News Conferences & Interviews on the Middle East/Israel
(1978)
JANUARY 6, 1978
THE MIDDLE EAST
Q. Mr. President, I am intrigued that you—I don't
want to belabor the Middle East episode, but it certainly did overshadow
the trip in many ways; developments kept going—you say that—Sadat
said that you have an identity of views, and you say that you don't
seem to have any differences. Does that put you—and Sadat has
differences with Begin—so where does that put you with Begin?
THE PRESIDENT. I lead the news reports after my statement
at Aswan, and Begin expressed approval of what I said. There is a fairly
good agreement between Begin and Sadat on matters concerning the definition
of peace.
Sadat told me that when he met in April with me in
Washington and I outlined the three basic principles, one was complete
peace between Egypt and Israel—open borders, diplomatic recognition,
ambassadorial exchange, free trade, tourist and student and cultural
exchanges. And he told me it would never happen in his lifetime, which
he did—he told me that in April.
He told me the other morning in Aswan that he was completely
wrong, that not only was he well accepted in Israel but he was a hero
when he came back to Egypt, that when the Israeli negotiators came to
Cairo, that they were embraced and the Egyptians wept. And he said to
me, "My people were far ahead of me, and what you proposed in April
that I thought was never possible has already proven to be possible."
That's one aspect.
The withdrawal of Israeli forces from the West Bank,
with minor exceptions on the western boundary, is a principle that we
espoused back in February or March publicly. And I think this is still
an acceptable approach to the Arabs, although publicly I wouldn't expect
them to espouse it now because it violates, in effect, the statements
in Rabat. They are able and, obviously, willing to speak for themselves.
But this is something we've been very clear on.
The other question, the resolution of the Palestinian
problem, I think, can be resolved with an interim solution for a joint
administration. I don't want to be definitive about it, but possibilities
including Israel, Jordan, the West Bank, Gaza Strip, Palestinians, perhaps
the United Nations for a period of time, specifically outlined ahead
of time, and then the right of the Palestinians to decide their own
future between whether they should continue that kind of administration
or affiliate with Jordan—those are the kinds of principles that
we have described very clearly and in writing, beginning 13 months ago.
So, the details are going to be a problem. But on those
expressions of principle, I don't know of any differences that separate
me and Sadat.
Q. Do you call that self-determination?
THE PRESIDENT. Well, yes, I don't think it's—I
have never thought and do not think that it's advisable for us, for
the Middle Eastern countries, or for the world to have an independent
Palestinian nation located between Israel and Jordan. I think they would
be a target of subversion. I think there would be a concentrated influence,
perhaps, exerted there by some of the more radical other leaders of
the world. And I think that that Palestinian entity or homeland ought
to be tied in at the least in a very strong federation or confederation
with Jordan.
But now I want to say that's our preference. And if
Israel and Jordan and the Palestinians and Egypt should work out something
different, we would not object. But that's our position. And we made
it very clear from the very beginning of my administration to the Israelis
and the Arabs that that's our preference.
Q. Mr. President, can you be more specific—maybe
you don't want to be-on what you mean when you say Palestinians have
the right to participate in their own self-determination?
THE PRESIDENT. I don't really want to spell out in
any more detail what the procedure ought to be. Dayan and Kamel 2 will
be meeting in Jerusalem on the 15th of January. Cy Vance will be there.
We'll offer our good offices.
My own preference is that the Israelis and Egyptians
negotiate that interim procedure with a final referendum themselves.
We'll try to find some compromise between them. I think if we can evolve
an acceptable set of principles, then it would be much easier for King
Hussein and, perhaps later on, the Syrians to join in the discussions.
I did not try to convince Hussein to participate now.
I feel and he feels also that Sadat is adequately representing
the Arab position. And I think Sadat, in an almost unique way, not only
has the trust of his own people and the rest of the world but also,
to a substantial degree, the trust of the Israeli citizens.
So, all of us feel for now until Sadat specifically
requests it, that Hussein should stay out of the direct negotiations.
The Shah will be supportive, the Saudis were very encouraging about
the future, and Hussein and we agree completely.
And so, I think that the present posture is a good
one. But exactly how the vote should be handled or when or what the
options might be offered to the Palestinians, I don't want to say. I
don't know.
Q. Can I also ask you, do you think that as a result
of your visit there, that Sadat's position with the hardline critics
of the Arab world has been improved and that he's strengthened his hand
as a result of this?
THE PRESIDENT. Well, I don't think I would be violating
any confidence to say that all the Arab leaders with whom I met said
they support Sadat unequivocally. Now, the feeling of Syria is something
that I can't assess. I didn't happen to talk to Asad lately, but the
feeling of Iraq and Libya and the more radical Arabs is obvious. They
don't want peace to prevail. They don't want a settlement to be reached.
They don't want the Geneva conference to be concluded. And many of them
still have as a unique purpose the destruction of Israel.
I don't think that Asad or King Hussein or Sadat or
the Saudis—the ones with whom I've talked—I don't think
any of them feel that way. I think they all are perfectly willing to
accept Israel now as a permanent entity in the Middle East, living in
peace.
JANUARY 12, 1978
THE MIDDLE EAST
Q. When you were in Egypt meeting with President Sadat,
President Sadat emerged from that meeting saying that your views and
his on the Middle East were essentially identical. Does that mean that
you think the Israelis should withdraw from all 20 settlements they
have in the Sinai plus their West Bank settlements before there can
be peace in the Middle East?
THE PRESIDENT. Well, it's not for me to decide the
specifics of an ultimate settlement, either between Israel and Egypt,
or Israel and Jordan, or Israel and the other nations involved or the
Palestinians.
I think that it's accurate that President Sadat and
I see the Middle East question almost identically. I've not been involved
and don't intend to get involved in the military settlement that's now
being negotiated in Cairo. The position of our Government is now and
has been that Israeli settlements on occupied territory are illegal
and that they contravene the Geneva conference decisions that were made.
The U.N. Resolution 242 is the basis for the ultimate
decision. All the nations involved have espoused 242, and 338 later
on, which set up the Geneva conference with ourselves and the Soviets
as chairmen. We have in that language that says Israel will withdraw
from occupied territories.
Combined with that requirement, though, is that Israel
will have secure borders, including a realization of security from the
attitude of her neighbors. So, this is an extremely complicated subject,
as you well know. I can't say that on every specific instance that President
Sadat and I will agree on details. We didn't discuss those details.
And I think that it's best for us just to add our good
offices when we can, support both men as they go to the negotiating
table. Secretary Vance will be in Jerusalem with the foreign ministers
of the two countries involved, and our position on the settlements has
not changed.
JANUARY 13, 1978
THE MIDDLE EAST
Q. Mr. President, I gather there's some concern at
the State Department over the course of Middle East negotiations, specifically
a feeling that President Sadat's initiative has not really been matched
so far by Israel and specifically a feeling that Israeli action over
the settlements has not been helpful.
Do you feel that the Israeli response so far has been
satisfactory, or do you simply feel that it would be impolitic for you
to exert the influence that, I guess, some people at the State Department
are urging you to do?
THE PRESIDENT. I don't know of any urging that has
originated in the State Department to which I have not responded to
their satisfaction. Cy Vance and I, you know, are constantly working
together, along with the Vice President and Dr. Brzezinski and all of
the staff that work under all of us, to make sure that our approach
to the Middle East is carefully considered.
We have a limited role to play. We are there to be
constructive and to respond to their requests and to be active when
there's a dormant situation in the Middle East; to be much more reticent
when we think progress is being made without us.
It was an unpleasant thing for me for 9 months or more
to be the intermediary between nations who wouldn't even speak to each
other, who wouldn't communicate directly with each other almost with
a religious fervor. And now, to see Sadat and Begin and their representatives
negotiating directly is a very major step forward and a very gratifying
thing for me to observe.
I think Sadat's initiative has been bold and courageous.
I think it's too early to say whether or not the Israeli response is
adequate. That's for Sadat to judge. The major bone of contention right
now, of course, is the highly publicized Israeli position on settlements,
which we have always considered to be illegal.
And I just can't imagine Prime Minister Begin and the
Israeli Government having the basic peace negotiations broken down because
of an argument about settlements. It may very well be that in the West
Bank or the Sinai that there could be some mutual agreements between
Jordan, Egypt, Israel, that some of those Israeli settlers could stay
on there. But that would be tied in very intimately with whether or
not United Nations forces were the peacekeeping forces or whether the
responsibility was Jordan's or the Palestinians' or Egypt's.
I think the details of those things are matters that
I ought not to address publicly. I do discuss them without constraint
with both Begin and Sadat, and we are very forceful in letting Prime
Minister Begin and the Arab leaders know when we disagree with their
position.
