News Conferences & Interviews on the Middle East/Israel
(1977)
FEBRUARY 9, 1977
TRADE BOYCOTTS
Q. Mr. President, my name is Howard Griffin, from the
Department of Commerce, Office of Export Administration. Some of my
workers would like to know what are you planning to do with the Arab
boycott? In one of your speeches you said that you were planning to
end it. They were wondering, how far have you progressed on this?
THE PRESIDENT. I think it is good for all of us to
understand that there are different meanings to the word "boycott."
A primary boycott is perfectly acceptable in international affairs.
We have, for instance, a primary boycott against Cuba.
It is all right for a nation to say we are not going to trade with you.
It is perfectly all right for the Arab countries to say we are not going
to trade with Israel. What does create a problem that I hope to eliminate
is for the Arab countries to say to us, "You cannot trade with
Israel and also trade with us" or "You cannot trade with us,
the Arab countries, if you have Jews on your board of directors."
This, in my opinion, violates the constitutional rights of Jewish citizens.
It also is completely obnoxious to me in a society like our own, built
on an absence of legal attention, of recognition of a person's religious
or racial or sexual characteristics.
So, that is what is called a secondary and even tertiary
boycott. We now have several bills that have been introduced in the
House and Senate. We have a cohesive group of business and labor leaders,
many of whom happen to be Jewish, who are working on the principles
that ought to be included in an antiboycott law.
And I will support those. I think it is time for us
to root out the concept of the secondary and tertiary boycott, never
permit a foreign nation to discriminate against any of our citizens
who happen to be Jewish, with legal permission from our own Government.
And we also need to have as a last thing uniformity among the different
States of the Nation in dealing with the antiboycott legislation. We
now have a strong antiboycott law in New York. We have a weak antiboycott
law in New Jersey. So, when the Arab countries want to come and trade,
they just bypass New York, come into New Jersey, and they can discriminate
against Jewish citizens accordingly.
So, uniformity and elimination of attention, of recognition
given to a citizen because they happen to be Jewish, and a prohibition
against the deprivation of human rights, and a secondary and tertiary
boycott are all things that I hope to root out.
The right of the Arab countries to boycott Israel is
something with which we have no authority and in which I do not want
to become involved.
MARCH 9, 1977
THE MIDDLE EAST
Q. Mr. President, there has been a lot of talk about
defensible borders lately and what that means in regard to the Middle
East. Could I ask you, sir, do you feel that it would be appropriate
in a Middle East peace settlement for the Israelis to keep some of the
occupied land they took during the 1967 war in order to have secure
borders?
THE PRESIDENT. The defensible border phrase, the secure
borders phrase, obviously, are just semantics. I think it's a relatively
significant development in the description of possible settlement in
the Middle East to talk about these things as a distinction.
The recognized borders have to be mutual. The Arab
nations, the Israeli nation, has to agree on permanent and recognized
borders, where sovereignty is legal as mutually agreed. Defense lines
may or may not conform in the foreseeable future to those legal borders.
There may be extensions of Israeli defense capability beyond the permanent
and recognized borders.
I think this distinction is one that is now recognized
by Israeli leaders. The definition of borders on a geographical basis
is one that remains to be determined. But I think that it is important
for the world to begin to see, and for the interested parties to begin
to see, that there can be a distinction between the two; the ability
of Israel to defend herself by international agreement or by the some.
time placement of Israeli forces themselves or by monitoring stations,
as has been the case in the Sinai, beyond the actual sovereignty borders
as mutually agreed by Israel and her neighbors.
Q. Well, does that mean international zones between
the countries?
THE PRESIDENT. International zones could very well
be part of an agreement. And I think that I can see in a growing way,
a step-by-step process where there might be a mutual agreement that
the ultimate settlement, even including the border delineations, would
be at a certain described point. In an interim state, maybe 2 years,
4 years, 8 years, or more, there would be a mutual demonstration of
friendship and an end to the declaration or state of war.
I think that what Israel would like to have is what
we would like to have: a termination of belligerence toward Israel by
her neighbors, a recognition of Israel's right to exist, the right to
exist in peace, the opening up of borders with free trade, tourist travel,
cultural exchange between Israel and her neighbors; in other words,
a stabilization of the situation in the Middle East without a constant
threat to Israel's existence by her neighbors.
This would involve substantial withdrawal of Israel's
present control over territories. Now, where that withdrawal might end,
I don't know. I would guess it would be some minor adjustments in the
1967 borders. But that still remains to be negotiated.
But I think this is going to be a long, tedious process.
We're going to mount a major effort in our own Government in 1977, to
bring the parties to Geneva. Obviously, any agreement has to be between
the parties concerned. We will act as an intermediary when our good
offices will serve well.
But I'm not trying to predispose our own Nation's attitudes
towards what might be the ultimate details of the agreement that can
mean so much to world peace.
of the possibility of substantial withdrawal of Israeli
control over territory and then, just a few seconds later, spoke of
the possibility of minor territorial concessions by the Israelis.
What is it exactly that you have in mind here? Are
you really talking about some big withdrawals, or are you talking only
about minor withdrawals?
THE PRESIDENT. I don't think I would use the word minor
withdrawals. I think there might be minor adjustments to the 1967, pre-1967
borders. But that's a matter for Israel and her neighbors to decide
between themselves.
Q. Mr. President, I'd like to go just a little bit
further in your discussion of the defensible borders issue.
If I understood you correctly, you're talking about
the possibility of something like an Israeli defense line along the
Jordan River and perhaps at some point on the Sinai Desert and perhaps
at some point on the Golan Heights, that would be defense forces but
not legal borders.
Have I understood that correctly, that your feeling
is that the Israelis are going to have to have some kind of defense
forces along the Jordan River and in those other places?
THE PRESIDENT. Well, you added a great deal to what
I said. In the first place, I didn't mention any particular parts of
the geography around Israel. And I didn't confine the defense capability
to Israeli forces. These might very well be international forces. It
might very well be a line that's fairly broad, say, 20 kilometers or
more, where demilitarization is guaranteed on both sides. It might very
well consist of outposts, electronics or, perhaps, personnel outposts
as were established in the Sinai region as a result of the Egypt and
Israeli agreement.
I'm not going to try to get more specific in saying
what will or will not be the case. But that is a possibility that might
lead to the alleviation of tension there, and it's one about which I
will be discussing this matter with the representatives from the Arab
countries when they come.
MARCH 16, 1977
THE MIDDLE EAST
Q. My name is Reverend Richard Harding, and, President
Carter, it's a pleasure to welcome you to the number one Everytown,
U.S.A.--Clinton, Massachusetts.
I would like to ask you, Mr. President-it seems that
world peace hinges greatly on the Middle East.
THE PRESIDENT. Yes.
Q. What do you personally feel must be done to establish
a meaningful and a lasting peace in that area of the world? Thank you.
THE PRESIDENT. I think all of you know that there has
been either war or potential war in the Middle East for the last 29
years, ever since Israel became a nation. I think one of the finest
acts of the world nations that's ever occurred was to establish the
State of Israel.
So, the first prerequisite of a lasting peace is the
recognition of Israel by her neighbors, Israel's right to exist, Israel's
right to exist permanently, Israel's right to exist in peace. That means
that over a period of months or years that the borders between Israel
and Syria, Israel and Lebanon, Israel and Jordan, Israel and Egypt must
be opened up to travel, to tourism, to cultural exchange, to trade,
so that no matter who the leaders might be in those countries, the people
themselves will have formed a mutual understanding and comprehension
and a sense of a common purpose to avoid the repetitious wars and death
that have afflicted that region so long. That's the first prerequisite
of peace.
The second one is very important and very, very difficult,
and that is the establishment of permanent borders for Israel. The Arab
countries say that Israel must withdraw to the pre-1967 borderlines;
Israel says that they must adjust those lines to some degree to insure
their own security. That is a matter to be negotiated between the Arab
countries on the one side and Israel on the other.
But borders are still a matter of great trouble and
a matter of great difficulty, and there are strong differences of opinion
now.
And the third ultimate requirement for peace is to
deal with the Palestinian problem. The Palestinians claim up 'til this
moment that Israel has no right to be there, that the land belongs to
the Palestinians, and they've never yet given up their publicly professed
commitment to destroy Israel. That has to be overcome.
