Teaching Morality in Armed Conflict
by Amos N. Guiora
(Updated June 2006)
Teaching morality and ethics
during armed conflict to combat units presents
unique challenges to both military educators and
commanders. Aspects of this complex issue include
the prevailing military culture, the character
of the military training, and the nontraditional
combat zone.
The Israel Defense Forces has created
a video program using short clips
from Hollywood movies familiar
with the target audience to present its eleven codes
of conduct. Following each simulation, presented with
its attendant dilemmas, the soldier is put through a
battery of questions involving legal and moral
issues.
- Introduction
- The Military Culture
- Morality in Armed Combat
- Contemporary Military Training
- The Modern Combat Zone
- Preparation for the Modern Combat Zone
- Education of the Soldier
- How to Educate & Train Soldiers
- The Israeli Model
- Checkpoints
- The Use of Simulations
- Scenarios & Codes
- Questions
- Pedagological Considerations
- Conclusion
Introduction
Teaching morality and ethics during
armed conflict to combat units presents unique challenges
to both military educators and commanders. However,
it must be understood from the outset that the ultimate
responsibility for morality and ethics is the commander's,
in terms of both words and action. If the commander
is unwilling to go beyond "talking the talk," or
if his actions contradict what he has instructed his
forces regarding issues of morality, the potential
for violations by his forces is great. The military
educator, who comes from outside the unit and therefore
is not a member of the immediate "family" though
he serves in the same army, leaves after speaking to
a unit on matters of morality. The commander must be
both the role model and the teacher of morality and
ethics; an absolute commitment on his part is the single
most critical component of the teaching of morality
in armed conflict.
The Military Culture
The military culture, like any other
professional culture, has its own sets of rules and
codes. What makes the military culture different, however,
is that it teaches, trains, encourages, and rewards
the killing of other human beings. The soldier who
is drafted or volunteers to "serve his country" will
be indoctrinated immediately into a culture where the
self is largely irrelevant - an often-cited example
is the crew-cuts given to all new recruits - as commanders
emphasize the greater good at every opportunity. It
is driven into the new recruit as an absolute truth.
The concept of the greater good is
no mere abstraction; soldiers must be able to blindly
- literally - trust their comrades-in-arms just as
the latter must trust them. Otherwise, a combat unit
will be unable to effectively perform its mission.
Esprit de corps is not a mere phrase; it is the absolute
guideline. Combat soldiers must be closer than brothers;
they are brothers-in-arms ready, willing, and able
to kill and be killed in order to protect each other
so as to guarantee mission accomplishment. It is truly
a concept of the "greater good."
That greater good, implicitly and
explicitly, includes the killing of the enemy, defined
by the state as threatening the welfare and safety
of that particular nation. A soldier must be prepared
to make what is called the "ultimate sacrifice" -
his own life. To reach this psychological state, whereby
young men and women are indeed ready to die for what
someone else has defined as the "greater good," the
enculturation process must be thorough, rapid, and
overwhelming. The commander cannot allow himself the
luxury of combat soldiers unwilling to pay this price;
otherwise he will lead mutiny-ridden units on the verge
of desertion. Accordingly, the military demands total
commitment to unit and mission.
There are, however, at least two overriding
principles that must be addressed: the soldier must
be taught how to identify the enemy and simultaneously
distinguish combatants from noncombatants. In addition,
the soldier must understand that issues of morality
are not less significant than what action must be taken
when the gun jams. Morality in armed conflict needs
to be one of the tools in the commander's toolbox.
Without internalizing these fundamental concepts, the
soldier is sent into today's battle unprepared. A soldier
who goes into battle unprepared is a disaster waiting
to happen.
Morality in Armed Conflict
Some argue that a soldier's primary
- if not only - task is the killing of the enemy. If
so, what explains the increasing centrality of teaching
morality in contemporary armed conflict? The answers
lies in the unique nature of today's combat.