I've been very careful to do one thing, and that is
that whenever we have an American position to put forward as a compromise
or as a basis for discussions earlier this year, to put it in writing
and show exactly the same document to Sadat, to Hussein, to Begin, and
also to Asad, just so there's no doubt about where we stand and what
we are proposing. And then, if Begin disagrees with item number four,
we tell Sadat—with Begin's permission, of course—this is
something that Begin disagrees with, and seek his response. That was
a tedious and, I say, unpleasant responsibility. But now we are there
to cooperate with them.
The last thing I want to say is that our effectiveness
in a time of stalemate or dispute is exactly compatible or commensurate
with the trust that they have in me. If I should ever do anything to
make either the Prime Minister or President Sadat or King Hussein or
Asad feel that we weren't acting in good faith, that I was lying to
them or misleading them or shading the truth, our effectiveness would
be completely destroyed.
I don't think we've ever done that yet. It means, sometimes,
that our Nation is taking the blame from both sides when we put forward
a position that was not instantly acceptable. But I'm pleased with the
progress made so far.
JANUARY 30, 1978
THE MIDDLE EAST
Q. Mr. President, on the Middle East, do you have a
clear idea now from Prime Minister Begin as to whether or not he will
authorize new settlements in the West Bank and in the Sinai, and do
you believe that Israel over a period of time ought to phase out those
settlements in return for real peace?
THE PRESIDENT. Well, I've covered this many times.
Our position on settlements in the occupied territory has been that
they are illegal, that they are an obstacle to peace. When Prime Minister
Begin was over here and when Foreign Minister Dayan was here, this question
arose. And my understanding of their commitment was that no new settlements
would be authorized by the government, that any increase in settlers
would be an expansion of existing settlements as much as possible within
the aegis of the military.
The Geneva conference agreement is that civilians should
not go in to settle permanently in occupied territories. I think the
Israeli Government has not authorized the Shilo settlement other than
as an archeological exploration project. And I've not yet heard from
Prime Minister Begin directly, but I have had information that this
is a policy of the Israeli Government, that this is not an authorized
settlement.
Q. Mr. President, do you have an overall view of the
final borders you would like to see for Israel? Do you expect Israel
to return to the 1967 borders in all aspects, especially in East Jerusalem?
THE PRESIDENT. No. I don't have a map or a plan that
ought to be the final border delineation between Israel and her neighbors.
I have always operated and made my statements under the framework and
within the constraints of United Nations Resolution 242, which calls
for Israel to withdraw from occupied territories.
Israel interprets this language differently, of course,
from the Arab neighbors. The Arab neighbors say that Israel ought to
withdraw from all occupied territories. Israel says that there's some
flexibility there and that the thrust of U.N. Resolution 242 is an exchange,
in effect, for portions of the occupied territory for guaranteed peace.
The three elements that I've pursued is, one, a delineation
of final borders; secondly, a feeling or conviction on the part of the
Israelis that their security was preserved, which would involve both
their own military strength, the delineation of the borders, and the
attitude now and in the future of their neighbors.
The second question, of course, is the definition of
real peace. What does peace mean? Does it simply mean a cessation of
hostility or belligerency, or does it mean open borders, trade, tourism,
diplomatic exchange, the location of ambassadors, and so forth?
I've taken the more definitive definition as my own
preference. And the other thing, of course, is to deal in all its aspects
with the Palestinian question.
But I have never tried to put forward in my own mind
or to any of the Mideastern leaders a map in saying this is where the
lines should be drawn.
FEBRUARY 17, 1978
MIDDLE EAST ARMS SALES
Q. Do you think that Congress will go along with your
decision to send sophisticated fighter jets to the Middle East? And
can you give us your rationale for including, for the first time in
these sales, Egypt and Saudi Arabia along with Israel?
THE PRESIDENT. Yes. I think Congress will go along
with the proposal to sell a limited number of airplanes in the Middle
East. F-15 planes are already being delivered to Israel, and in the
new proposal Israel will receive additional F-15's and F-16's, very
advanced fighter planes.
We have for a long time sold military equipment to
Saudi Arabia, one of our closest allies, staunchest friends, and economic
partners. This is the first time we've sold F-15's to Saudi Arabia,
but they have other advanced equipment.
The first planes will be delivered to Saudi Arabia
not this year or next year, but in 1981 or 1982. The planes that we
have agreed to sell to Egypt are the F5E's, not nearly so advanced a
weapon as the F-15's or F-16's. But as you know, a few years ago, Egypt,
which is now one of our staunchest friends and allies, severed their
close relationship with the Soviet Union and, in effect, became an ally
of ours. And I don't believe that there's any danger of this relatively
short-range, not advanced fighter causing any disruption in the peace
between Egypt and Israel.
So for those reasons, I am advocating to the Congress
that they approve these sales, and I believe the Congress will agree.
Q. Mr. President, given the tension that already existed
over the Israeli settlement policy, do you have any second thoughts
about the timing of your announcement to sell warplanes to Egypt, or
was the timing of that announcement and our public statements about
the Israeli settlement policy a message to the Israelis to become more
flexible in the current negotiations?
THE PRESIDENT. The two were not interrelated in my
decisionmaking process. When I was in Saudi Arabia early in January,
I told them that shortly after the Congress reconvened I would send
up a recommendation for military sales to the Middle East.
Every time I've ever met with Prime Minister Begin,
both in the public sessions, that is, with staff members, and also in
my private sessions with just him and me present, this has been the
first item that he's brought up: "Please expedite the approval
of the sales of military planes to Israel."
I think that the timing is proper. We're not trying
to shortcircuit the allotted time for the Congress. As a matter of fact,
we will not begin the process until after the Congress reconvenes, the
Senate reconvenes. So there will be a full 50 days for the Congress
to consider the matter. Twenty days after this coming Monday, I'll send
up the official papers.
So, I don't think it's a bad time to send it up. I
recognized ahead of time that there would be some controversy about
it. And we did give it second and third thoughts before I made a decision
about the composition of the package and the date for submitting it.
FEBRUARY 18, 1978
MIDDLE EAST ARMS SALES
Q. I am Cass Spanos from Stevens High School in Claremont,
New Hampshire. Mr. Carter, President Sadat of Egypt has shown a great
deal of courage in initiating peace overtures in Israel. Do you think
you have done anything to negate or to disrupt these negotiations by
agreeing to send fighter planes to Egypt? And further, do you feel that
by taking this action the Israelis will be pressured into making more
concessions with Egypt?
THE PRESIDENT. No, I don't. I have met already with
Prime Minister Begin, personally, on two occasions, and he will be coming
to our country next month on the 14th and 15th and 16th to meet with
me again.
Every time I've ever met with him, either privately
or within a small group, his first request has been to go ahead and
approve or recommend to the Congress approval of the sale of very advanced
fighter planes, the F-16's and F-15's, our best planes of all, to Israel.
The previous administration and I have promised our
long-time friends and allies, the Saudi Arabians, to sell 60 F-15's
to them. The Egyptian request was much more modest—to sell them
the F-5E's, which is not a very advanced fighter plane. It's of fairly
short range. And to be perfectly frank, in a combat situation, they
would not be a match for the F-15's.
I thought it was proper and advisable and hope the
Congress will approve the sale that I have advocated to the Israelis,
the Saudi Arabians, and the Egyptians. It will not upset the balance
of strength in the Middle East. I would say that the Israeli Air Force
will still be the dominant and the most efficient and effective air
force there by far.
One reason that I wanted to honor President Sadat's
request is that a few years ago, Egypt was closely allied with the Soviet
Union and was completely dependent upon Russia to give them their military
weapons. Since then, Egypt has moved toward us, and now Sadat and I
have the closest possible personal relationship, and Egypt is one of
our own closest possible friends. So, we cannot leave Egypt defenseless.
I don't think there's any likelihood at all of a war
between Egypt and Israel. They're well on the way toward peace. But
Egypt is still threatened by some of their neighbors. Libya has heavy
shipments of arms coming in from the Soviet Union; Ethiopia, the same;
Iraq, the same; Syria, the same; Algeria, the same. And Egypt has got
to be able to defend themselves. The weapons that they did buy, years
back, from the Soviet Union are now becoming obsolete.
And so I think this is a well-balanced package. It
does contribute to a greater sense of security in the Middle East among
our own friends and neighbors, and I think it also does not upset the
balance of military power in the Middle East. I might close by saying
this: I pledge myself each year while I'm in office to cut down on the
volume of sales that we make to nations of this kind. And we will reduce
our sales.
MARCH 2, 1978
THE MIDDLE EAST
Q. Later this month you'll be meeting with Prime Minister
Menahem Begin from Israel. Dick Ryan of the Detroit News asks: What
do you hope to achieve during your meetings with the Prime Minister?