There has to be a homeland provided for the Palestinian
refugees who have suffered for many, many years. And the exact way to
solve the Palestinian problem is one that first of all addresses itself
right now to the Arab countries and then, secondly, to the Arab countries
negotiating with Israel.
Those three major elements have got to be solved before
a Middle Eastern solution can be prescribed.
I want to emphasize one more time, we offer our good
offices. I think it's accurate to say that of all the nations in the
world, we are the one that's most trusted, not completely, but most
trusted by the Arab countries and also Israel. I guess both sides have
some doubt about us. But we'll have to act kind of as a catalyst to
bring about their ability to negotiate successfully with one another.
We hope that later on this year, in the latter part
of this year, that we might get all of these parties to agree to come
together at Geneva, to start talking to one another. They haven't done
that yet. And I believe if we can get them to sit down and start talking
and negotiating that we have an excellent chance to achieve peace. I
can't guarantee that. It's a hope.
I hope that we will all pray that that will come to
pass, because what happens in the Middle East in the future might very
well cause a major war there which would quickly spread to all the other
nations of the world; very possibly it could do that.
Many countries depend completely on oil from the Middle
East for their life. We don't. If all oil was cut off to us from the
Middle East, we could survive; but Japan imports more than 98 percent
of all its energy, and other countries, like in Europe--Germany, Italy,
France--are also heavily dependent on oil from the Middle East.
So, this is such a crucial area of the world that I
will be devoting a major part of my own time on foreign policy between
now and next fall trying to provide for a forum within which they can
discuss their problems and, hopefully, let them seek out among themselves
some permanent solution.
Just maybe as briefly as I could, that's the best
answer I can give you to that question.
APRIL 8, 1977
THE MIDDLE EAST
Q. Mr. President, do you think that the resignation
of Prime Minister Rabin may throw off your timetable for the Geneva
talks and a settlement in the Middle East?
THE PRESIDENT. No, I don't. Obviously, the Israeli
Labor Party will now be searching for a replacement candidate for Prime
Minister Rabin in May. And I believe that the outcome of the election
might very well be affected; nobody can anticipate how.
But there is a great realization among the Israeli
leaders that 1977 is an important year. There is almost a unanimous
commitment, I think, among all the Mideastern countries, that if we
don't succeed this year in some major step toward peace that it will
be a long time before we can mount such a mammoth multinational effort
again.
So, it may be affected---the chances for peace--but
no one can predict how. And I believe the Israelis will push forward
with their own strong desire to have a permanent and lasting peace with
the Arab neighbors, to have borders that they can defend, and that the
Palestinian question be resolved. I don't think the identity of one
particular political figure, even the Prime Minister, will affect that
adversely.
Q. Mr. President, when you were meeting with President
Sadat and you were talking about this Palestinian question, did you
get any impression that there is a way to get the Palestinians to Geneva
as part of some delegation? And if so, can you give us some of your
thinking on that?
THE PRESIDENT. Well, as you know, President Sadat earlier
had been the Arab leader that was courageous enough to espouse the idea
that the Palestinians might be part of the Jordanian delegation. Whether
or not that will evolve, I don't have any way to anticipate.
But I have good hope that we can resolve the question
of Palestinian participation in some fashion or another. At this point,
which is quite early in the year's efforts, I believe that it's primarily
a responsibility of the Arab countries and the Palestinians. And for
me to spell out what I think is a most likely prospect, I think would
be counterproductive at this point.
Q. Mr. President, do you think they should be represented?
THE PRESIDENT. Well, obviously, one of the three crucial
decisions to be made in the Middle East concerns the Palestinian people.
And there will have to be a spokesman for their viewpoint during the
conference itself. Whether that would be done by a surrogate or by them
directly is something that hasn't been evolved.
The other two questions, obviously, are the definition
of permanent peace and the assurance of it, and the border delineations.
But I certainly think that in some fashion that the Palestinian people
must be represented.
Q. Mr. President, President Sadat used the word entity
when he came to Washington, instead of Palestinian nation or Palestinian
state.
THE PRESIDENT. Yes.
Q. Did you get any impression from him that he is moving
toward, or more willing now to accept a Jordanian-Palestinian nation,
that is, a homeland that would be under the control of Jordan?
THE PRESIDENT. That's a question I wouldn't want to
answer for President Sadat. I'll let him make his own statements publicly,
and I don't intend to repeat what he tells me privately.
But I think that it's obvious that that's one avenue
of success. It's one that I have espoused even during the campaign months;
that perhaps some confederation or some relationship between the Palestinians
and Jordan might be advisable.
As you know, there are approximately a million Palestinians
who are part of the Jordanian society now, in very high positions in
the government, and I think this is a natural possibility. Whether or
not it will be the ultimate decision, I can't say.
Q. Can I go back to something you said earlier on another
subject? That was the subject of the total $11 billion in under-spending
and over-tax collection.
THE PRESIDENT. Yes.
MAY 12, 1977
THE MIDDLE EAST
Q. Mr. President, do you think that Israel should accept
the Palestinian homeland if the Palestinians or PLO accept the fact
of Israel? And also, as a result of your talks today, are you persuaded
that we should share arms technology and coproduction with Israel?
THE PRESIDENT. The answer to both those questions is
yes. I don't think that there can be any reasonable hope for a settlement
of the Middle Eastern question, which has been extant now on a continuing
basis now for more than 29 years, without a homeland for the Palestinians.
The exact definition of what that homeland might be, the degree of independence
of the Palestinian entity, its relationship with Jordan, or perhaps
Syria and others, the geographical boundaries of it, all have to be
worked out by the parties involved. But for the Palestinians to have
a homeland and for the refugee question to be resolved, is obviously
of crucial importance.
We have a special relationship with Israel. It's absolutely
crucial that no one in our country or around the world ever doubt that
our number one commitment in the Middle East is to protect the right
of Israel to exist, to exist permanently, and to exist in peace. It's
a special relationship.
Although I've met with the leaders of Egypt, Syria,
Jordan, and had long hours of discussion, I never found any of those
Arab leaders who objected to that special commitment of ours to the
protection of the integrity of Israel.
And obviously, part of that is to make sure that Israel
has adequate means to protect themselves without military involvement
of the United States. I have no objection about this arrangement. I'm
proud of it. And it will be permanent as long as I'm in office.
Q. May I get back briefly to Helen's question? It seemed
to us, traveling with you, that you and the people in your party were
a 'bit more upbeat on the question of the Middle East this week than
perhaps a couple weeks ago after the Hussein visit. I just wonder, do
you have indications now that the Palestinians are ready to recognize
the right of Israel to exist? And also, .do you have--in reference to
the question Helen brought up--do you have some indication that Israel
is ready to recognize the need for a Palestinian homeland?
THE PRESIDENT. We have had no contact with the Palestinians,
with PLO. But I have concluded meetings with the Prime Minister of Israel,
the President of Egypt, the President of Syria, and the King of Jordan.
At the conclusion of this series of meetings, I feel 'better than I
did before. At the end of the Hussein meeting my own hopes were improved.
I don't want to mislead anyone. The chances for Middle
Eastern peace are still very much in doubt. We have a long way to go.
But I do believe that there's a chance that the Palestinians might make
moves to recognize the right of Israel to exist. And if so, this would
remove one of the major obstacles toward further progress.
Our Government, before I became President, promised
the Israeli Government that we would not recognize the PLO by direct
conversations or negotiations, as long as the PLO continued to espouse
the commitment that Israel had to be destroyed.
I would like to see this resolved. There's a chance
that it will be done. We are trying to add our efforts to bring this
about. But I have no assurance that it will be accomplished.
FOREIGN ARMS SALES
Q. Mr. President, about a month ago you got recommendations
on your desk for a new weapons sales policy for overseas, and Secretary
Vance has explained that to some members of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee. Did you explain that policy to the other leaders in London
that you met with, and will Israel get any kind of special treatment?
Will there be a class of countries that get special treatment?
THE PRESIDENT. I did explain it to the other leaders
in London--to some of the other leaders, not all of them, because I
met with so many. And the second answer is that Israel will get special
treatment. We have a certain small group of nations who, because of
long-standing historical commitments of Presidents, Congress, and the
American people, do have a special relationship with our Government.
In coproduction--that's when we share responsibilities
for the production of a certain weapons system or the sale of the advanced
weapons systems--Israel is one of those countries. Yes.
