaller alterations to the vans were
undertaken to prevent [the building-up] of high pressures in the
box-superstructures [106].
SS-Gruppenführer Harald Turner, head of the
administration staff with the military commander in Serbia, had requested
and got a gas-van in April 1942 for the killing of the Jews of Belgrad
[107].
On 9th June this Saurer-van was sent back to Belin after
completed "special task" [108]. After due repair, it was sent to
Riga conforming to the request on 15th June [109].
Often the gas-vans have been seen on intermediate stops
on their way to the East, e.g. in Breslau or Krakau [110].
The Leader of Einsatzgruppe D, Ohlendorf,
testified that the gas-vans didn't belong to the transportation-
park/rolling stock of the Einsatzgruppe, but were
commissioned/leased to them from Berlin [111].
With the gas-vans, the drivers, who had got a training
to the handling of the vans [112] were sent along. Gas-vans drivers
testified that on order of the operative leader of group II D 3a they had
fetched/got the vans in Berlin and brought them to their operation
location/area [113].
This means, that Amt II D 3a was not only
responsible for the construction of the gas-vans, but it
directed/orchestrated centrally from/in the RSHA the operations of the
gas-vans [114], providing the vans, drivers, and exchange parts/equipment;
it controlled/supervised and coordinated the operationing of the vehicles.
In closing, we conclude:
In the period of four months, on order by Himmler, a new
killing method, the gas-van, was developed in the following sequence of
actions/events:
- 15./16.8.1941 Himmler's order.
- 16./18.9. Experiments in Minsk and Mogilev.
- Early October, order given to Amt II D 3a
- 3.11. experimental gassing in Sachsenhausen.
- Late November and in December first usage of the vans.
In this the RSHA cooperated closely with the following
services:
- the KTI; here emerged the idea to build gas-vans; and
it was responsible for the "chemistry part" of the experiments.
- Referat II D 3a; it prepared two series of
vans, six smaller ones (Daimond and Opel-Blitz) and the thirty Saurer-
vans; it directed and supervised the operationing of the vans, centrally
from Berlin.
In the development of the gas-vans, the experience
gathered during the "Euthanasia", which was stopped officially in
1941 was purposively applied/used in technical matters ("Kaisers
Kaffee"-vans) as well as with the staff employed (KTI, Becker,
Lange). Unlike the case of "Kaisers Kaffee"- vans, a
participation of Führer's chancellery cannot be stated/found here. This
staff worked during that time on the development of another method which
was used in the destruction centers since 1942.
"Technical developments" were a precondition
for the perpetration of the premeditated/intended crimes. The step- wise
perfectioning of the killing-methods were the development of the gas-van
was only one step in the sequel of national-socialist killing methods,
result in the killing of ever more people, mainly Jews.
Footnotes
1. Deposition by Gustav Laabs driver of a gas-van in
Chelmno, dated 29.11.1960, Staatsanwaltschaft (StA) [Attorney
bureau] Bonn, Aktenzeichen (Az) [Filen-number] 8 Js 52/60
[[ZSL, Az.203 AR-Z 69/59, Bl.912]]. The designation/word
is used as well in the literature and by witnesses.
Raul Hilberg, {The destruction of the European Jews},
Chicago 1961, p.219, uses "{gas-van}", apparently a tranlation of
the German word.
SS-Obersturmführer Walter Rauff, Gruppenleiter [department-leader] of Dienststelle[department of services] II D (Technical
matters) in the RSHA [Reichssicherheitshauptamt:
Main security bureau in the Reich] speaks in his
affidavit dated 19.10.1945 about "{death vans}", International
Military Tribunal, Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the
International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg (IMT) Vol.30, Doc.2384-PS. In
the description given in document IMT 501-PS the word Vergasungswagen [gassing-van] is used.
2. Letter by Rauff to the KTI [Kriminaltechnisches
Institut] dated 26.3.1942. Copy in ZSL, Folder: Verschiedenes Nr.227.