Traditional warfare, as in World Wars
I and II, involved large armies matched against each
other on large battlefields. The machinery available
to the commander included, among other things, tanks,
planes, missiles, and ships. Soldiers were taught to
operate these increasingly sophisticated weapons for
the single purpose of killing the enemy soldier; the
enemy soldier was given similar instructions. On the
other hand, soldiers who were expected to defeat the
enemy were also taught that a captured enemy soldier
was to be considered a prisoner of war according to
conventions signed and ratified by nations as part
of the laws of war. Nevertheless, history is replete
with examples of wrongful treatment, including torture
and killing, of captured enemy soldiers. This could
result from the very nature of battle, insufficient
training, or willful violation of international law.
Contemporary Military Training
How does the contemporary army prepares
itself for today's war, which is fundamentally different
from yesterday's war? That difference relates to the
core question of whom the soldier is fighting; who
is the enemy? Contemporary armed conflict does not
and will not take place on the vast battlefields of
the past; rather, it will occur in the back alleys
of Groznyy, Nablus, and Mosul. The soldier will not
be facing another soldier wearing a uniform with insignia,
carrying his weapon openly, and serving in a unit with
a clear chain of command. In the contemporary combat
arena, the fighting is far more complex and ambiguous
than in traditional warfare for two primary reasons:
increasingly, combat will occur in urban centers and
not on a battlefield; and civilians will be very much
present.
The Geneva Convention stipulates that
for a combatant to be designated a soldier he must
wear a uniform with insignia while carrying his weapon
openly and be part of a chain of command. 1 Does this
mean the Geneva Convention is irrelevant to contemporary
warfare? Not necessarily, but it does suggest that
changes may be required to ensure continued relevance.
What is critical in the present context is that the
Convention demands that an army educate its forces
on issues of international law.2
In contemporary armed conflict, the
soldier placed in the combat zone - the parameters
of which are ill-defined - will often encounter an
individual wearing civilian clothes - jeans and a T-shirt
are standard - without knowing for sure if that person
is friend, foe, or perhaps neither. The attire of the
foe in contemporary armed conflict is in many ways
an apt metaphor for the fundamental change from the
traditional to the modern. In today's combat, the soldier's
world is much more ambiguous and complicated precisely
because the combatant standing opposite is at best
wearing faded blue jeans - as are all those around
him.
The Modern Combat Zone
The equation, then, has been turned
on its head: if in traditional warfare noncombatants
were the minority in the combat arena, today combatants
are the minority. Yet the omnipresent civilians are
generally nonparticipants, meaning noncombatants. In
many cases they are women and children - generally
definable as innocent civilians and therefore as protected
individuals according to the Geneva Convention.3
The person standing next to an innocent
civilian, however, may be a terrorist, albeit similarly
dressed and looking the same. Moreover, as the soldier
glances left and right he will see an "arena" fundamentally
different than he would have twenty years ago: there
are no uniforms, yet he knows that somewhere in that
crowd of people - who speak a language he does not
understand and have cultural mores alien to his - are
those intent on immediately killing him. These individuals,
however, may well be unseen until it is too late. And
when the soldier finally does confront them in a dark
alley, it will still probably be very difficult to
make certain if they are friend or foe.
The effect of this reality on the
soldier is critical: he is in doubt as to who is the
enemy. A soldier in doubt is a scared soldier, albeit
heavily armed and trained to kill. The training of
today's soldier must, then, be fundamentally different
than in the past. Commanders who do not understand
this transformation and its attendant responsibilities
will not only fail in their obligations to their soldiers,
they will also place their nation and its leaders in
situations of potentially great political damage, internally
and externally.
Preparation for the Modern Combat Zone
Whereas in contemporary combat the
soldier usually will not know if those confronting
him are friend or foe, a soldier's training is in many
ways the teaching of instinctive reactions - better
to kill than be killed. "Reaction time," "better
to be the initiator," "take the fight to
the enemy" are all phrases associated with traditional
warfare when the soldier instinctively and clearly
knew who was the enemy. The challenge facing commanders
and military educators today is how, on the one hand,
to teach a soldier to respond instinctively and immediately,
and yet to ascertain that the civilian is a foe and
not a friend.