MAY 20, 1977
PRIME MINISTER BEGIN OF ISRAEL
Q. Have you been in touch with Mr. Begin since his
election, and do you plan any meeting with him? And what changes in
our Mideast policy does this suggest may be necessary?
THE PRESIDENT. I have not been in touch with Mr. Begin.
I think it's proper for me to wait for congratulatory messages and also
to contact Mr. Begin until the President of Israel officially designates
him as the new leader. At this point, of course, Mr. Perez is still
the Prime Minister, and until the President designates Mr. Begin as
the one to put a government together, I don't intend to communicate
with him.
After, though, he is designated to put the government
together, my intention is to congratulate him and also to let him know
that I would welcome a visit and a discussion with him about the future
of the Middle East.
I am very hopeful that the election will not change
the long-time commitment of Israel to searching for a permanent peace
settlement. And I have never met Mr. Begin. He has been here earlier
to meet with Dr. Brzezinski since I have been President, but I was not
here and did not get a chance to meet him. But we are being very reticent
about making any statements concerning the Israeli election until we
can understand the prospects of the new government as it relates to
a possible peace settlement, and I doubt that I will know, even have
a firm opinion, on how much that's changed until I have a personal meeting
with him.
We have successfully concluded talks with the leaders
of Israel, when Mr. Rabin was there, of Egypt and Jordan and Syria.
I found all those talks to be very constructive and my hope is that
these constructive remarks made to me by the leaders accurately represents
the strong inclination of the people whom they lead. If so, I think
that the identity of particular leaders will be much less a factor than
is generally believed in the immediate aftermath of an election.
MAY 26, 1977
THE MIDDLE EAST
Q. Mr. President, on March 9, you talked about the
idea of Israel withdrawing to her '67 borders, with only minor adjustments.
Is that still your position, and is there any way that Israel could
retain the West Bank of the Jordan and make that fit in the definition
of "minor adjustments"?
THE PRESIDENT. That is still my position, although
I might add again that the United States, including myself as President-we
do not have a Middle Eastern settlement plan, but the basic premises
have been spelled out very clearly.
In the United Nations resolutions that have been passed,
coming from the Security Council, voted on and supported by our Government--and
these have been binding policies of the Government--they do include
the right of the Palestinians to have a homeland, to be compensated
for losses that they have suffered. They do include the withdrawal of
Israel from occupied territories from the 1967 war, and they do include
an end of belligerency and a reestablishment of permanent and secure
borders.
All these things have been spelled out in writing in
those United Nations positions which we have endorsed--every administration
since they were passed.
I would certainly assume that withdrawal from West
Bank territories, either partially or in their entirety, would be a
part of an ultimate settlement, but that is something that has to be
worked out still between the Israelis and their neighbors.
We do not intend to put forward a description of what
the exact borders should be. It is not our role to play. We will explore
possibilities for common agreement and reserve the right to make our
opinions known. But we have no control over anyone in the Middle East
and do not want any control over anyone in the Middle East. But those
three basic principles-permanent peace, secure borders, and resolution
of the Palestinian question--all have been and still are integral parts
of any peace settlement.
Q. Mr. President, to follow up on the Middle East,
Mr. President, could you give us more of your thinking on the disposition
of places like the Golan Heights, which you talked about during the
campaign, the question of Jerusalem, and other areas like that? And
can you say how your proposal for minor alterations differs from the
1969 American plan calling for substantial alterations?
THE PRESIDENT. No, I can't respond to those specific
things. I think it would be inappropriate for me to try to draw a line
on a map in the Golan Heights, the West Bank of Jerusalem, or the Sinai
Peninsula. That is something that would have to be negotiated between
the parties involved.
But I think also that it was obvious that the United
States didn't advance the cause of the settlement when the so-called
Rogers plan was put forward without adequate prior consultation with
the different nations who were concerned with the Middle, Eastern question.
I think it is better just to talk in terms of what
our country has had as its longtime policy. But as far as an exact definition
of the borders, I don't have the capability nor the inclination to go
into that.
Q. And your public statements with respect to a Palestinian
homeland are being credited as being a factor in the election of a conservative,
hard-line political group in Israel.
Do you think that you are going to be able to continue
your policy of open discussions of foreign policy issues and, at the
same time, achieve agreements? In other words, do you think you are
going to be able to have your cake and eat it, too?
THE PRESIDENT. I don't agree with the premise of your
question. I don't believe that my open espousal of a desire on the part
of the American people to reduce the number of missile launchers or
atomic weapons prior to the time we negotiated in Moscow was a reason
for a breakdown in that discussion.
It has led to continuing discussions, and I believe
it's a viable policy that I will pursue and I see no reason why the
American people should not know it, and I believe that overwhelmingly
the American people support it.
I think it's good for the American people to know what
our positions are at the time that the Soviets know what our positions
are, and vice versa.
This is a matter that must be addressed openly. It
involves not only the Soviet and American people but it also involves
our allies and friends who depend upon us around the world.
In the campaign itself and in my Inaugural Address,
I expressed a hope which I still have, that ultimately myself or my
successor, Mr. Brezhnev or his successor, can arrive at a point where
nuclear weapons are eliminated completely from the Soviet and the American
arsenals.
The other point of your question was concerning the
results of the election in Israel. I think that the international questions
in Israel were very slightly discussed or debated during their campaign.
My opinion is that the result of the elections were not affected appreciably
if at all by any statements that I made concerning an ultimate Middle
Eastern settlement.
Our positions are compatible with the positions taken
by my own predecessor and, in fact, historically the United States has
espoused these basic principles. And I think that this is something
that must be addressed frankly by the prospective government in Israel,
by the people of Israel, their Arab neighbors, and by the people in
the United States.
So, I don't intend to refrain from expressing very
clearly my position on foreign issues to the public on occasion when
negotiations are going on--or when we have an agreement with our negotiating
partners to refrain from public statements, of course I will do so.
But that will be an individual judgment to be made.
MENAHEM BEGIN
Q. Realizing that the Israeli government is not in
place yet, but assuming that Mr. Begin will have a dominant role in
it, and based on his initial remarks about withdrawal of the sector,
do you see him as a potential obstacle to the peace process?
THE PRESIDENT. No, I don't.
I don't yet have any way to know who will put the government
together. Obviously, Mr. Begin leads the Likud government which came
in first. And we are waiting now for the Israeli election results to
be confirmed and for the President of Israel to designate the leader
of that party to put the government together. Following that time and
before the government is completely evolved, I intend to congratulate
Mr. Begin, if it is he, and to invite him or whoever is designated to
come over here for discussions with me.
There obviously are difficulties caused by a change
in the Israeli government. But in the long run, as is the case in our
own country and in a democracy like Israel, the government leaders fairly
accurately reflect the hopes and desires and fears and purposes of the
people whom they are chosen to lead.
Mr. Begin will have to put together a government. He'll
have to deal with conflicting interests as he forms his cabinet and
brings in other groups to make sure that he has a majority in the Knesset.
So, I don't look at this as an insuperable obstacle.
It does create a question. I think a large part of that question can
be resolved when I meet with him personally and when he meets with the
congressional leaders and with the Jewish Americans who are very deeply
interested in this and sees the purpose of our own country.
I think this may have an effect on him. I have already
seen some moderation in his views as he's dealt with Mr. Yadin and others,
and I hope that this moderation will continue.
Obviously, the Arab leaders also have to be moderate.
Some of the adamant stands that they have taken in the historical past
will have to be abandoned. If they didn't, there would be no hope for
peace.
So, both sides of this--or rather all sides of this
discussion have to yield to some degree to accomplish the purposes of
their own people.
JUNE 30, 1977
THE MIDDLE EAST
Q. Mr. President, Senator Javits says you are pushing
Israel too far. And other Americans sympathetic to the Israeli position
say worse, that you are perhaps selling Israel down the river. My question
is, first, do you think you are, and secondly, how difficult will it
be for you to continue your policy if the American Jewish community
sides with Mr. Begin instead of Mr. Carter?
THE PRESIDENT. I might say, first of all, that I look
forward with great anticipation to the visit of Prime Minister Begin
on the 19th of July. My determination is that the talks will be friendly
and constructive and also instructive for both him and me.