3. Entry/note in file dated 27.4.1942, Copy in ZSL, USA
Dok. Film I, Bl.19-25; Letter by Firma Gaubschat [Company/manufacturer] to the Referat [sub-department] IID 3a of the
RSHA dated 14.5.1942, ZSL, USA Dok. Film I, Bl.28.
4. Entry/note in file dated 5.6.1942, Copy ZSL, USA Dok.
Film I, Bl.9-14; facsimile in: Nationalsozialistische Massentoetung
durch Giftgas. Eine Dokumentation, hrsg. von A.Rueckerl/E.Kogon/H.Langbein
u.a., Frankfurt a. M.1983, pp.333-337. [This should be also available
in the English Translation now] Letter by SS- Obersturmführer Schaefer to Rauff dated 9.6.1942, IMT-Doc. 501-PS.
5. Letter by SS-Hauptsturmführer Truehe to Rauff
dated 15.6.1942, IMT-Doc. 501-PS. The "S" is probably an
abbreviation to spezial or sonder [special]. These adverbs
were originally used with respect to the container-superstructure, which
was specially manufactured. Cf. entry/note in file dated 23.6.1942, Copy
ZSL, USA Dok. Film II, B1.14-16, where the word Spezialaufbauten [special superstructure] is used. The relation to the camouflage word Sonderbehandlung [special treatment], i.e. killing is apparent, IMT-Doc. 501-PS.
6. Letter by SS-Gruppenführer Harald Turner to SS-
Obergruppenführer Karl Wolff, head of the personal staff of the Reichsführer
SS (RFSS) [Leader of the SS, H.Himmler], dated 11.4.1942, StA Muenchen
II, Az.10a Js 39/60, bill of indictment/accusation [[ZSL, Az. Sammelakte
137, Bl.164-167].
7. The earliest document is dated 26.3.1942, cf. Note
[2]. In the entry dated 5.6.1942 it is noted that since december 1941
97.000 human beings were "processed", i.e. killed with tree vans,
cf. Note [4].
8. See as well: A.Rueckerl (ed.): NS-Vernichtungslager
im Spiegel deutscher Strafprozesse. Belzec, Sobibor, Treblinka, Chelmno. Muenchen 1977; same author: NS-Prozess nach 25 Jahren Strafverfolgung. Moeglichkeiten, Grenzen, Ergebnisse, Karlsruhe 1971. Nationalsozialistische
Massentoetung Frankfurt a.M. 1983. Here I'd like to thank the ZSL for
the support and the helps, especially Mr Chief-attorney A.Rueckerl, Mr
Chief-attorney A. Streim, Mr attorney W.Dressen, Inspector S.Fritschle and
last but not least Mrs H.Doms from the documentation.
9. I.Arndt/W.Scheffler: Organisierter Massenmord an
den Juden in nationalsozialistischen Vernichtungslagern. Ein Beitrag zur
Richtigstellung apologetischer Literatur, in: VfZ 24 (1976), S.115
Anm.20.
10. See for an excellent example, A.Streim, Die
Behandlung der Kriegsgefangenen im Fall Barabarossa, Heidelberg 1981,
S.74 ff. In the following, the different quality of documents and witness
testimonies is remarked here, by notifying each quotation from a
depostition.
11. This allows for instance to check the
credibility/consistency of witnesses. If there exist consistency between
document and testimony, it is reasonable to assume that the witness's
deposition is reliable/trustworthy as well with respect to facts/ cases
which aren't covered by documents.
12. Deposition by H.H.Renfranz, dated 10.10.1962, StA
Hannover, Az. 2 Js 614/62 [ZSL, Az. V 203 AR-???1101/1960, Bl.2]. See also Nationalsozialistische
Massentoetung, p. 62 ff; E.Klee, "Euthanasie" im NS-Staat.
Die "Vernichtung lebenswerten Lebens", Frankfurt a.M. 1983,
S.106 ff and S.190 ff.