In the split second that the soldier
must make that distinction - one of the critical requirements
of international law - the civilian clearly enjoys
the advantage. If the soldier has been properly trained,
not only operationally but also regarding issues of
morality, he will know how to run through a mental
checklist that, while far more complicated than in
the past, is critical to contemporary armed conflict.
The civilian - or at least the person dressed like
one - may actually be a terrorist, or may truly be
an innocent civilian. The dilemma facing the soldier
is overwhelming. A wrong decision has potentially dramatic
ramifications, which may reach far beyond those immediately
involved.
The Education of the Soldier
Interactive software developed by
the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) to prepare soldiers
for such dilemmas has been called the best and most
advanced of its kind by senior officers from many foreign
armies.5 The IDF has received numerous requests for
the video from other armies. The research for this
article involved conversations with senior American,
Canadian, and British officers whose comments reinforced
those reactions. As more and more nations encounter
the new form of armed conflict, they too will have
to develop models relevant to their particular needs,
rules of engagement, and standard operating procedures.
Meanwhile, this author's research clearly indicates
that the IDF has "defined the field."
However, this does not mean that in
the future IDF soldiers will not commit acts that violate
both morality and law. Mistakes will occur because
eighteen-year-olds, no matter how well trained and
sensitized, remain eighteen-year-olds. Over the past
few years, the question of how IDF soldiers should
conduct themselves toward the Palestinian civilian
population has become a major issue among commanders,
actively addressed at all levels. This is not to suggest
that previously the IDF was immoral, but to note that
morality in armed conflict is now a pressing concern.
A case in point was the pronouncement
by then chief of staff Moshe Ya'alon that the true
battle facing the IDF today is the fight for its moral
soul. This "battle," he asserted, must be
joined immediately and thoroughly.6
How to Educate and Train Soldiers
Upon appointment as commander of the
IDF School of Military Law in March 2002, the overriding
issue faced by this author was how best to help the
soldier confronting two almost untenable situations:
(1) fighting terrorists in what the media calls urban
warfare, and (2) manning checkpoints and having to
determine who proceeds and who does not. In both cases
the soldier must act quickly, or may pay with his life.
Over many years, IDF soldiers had
regularly received lectures about international law
and the law of war. Whether this was effective is not
clear, but it was evident that the educational effort
had to be expanded beyond legal issues only. The dilemma
faced was how to teach soldiers - aged eighteen to
twenty-one - not only the law, but also morality without
losing the audience in the process. Morality can be
considered an abstract and "soft" subject,
requiring nothing more than "common sense." If
the topic is not presented creatively, it may well
elicit a dismissive response.
Conversations with a broad range of
commanders - junior, including noncommissioned officers
(NCO), and senior grades from both the standing army
and reservists serving in the ground forces, air force,
and navy - revealed a willingness to try a different
approach. Commanders were prepared to cooperate in
creating a new mechanism to teach morality to junior
commanders and soldiers. The question was what technique
would be most effective.
The preferred solution was to avoid
- unless field and operational circumstances dictated
otherwise - "standup" lectures to units whose
soldiers were either in training or preparing for deployment,
and instead to develop an interactive software, based
on Hollywood movies and state-of-the-art graphics,
to teach an eleven-point code of conduct. This code
is based on international law and was formulated after
careful analysis of other armies' practice.
Although other armies had indeed developed
training material on this issue, means of effectively
reaching the soldier were lacking. The client has to
be "hooked" to ensure - as much as possible
- that a genuine learning process will take place.
A training video with role-playing actors, as used
in other armies, was found to be "unnatural" and "staged." The
goal was to devise an educational tool that the audience
could relate to, not only in the context of present
experience from before their military service. That
tool had to be entertaining at least in its approach;
it had to have a "marketing edge" to it,
or the soldier might disregard it.
The Israeli Model
It was decided to teach the codes
by using two- to three-minute clips from relevant Hollywood
movies that would be familiar to most of our "clients." The
use of the word client is intentional, since an educational
mission that is not client oriented is a guaranteed
failure.