He'll be received with the kind of friendship that's
always been a characteristic of the American people's attitude toward
Israel. An overwhelming consideration for us is the preservation of
Israel as a free and independent and, hopefully, peaceful nation. That
is preeminent. At the same time, I believe that it has been good during
this year, when I hope we can reach a major step toward a peaceful resolution
in the Middle East, to have the discussions much more open, to encourage
the Arab nations and Israel to frankly understand some of the feelings
that each of them has toward the other, and to address the basic questions
of territories, the definition of peace, the Palestinian question.
I really think it is best for this next roughly 3 weeks
before Mr. Begin comes that we refrain from additional comments on specifics
because I think we've covered the specifics adequately. And if I or
someone in the State Department or someone on my staff emphasizes territory
and the definition of peace, the immediate response is: Why didn't you
say something about the Palestinians, and so forth. So, I believe that
we've discussed it adequately.
I believe all the issues are fairly clearly defined.
It's accurate to say that our own Nation has no plan or solution that
we intend to impose on anyone. We'll act to the degree that the two
sides trust us in the role of an intermediary or mediator, and I still
have high hopes that this year might lead toward peace.
But it will never be with any sort of abandonment of
our deep .and permanent commitment to Israel. And I have made this clear
in specific terms to every Arab leader who has been to our country.
JULY 28, 1977
ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS IN OCCUPIED TERRITORIES
Q. Mr. President, in your view, did the Israeli embrace
of the three settlements on the West Bank diminish in any way the prospects
for a negotiated settlement in that part of the world?
THE PRESIDENT. Yes. I think that any move toward making
permanent the settlements in the occupied territories or the establishment
of new settlements obviously increases the difficulty in ultimate peace.
It's not an insurmountable problem. The matter of legalizing
existing settlements was a subject that was never discussed by me or
Prime Minister Begin. My own concern was with the establishment of new
settlements. And I let him know very strongly that this would be a matter
that would cause our own Government deep concern.
This matter of settlements in the occupied territories
has always been characterized by our Government, by me and my predecessors
as an illegal action. But I think that the establishment of new territories
[settlements] or the recognition of existing territories [settlements]
to be legal, both provide obstacles to peace, obstacles which I think
we can overcome, by the way.
ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS
Q. Could I follow up on that, Mr. President? I believe
you said just a moment ago that Mr. Begin gave you no advance hint of
this action that he took this week on the settlements. You said that
you discussed future settlements. Can you tell us what he said about
that? Is he going to encourage new settlements there, and what did you
tell him about that?
THE PRESIDENT. Mr. Begin did not give me any promise
about his action on the settlement question. I did describe to him our
longstanding position on the settlements, which I've already outlined,
and told him that this was a major item of potential differences between
Israel and the Arab countries and my strong hope that nothing would
be done by the Israeli Government in establishing new settlements that
might exacerbate an already difficult position.
He listened to me very carefully. He said this was
a major political issue in Israel, that in many instances he and his
opposition political parties in Israel, felt the same about it, but
that he was certainly aware of our concern. But he did not give me any
commitments about what he would do.
And to answer the other part of your question, he did
not give me any prior notice that they were going to recognize the legality
of the settlements involved.
Q. Mr. President?
THE PRESIDENT. Mr. Schram [Martin J. Schram, Newsday].
Q. Mr. President, at the risk of going back over well-plowed
ground, I'd like to ask you why it is that you did not ask Mr. Begin
what his plans were concerning the existing settlements on the West
Bank, and more specifically, were you led to believe from your own studies
in advance of those talks that he was not going to take this action?
THE PRESIDENT. I hate to admit it to you, Mr. Schram,
but I did not think about raising the subject of recognizing the legality
of those settlements. The item that I wanted to discuss with him--and
I did--both in the public meeting with Cabinet members and also privately
upstairs in the White House, was the establishment of new settlements.
And I pointed out to him, as I've said earlier, that I thought the establishment
of new settlements would be a very difficult thing for public opinion
to accept, both here and in the Arab countries, and that if-he pointed
out to me that new settlers, as a result of his campaign statements
and those of his opponents, were eager to go into the area--I don't
think it's violating any confidence to tell you what I said, and that
was that I thought it would be easier for us to accept an increase in
the population of existing settlements than it would be to accept the
establishment of new settlements. But I did not think about talking
to him concerning the granting of legal status to those settlements.
It was an oversight which never was discussed.
PRIME MINISTER BEGIN
Q. Mr. President, isn't there a basic conflict between
all the talk of progress we heard around here during the Begin visit
and at the time he left, and the first action that he took upon returning
to Israel and the rejection of the idea that we could have any influence
over what moves he might make to the West Bank settlements?
THE PRESIDENT. Well, I think it's not fair to overly
criticize Prime Minister Begin. The fact is that under the previous
Mapai Coalition, the labor government, that settlements have been built
there, a fairly large number. The number of people involved is quite
small. And this is not a new thing. I think it would be a mistake to
overemphasize it or to exaggerate the significance of it. We feel that
any restraint that Prime Minister Begin might want to exert on this
subject would certainly be contributory toward peace.
I think he's in a position now of great strength in
Israel. I think that his voice would be honored by the Israeli people.
But he, like myself, has run on campaign commitments, and I think he's
trying to accommodate the interest of peace as best, he can. That doesn't
mean that the settlements are right, but I think it would not be proper
to castigate him unnecessarily about it because he's continuing policies
that have been extant in Israel for a long time. And the Israeli Government
has never claimed that these settlements are permanent. What they have
done is to say that they are legal at the present time.
I think that that's all I know about the subject, and
that's certainly all that I'm going to say now.
JULY 29, 1977
ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS IN OCCUPIED LANDS
Q. Mr. President, do you have a commitment from Prime
Minister Begin before he left here that he would not formalize or legalize
the three settlements on the West Bank?
THE PRESIDENT. No, we did not discuss his legalizing
those settlements. We did discuss my concern about the adverse impact
of establishing new settlements. He did not promise me anything on the
subject, and we did not even discuss the E question.
Q. So that you weren't upset by the fact that they
did legalize these settlements?
THE PRESIDENT. Yes, I was upset. As I said I think
it's an obstacle to peace. And I let Mr. Begin know very clearly that
our Government policy, before I became President and now, is that these
settlements are illegal and contravene the Geneva conference terms.
Mr. Begin disagrees with this. But we've spelled this
out very clearly on several occasions in the United Nations and other
places that these settlements are illegal.
I think that it's accurate to say that the Israeli
Government has never maintained that they are permanent but, that on
a temporary basis, maybe extending quite a while in the future in their
view, that they are legalized, but not as a permanent settlement.
Israel has never claimed hegemony over the West Bank
territory, as you know. And I think that it would be a mistake, as I
said in my press conference yesterday, to condemn Mr. Begin about this
action because this was a campaign commitment he made. I think what
he did was in consonance with the desires of the Israeli people.
But I don't want anybody to misunderstand our feelings
about it. We think it's wrong to establish these settlements, it's wrong
to insinuate that they are legal, it's certainly wrong to ever claim
that they are permanent. And to establish new settlements would be even
more unsettling to their Arab neighbors, as we try to go to Geneva in
a good spirit of compromise and cooperation, than the allocation of
legality by the Government to those already in existence.
Q. Well, this hasn't passed your optimism for a resumption
of a peace conference in Geneva?
THE PRESIDENT. No, I'm still optimistic about it.
But it's an additional obstacle that we had not anticipated.
AUGUST 10, 1977
THE MIDDLE EAST
MR. REASONER. Keeping on the Middle East for just one
minute, a number of Israeli leaders in private say that you have made
drastic changes in America's attitude toward Israel and that they regard
you with considerable trepidation. Are you aware of that feeling, and
do you think there is justification for it?
THE PRESIDENT. Yes, I'm aware of that feeling and also
many other feelings. There's no single attitude among all Jews in the
world or all Israeli citizens. To the extent that Israeli leaders genuinely
Want a peace settlement, I think that they have to agree that there
will be an acceptance of genuine peace on the part of the Arabs, an
adjustment of boundaries in the Middle East which are secure for the
Israelis and also satisfy the minimum requirements of the Arab neighbors
and the United Nations resolutions, and some solution to the question
of the enormous numbers of Palestinian refugees who have been forced
out of their homes and who want to have some fair treatment.
These three basic elements are there. And we are trying
not only to put forward our own ideas but to search among the different
disputing nations for some common basis on which they can reach agreement.
We can only act as an intermediary to the extent that the different
countries trust us.
So, we've tried to be fair. We've tried to be open
when possible. We've kept confidences when they have been given to us
in confidence. And I don't know that we can reach a final solution.