13. IMT, Vol. 26, S.169.
14. Deposition by A.Widmann, Head of Abt. V D 2
(Chemistry and Biology) in the KTI, dated 11.1.1960; StA Duesseldorf, Az. 8
Js7212/59 [ZSL, Az.202 AR-Z 152/59, Bl.51 f.]; deposition by A.Becker,
20.6.1961, StA Stuttgart, Az. 13 Js 328/60 [ZSL, Az.439 AR-Z 18a/60,
Bl.1001 ff.] See also Nationalsozialistische Massentoetung, S.46;
Klee, "Euthanasie", S.84 f.
15. same sources as note [13]
16. deposition by A.Widmann, 27.1.1959, StA Duesseldorf,
Az.8 Js 7212/59 [ZSL, Az. 439 AR-Z 18a/??, Bl.36 f.]; Klee, "Euthanasie",
S.84 f.
17. deposition by A.Becker, 28.1.1960, StA Hannover, Az.
2 Js 299/60 [ZSL, Az.415 AR-Z 220/59, Bl.36 ff.].
18. deposition by Walter Schade, datd 12.2.1959, StA
Hannover, Az. 2 Js 299/60 [ZSL, Az.415, AR-Z 220/59, Bl.110 ff.].
19. cf. note [12]
21. Copy ZSL, USA Dok.Bd.II, Bl.6; see also Klee,
22. He testified on 7.3.1962, that before 1941 another
"Gaswagen" was tested in Sachsenhausen and produced there; StA
Hannover, Az. 2 Js 299/1960 [ZSL, Az. 415 AR-Z 220/59, Bl.277 ff; see also
Rueckerl, NS-Vernichtungslager, p. 268, note 55.
23. Cf. text p.409 f. [Page Seven f.]
24. deposition by A.Trenkers, dated 17.5. 1962, StA
Hannover, Az. 2 Js 299/60 [ZSL, Az. 415 AR-Z 220/59, Bl.635].
25. deposition dated 16.5.1961, StA Bonn, Az.8 Js 52/60
[ZSL, Az. 203 AR-Z 69/59, Bl.678 f.]. 26. Cf. note [24]
27. Copy of the correspondence in: ZSL, USA Dok.Bd.I,
Bl.90 and 98; Bd.II, Bl.801-807. See as well Klee, "Euthanasie",
pp.190-193. Characteristically, on the letter there is a note by Wolff,
that he phone with Brack, one of the responsibles in the "Euthanasie"-
program, about the affair.
28. Diensttagebuch [Diary kept on duties during
service/official diary] Bach-Zelewski, Bundesarchiv, Sign.R20/45b, Copy ZSL, Findmittelschrank Nr.35. Accordingly, Himmler was in Baranowitschi
on 30-7-1941 and in Baranowitschi and Minsk on 15/16th August 1941.
On 15th August, Bach attended/was drawn [to the visit],
so Himmler's observation of the shootings is most likely to be dated on
that day. Cf. deposition by the Russian [lady-]doctor N.N.Akimova, who
reports about a visit spent by Himmler to a sanatorium in August 1941; see
A.Ebbinghaus/G.Preissler: Die Ermordung psychisch kranker Menschen in
der Sowjetunion. Dokumentation, in: Aussonderung und Tod. Die
klinische Hinrichtung der Unbrauchbaren, Berlin 1985, p.188.
29. About Einsatzgruppe B: H.Krausnick/H.-H.Wilhelm, Die Truppe des Weltanschaungskrieges. Die Einsatzgruppen der
Sicherheitspolizei und des SD 1938-1942, Stuttgart 1982, p.179ff.
30. Deposition by Back-Zelewski in: Aufbau (New
York), 23.8.46, p.2. Cf. similar deposition by Karl Wolff, Himmler's
adjutant, who attended there too, StA Muenchen, Az.10a Js 39/60, Anklageschrift [bill of indictment/accusation] [ZSL, Az.Sammelakte 137, Bl.140ff] with
further testimonies about the incidence.