The eleven codes that were developed
and the attendant movies are:
1. Military Objectives/Targets - Apocalypse
Now
2. Necessary Force and Collateral Damage - Rules
of Engagement
3. Weapons and Ammunition - Three Kings
4. Human Dignity - Platoon
5. Religious and Cultural Property - The Eagle
Has Landed
6. Pillage - Kelly's Heroes
7. POWs, Detainees, Surrendered and Arrested Persons
- The Siege
8. The Wounded and the Sick - Apocalypse Now
9. Foreign Representatives and International Workers
- The English Patient
10. Persons with Unique Status - The Year of Living
Dangerously
11. Reporting Violations - Casualties of War
The overriding motif is the absolute
requirement that the soldier treat the Palestinian
civilian population with the utmost dignity and respect.
In a number of documented cases, IDF soldiers have
not met that obligation. It is critical that commanders
and military educators be resolute in addressing the
issue.
The segment shown from the movie Platoon,
which depicts a My Lai-like incident, is powerful in
its images and sounds. Soldiers are seen burning huts
and throwing grenades into dug holes that may well
be hiding places. Children cling to their parents and
beg that they not be taken from them. Against this
harsh background, the camera focuses on the commander
walking away deep in thought.
The graphic that complements this
clip emphasizes the imperative of maintaining the dignity
of the Palestinian population. Using voice-over, it
addresses the issues of: Palestinians at checkpoints;
house demolitions and who may authorize them; the absolute
illegality of sexual assaults and the absolute requirement
of protecting innocent civilians.
Checkpoints
Checkpoints are where the frictions
between the occupied and the occupier come to a head.
In many ways, the checkpoints are the most difficult
issue. The IDF has created the position of checkpoint
commander and established an intensive two-day course
- in which local representatives of the International
Red Cross participate - to provide these commanders
with an operational toolbox. They are also instructed
on basic words in Arabic and on the various identity
cards seen at checkpoints, and receive a lecture from
the IDF School of Military Law.
The abovementioned graphic includes
a picture (still) of a soldier checking a group of
men at a checkpoint, with a small boy nearby. When
units are asked who is the most important person in
the picture, most reply that the boy is: if a soldier
humiliates - or worse - the father, the end result
may well be the birth of a new terrorist. On several
occasions, Palestinians arrested on the way to suicide-bombing
missions told interrogators that their impetus, or
one of them, was having witnessed a family member,
particularly a parent, mistreated at a checkpoint.
From an educational perspective, then,
what the soldier is intended to learn from the clip
and the graphic is: the issue of human dignity, the
concept of innocent civilians, and the price to be
paid should he err.
The Use of Simulations
In creating the software the main
aim was to educate the soldier in the eleven codes
using the movies and graphics. It was decided that
simulations based on actual events that transpired
in the IDF's Central Command, which has control over
the West Bank, would be most effective. Confronting
the soldier with real-life dilemmas that either his
unit or similar units have experienced was seen as
the most realistic and potentially effective approach.
Six scenarios with their attendant
dilemmas were chosen:
1. Two soldiers driving in a jeep
in the West Bank (topographically identifiable) come
across a pile of rocks that may well be booby- trapped;
may they order a local inhabitant to remove the pile?
2. The commander has just been informed
that a wanted terrorist is in the area and the only
vehicle available is an ambulance; may such a vehicle
be used for operational purposes?
3. A combat unit active near a hospital
hears gunfire coming from it; may the commander order
his soldiers to enter the hospital to end the shooting?
4. A force deep in enemy territory
after completing its operation comes upon a shepherd
who may endanger the unit should he run away; may
the commander order his troops to kill the shepherd?
5. After completing an operation,
a unit comes upon a destroyed factory; may the commander
allow his soldiers to take with them a small souvenir
from it?
6. A unit is based in a family's
house and someone in the family is injured by gunfire;
must the commander allow an ambulance to approach
the house at all costs?
After viewing each simulation, the
soldier is asked a series of questions to test his
understanding of the legal and moral issues entailed.
In other words, the soldier who so far has been passively
watching clips, graphics, and simulations must now
attempt to integrate all the material.
An interesting phenomenon was that
when control groups from NCO school and officers training
school were shown the video, before its distribution
for general use, there was much chatter among the soldiers
during the "passive" period and then absolute
quiet when they became "active."