We are hopeful that we can, and I think world opinion is very powerful
on disputing nations when there is a consensus about what ought to be
done.
So, we'll continue to labor at it, taking slings and
arrows from all directions, criticisms, publicly in nations when privately
the leaders say we are willing to do this when we come out publicly
for the same position. Quite often for domestic political consumption
there's an adamant, very disputive, and antagonistic attitude taken
on the part of some leaders. But we are willing to accept this consequence.
I don't know how to guarantee an ultimate success, but I am willing
to accept the criticism that comes from all parties as we struggle for
success.
AUGUST 23, 1977
ISRAEL
Q. Mr. President, twice in recent weeks the United
States has said that Israel is in violation of international law in
terms of the West Bank settlements, which some view as an annexation
plan. My question is: What does the United States plan to do to protect
the rights of the people in the occupied lands?
THE PRESIDENT. Well, it's been the position of our
own Government, long before I was elected President, that the West Bank
territory, the Gaza Strip, areas of the Golan Heights, Sinai region
the occupied territories, in other words, were not a part of Israel.
Our Government has expressed on several occasions---the President, our
Ambassadors to the United Nations and otherwise--that the settlement
of Israeli citizens in some of these areas was in violation of the Geneva
Convention and that, therefore, the settlements were illegal.
We have private assurances and there have been public
statements made by Mr. Begin that these settlements were not intended
to show that Israel was to occupy these territories permanently, that
the final boundaries to be established through mutual agreement between
Israel and the Arab countries was to be decided without prior commitment,
and negotiations would include these areas.
So, at this time, our pointing out to Israel that these
three settlements that were just established are illegal because they
were made on occupied territory, is the extent of our intention.
I concur with the statement that was made by Secretary
Vance, the State Department, that this kind of action on the part of
Israel, when we are trying to put together a Middle Eastern conference
leading to a permanent peace, creates an unnecessary obstacle to peace.
I believe that our opinion is shared by the overwhelming number of nations
in the world, but we don't intend to go further than our caution to
Israel, our open expression of our own concern, and the identification
of these settlements as being illegal.
Q. But you don't feel that you have any leverage at
all to move in any direction in terms of military aid to Israel to keep
her from violating
THE PRESIDENT. Obviously, we could exert pressure on
Israel in other ways, but I have no intention to do so.
September 16, 1977
THE MIDDLE EAST
Q. Mr. President, Jim Wisch, with the Texas Jewish
Post, Dallas and Fort Worth.
First of all, on behalf of the American Jewish Publishers
Association, I want to thank you for the profound message you sent from
your wife, Rosalynn, and yourself to the American Jewish community.
It was indeed very sincere. And with regard to your sincerity, which
was recognized by all editors across the country, regardless of their
background, I want to point up to you your profound statement on the
Mideast which we published right before the election, which was highly
informative and set out many things that you had proposed to do.
I just returned from the Mideast, where I had a long,
long conversation with Ambassador Lewis. And it seems to me there's
a great deal of apprehension going on amongst American Jews and Jews
of the world, and somehow it rests upon what some of your decisions
are going to be.
I think this apprehension could be cleared, because
I think there may be a disagreement, perhaps, in semantics rather than
in objectives. And I wonder if you had been concerned about your popularity
or your interpretation vis-a-vis your embracement of the PLO, and that
your regard for them has given them a propaganda ploy where they have
become recalcitrant they still employ Chapter 16, the complete destruction
of Israel. Now, people think that you are pushing Israel to sit down
and recognize the PLO, regardless of that point in the PLO's platform.
242, your resolution, which you so eloquently described last July, says
that nobody can sit down unless it's a face-to-face discussion and they
recognize the entity of each nation as being a sovereign nation like
we are doing with Panama.
And in view of this regard, I wonder if you plan to
clear this up or elucidate or however you plan to handle this.
THE PRESIDENT. With all due respect, that's one of
the most distorted assessments of my own policy that I've ever heard.
Q. It is not my assessment[laughter]--
THE PRESIDENT. I understand.
Q. But it's incumbent upon me to bring it to you.
THE PRESIDENT. I've never endorsed the PLO. Our Government
has had no communication, at all, directly with the PLO. The only communication
has been when representatives of the PLO have been to Arab leaders immediately
prior to a Cy Vance visit with them or their visit to our country and
have delivered messages to us indirectly.
Our agreement with the Israeli Government several years
ago, before I became President, was that we would not communicate with
the PLO as long as they did not refute their commitment to destroy the
nation of Israel and did not accept the right of Israel to exist. Our
public position is the same as our private position. There is no difference
between them.
We have said that if the PLO would accept publicly
the right of Israel to exist and exist in peace, as described under
United Nations Resolution 242, that we would meet with them and discuss
the future of the Palestinians in the Middle East. We have never called
on the PLO to be part of the future negotiations. We have said that
the Palestinian people should be represented in the future negotiations.
That is one of the three major elements of any agreement that might
lead to lasting peace--one is the territorial boundaries; the other
one is the Arab countries accepting Israel, to live in peace as neighbors;
and the third one is some resolution of the Palestinian question.
I've never called for an independent Palestinian country.
We have used the word "entity." And my own preference as expressed
in that talk that I made in New Jersey, I think, and now, is that we
think that if there is a Palestinian entity established on the West
Bank, that it ought to be associated with Jordan, for instance. I think
this was the case among many Israeli leaders as their preference in
the past.
So, we have been very cautious, very careful, very
consistent in spelling out our posture on the Middle Eastern settlements.
When we have gone around, for instance--I haven't, but Cy Vance has
gone around to Israel, to Jordan, to Syria, to Egypt, to Saudi Arabia--to
talk about a future Middle Eastern conference and, hopefully, a settlement,
we have taken the same exact written set of principles so there would
be no difference among them, and discussed it with Sadat and Hussein
and Asad and Fahd and with Mr. Begin, so that there would never be any
allegation on any part of theirs that we took one position with the
Israelis and a different position with the Arabs. Sometimes the Israelis
would say, "We don't accept this principle number 4." Sometimes
the Arabs would say, "We don't accept principle number 1."
But we've tried to negotiate in good faith.
I might say one other thing. We are not just an idle
bystander. We are not just an uninterested intermediary or mediator.
Our country has a direct, substantial interest in a permanent peace
in the Middle East. And I sincerely hope and I believe that the nations
who live there also want to have a permanent settlement and a permanent
peace in the Middle East. And the principles that I described in that
speech, the principles that the Vice President described in a speech
he made in California earlier this year, and the principles that we
espouse in our public and private conversations with Arabs and Israelis
and with Prime Minister Barre, yesterday, from France, and others who
are interested, are exactly the same. We've never deviated.
We have learned a lot. And as we've learned, we've
added additional new items onto our basic proposal. But ultimately,
the Middle Eastern settlement has got to be an agreement among the parties
involved.
Now, I hope that all the countries are eager to negotiate
in good faith. I hope that none of them are putting up deliberate obstacles
to prevent a Geneva conference from being convened. That's my hope and
that's my present expectation.
SEPTEMBER 29, 1977
GENEVA CONFERENCE
Q. Mr. President, there have been a lot of confusing
statements from the White House and from leaders who have seen you recently
on where exactly the United States stands in terms of Palestinian--PLO
participation in a Geneva peace conference, if one comes about. Can
you really clarify this point?
THE PRESIDENT. I doubt it-[laughter] but I would be
glad to try. What we are trying to do now is--as a first and immediate
goal--is to bring all the parties in the Mideast dispute to Geneva for
a conference. We are dealing with Israel directly. We are dealing directly
with Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, and Egypt. We are trying to act as an intermediary
between Israel and each one of those Arab countries that border their
own country.
There are some differences among the Arab nations,
which we are trying to resolve, concerning a unified Arab delegation
or individual Arab delegations and the format which might be used to
let the Palestinian views be represented.
At the same time, we have a further complicating factor
in that we are joint chairmen of the Geneva conference along with the
Soviet Union. So, in the call for the conference, in the negotiations
preceding the format of the conference, we have to deal with the Soviet
Union as well. So, on top of all that, and perhaps preeminent in my
own mind, is that we are not an idle observer or bystander, we are not
just an intermediary or mediator. We have a vital national interest
in the ultimate peace in the Middle East.