31. Ibid. Cf. N.N.Akimova's deposition (note 28).
32. Deposition by Back-Zelewski (note 30 ). Cf.
deposition by the chemist H.Hoffmann, 7-1-59, StA Duesseldorf, 8 Js 7212/59
[ZSL, Az.439 AR-Z 18a/60,Bl.28].
33. Deposition by A.Widmann as of 11-1-1960 (note
14),Bl.45ff; A.Bauer, driver with the KTI, deposition as of 17-3-1960,
H.Schmidt, collaborator with the KTI, StA Bremen, Az.6Js 3/60 [ZSL, Az.202
AR-Z152/59, Bl.135; 201].
34. Deposition by A.Widmann as of 11-1-1960 (note 14),
Bl.46.
35. Cf. note 28
36. Same as note [14], Bl.50f. Gerald Reitlinger, Die
Endloesung. Hitlers Versuch der Ausrottung der Juden Europas 1939-1945,
Berln 1951, mentions on page 1944, that in 1949 negatives were found in
Nebe's home, which show this incident/procedure. According to E.J.Else,
superintendent of transport services of the K-Staffel [squad] in the
1st company, Police-Battaillon 3, the van, recognizable on these pictures,
belonged to his transport park. Deposition on 13- 12-1962, StA Frankfurt
a.M., Az 4 Js 1928/60 [ZSL, Az.202 AR- Z 152/1959, Bl.1127] Thus, he was
member of Einsatzkommando 8, which participated in the experiment.
37. Ebbinghaus/Preissler, Ermordung, p.189. The
plausibility of this date is given by the following relations: Bach-Zelewski
couldn't attend at the final conference/meeting because of a Russian
air-attack/raid, which happened on 17-9-1941 according to Bach-Zelewski's
diary. Cf. too Widmann's deposition on 11-1-1960 (note 14).
38. This date may be exactly determined because the
witnesses name the days of the week on which they stayed in Minsk and
Mogilew. When relating these statements with the exact fixture in time,
18-9, one gets the period for the stay.
39. Deposition by A.Widmann on 11-1-1960 (note 14);
further testimonies in the same vein: Karl Schulz, Nebe's adjutant,
deposition on 9-3-1959, StA Stuttgart, Az.13 Js 328/60 [ZSL, Az.439 AR-Z
18a/1960, Bl.48]; deposition by B.Wehners on 26- 1-1960, StA Bremen, Az.6
Js 3/6 [ZSL, Az.202 AR-Z 152/1959, Bl.57f.].
40. Deposition by A.Widmann on 27-1-1959 (note 16),
Bl.33f; deposition by H.Engelmann, Nebe's adjutant, on 9-1-1951, ibid,
Bl.617; deposition by B.Wehner on 26-1-1960 (note 37).
41. Krausnick/Wilhelm, Truppe, pp.150ff.
42. Deposition by A.Widmann on 27-1-1959 (note 16) and
on 12-1-1960 (note). These two depositions differ inasmuch, that different
dates are given for the events described. In the first deposition, he gives
as date: shortly after the beginning campaign in Russia, in the second:
"shortly before the campaign/onslaught/invasion in Russia". This
second statement is probably wrong/incorrect, as the psychic stress of the
execution squads and the great distances in Russia as hindrance for the
transport of CO-cylinders are mentioned. These arguments/reasons may play a
role only after the begin of the campaign in Russia. Further
observations/considerations to follow will corroborate this claim.
43. ibid.
44. Decision by Landgericht [Provincial/regional
court] Hannover on Pradel and Wentritt, Az. 2 Js 299/60 [ZSL Az.415 Ar-Z
220/1959,Bl.419f].
45. StA Hamburg, Az. 147 Js 31/67 [ZSL, Az.II 415 AR-Z
1310/63-E32, Bl.545].
46. Deposition on 2-2-1961, StA Hannover, Az. 2 Js
299/60 [ZSL, Az.415 Ar-Z 220/59, Bl.260b]. Compare the following statements
with the court-decision on Pradel, Bl.418 ff.