Scenarios and Codes
Although there are eleven codes, there
are only six simulations; it is often asked whether
there should not be a scenario for each code. It was
felt, however, that the six scenarios and their subsequent
questions, which address issues with legal and moral
implications, are broad enough to relate to all eleven
codes. On the other hand, it was thought that too many
simulations would not be educationally beneficial.
The operational reality of armed conflict
short of war is that a soldier must make multiple decisions
involving various factors, all of which have endless
ramifications. No decision is linear; all lead to additional
dilemmas and require further decision-making.
Questions
Following each simulation and its
attendant dilemma, the soldier is given a battery of
questions involving legal and moral issues. For example,
the questions for the first scenario are:
QUESTION: Is it forbidden to force a local
resident to help move an obstacle?
ANSWER: It is forbidden
to use a local resident or an enemy soldier
to clear an obstacle when there is suspicion
that it is booby-trapped.
QUESTION: If there is suspicion that the obstacle
is booby-trapped, is it permissible to have a local
resident help out so that the unit won't be endangered?
ANSWER: Use of civilians
as hostages or as human shields is strictly
forbidden.
QUESTION: Should the unit not wait for the
bomb squad since time is of the essence and the force
is in danger?
ANSWER: Clearing
an obstacle that is suspected of being
booby-trapped shall be performed as circumstances
permit and pursuant to existing combat
doctrines.
QUESTION: If you witnessed a local resident
placing the stones in the road, may that same resident
be used to remove the stones?
ANSWER:
An individual who has been seen placing
the stones may be used to removed the stones.
After the soldier has finished answering
the questions, which are in the form of a true-false
exam, the correct response appears on the screen, and
the accompanying voice-over explains the rationale
behind it. There is no final score and passing the
exam has not been a criterion for course completion.
Pedagogical Considerations
In many though not all cases, the
use of the video was accompanied by a discussion led
by an officer from the IDF School of Military Law in
the presence, and with the contribution, of the particular
unit's commander. It was seen as imperative to make
the commander a full participant in the educational
process. If he is not present, the message is that
the issue is not very important. In addition, morality
in armed conflict is ultimately a command issue and
not a matter for the Judge Advocate General's Corps
(JAG); the JAG can be a significant contributor but
cannot instruct the soldier how to conduct himself
as he does not give orders. Hence, the phrase adopted
to explain the relationship between the video, the
JAG, and the commander was "another tool in the
commander's toolbox."
Conclusion
The dilemmas facing soldiers, junior
commanders, and senior commanders are literally overwhelming.
The IDF School of Military Law is now making a conscious
effort to assist commanders in teaching perhaps the
most important issue in the contemporary battlefield.
Although, in developing the interactive video, the
IDF learned from other armies, the final product represents
a creative and unusual educational effort. There is
no guarantee that this video will in itself prevent
tragic mistakes. However, other armies' praise for
it indicated its potential effectiveness. If, as a
result of the video, a single Palestinian is spared
humiliation, then it can be defined as an effective
military educational tool.
Sources:JCPA
1. Geneva Convention (III) Relative to
the Treatment of Prisoners of War, opened for signature
12 August 1949, art. 4(2).
2. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of
12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims
of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), opened
for signature 8 June 1977, art. 83.
3. Ibid., art. 50.
4. Ibid., art. 48.
5. This author, on a number of occasions, demonstrated
the software to senior officers from foreign armies.
6. As reported to the author by a senior IDF officer
present when the chief of staff made these comments.
PROF. AMOS N. GUIORA is professor
of law and director of the Institute for Global Security,
Law and Policy, Case Western Reserve University School
of Law. He served for nineteen years in the Israel
Defense Forces, holding senior command positions in
the Judge Advocate General’s Corps including
legal adviser for the Gaza Strip, judge advocate for
the navy and Home Front commands, and commander of
the IDF School of Military Law. In this last capacity
he had command responsibility for developing an eleven-point
interactive video teaching IDF soldiers and commanders
a code of conduct based on international law, Israeli
law, and the IDF ethical code.
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