It's obvious to me that there can be no Middle Eastern
peace settlement without adequate Palestinian representation. The Arab
countries maintain that the PLO is the only legitimate representative
of the Palestinian interests. The Israelis say that they won't deal
with the Palestinians, or certainly not the well-known PLO members,
because they have been identified in the past as committed to the destruction
of the nation of Israel.
So, we are trying to get an agreement between the Israelis
and the Arab countries, with widely divergent views, about the format
of the meeting and, also, who would be welcomed to the conference to
represent the Palestinians.
This is something that is still in the negotiating
stage, and I cannot predict a final outcome. We have no national position
on exactly who would represent the Palestinians or exactly what form
the Arab group would take in which the Palestinians would be represented.
I just can't answer that question yet because the question has not been
answered in my mind.
PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION
Q. Does the United States recognize--recognize is the
wrong word-but accept the PLO as a representative of the Palestinians?
THE PRESIDENT. We have pledged to the Israelis in
the past, and I have confirmed the pledge, that we will not negotiate
with, nor deal directly with the PLO until they adopt United Nations
Resolution 242 as a basis for their involvement, which includes a recognition
of the right of Israel to exist. We have let this be known to the PLO
leaders through various intermediaries, through intermediaries through
the United Nations, leaders in Saudi Arabia, Syria, Egypt, Jordan, and
so forth. They know our position.
If the PLO should go ahead and say, "We endorse
U.N. Resolution 242; we don't think it adequately addresses the Palestinian
issue because it only refers to refugees and we think we have a further
interest in that," that would suit us okay.
We would then begin to meet with and to work with the
PLO. Obviously, they don't represent a nation. It is a group that represents,
certainly, a substantial part of the Palestinians. I certainly don't
think they are the exclusive representatives of the Palestinians. Obviously,
there are mayors, for instance, and local officials in the West Bank
area who represent Palestinians. They may or may not be members of the
PLO. So, we are not trying to define an exact formula that we would
prescribe for others. We are trying to find some common ground on which
the Israelis and Arabs might get together to meet in Geneva.
I think, by the way, that both the groups, the Arabs
and the Israelis, have come a long way. They are genuinely searching
for a formula by which they can meet. They want peace. And I think they
are to be congratulated already, because in the past number of years
they have made very strong and provocative statements against one another,
and now, to move toward an accommodation is a difficult thing for them.
And we are trying not to make it any more difficult.
Q. Mr. President, what are the assurances given to
the PLO in the event of accepting 242?
THE PRESIDENT. If they accept U.N. 242 and the right
of Israel to exist, then we will begin discussions with the leaders
of the PLO. We are not giving them any further assurance of that because
we are not trying to prescribe, as I said, the status of the PLO itself
in any Geneva conference. But it would give us a means to understand
the special problems of the Palestinians. And as you know, many of the
Israeli--some of the Israeli leaders have said that they recognize that
the Palestinian question is one of the three major elements. But I can't
and have no inclination to give the PLO any assurances other than we
will begin to meet with them and to search for some accommodation and
some reasonable approach to the Palestinian question if they adopt 242
and recognize publicly the right of Israel to exist.
OCTOBER 14, 1977
THE MIDDLE EAST
Q. How do you deal, Mr. President, with Israel's fears
that if they come to some sort of settlement on the West Bank, any kind
of settlement on the West Bank, first they'll be subjected to ongoing
terrorism from irreconcilable Arabs over a long period of time or the
new government, having gained a new position, declares itself to be
hostile towards the State of Israel? How do you deal with those kinds
of fears and are these fears legitimate?
THE PRESIDENT. Well, in the first place, any agreement
reached in the Middle East would have to be accepted voluntarily by
the Israelis and by their Arab neighbors. There won't be any imposition
of a settlement by us or the Soviet Union or anyone else. So, you have
that much of a safety factor to start with, that no settlement would
be reached unless the Israelis wanted that settlement. Secondly, I do
not favor and have never favored an independent Palestinian state in
the West Bank area or in the Mideast area in presently occupied territory.
We have always, since the first few minutes of the
foundation of Israel, had a national policy supporting the integrity,
the independence, the freedom, the permanence of Israel, and hoping
for peace. All of those factors, I think, have been met--sometimes challenged,
but always met--except peace.
Now the Israelis and their neighbors, Arab countries,
see the prospect of peace. The Arab leaders are making statements now
that they could and would never have made a year ago, recognizing Israel's
right to exist, being willing to negotiate with Israel directly if we
get to Geneva.
There is a serious question about Palestinian representation.
My belief is that when we consider the future status of the West Bank,
Gaza Strip, and the Palestinians, that it ought to be negotiated with
some participation by Palestinians. I personally think that Israel has
agreed--I think this has been announced--that they would accept those
Palestinians from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and that that area
would be negotiated by those Palestinians, Jordan, Egypt, and Israel
on a multinational basis, because it's all wrapped up in one.
We have also got the prospect of considering as a separate
item, but certainly a directly related item, the future of the refugees
as such---some Jewish, some, of course, Palestinian. This would be on
a multinational basis. But I think every possible right and prospect
of Israel's existence, freedom, security in the future will be honored,
certainly, by Israelis, backed by us.
OCTOBER 28, 1977
U.S.-SOVIET JOINT STATEMENT ON THE MIDDLE EAST
Q. Mr. President, my name is William Frank, and I'm
from Wilmington, Delaware.
There's a movement being started in the city where
I live to send you a lot of letters. The text seems to be that the joint
Soviet-United States statement on the Mideast 1 represented a severe
erosion of the United States posture, and they also will tell you that
the abandonment by the United States of solemn promises to Israel raises
the question of the reliability of the American commitments. Do you
have any comment on that?
1 The text of the October 1 statement is printed in
the Department of State Bulletin of November 7, 1977, page 639.
THE PRESIDENT. On the fact that the letters will be
sent or the accuracy of the letter itself?
Q. This is a ---
THE PRESIDENT. I welcome the letters. That description
of the position is completely erroneous in two respects; I think you
only raised two respects. One is that the joint U.S.-Soviet statement,
I think, is a major move in the right direction to bringing about an
ultimate, peaceful resolution of the longstanding Middle Eastern dispute.
The Soviets and we, after long weeks of negotiation, agreed on a common
approach which did not contravene any public or private commitments
that I've ever made to Israel or to the American public and which represented
a substantial change in the previous Soviet commitment, almost uniquely,
to the PLO and the Syrian positions.
The Soviets, for instance, for the first time spelled
out the need for a peace treaty, for full definitions of peace, which
we had espoused. We incorporated the basic language of U.N. Resolution
242 on territories. The PLO was not mentioned. There was an abandonment
of the previous Soviet position calling for the recognition of Palestinian
national rights and an adoption of our own position that we described
earlier.
So, I think it was a major step forward. As you know,
ever since 1973 we and the Soviets have been cochairmen of the Geneva
conference. This was something established, as I said, 4 years ago.
And to have a cochairman who might be publicly and privately opposing
any peaceful resolution or openly espousing the unilateral positions
of the Arab countries would have been a very serious problem for us
to overcome.
I think this is a public commitment of the Soviets
to take a much more objective and fair and well-balanced position. So,
I think it's a major step in the right direction.
And the other part of your question is that I have
never violated any commitments made to the Israelis, either by my administration
or by the previous administrations. Both I and Foreign Minister Dayan,
within the last month or two, reviewed in a confidential way all of
the publicly disclosed and private agreements that had been reached
between Mr. Kissinger and the Israeli Government, and between the Presidents
who preceded me here and between myself and the Israeli Government.
There has not been and will not be any violation of those commitments.
NOVEMBER 10, 1977
THE MIDDLE EAST
Q. Mr. President, it's our understanding that some
of your top national security advisers met yesterday in the White House
Situation Room to sort of reassess the situation in the Middle East
in light of the recent trouble on the Lebanon border. Can you give us
some assessment this morning, especially what effect this might have
on the Middle East peace conference later this year?
THE PRESIDENT. This new outburst of violence is a great
concern to us and, I think, to the nations in the Middle East, to all
people of the world. The unwarranted and continuing terrorist attacks
have been part of the Middle East picture for years. The retaliatory
measures taken by nations who were attacked by terrorists has been a
part of the picture in the Middle East for years. I think it shows the
volatile nature there of the continuing problems.