47. Deposition by M.Bauer, technician of the Gaubschat
factory, on 21-3-1961, StA Hannover, 2 Js 299/60 [ZSL Az.202 AR-Z 152/59,
Bl.275f.].
48. Deposition by H.Wentritt on 2-2-1961 (note 46),
Bl.260d ff.
49. Cf. following statements p.412 [Pag ten].
50. IMT-Doc. 2348-PS. The credibility of this testimony
is corroborated by that of H.Wentritt (note 46), Bl.260 e, who mentions as
well a number of five or six vehicles.
51. Deposition by H.Wentritt on 2-2-1961 (note 46), Bl.
260b ff.
52. Deposition on 6-2-1959, StA Stuttgart, Az.13 Js
328/60 [ZSL, Az.439 AR-Z 18a/1960, Bl.39]. This analysis is testified also
by Widmann (note 14).
53. Deposition by Widmann on 12-1-1960, ibid.; see also
IMT- Doc.501-PS dated 16.5.42.
54. This is testified unanimously by Leiding, Hoffmann
and Widmann.
55. See, Krausnick/Wilhelm, pp.544f. The testimonies fix
the time for the experiment to early November 1941.
56. Deposition on 6-2-1959 (note 52), Bl.40. Hoffmann
describes the event similarly; deposition on 27-1-1959, StA Hannover, Az.2
Js 299/60 [ZSL, Az.415 AR-Z 220/59, Bl.95ff.].
57. See, court-decision on Pradel, Bl.427.
58. Deposition by E.Freiwald, employee at the KTI, on
3-9- 1959 and W.Schade on 12-2-1959, StA Hannover, Az.2 Js 299/60 [ZSL, Az.
415 AR-Z 220/59, Bl.68f and 181].
59. See, note 44.
60. File entry dated 27.4.1942 and 5.6.1942 (note 3).
61. File entry dated 23.6.1942 (note 5).
62. Letter by Rauff to the KTI dated 26-3-1942 (note 2).
63. Cf. the following statements/arguments p.413 [Page
eleven].
64. Note 41, pp.186 ff.
65. Deposition by a member of this command, Lauer, StA
Darmstadt, Az. Ks 1/67 [ZSL 205 AR-Z 269/60, Bl.2390ff]. P.Blobel, leader
of Einsatzkommando 4a, testified on 6-5-1947 in Nuremberg, that a
gas-van was used already in September or October 1941. This statement
cannot be correct. Howeber, his description of the smaller vehicles is
conclusive. Nuremberg Document NO-3824.
66. ibid.
67. L.Bednarz, Extermination Camp at Chelmno, in: German
Crimes in Poland 1/1946, p.110. Regarding Sonderkommando Lange cf.
Rueckerl, NS-Vernichtungslager, pp.243ff .
68. See note 1.
69. Deposition by the driver K.Gebel on 23-10-1962, StA
Hannover, Az. 2 Js 299/60 [ZSL, Az.415 AR-Z 20/59, Bl.634f.].
70. IMT-Doc 501-PS.
71. See note 41, pp.195 ff.
72. Court-decision on Drexel and Kehrer, StA Muenchen I,
Az.119c Ks 6 a-b/70, Bl.33-35 [ZSL, Az.Sammelakte 32].
73. Deposition by Becker on 26-40-1960, StA Giessen,
Az.3 Js 11/60 [ZSL, Az.2 AR-Z 311/59, Bl.194]
74. ibid., Bl.195; Becker's statements are ascertained
by Ohlendorf, Einsatzgruppen-case Per. ??02 VI, Interrogation
Nr.167.
75. Consequently, all dates given before this date and
relating to the usage of gas-vans cannot be correct. Cf. note 65 too.
78. Deposition by Jeckeln on 21-12-1945 (note 41),
p.548.
79. See the arguments on p.414 [Page twelve].
79. That the number of people carried in the van may be
viewed as a sure mark of the vans is ascertained by the notes in the files
on 5.6.1942 (note 4).