THE PRESIDENT. This will be my third meeting with Prime
Minister Begin since he's been the leader of Israel. In addition, I
communicate with him fairly frequently by personal letter, by diplomatic
message, and on occasion by telephone. And both our own Secretary of
State and other officials and his secretary of state and other officials
come here frequently. Defense Minister Weizman will be here shortly
to consult with me and with the Secretary of Defense, Secretary of State,
and others.
We are looking for some common ground on which the
Egyptians, the Israelis, the Jordanians, the residents of the West Bank
and other areas can agree.
This is a difficult and sensitive question. As you
know, the Gaza Strip has had an affiliation in the past with Egypt,
the West Bank with Jordan, both now occupied by Israel. And we hope
to search out at the top level of government some resolution of the
differences on specifics relating to the Sinai and also on a statement
of principles relating to the occupied territories of the West Bank
and the Gaza Strip, hoping at that time that Egypt and the Jordanians
and the Palestinian Arabs who live in the West Bank, Gaza Strip would
be satisfied to conclude perhaps some agreements and to proceed with
further negotiations leading to an ultimate resolution of the issue,
based on United Nations Resolution 242.
One of the crucial elements of any progress in the
Middle East is a cleaving to the commitment that U.N. 242 is a basis
for continued negotiations and a solution. The abandonment of that would
put us back many months or years. So, this is what I hope to accomplish
with Prime Minister Begin, to frankly discuss with him my previous agreements
and discussions with President Sadat, to encourage direct negotiations
to be resumed, and to search out common ground, based on advice given
to me by Secretary of State Vance and also by Mr. Atherton, on the latest
possible language changes that might be necessary to let Egypt and Israel
agree. So, this is what I hope to accomplish, and I believe the personal
discussions will be good.
I would much prefer that the personal discussions be
carried on between Sadat and Begin. But in the absence of that possibility
at this moment, we hope to restore it and act as an intermediary.
MARCH 9, 1978
MIDDLE EAST ARMS SALES
Q. Mr. President, you have spoken many times of the
commitment that the United States has for the security of Israel. In
1975, in September, the Sinai II agreement said specifically that the
United States would promise to give advanced aircraft, such as the F-16,
at an unspecified time and number, to Israel.
Now, why is that promise of the United States now made
part of a package deal? In other words, why is it tied to approval for
aircraft to other countries, Egypt and Saudi Arabia?
THE PRESIDENT. Well, we are honoring completely the
commitments made to Israel in the fall of 1975 concerning an adherence
on our part to the adequate defense capabilities of Israel, including
advanced aircraft like the F—15 and the F-16.
Some orders of this kind have already been placed,
accepted, and deliveries are in prospect. Some planes have already been
delivered. And the proposal that I've made to Congress on the arms sales
package is compatible with that commitment.
In the fall of 1975, commitments were also made to
the Saudi Arabians, to provide them with advanced aircraft, to replace
their present Lightning planes which are becoming obsolete.
Later, in the Ford administration in 1976, in the fall,
a commitment was made to them to send Defense Department officials to
Saudi Arabia, to give them some assessment of the characteristics of
the F 15's and F-16's, with a commitment then made that they would have
their choice between the 16's and the 15's.
When Crown Prince Fahd came to our country last spring,
I repeated this commitment, that had been made by my own predecessors
in the White House, and so the sale of F-15's to Saudi Arabia is consistent
with the commitment also made in the fall of 1975 and repeatedly reconfirmed.
The sale of the F-5E's—a much less capable airplane,
by the way—to the Egyptians is, I think, a very legitimate proposal,
because Egyptians in effect have severed their supply of weapons that
used to come from the Soviet Union and have cast their lot with us,
which is a very favorable development in the Middle East, one of the
most profound developments of all.
I have no apology at all to make for this proposal.
It maintains the military balance that exists in the Middle East. I
can say without any doubt that the superior capabilities of the Israeli
Air Force, compared to their neighbors, is maintained, and at the same
time, it reconfirms our own relationship with the moderate Arab leaders
and nations for the future to ensure that peace can be and will be maintained
in the Middle East.
EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI RELATIONS
Q. Mr. Carter, on the same subject, we've seen reports
in recent days from the Middle East, from both Cairo and Jerusalem,
that in effect President Sadat's initiative has come to an end, that
it has come aground. We also see reports from Jerusalem that ministers
in the Israeli Government have decided that there is no deal to be made
at this time. Could you give us your assessment of where this stands
and where you think it's going to go?
THE PRESIDENT. Well, as is the case in the White House
and in the Congress, and in the United States, there is a difference
in Israel, a very heated debate in prospect and already in progress
about what should be done to bring about peace in the Middle East. There
are, obviously, differences also between nations, between Egypt and
Israel, between Israel and their other neighbors.
So, I would say that in comparison to the situation
a year ago, the prospects for comprehensive peace in the Middle East
are quite good. We would hope that there could be an immediate resolution
of all the differences. That's not immediately in prospect.
Prime Minister Begin will be coming to visit with me
this coming week. I know him very well. I've met with him twice before.
He is a very strong advocate, a very dedicated advocate of the position
of the Israeli Government. He's a forceful and outspoken person. And
I'm sure after our meeting, we will at least understand each I other
better.
I hope we can move another step toward peace. I had
an equivalent opportunity this year to meet and to have long discussions
with President Sadat.
So, I would say that there's been a great deal of progress
made. Just looking at the changes from the viewpoint of the Israelis,
we have now the major Arab nation who has recognized Israel's right
to exist, right to exist in peace, right to exist permanently, has offered
the full definition of peace which I described earlier. They have been
meeting directly and personally, Begin and Sadat and their representatives,
which was not in prospect at all a year ago.
There are still differences between them—relatively
minor differences in the Sinai, more major, strategic kinds of differences
involving the Palestinian question and the implementation of U.N. 242.
So we've got a long way to go.
It's a difficult question that's been one of the most
challenging, I guess, in the last 30 years for the world, to bring about
peace in the Middle East. But I'm not discouraged about it. We're going
to stick with it. And even though it takes a lot of time and much abuse
and much debate and many differences expressed by all public officials,
I intend to stay with it. And I believe the American people are deeply
committed to two things: One is the security of Israel under any circumstances,
and secondly, the achievement of comprehensive peace.
U.S.-ISRAELI RELATIONS
Q. Mr. President, Mark Siegel, one of your aides, quit
today, and you accepted his resignation with regret. He cited as his
reason, differences with your Middle East policy.
His resignation, to many, symbolizes the split in the
American Jewish community over the internal debate that's going on over
our Middle East policy. And with Begin coming, I wonder if you could
tell us what differences there are between the two of us, what your
position will be on these differences, and a comment on the report that
you're going to pressure him to make significant concessions?
THE PRESIDENT. I don't have any intention to pressure
Prime Minister Begin. I don't have any desire to do it and couldn't
if I wanted to. He's a very strong and independent person representing
a strong and independent nation. Our role has been that of an intermediary.
And one of the most pleasant respites that I have had since I've been
in office was the brief time when Prime Minister Begin and President
Sadat were negotiating directly and I was out of the role of carrying
messages back and forth.
This is, however, a situation that has now deteriorated
to some degree since President Sadat went to Jerusalem. Both the military
and the political talks are now interrupted—we hope temporarily.
One of the things I will be doing is to repeat to Prime
Minister Begin personally the request and the negotiating positions
of President Sadat. And we've tried to do this through our ambassadors
and through our negotiator, Mr. Atherton 1 in the Mideast, and I think
perhaps I can do it perhaps a little more effectively.
1 Alfred L. Atherton, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State
for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs.
But the differences that exist between them are well
known. In the Sinai, as I said, they are relatively easy to resolve-the
Jewish settlements, the placement of Egyptian forces in the Sinai, and
some continuation of Israeli control over some airfields or aerodromes,
and the rapidity with which Israel would withdraw from the Sinai itself.
In the West Bank, Gaza Strip, this involves implementation
of U.N. Resolution 242 and some resolution of the Palestinian question.
We do not and never have favored an independent Palestinian nation,
but within that bound of constraint, how to give the Palestinians who
live in the West Bank, Gaza Strip some voice in the determination of
their own future, is an issue still unresolved.
That outlines very briefly the situation that we're
presently in.
MARCH 30, 1978
THE MIDDLE EAST
Q. Mr. President, in recent days, you've seen the use
of American military supplies to invade a country and to cause untold
suffering to hundreds of thousands. Some say this is the violation of
U.S. law. In view of the facts that you have before you, is it a violation;
and two, has it caused you to reassess your warplane package for the
Middle East?
THE PRESIDENT. Are you referring to the Lebanon question?
Q. Yes.
THE PRESIDENT. As you know, when the terrorist attacks
in Israel precipitated the countermove by Israel into Lebanon, which
has been a haven for the Palestinian terrorists, the United States took
the initiative in the United Nations—I might say, without the
approval of Israel—to initiate United Nations action there to
expedite the removal of Israeli forces from Lebanon.