I think it shows in a much more vivid way than perhaps
in the past, recent past, the need for an immediate convening of the
Geneva conference as soon as we can get these national leaders to sit
down, or their representatives to sit down on a continuing basis and
work out face to face these divisions that have existed in the Middle
East for generations.
Loss of life is deplorable. But the situation is never
going to be improved, in my opinion, until those nations there are willing
to step beyond the procedural debates and squabbles about exactly how
to go and exactly what representation will be present and start dealing
with the real issues. I've been pleased that the Israeli Government
has adopted the procedures for the Geneva conference that we've proposed.
I was pleased with the statement yesterday by President Sadat that he
was willing to go to Geneva or anywhere else and begin to consult directly
with Israel and with the other Arab nations without quibbling any more
about the detailed wording of the procedures. That's our position.
I hope that Jordan and Syria and Lebanon very quickly
will make a similar response to us, and that we can then convene the
Geneva conference. But the major all-encompassing question in the Middle
East is that the bloodshed, in my opinion, will not be stopped until
the nations are willing to negotiate on the basic divisions that have
separated them so long.
Q. Well, do you think the Israeli attack was justified--the
retaliation?
THE PRESIDENT. Well, I think this is a question that's
hard for me to answer-whether Israel can sit dormant and quiescent and
accept repeated attacks on their border villages without retaliation,
whether the retaliation was excessive. Those are questions that I think
both answers would be, perhaps, yes. There ought not to be any attacks.
If there are continued attacks, some retaliation is required.
I don't know the details of it, but I think the overriding
consideration is not to condemn Israel at this point for retaliation,
but just to say that if the provocations were absent that the retaliation
would have been unnecessary. And the best way to resolve it is for Lebanon,
Syria, and Israel, relating to that region of the Mideast, for Jordan
and Egypt and Israel to start direct negotiations. The whole tiling
is just sitting and teetering on another outbreak of even more major
violence. And I think that at this time, a condemnation of people is
probably inappropriate, but an urge for all nations now to stop this
present, recent outbreak and to move toward major consultations is the
only answer that I can give.
NOVEMBER 30, 1977
THE MIDDLE EAST
PRESIDENT. The other comment I'd like to make is concerning
the Middle East. In the last few days we have seen, I believe, an historic
breakthrough in the search for a permanent, lasting peace in the Middle
East because of the true leadership qualities that have been exhibited
by the courage of President Sadat and the gracious reception of him
in Israel by Prime Minister Begin.
This has been, already, a tremendous accomplishment.
I think the importance of it is that there has been an initiation of
direct, person-to-person negotiations between Israel and the major power
in the Mideast among the Arab nations who are Israel's neighbors. Lebanon,
Syria, Jordan have a total population of about 12 million; Egypt has
a population of 36 million and has by far the greatest military force.
And the fact that this strongest Arab country and the nation of Israel
are now conducting direct negotiations is a major accomplishment in
itself.
Two of Israel's most cherished desires have already
been met. One is this face-to-face negotiation possibility, and the
other one is a recognition by a major Arab leader that Israel has a
right to exist. In fact, President Sadat said, "We welcome you
in our midst."
The United States has been very pleased to see this
reduction in distrust and a reduction in fear and a reduction in suspicion
between the Arabs and the Israelis. We have played a close consultative
role with both of these leaders. We have, on several instances recently,
acted as intermediaries at their request. Both Prime Minister Begin
and President Sadat have publicly expressed their reconfirmation that
these exploratory talks are designed to lead toward a comprehensive
settlement including Israel and all her neighbors.
Sunday, President Sadat called for a conference in
Cairo. This is likely to be held around the 13th of December, about
the middle of December. We will participate in that conference at a
high level--Assistant Secretary Atherton 1 will represent our Nation.
We look on this as a very constructive step. The road toward peace has
already led through Jerusalem, will now go to Cairo and ultimately,
we believe, to a comprehensive consultation at Geneva.
1 Alfred L. Atherton, Jr., Assistant Secretary of
State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs.
It's not an easy thing to bring about a comprehensive
peace settlement. Immediate expectations have sometimes been exaggerated.
The definition of real peace--I think we've made good progress on that
already. The resolution of the Palestinian question still has not been
decided. And the solution to the problem concerning borders and national
security has also not been decided.
We have played, I think, a proper role. I have tried
to convince, in the past, Prime Minister Begin of the good intentions
of President Sadat and vice versa. When there has been no progress being
made, the United States has taken the initiative. Now that progress
is being made, a proper role for the United States is to support that
progress and to give the credit to the strong leadership that's already
been exhibited by Prime Minister Begin and President Sadat and to let
our Nation be used, as called upon, to expedite the peace process.
I believe that this is a move that the whole world
looks upon with great appreciation. And again, I want to express my
congratulations and my appreciation to these two strong leaders for
the tremendous progress already made and for their commitment to future
progress.
Q. Mr. President, what is your reaction to Secretary
General Waldheim's suggestion for a post-Cairo, pre-Geneva Middle East
conference at the United Nations or on some neutral ground?
THE PRESIDENT. As you know, Secretary General Waldheim
has also agreed to send a high-level representative to the conference
to be held in Cairo. I don't know yet what position our country will
take toward a potential meeting at the United Nations. We've not received
any invitation to it. I noticed in the news this morning that Israel
has said that they would not participate. But it's too early for us
to decide whether or not we will go to any conference, if one is actually
held at the United Nations.
Q. Mr. President, Egypt and Israel can legitimately
deal with themselves, but can Egypt really represent all the other parties,
when they're not even at the conference, and the Palestinians, who have
never had a say in their own political destiny?
THE PRESIDENT. Well, I think that President Sadat,
in his private communications with me and even in his public statements,
has said that he is trying as best he can to represent the Arab position
concerning Israeli withdrawal from occupied territories and also the
resolution of the Palestinian question.
Obviously, the leaders in Syria, even Jordan, certainly
the PLO, have not recognized that Egypt is speaking for them adequately.
I think, though, that in his speech to the Knesset, in his followup
speech to the People's Assembly in Egypt, President Sadat has evoked
very clearly the basic Arab position that I have understood in my private
conversations with President Asad from Syria and with the King of Jordan,
Hussein.
So, I believe that this is an exploratory effort that
does accurately represent the basic differences between Israel and all
their neighbors. And the fact that Jordan and Syria have not been willing
to participate, I don't think has dampened President Sadat's commitment
or enthusiasm at all. It is constructive, and I think what he discovers
in his already completed discussions with Prime Minister Begin and those
that might be taking place in Egypt in the middle of next month will
certainly be conducive to pursuing the Arab cause.
I think it's constructive, because for the first time,
the Arab position on those controversial issues has been spelled out
very clearly for worldwide understanding. And I think the differences
that have been faced by us and others for long years are now much more
clearly understood by the public. The differences are still sharp; the
resolution of those differences is going to be very difficult. I think
that to the best of his ability, President Sadat is speaking for the
Arab world.
Q. Mr. President, if the other Arabs refuse--continue
to refuse not to sit down with Israel, would the United States oppose
it if Egypt and Israel somehow worked out some sort of separate agreement?
Would that be a good thing, and what would our position be on that?
THE PRESIDENT. Well, we and Egypt and Israel have
all taken the position, publicly, and the same position privately among
ourselves, that a separate peace agreement between Egypt and Israel
to the exclusion of the other parties is not desirable. This is predicated
upon the very viable hope that a comprehensive settlement can be reached
among all the parties involved. If at some later date it becomes obvious
that Jordan does not want peace or that Syria does not want peace or
that Lebanon does not want peace in a settlement with Israel, then an
alternative might have to be pursued. But we've certainly not reached
that point yet.
I think that the other Arab leaders do want peace with
Israel. And I am certainly not even considering, and neither is Sadat
nor Begin, any assumption that the possibilities for peace have narrowed
down to just two nations.
Q. Mr. President, to come back to the Middle East for
a minute, is the United States Government taking any concrete steps
with some of the other governments that have been reluctant, such as
Syria, the PLO, which is not a government, and the other countries,
to bring them into this process that has been initiated by Israel and
Egypt? And if so, what steps are we taking?
THE PRESIDENT. Yes, not with the PLO; we have no contact
with the PLO. But with Jordan and with Syria, with Lebanon and, in a
supportive role, with the Saudi Arabians and others, we have played,
I think, an adequate role. At the time we discovered that President
Sadat was going to make a proposal to go to Jerusalem, we immediately
began to use whatever influence we had available to us to encourage
the other nations not to condemn President Sadat. This particularly
applied to Saudi Arabia, to Jordan, to the European countries, to the
Soviet Union, and to Syria. In some instances, either they decided not
to condemn him or our influence was successful.