80. See notes 54 and 56.
81. See note 50.
82. This formulation/words were used by Becker in his
report on 16.5.1942, IMT-Doc. 501-PS.
83. Deposition by H.Wentritt on 2. 2. 1960 (see note
44), Bl.260h; letter on 15.6.1942, IMT-Doc 501-PS.
84. Deposition by H.Hoffmanns on 27.1.1959, StA
Duesseldorf, Az. 8 Js 7212/59 [ZSL, Az.439 AR-Z 18a/1960, Bl.28];
deposition by A.Becker on 26-3-1960 (note 71), Bl.195. As the first series
consisted not only of chassis of one type, Becker couldn't give a more
precise designation in his report on 16.5.1942, as he did with the vans of
the second series.
85. See above p.410 [Page eight].
86. Letter to Gaubschat company on 30.4.1942, Copy ZSL,
USA Dok. Film I Nr.26f.; Letter from Becker to Rauff on 16.5.1942, IMT-Doc.
501-PS; Letter from Schaefer to Rauff on 9.6.1952 (note 4); Truehe to Rauff
on 15.6.1942 (note 5).
87. Note in the files on 27.4.1942 (note 3). This number
of people can be calculated from the measures given there.
88. See note 5.
89. See note 44 (Bl.429).
90. See note 3.
91. Note in the files on 5.6.1942 (note 4).
92. Cf. note 86.
93. This may be concluded from a letter from Gaubschat
company to Rauff on 14.5.1942 (note 3).
94. Cf. the letters on 9. and 15.6.1942 and Becker's
report on 16.5.1942, IMT-Doc. 501-PS. Regarding the witness- testimonies
see NS-Massentoetung, pp.87ff.
95. See note 62.
96. Deposition by A.Becker on 28-1-1960 (note 17),
Bl.44.
97. See note 3.
98. Note in the files on 5.6.1942 (note 4).
99. See above p.413 [Page eleven]
100. Deposition by Becker on 26-3-1960 (note 73).
101. ibid. Bl.197f.
102. ibid.; cf. his report on 16.5.1942 too.
103. Note in the files on 5.6.1942 (note 4).
104. See note 5; deposition by H.Munk on 3.2.1959, StA
Karlsruhe, Az. Js 2138/58 [ZSL, Az.415 AR-Z 220/59, Bl.499ff.]
105. 16.5.1942 (note 82)
106. Note in the files 5.6.1942 (note 4). Deposition by
A.Widmann on 11.1.1960 (note 14).
107. See note 6.
108. IMT-Doc 501-PS.
109. ibid.
110. Deposition by M.Draheim on 29.8.1961, StA Hannover,
Az. 2 Js 299/60 [ZSL, Az. 415 AR-Z 220/1959, Bl.294f] deposition by
W.Schmidt, ibid, Bl.260zf.
111. IMT, Vol.4, deposition on 3.1.1946, p.357.
112. Deposition by Becker on 28-4-1960 (note 96), Bl.43.
113. Cf. depositions by the drivers G.Laabs and K.Gebel
(notes 1 and 69).
114. Deposition by A.Truehe on 16-10-1959, ZSL, Az 2
AR-Z 311/59, Bl.43ff.
115. Cf. draft version of a letter from the
official/administrative servant at the ministry for the occupied
territories to the Reichskommisar for the Ostland on
25.10.1942, Doc. No-365; deposition by SS- and Police-Leader Warthegau
W.Koppe on 2-2-1960, StA Bonn, Az.18 Js 52/60 [ZSL, Az.220/59, Bl.138f.].
116. Note in the files on 5.6.1942 (note 4). There we
read: "Since December 1941 e.g., 97.000 have been processed with 3
vans employed, without any failure of the vehicles."
Work Cited
Mathias Beer, "Die Entwicklung der Gaswagen beim
Mord an den Juden," Miszelle. Vierteljahreshefte fuer Zeitgeschichte,
37 (3), pp. 403-417. [Translated from the German]
Source: The Nizkor Project