We have obviously attempted to comply with the law,
and this is a matter that we are still addressing. The other part of
your question?
Q. Has it caused you to reassess your package of warplanes
for the Middle East, and how do you say you have attempted to comply
with the law?
THE PRESIDENT. Well, we're attempting to terminate
as rapidly as possible the military presence of Israel in southern Lebanon
through United Nations action. I believe this is the proper way to do
it, rather than unilateral action on our part, which would probably
be unsuccessful in any case to get Israel to withdraw. The presence
of United Nations forces, the French, the Swedes, and others, I believe,
is the preferable way, and it marshals the opinion of the entire world,
through the United Nations, against the Israeli presence being retained
in Lebanon.
This has not caused me to reassess the American position
on the sale of warplanes and other equipment to the Middle East. This
is a very well balanced package. It emphasizes our interest in military
security of the Middle East. It does not change at all the fact that
Israel still retains a predominant air capability and military capability.
There is no threat to their security. But it also lets the nations involved
and the world know that our friendship, our partnership, our sharing
of military equipment with the moderate Arab nations is an important
permanent factor of our foreign policy.
PRIME MINISTER MENAHEM BEGIN
Q. Mr. President, have you or any other top U.S. officials—Dr.
Brzezinski, for instance—suggested that Prime Minister Begin may
not be the Fight man to head that government in the present circumstances?
And apart from what may or may not have been said, do you now think
the Begin government can make the hard decisions necessary to move the
peace process forward?
THE PRESIDENT. I can say unequivocally that no one
in any position of responsibility in the United States administration
has ever insinuated that Prime Minister Begin is not qualified to be
Prime Minister or that he should be replaced. This report, the origin
of which I do not know, is completely false.
I think that Prime Minister Begin and his government
are able to negotiate in an adequately flexible way to reach an agreement
with Egypt, later Jordan and other of the neighboring countries. This
is our hope and this is also our belief. We have not given up on the
possibility of a negotiated peace settlement in the Middle East.
Under the Begin government, with him as Prime Minister,
recently arrangements have been made between Israel and Egypt for Ezer
Weizman to go to Egypt again, which will be a continuation of the probing
for a compatibility. I think it is obvious now that with the issues
so sharply drawn, that key differences remain that must be addressed
on the side of Israel. The things that are of deepest concern is Israel's
refusal to acknowledge that United Nations Resolution 242 applies clearly
to the West Bank, their unwillingness to grant to the West Bank Palestinians,
the Palestinian Arabs, a right to participate in the determination of
their own future by voting at the end of a 5-year period, and so forth,
for the kind of affiliation they would have with Israel or Jordan or
under a joint administration. And this is a problem for which I have
no clear solution yet. But I believe that the Begin government is completely
capable of negotiating an agreement with Egypt.
APRIL 7, 1978
ISRAEL'S DEFENSE CAPABILITY
Q. Mr. President, I wondered if it is your impression
that Israel has nuclear weapons, and if so, how does this affect your
judgment of the capacity of Israel to defend itself in a difficult time?
THE PRESIDENT. Well, our policy is to accept the statement
of the Israelis concerning their nuclear weapon capability. I don't
have any independent information beyond that.
My own belief is that Israel is completely capable
of defending themselves with conventional weapons alone, against any
foreseeable attack now or in the years to come. We have participated
with the Israelis in developing their defense capability. They are a
proud and deeply committed nation. They have been willing, even eager,
to sacrifice when necessary to guarantee their own security, not only
economically but with the lives of their own people.
And because of that spirit that Israel has and a long-time
commitment to putting security as a top priority of their nation, even
when they didn't have adequate support from the rest of the world, my
belief is that now and in the foreseeable future they will be strong
enough to defend themselves.
APRIL 25, 1978
MIDDLE EAST ARMS SALES
Q. Mr. President, are you going to heed the calls of
the congressional leadership of your own party and delay the formal
submission of the package sale of warplanes to the Congress or break
it up in any way?
THE PRESIDENT. Well, I've not been asked by the leadership
in the Congress to delay. I have had one Senator who came to see me
about holding off on this proposal. Secretary Vance and I have been
in close communication, both with one another and with leaders in the
Congress, for a number of weeks concerning the arms sales package that
will be presented to the Congress very shortly. This package will be
presented in individual, component parts to the Congress. It's the only
legal way to do it.
The Congress will act on those major sales proposals
individually to Israel, to Egypt, and to Saudi Arabia. Each one is important.
Each one completes a commitment that has been made by either me, or,
even in the case of the Saudis and Israel, our predecessors for these
sales.
I look upon them as a package, and if the Congress
should accept a portion and reject another, then my intent is to withdraw
the sales proposal altogether. But the Congress will not receive nor
act on these proposals as a package. They have to act, according to
the law, on individual items.
These proposals are in the national interest. I think
it's important to our country to meet our commitments. The one that's
perhaps the most controversial is the sale of F-15's to the Saudi Arabians.
This was a promise that was made to the Saudi Arabians in September
of 1975, to let them have a choice of F-16's or F-15's. They want these
weapons for defensive purposes.
I recommitted this Nation to provide these planes both
last year and again this year. And my deep belief is that, since in
the Middle East our preeminent consideration is the long-range and permanent
security and peacefulness for the people of Israel, that to treat the
moderate Arabs with fairness and with friendship and to strengthen their
commitment to us in return is in the best interests of our own country
and of Israel.
We are negotiating or discussing these matters with
the Congress. But there will be no delay of the sales proposal beyond
the point where it can be completed by the time the Congress goes into
recess-maybe 2 or 3 days, no longer than that.
Q. Mr. President, just to follow up on the Middle East
thing, I would like to pursue it just a little bit more maybe from a
slightly different angle. The Israeli Foreign Minister, Mr. Dayan, has
suggested that Israel might be willing to give up its own fighter planes
in your package if the sales were stopped to Saudi Arabia and Egypt.
Now, in the light of your own professed interest in
cutting back on foreign arms sales, would you consider withdrawing the
entire package to prevent a new escalation of the arms race in the Middle
East?
THE PRESIDENT. No, I would not. As I said earlier,
the process through which we sell arms—and this sales proposal
would be completed 5 years in the future, by—I think the last
deliveries would be 1983—is initiated by a request from governments,
foreign governments, that we permit the sale of arms to them. As I said
earlier, we committed ourselves to help Saudi Arabia with arms sales
to protect themselves in September of 1975.
At the same time, approximately, in the fall of '75,
our Government committed to help Israel with their proposal by making
arms sales available to them. Obviously, if any nation withdrew its
request for arms sales, that would change the entire procedure.
I have never heard of Foreign Minister Dayan's statement
that they did not need the weapons or would withdraw their request for
weapons until today. Mr. Dayan is on the way to our country. He will
be meeting shortly with the Secretary of State and others, and I think
only after very close consultations with them can we determine whether
or not Israel desires to go ahead with the arms sales commitment that
I've made to them.
But I do not intend to withdraw the arms sales proposals
after they are submitted to the Congress, and I do not intend to delay.
Q. If Mr. Dayan did in fact tell you that Israel would
withdraw its request, would you then be willing to pull back the whole
package?
THE PRESIDENT. I can't imagine that happening, and
I would rather not answer a hypothetical question of that kind.
Q. Mr. President, your spokesmen have said that there
will be written assurances from Saudi Arabia and Egypt that they will
not use the warplanes against Israel in any future conflict. And further,
various administration spokesmen have pointed out that the Saudi Arabian
Government will be dependent on the U.S. for technical support for these
planes, and this support could always be cut off in the event that a
future conflict would start and that the Saudis desired to use the weapons
against Israel.
Is it your understanding that both types of assurances
will be in effect?
THE PRESIDENT. Well, we would not sell the planes to
the Saudi Arabians if we thought that the desire was to use them against
Israel. I'm completely convinced that the Saudis want their airplanes
to be used to protect their own country.
The Saudis have informed officials in our Government
that they do not desire to deploy them at Tabuk, which is the airfield
nearest to Israel, and I know for a fact that the configuration of the
weapons on the F-15 that the Saudis have offered is primarily a defensive
configuration. And for those reasons I feel sure that the problems that
you described are adequately addressed in the proposals that I've made
to the Congress and in the statements that the Saudis have already made.
MIDDLE EAST PEACE NEGOTIATIONS
Q. You mentioned that Mr. Dayan is coming. I just wonder,
sir, do you have any reason at all to feel optimistic that the negotiations
between Israel and Egypt can somehow be brought off dead center?
I know Mr. Atherton's been in Cairo, and you've had
consultations. What is the outlook now?
THE PRESIDENT. Yes, I have reason to be optimistic,
but I can't predict success anytime soon. This has been going on for
30 years.