We would like very much to keep any of the nations
involved in the immediate Middle Eastern discussions from rejecting
an ultimate peace settlement and withdrawing from the prospect of going
to Geneva. This includes, of course, Prime Minister Begin and President
Sadat. They have not rejected the concept that there must be a comprehensive
settlement.
In the meantime, we don't see anything wrong; in fact,
we look with great favor on the bilateral negotiations between Israel
and Egypt. In the meantime, we are trying to induce the Syrians, the
Lebanese, the Jordanians, and, as I say again, in a supporting role,
the Saudis and others, to support both the ongoing negotiations that
will continue from Jerusalem into Cairo and also to avoid any condemnation
of Sadat that might disrupt his influence and put an obstacle to peace
in the future.
That's about all we can do. We have no control over
any nation in the Middle East. When we find the progress in the Middle
East being stopped, we use all the initiative that we can. When we see
progress being made by the parties themselves, we support them to move
on their own.
I think it's much more important to have direct negotiations
between Egypt and Israel than to have us acting as a constant, dominant
intermediary. I think this is a major step in the right direction. We
hope later that Jordan and Syria and Lebanon will join in these discussions,
either individually or as a comprehensive group, dealing with Israel
directly.
Q. Mr. President, you used the word "induce."
What inducements is the United States Government offering to Syria and
the others?
THE PRESIDENT. Well, we are not offering them any
payment of money or anything, but we primarily capitalize on their clear
determination, their clear desire to have peace. There is no doubt in
my mind at all that President Asad, who has been one of the most highly
critical leaders of what Sadat did--there's no doubt in my mind that
President Asad wants peace with Israel, and there's no doubt in my mind
that King Hussein wants peace with Israel. And sometimes it's very difficult
for them to communicate directly with Israel.
We act as an intermediary there. We meet with those
leaders on both sides. Obviously, if there should be a breakthrough
in the future, similar to what occurred between Egypt and Israel--let's
say, for instance, that if King Hussein said he would like to negotiate
directly with Prime Minister Begin, we would support that enthusiastically
and offer our good offices to encourage such an interchange. But we
don't have any inclination nor ability to dominate anyone nor to require
them to take action contrary to what they think is in the best interests
of their nation.
DECEMBER 15, 1977
THE MIDDLE EAST
Q. Mr. President, there are reports that Prime Minister
Begin is bringing along some of his peace proposals to discuss with
you. My question is, if the United States underwrites peace, will we
have a say in terms of what real peace is, if it gives economic aid,
psychological aid, security, and so forth? And I have a followup.
THE PRESIDENT. Well, our hope and our goal has been
that the nations directly involved in the Middle Eastern crisis, the
Middle Eastern disputes, would meet directly with one another and reach
agreements that would encompass three basic questions. One is the definition
of real peace, genuine peace, predictable peace, relationship among
human beings that might transcend the incumbency of any particular leader.
I think President Sadat has made a major stride already in the achievement
of what is real peace. The second one is the withdrawal of the Israelis
from territory and, at the same time, the assurance that they would
have secure borders. And the third one, of course, is to resolve the
Palestinian question.
As I've said before, the direct negotiations between
Egypt and Israel is a major step forward. We are attending the Cairo
conference and will offer our good services when it's needed. But the
basic responsibility will be on the shoulders of the two nations directly
involved. As you know, United Nations observers are also there. Other
countries were invited by President Sadat to attend--Lebanon, Syria,
Jordan, and the Soviet Union. They have not yet accepted that invitation.
We are not trying to define the terms of peace. Anything
that is acceptable to Israel and her neighbors will certainly be acceptable
to us. But we are always available, I hope, as a trusted intermediary
on occasion to break a deadlock or add a supportive word or in a way
to introduce one of those leaders to another and convince the opposite
party that each leader is acting in good faith.
I have no idea what proposals, if any, Prime Minister
Begin will bring to me tomorrow morning. But he and I will meet privately,
just the two of us for a while at his request, and I will listen to
what his report might be, and we will be constructive as we have been
in the past.
Q. Mr. President, your preference for a general or
comprehensive settlement in the Middle East is quite understandable,
one that could be endorsed by all the interested parties. But I wonder
if you think, in light of what has happened since President Sadat's
visit, since many people feel that Israel has no real worries about
a one-front war, that if an agreement, formal or informal, even a real
warming takes place between Israel and Egypt, that you could have de
facto peace in the Middle East, perhaps not as neat and wrapped up as
a treaty, that would be a major accomplishment in itself? And do you
think that it may have to come to that as a result of President Asad's
opposition to the talks and the PLO?
THE PRESIDENT. Well, our immediate hope and goal is
that any peace move made by Israel and Egypt would be acceptable to
the moderate Arab leaders in the Middle East, certainly King Hussein
in Jordan, certainly the Saudi Arabians. We have had good indications
in my personal visits with President Asad that he wants to resolve the
differences. Lebanon is heavily influenced, as you know, by Syrian presence
there. The PLO have been completely negative. They have not been cooperative
at all.
In spite of my own indirect invitation to them and
the direct invitations by Sadat and by Asad, by King Hussein, by King
Khalid in Saudi Arabia, the PLO have refused to make any move toward
a peaceful attitude. They have completely rejected United Nations Resolutions
242 and 338. They have refused to make a public acknowledgement that
Israel has a right to exist, to exist in peace. So, I think they have,
themselves, removed the PLO from any immediate prospect of participation
in a peace discussion.
But I certainly would not ascribe that short of intransigence
or negative attitude toward any of the other parties who have been mentioned
as possible participants. We want to be sure that at least moderate
Palestinians are included in the discussions. And this is an attitude
that's mirrored not only by myself but also by Prime Minister Begin,
President Sadat, and others. So, I think they are all major steps, already
having been taken, to delineate those who are immediately eager to conclude
a step toward peace--those like President Asad, who will wait a while
and see what does occur, to see if the Golan Heights question can be
resolved and so forth, and those who have in effect removed themselves
from serious consideration like the PLO.
DECEMBER 30, 1977
THE MIDDLE' EAST
Q. Mr. President, are you likely to go to Egypt next
Wednesday, and if you do, will it be primarily because President Sadat
has urged you to go, or for some other purpose, or why?
THE PRESIDENT. Well, I have a standing invitation
from President Sadat to visit Egypt that he extended to me on his trip
to Washington. And he's reemphasized it several times since that date.
We have had no discussions with President Sadat on that particular visit
to Egypt while I'm on this trip. We will try to keep our schedule flexible.
If it's mutually convenient and desirable, we would certainly consider
it. But we have no plans at this time to stop in Egypt next Wednesday
or any other time on this trip.
I might say that our own relations with the Arab nations,
including, certainly, Egypt, are very good and harmonious. There has
been no change in our own position relating to the Middle Eastern talks.
And we communicate almost daily with the Egyptian and Israeli leaders.
And as you know, I will be meeting King Hussein in Tehran on our next
stop on this trip.
Helen [Helen Thomas, United Press International].
Q. You said you often don't intend and don't desire
to dictate the terms of a Middle East settlement.
THE PRESIDENT. Yes. This is true.
Q. And yet President Sadat seems to think that you
have pulled the rug out from under him and that you are in fact dictating
terms when you are backing an Israeli military presence on the West
Bank at Gaza after there would be a settlement.
THE PRESIDENT. We don't back any Israeli military
settlement in the Gaza Strip or on the West Bank. We favor, as you know,
a Palestinian homeland or entity there. Our own preference is that this
entity be tied in to Jordan and not be a separate and independent nation.
That is merely an expression of preference which we have relayed on
numerous occasions to the Arab leaders, including President Sadat when
he was with me in Washington. I've expressed the same opinion to the
Israelis, to King Hussein, and to President Asad, and also to the Saudi
Arabians. We have no intention of attempting to impose a settlement.
Any agreement which can be reached between Israel and her Arab neighbors
would be acceptable. to us. We are in a posture of expressing opinions,
trying to promote intimate and direct negotiations and communications,
expediting the process' when it seems to be slow, and adding our good
offices whenever requested. But we have no intention or desire to impose
a settlement.
Sources: Public Papers of the President |