I think compared to a year ago, for instance, remarkable
progress has been made. After the visit of President Sadat to Jerusalem,
there was a remarkable sense of excessive hope or euphoria that swept
the world, that peace was imminent. Since then, I've met extensively
with President Sadat and with Prime Minister Begin and also with the
Foreign Ministers of the two countries involved. And there's still hope
that we can move toward a peaceful settlement.
I think if there were not hope, that Foreign Minister
Dayan would not be coming to Washington to meet with our own officials
to explore further avenues for progress.
As you know, since Prime Minister Begin was here, Ezer
Weizman, who is the Defense Minister of Israel, has been to Egypt twice
(once) 1 to meet with President Sadat. So, discussions are going on
and explorations are continuing.
1 Printed in the transcript.
And I am firmly convinced that both the Israelis and
the Egyptians want peace. They both are concerned about the terms of
peace. After years of hatred and even active combat, there's still an
element of distrust about the future intentions of each other.
But I am hopeful that we can continue to make progress.
My commitment is deep and irreversible. As long as I'm in the White
House as President, I will continue to pursue, without any slacking
of my interests or commitment, the avenue toward peace.
And I anticipate that now and in the future there will
be temporary periods of discouragement and withdrawal of the negotiating
parties. So, I think every evidence that I have both publicly and privately
known is that both sides want peace and the progress toward peace is
steady.
APRIL 28, 1978
MIDDLE EAST ARMS SALES
Q. Mr. President, Anthony Sampson, in "Arms Bazaar,"
quotes Kenneth Galbraith as saying that, in effect, the United States
caused the India-Pakistan war by selling arms to Pakistan. In fact,
they sold to both sides. It created an imbalance in that area, and that's
what led to the war. Now, changing the balance in the Middle East, will
it not likewise inevitably cause another war? Isn't it a repetition
of a road to disaster if you lump these sales together, to sell both
to the Arab countries and to Israel?
THE PRESIDENT. Well, as you know, our arms policy in
the Mideast has been to sell moderate supplies of arms to all of our
close allies there and to give an extra attention to the 'needs of Israel,
pretty much as defined by Israel.
I think it's obvious that the Israeli military strength
is overwhelming in the air. We have longstanding commitments made to
the Saudi Arabians, dating back to September of 1975, by President Ford
and Secretary Kissinger. I reconfirmed that commitment, because our
Nation's word of honor is at stake, early in my own administration when
the Saudi leaders visited here.
This arms sales package, as such, is not a package
as far as the Congress is concerned. These proposals will be submitted
to Congress individually. Each one, separately, will be assessed by
Congress in the best interests of our own country and that of our allies.
My own belief is that the Saudis have made their choice
of weapons and the appurtenances or armaments on the F-15 on a basis
of defense. The 1:-16 is more of an offensive weapon, and the Saudis
have not ordered air-to-ground armaments that would be used in an offensive
mode. They've also indicated to us that they do not intend to station
the planes at Tabuk, which is a base close to Israel, but will be stationing
these planes near Iraq and South Yemen as a defensive mechanism.
Just to close, this is a proposal that, in my opinion,
is best for Israel. I think it would be a serious mistake for us to
sever the friendly relationships and the mutual trust and confidence
that's crucial, that presently does exist between ourselves and the
moderate Arab leaders. I think our being the ones to sell these weapons
to the Saudis—which will not be delivered completely until 1983—is
advantageous as compared to the Saudis' completely unrestricted ability
to buy the same type of weapons and same quantity of weapons from the
French or, perhaps even later, from the Soviets. And their peaceful
intentions are well recognized and trusted by me.
As you know, the sale of the F-5's to Egypt is not
something that's even opposed by the Israelis, so far as I know. I was
with Prime Minister Begin—in this room and over privately in the
Mansion at the White House and in my little back office for several
hours—for 2 full days this year, and Prime Minister Begin never
mentioned to me one time any concern that he might have about the sale
of weapons to Saudi Arabia or Egypt.
So, I think that this is a well-balanced proposal.
Each sale was made on its own merits. I think that it is moderate in
quantity. The weapons for Saudi Arabia and Egypt are acknowledged to
be defensive in nature, and I think this provides us with the kind of
relationship and influence in the moderate Arab world which is conducive
to peace for Israel.
Q. I was with Prime Minister Begin, Mr. President,
after he left you, and it is of greatest concern to him. In fact, it
is to every Israeli leader, going back to Rabin and Peres and all of
them. It's of tremendous concern to them, because by the time these
weapons are delivered in 1981 or '82, you may not have the present rulers
in Saudi Arabia because of the conditions that are going on over there
right now. You might be delivering it to a pro-Communist government.
THE PRESIDENT. I can't dispute what you say about Begin's
importunities or concerns to you. But I'm telling you that for 9 days
he had my undivided attention, and he never mentioned it.
Now, the second point that you make is that we will
provide, as is the case in all of our major arms sales, a servicing
in spare parts for these weapons over a long contractual period. And
this gives us a great knowledge of the pilots who fly the planes, the
security measures that accrue to prevent violation of our own secrecy,
the point of stationing of these planes, any modification in their armaments,
the transfer of the F-15's from a basically defensive plane to one of
offensive nature.
This relationship that we will have with the Saudi
Arabians will help to prevent any shift in their attitude toward an
offensive design against Israel. I think that this is good insurance
that ought to be maintained.
MAY 4, 1978
MIDDLE EAST ARMS SALES
Q. Are you willing to compromise on the number of warplanes
you propose to sell to Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Israel in order to achieve
congressional approval of those sales? And the second part of my question
is, do you see the same linkage between Saudi Arabian support of the
American dollar and oil prices that Sheik Yamani did last week when
he looked at the sale?
THE PRESIDENT. I think Sheik Yamani has recently denied
saying what was reported from him about a close interconnection between
continued involvement with the American dollar and friendship between
Saudi Arabia and the United States and the sale of warplanes to Saudi
Arabia. I think he's denied that.
I think the proposals that we have made to Congress—to
Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Israel for warplanes—ought not to be
changed at all, and I hope and expect that the Congress will approve
this proposal as we submitted it.
Obviously, there will be a lot of hard work to be done
in the Congress. We'll be presenting testimony to the House committee
on the 8th and 9th of May—and we've also testified yesterday for
6 or 7 hours in the Senate committee. I think we will win tills proposal
because it's right, it's good for our country, very badly needed.
One of the most crucial elements of a permanent maintenance
of peace in the Middle East and the security of Israel is for us to
have a relationship with the moderate Arab nations, like Egypt and Saudi
Arabia, where they depend upon us to keep our word and where there is
a clear recognition of the friendship and mutual trust between our countries.
We have provided these planes for Saudi Arabia, not
to attack Israel; they are a defensive type of airplanes. And the Saudis
have ordered configuration or appurtenances on the planes, fittings
on the planes that are defensive in nature. So, they are designed and
needed to defend Saudi Arabia. I see no reason to change any of those
proposals.
MAY 5, 1978
MIDDLE EAST PEACE NEGOTIATIONS, ARMS SALES
Q. Mr. President, thank you for this opportunity. My
name is Dennis Redford. I would like to know why we are involving ourselves
in the sale of arms to Sadat and Begin on the one hand, and at the same
time, not only advocating peaceful settlement but taking the posture
of peacemaker in an active role with their negotiations? Aren't these
positions realistically, diametrically opposed? Isn't this hard to justify
morally?
THE PRESIDENT. No. And I'll explain why. There have
been disputes in the Middle East for 30 years, even centuries, even
before the time of Christ. And I think part of the involvement of American
people in shaping my own decisions and the policy of our Government
are very well illustrated by the Middle Eastern question. If you think
back 12 months or 15 months, we've made a great deal of progress.
Never before have Arab leaders and Jewish leaders been
willing to communicate directly with one another. I think the reason
that Sadat went to Jerusalem and was received by Begin and Begin went
to Ismailia in Egypt and was received by Sadat is because we helped
in a limited way, I admit, to convince Begin and Sadat that both of
those leaders genuinely wanted peace.
There's no doubt in my mind that Sadat wants peace
perhaps as much as anybody in the world, and there's no doubt in my
mind that Begin wants peace just as deeply.
One surprise that struck Begin and Sadat, they both
told me that—in fact, Begin just a few days ago—one surprise
was they underestimated their own people. When Sadat went into the streets
of Jerusalem, the expression on the faces of public officials, women,
children, every citizen along the street, was one of hope and welcome,
even love for an Arab leader who in the past had been involved in war
and the most intense hatred against the Israelis, against the Jews.
The same experience was witnessed when the negotiators
went into Cairo. They couldn't walk down the street without being surrounded
by Arab Egyptians who tried to give them gifts, some of them who were
there—Ezer Weizman 1 told me that people would come out of their
jewelry stores and try to put in their hands very expensive rings and
diamonds, just as a gift from the Egyptian people for trying' to strive
for peace.
1 Israeli defense minister.
So, the essence of what we've tried to do is to capitalize
on the genuine desire of the Arabs and Israelis to find peace, and a
great deal of progress has been made. The first time I talked to Sadat
in the seclusion of the upstairs bedroom area of the White House, he
said, "What do you want, Mr. President, me to do?"
And I said, "I want you first of all to recognize
that Israel has a right to exist, to exist permanently and to exist
in peace. Secondly, I want you to reach out your hand and talk directly
with the leaders of Israel, not through us as an intermediary. And third,
I want you to recognize that there can be genuine peace between the
Egyptians and Israelis, open borders, trade, tourist exchange, student
exchange, diplomatic recognition."
He said, "Mr. President, that will never happen
in my lifetime." Less than a year later, Sadat adopted all those
requests of mine and laid them on the table. The Israelis responded
accordingly. Begin has now put forward some good ideas.
Now, it comes to the arms question. Our interest in
the Mideast is not as a distant observer. It's not just as a postman
to carry messages back and forth between the Israelis and the Egyptians
and others. Most of the time the messages are not received well, as
you know, because each side wants more than the other one is willing
to offer. We're not just a disinterested person or party.
We have an intense, serious, national interest in Middle
Eastern peace, first of all, because of our total commitment that will
never be shaken, that Israel shall be free, protected, secure, and peaceful.
That overrides everything else.
The second, though, is my realization that the best
way to do that is to also have the friendship and the trust and the
partnership of the moderate Arab leaders, leaders like Sadat, a peaceful
man, leaders like the Saudi Arabians, who have been staunch friends
and allies of ours-there's no other government that I can think of that's
been more helpful to me as President than those from Saudi Arabia.
We don't want them to turn against each other. We don't
want them to turn against Israel. We don't want them to turn to even
other European countries or to the Soviet Union for their own security.
The Saudis, for instance, in the most controversial
part of the arms package, have requested 60 F-15 airplanes to be delivered
between now and 1983. It's a very modest request.
When President Ford was in office, Secretary Kissinger
promised the Saudi Arabians, with the full knowledge of the Defense
Department, many leaders in the Congress, "We will give you whichever
you want, F 16's" which are primarily offensive planes— "or
the F 15"—which is the finest defensive fighter plane in
the world.
I reaffirmed this commitment when I first became President,
and again in January when I went to Saudi Arabia to meet with King Khalid
and the leaders. I said, "We will make this delivery." They
chose the F-15, the defensive fighter. They did not ever ask us to put
bombracks or offensive weapons on the F-15.
I think it's much better for us to keep that sense
in Saudi Arabia that we are their friends, they- can trust us when we
make a commitment or a promise on the part of the President and the
Congress, it will be honored. And I believe that it's best for Israel,
for us to have this good, firm, solid, mutually trustful, friendly relationship
with the moderate Arab leaders.
So, I believe that this proposal that I have made to
Congress is minimal. I hope and believe the Congress will honor my recommendation.
It will never be in any way a derogation of Israeli superiority in the
air. They'll still be superior in every sense of the word. There's no
threat to them.
The Saudis do not want to station these planes close
to Israel. They want to put them up near Iraq and South Yemen, where
the major threat against Saudi Arabia might come.
So, the totality of it is that we will go ahead with
this proposal. It's good for us, it's good for Israel, it's good for
peace in the Middle East. It helps us to keep a good trade relationship
with those countries involved. It reinforces the commitment of Egypt
and Saudi Arabia to look to us for their future prosperity and security.
And in the whole process we will keep my honor—my commitment to
the American people, that year by year, completely contrary to what
we've done in the past, we're going to cut down each year the quantity
of arms we sell overseas. I'm committed to doing this, and I'm going
to do it.
MAY 26, 1978
U.S. RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL
SENATOR BERMAN. My question relates to the concerns
of the Jewish community in relation to the State of Israel. Many of
us who have Jewish constituents and are Jewish in this body have great
apprehension that there's been a deviation from the classic position
of the United States of a special relationship and a total commitment
to the security of Israel. We have heard of this apprehension from our
own constituents, and I appreciate your office has indicated that an
aide would be willing to meet with the Jewish legislators after your
meeting, but I don't think that's necessary because I think this is
much more meaningful, and I appreciate this opportunity.
I think the Jewish community is going to be looking
for deeds, but I would ask you this morning to please comment on what
type of message we can bring back to these people that are fearful of
this deviation, to reassure them of the total commitment of your administration
to the security of Israel.
THE PRESIDENT. Thank you, sir. This is one of those
difficult questions that I mentioned earlier.
The special relationship between the United States
and Israel still stands. Our total commitment to Israel's security and
our hope for peace is still preeminent among all the other considerations
that our Nation has in the Middle East.
I have spent more time on the Middle Eastern question
since I've been in the White House than any other subject, not just
in analysis within our own group and with the Members of the Congress,
who are deeply interested about what our country's position ought to
be, but having long, detailed, sometimes private conversations with
all the leaders of nations participating in the potential or existing
negotiations in the Middle East.
Israel has dominant air capability in the Middle East,
and that dominance will even increase as a result of the recent approved
arms sales.
I don't know anyone in the world that I am more convinced
wants peace than Anwar Sadat. When I met with him for the first time
early last year, he said to me, "Mr. President, what is it that
I can do to break the deadlock that has existed for years and years
between us and Israel?" I said, "First of all, you can negotiate
directly with the leaders of Israel, not through us as intermediaries."
He said, "I don't believe that's possible, Mr. President."
I said, "You can break down the barriers that
have existed between Egyptians and Israelis and the hatred that evolves
from constant radio broadcasts and propaganda efforts." He said,
"I believe I can do that."
I said, "You can put forward a proposal where
in the future the borders between Israel and Egypt will be open for
trade, tourism, student exchange, cultural exchange, even diplomatic
recognition." And he said, "That will never come in my lifetime."
That was about a year ago. And there has been a dramatic
change since then. Most of it took place, as you know, during the November-December
era, when Begin received Sadat with open arms, and vice versa. And both
those leaders have told me they were shocked at the warmth of the reception
of Israeli negotiators when they arrived in Egypt, and of Sadat and
his negotiators when they arrived in Jerusalem. I think this proves
that the people in Egypt and Israel genuinely want peace.
Since then I've met with both leaders extensively,
and I'm convinced that if we sever our relationship with the moderate
Arab nations, with Egypt—by far the dominant nation as far as
the Arab world goes—with the Saudi Arabians who are not part of
the negotiating process, but who have a very good moderating influence-with
King Hussein, and just isolate ourselves with a bilateral relationship
with Israel, it would almost prevent any further, future progress on
peace.
So, our commitment is to continue, in spite of constant
discouragement, in spite of political costs, to move toward a resolution
of the issue.
I think when Sadat went to Jerusalem, that Begin responded
with a very good proposal, which was a step in the right direction,
a basis for good negotiations-how to withdraw from the Sinai, how to
have some negotiations about home rule, so-called, for the West Bank,
Gaza Strip area.
We are not trying to impose a settlement, but we'll
still have active negotiations going on, getting a message from the
Israelis, delivering it to the Egyptians-they're always disappointed—getting
a message from Sadat, delivering it back to the Israelis—they're
always disappointed. We're kind of an unappreciated postman going back
and forth between leaders who tried to open a door at the end of last
year and have now seen the door closed again.
I believe that the confidence that Egypt now has that
we are concerned about their security, not against Israel—the
F-5E's are no match for the Israeli Air Force-but against their other
neighbors, who are on the continent of Africa, I think, is a very sound
insurance policy that in the future Sadat will trust me enough and trust
our Nation enough to continue to negotiate in good faith, even when
the Syrians, the Iraqis, the Libyans, and others are castigating him
for keeping the peace doors open.
And I believe that Israel can rest assured that there
will never be any deviation in our own country, of our total commitment
to giving them adequate provisions to defend themselves.
Prime Minister Begin, I think, shares what I've just
said to you, and I don't believe that Sadat would disagree with a word
of it. But there need be no concern among the Israeli people nor among
Jews in this country that our Nation has changed or turned away from
Israel. It was a difficult vote, but I think it was an honoring of past
commitments. And if we have violated our Nation's word of honor to provide
that modest amount of military capability to those two Arab countries,
I think we would have driven them away from us permanently and driven
permanently away any prospect for peace in the Middle East, which we
pray for and which I'm determined to pursue until the last day I'm in
the White House.
I believe we still have a good chance for Success.
JUNE 26, 1978
THE MIDDLE EAST
Q. Mr. President, could you give us your current assessment
of Middle East peace prospects at this time, when Israel and Egypt are
again apparently at an impasse?
THE PRESIDENT. My experience in dealing with the Mideast
peace proposals leads me not to be surprised when we have temporary
setbacks or rejections from one side or the other.
I thought the Israeli Cabinet response to our two basic
questions was very disappointing. And I notice that this weekend the
Israeli Cabinet rejected an Egyptian proposal that has not even yet
been made. It's not in final form, I understand. It certainly has not
been presented to us to present to the Israelis. It's already been rejected.
Our commitment to pursuing a comprehensive and effective
peace agreement in the Middle East is constant and very dedicated. We
will not back off on this. After we receive the Egyptian proposal when
it's put in final form, we will be sure to relay it to the Israelis,
as the Egyptians will request, and then both proposals, the Israeli
proposal, the Egyptian proposal, will be on the table.
At that time it might be appropriate, if the Israelis
and Egyptians agree, for a meeting between their Foreign Ministers,
perhaps, and our own Secretary of State. I would hope that at that point
we could make real progress toward searching out the common ground on
which they might stand and alleviating the differences that still remain.
But I can't predict the rate of progress. It obviously will require
good faith and some flexibility on both sides.
JUNE 30, 1978
THE MIDDLE EAST
Q. Going back to the Middle East, Mr. President, for
a second, I know we're most anxious not to even suggest an American
solution, but what do you think the prospects are over time that those
parties can somehow work out something that we can stay well clear of,
except to endorse?
THE PRESIDENT. Well, let me first say that I'm convinced
that Prime Minister Begin and President Sadat genuinely want peace.
I don't think there's any doubt about it. Ever since Israel became a
nation, it's never had 1 day free of war or the threat of war, and this
is a terrible burden for a people to bear. Sadat also sees a continuing
economic and political military problem for his own nation if the threat
of war is there. So, that's the foundation for my belief that peace
is possible.
As I said in my news conference, we've been disappointed
in the last few days at the response of the Israeli Government to the
questions that we asked them. And I believe that to the extent possible,
it's better to let the negotiations be directly between Israel and her
individual neighbors.
We have not been able so far to get Begin and Sadat
to continue their discussions. There have been some periodic discussions
at the Foreign Minister level and the Defense Minister level.
I believe the next step in the process, probably following
the Vice President's visit, will be the promulgation, or at least the
delivery to Israel of the Egyptian peace proposal. I don't know what's
in it. I don't have any way to know yet. It's still in the formative
stage, but I think it won't be delayed. We will receive that from Egypt,
I understand, and then we will deliver it to the Israelis. Whether it's
made public will be up to the Israel and Egypt Governments' desires.
My guess is that it'll be a step in the right direction
but inadequate,* in which case my own inclination would be to try to
bring those two nations together, at least at the Foreign Minister level,
to search out the compatibility and the incompatibility of the two proposals.
We may or may not participate in that conference. If called upon to
do so by both governments, we would.
* By this term, the President wishes to make it clear
that he means that the entire Egyptian proposal is unlikely to be totally
acceptable to the Israeli Government. [Printed in the transcript.]
Following that, I think that my responsibility would
be to analyze those differences and compatibilities and see if we can
put forward, as we have for years, some compromise proposals which the
two governments would then consider.
If all of this should ultimately fail, then, of course,
the United Nations has a role to play in the Middle East and has for
a long time. And as you know, the Geneva conference is the basic framework
for peace as a result of the United Nations resolution, and that's always
a fallback position if we fail as an intermediary or a mediator.
So, I can't give you a prediction of success, but I'm
determined, as long as I'm in the White House as President, not ever
to give up the hope of realizing the desire of the people involved in
the Middle East.
SEPTEMBER 23, 1978
ISRAELI OCCUPIED TERRITORIES
Q. Good afternoon, Mr. President. My name is James
Hawkins. I'm from New Sewickley Township here in Beaver County. I wish
to welcome you here to western Pennsylvania.
There are approximately 100,000 orthodox Christians
here in the Pittsburgh area, Mr. President. Many of us have been very
concerned with the treatment which our brothers and sisters, the orthodox
Christians in occupied Palestine, have received for the last 30 years
at the hands of the Zionist invaders, who have stolen the land and evicted
them from their homeland.
We want to know why your administration has not had
the courage to stand up to Menahem Begin and to the American Jewish
community by simply cutting off all foreign aid to the Israelis until
they give back all territories stolen from the orthodox Christians and
others in occupied Palestine?
THE PRESIDENT. I thank you for your very objective
and unbiased question. And I'll try to answer it as best I can. [Laughter]
I don't think that in addressing this particular problem
of the Palestinians, nor in addressing all the broader interests in
the Mideast, that my administration or I have been timid or cowardly.
We have raised, as you know, for the first time in any administration,
the basic problems of the Palestinians who live in the region as you
described, without regard to the religious affiliation of the people
involved.
Palestinian Jews, Arabs, and Christians in my opinion
should have a maximum opportunity for a change, to escape the military
occupation rule and to have their own government within which they can
manage their own affairs, religious affairs and affairs concerning education,
police, highways, and the normal administration of their lives.
One of the remarkable results of Camp David is that
everything that I have just described to you has been accomplished.
And the Israelis, under their spokesman, Prime Minister Begin, have
agreed to this. As soon as the negotiations can be completed, hopefully
within just 2 or 3 months, there will be a self-government set up in
the Palestinian area with full autonomy. The Israeli military government
will be withdrawn for the first time in many years, and the people will
have a chance to administer their own affairs, including the right to
worship.
I believe that you would agree that this is a major
step forward, the first time it has been accomplished.
Now, of course, the fact remains that many issues still
remain to be resolved. And in the absence of a willingness of the Palestinians
themselves to negotiate further and in the absence of a willingness,
for instance, for King Hussein to negotiate further—because some
of these disputes involve Jordan; many of the inhabitants of the West
Bank, for instance, are Jordanian citizens—the progress we can
make will be limited.
But President Sadat has committed himself to me in
writing, a letter released yesterday, that in the absence of cooperation
or participation by, for instance, King Hussein, he himself will continue
the negotiations, not just on the Sinai relating to Egypt-Israel but
also will continue the negotiations concerning the West Bank and Gaza
Strip area.
We've addressed as best we could, also, the problems
of the refugees and also the displaced persons who left that area as
a result of different events that have occurred in the last 30 years.
So, I believe we are making great strides toward realizing
the hopes that you have just outlined, to terminate military rule and
to give people a chance to worship as they please. And I'm proud to
report that to you and believe that we can do even more in the future
when all the negotiating parties are willing to sit down and take advantage
of the wonderful door that has now been opened because of the Camp David
agreement.
PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION
Q. Hello, Mr. President. My name is Dan Chamvitz, and
I live in Hopewell Township.
My sister happens to live in Israel. The PLO has set
off bombs within 100-yards of where she works and where she lives. So,
I would like to know how the United States could let the PLO, an organization
which has openly killed hundreds of people, open an office and .distribute
propaganda in Washington, D.C.?
THE PRESIDENT. We have in our country a constitutional
right to freedom of speech, one of the deepest commitments of the American
people. There are a lot of organizations in our country which are obnoxious
to some of us, what they stand for, what they believe in. And it's a
difficult thing for a public official not to use this kind of issue
to demagog and to stamp out an unpopular group, no matter how small
it might be.
There is obviously no threat to our Nation's security.
There is obviously no threat to the well-being of people who live in
Israel if the PLO has this small information office. My own guess is
that they will learn more about our country by being here and what we
stand for than we'll learn from them.
There are many groups like this that cause us concern.
The Ku Klux Klan, for instance, the Communist Party, the Nazis—you
know, it would be nice for us if they would just go away. But it's part
of our system of government to let them have a fight to speak. And I
believe that as long as the American people are educated and knowledgeable
about the threat of these organizations, that that's the best way to
stamp them out.
I might add one other thing: I have a commitment to
the people of Israel not to negotiate with nor to have private meetings
with the PLO until after that organization recognizes Israel's fight
to exist and espouses United Nations Resolution 242, with which I know
you are thoroughly familiar. So, I think we're making good progress
in the Mideast.
You need not fear the little office in Washington.
I believe we can handle the PLO, not by stamping them out, but by the
American people.
SEPTEMBER 28, 1978
CAMP DAVID AGREEMENTS
The first is by the Israeli Knesset, their parliament,
late last night, when they voted overwhelmingly by more than a 4-to-1
margin for peace in the Middle East, including the removal of the Israeli
settlers from the Sinai, which is Egyptian territory.
This is a continuation of the courageous action that
has already been demonstrated by Prime Minister Begin, who led the parliament
debate, gave his full weight to this peace move, and by President Sadat
who cooperated at Camp David in making it possible.
Since the Knesset vote, I have talked to Prime Minister
Begin; also, just a few minutes ago, since lunch, to President Sadat.
Both of them agree that there are no remaining obstacles to proceeding
as rapidly as possible to conclude a peace treaty between Israel and
Egypt.
I'm very proud of this action on their part. We will
cooperate again as full partners in the negotiations to conclude the
final terms of the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty.
ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS; PRESIDENTIAL TRIP TO MIDDLE EAST
Q. Mr. President, what will you do to make Prime Minister
Begin comply with your understanding that Israel must eventually withdraw
from the West Bank and, further, to build no settlements there during
the 5 years of negotiation? And will you consider a Christmas trip.
to the Middle East for the signing of the peace treaty?
THE PRESIDENT. There's nothing that I can make Prime
Minister Begin do. He's an independent leader of an autonomous and independent
nation, and I can only use persuasion and depend upon the mutual trust
that exists between me and him.
There were 20 or 30 very crucial issues that were obstacles
at the beginning of the Camp David negotiations. This was one of them.
And I would guess that it was after midnight Saturday, less than 24
hours after the final agreement was signed, that we reached these agreements.
There are two elements of the dispute. One is at what
time will the agreement not to build any more settlements be concluded.
Prime Minister Begin's interpretation is that this is to be maintained,
the prohibition against new settlements, during the negotiations concerning
the Sinai with Egypt. My very clear understanding is that it related
to the negotiation for conclusion in the West Bank, Gaza Strip, of the
establishment of a self-government.
The other question concerns whether or not Israel would
initiate new settlements after this negotiating period was concluded
and the self-government was established. I think the best answer to
that is that this is an honest difference of opinion.
The best answer I can give is to quote from a statement
by Foreign Minister Dayan, who was with us at that midnight meeting,
and this is a statement he made at the Ben Gurion Airport on the 19th
of September, when he arrived in Israel. "Let us not delude ourselves"-I'm
quoting him—"I have no doubt that when we enter into deliberations
with the other three parties concerning what is to happen in the area
in the 5 years of transition"—that's the West Bank, Gaza
Strip—"this question will come up and will be discussed and
agreement will have to be reached on this subject."
So, the degree of participation of the residents of
the West Bank has still got to be determined. But it's an honest difference
of opinion. It would certainly be no obstacle to the progress towards
peace.
But I can't say that we've resolved it yet. There's
no personal animosity between myself and Prime Minister Begin. I certainly
do not allege any improper action on his part. It's just an honest difference
of opinion, which I think will be resolved.
AIRBASES IN THE NEGEV
Q. May I follow up? If Prime Minister Begin persists,
would you consider cancelling the U.S. agreement to build airbases in
the Negev for Israel?
THE PRESIDENT. No. The letter to Israel concerning
the two airports to be put in the Negev—I have already directed
that that letter be sent to Israel. It's not being sent from me to Prime
Minister Begin; it's being sent from Defense Secretary Harold Brown
to Defense Minister Weizman.
We have not agreed to build the airbases. We've agreed
to consult with the Israelis and participate in the cost of those rebuilt
airbases, to the degree that we negotiate in the future. We will certainly
participate in the cost, the degree to be determined in the future.
EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI PEACE NEGOTIATIONS
Q. Mr. President, you said in your opening statement
that both President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin said there are no
remaining obstacles to concluding the Sinai treaty. Have they set a
date yet for starting these talks? And how long would you estimate that
it would take to go through the formalities that still remain?
THE PRESIDENT. I would hope that we could commence
the talks within 2 weeks, but no specific date has been set. Both Prime
Minister Begin and President Sadat today, when I talked to them on the
phone, on their own initiative said that they were expecting us to be
full partners, as I was at Camp David, and they could see no obstacle
to the peace talks beginning without delay.
I think it will take 2 weeks to prepare for the talks.
There are some official responsibilities that President Sadat has in
his own country that will take place and be concluded within 2 weeks.
But that would be the approximate time frame. I'm not trying to be presumptuous,
because no date has been set.
Q. If I could follow that up, Prime Minister Begin
is supposed to be sending a letter dealing with the Israeli position
on the West Bank. Has that letter been received yet? And would any delay
on that letter perhaps hold up these talks on the Sinai?
THE PRESIDENT. Prime Minister Begin has sent me a letter
expressing his position, and I've also sent him a letter expressing
my position. Now I think the next step would be for me and him, in good
faith and in a friendly, cooperative attitude, to try to work out the
differences between us.
Q. Will you make those letters available?
THE PRESIDENT. I'll think it over. I can't answer because
I would really—it suits me okay for the letters to be made available,
but I can't unilaterally release the letter that I sent to him or received
from him without his approval.
My own inclination is to let all the correspondence
be made public that relates to the Mideast settlements. We've done that
so far, even when we had differences of opinion. But I would have to
get his permission before we could release the letters.
Q. Mr. President, can you tell us a little more, sir,
about the nature of your participation in this next round of talks?
You mentioned full partnership. Will you be personally involved with
that, or will Secretary Vance be?
THE PRESIDENT. I would guess that I would not be personally
involved, except in a case where the leaders of the other two nations
were involved. If there was a dispute about a particular drawing of
a line, or a phased withdrawal, or something of that kind that could
not be resolved at the Foreign Minister or delegate level, then I would
get involved if necessary.
I wouldn't want to see the talks break down because
of any timidity on my part. I consider it to be one of the most important
responsibilities that I have. I would guess, though, that the negotiations
will be carried on at a fairly high level, below the President and Prime
Minister level.
I understand from Prime Minister Begin that the leader
of his delegation will be Foreign Minister Dayan. I don't know yet who
will head the Egyptian delegation, and I've not yet decided on the American
delegation leader. But it'll be at a fairly high level.
And the principles for settling the Sinai disagreements
have all been resolved. Now the details, which I don't think are going
to be highly controversial, are the only things remaining to be resolved.
The exact decision of whether a particular road intersection or a hilltop
would be at the first withdrawal line, those are the kind of things
that would be settled. And I believe we have a good relationship between
the two leaders that wouldn't cause a deterioration in the negotiations.
FRANK CORMIER [Associated Press]. Thank you, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT. Thank you very much. I enjoyed it.
OCTOBER 10, 1978
EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI PEACE NEGOTIATIONS; ISRAELI OCCUPIED
LANDS
Q. Mr. President, are the separate peace talks that
open on Thursday between Israel and Egypt linked in any way to negotiations
on other Arab lands under Israeli occupation? And have you ever answered
King Hussein's questions concerning the clarification on the sovereignty
issues?
THE PRESIDENT. The two discussions on the Sinai, which
relates to Egypt and Israel only, on the one hand, and the West Bank,
Gaza Strip discussions on the other are not legally interconnected.
But I think throughout the Camp David talks and in the minds of myself,
Prime Minister Begin, and President Sadat, they are interrelated. We
have been trying to induce the Jordanians, and to some lesser degree,
so far, the Palestinians who live on the West Bank, Gaza Strip area
to participate in the talks.
We hope that they will both participate, along with
the Egyptians and the Israelis. There's no doubt in my mind that while
the negotiating teams are in Washington, we will discuss both the Sinai
questions leading to an Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty and also the questions
concerning the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
I have not yet responded to the questions that King
Hussein sent to me. I saw him on one of the television programs reading
the questions. They're in the process of being assessed by the State
Department, and I presume when they get to me—
Q. They were given to you privately, were they not?
THE PRESIDENT. No, they were not. I've not yet received
them personally. But I do know basically what's in them. It's important
that this be done expeditiously, and I will not delay it, but it'll
be several days.
EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI PEACE NEGOTIATIONS
Q. Mr. President, to follow up Helen's [Helen Thomas,
United Press International] opening question on the Middle East, you
said there was no doubt that the subject of the West Bank would come
up in the talks as well as that of Sinai. One of the Egyptian delegates
has indicated that the Egyptians might be unwilling to sign a peace
treaty without evidence of Israeli flexibility on the future question
of settlements on the West Bank. Have the Israelis given any indication
yet—for example, have they yet responded in this question of the
exchange of letters and come around to the U.S. position on the future
settlements in the West Bank?
THE PRESIDENT. I don't believe that your opinion accurately
expresses what President Sadat has told me. I don't think he would let
any single element of the West Bank, Gaza Strip settlement prevent a
conclusion of a treaty between Egypt and Israel.
And I think the Israelis have been very forthcoming,
in my experience with them at Camp David over long days of negotiation,
concerning the West Bank and Gaza Strip. I think they're acting in good
faith to set up an autonomous governing entity in the West Bank, Gaza
Strip, to withdraw their military government very expeditiously. And
I think the settlements issue still remains open, but it's subject to
a negotiation.
And last time I had a press conference, I read the
statement that Foreign Minister Dayan made in Israel—which I think
is adequate—combined with a cessation of settlement activity altogether,
between now and the time the self-government is set up.
The role of our Government—our position has always
been that the settlements in occupied territory are illegal and are
an obstacle to peace. I've not changed my opinion. But to summarize,
I don't believe that this one issue, if unresolved expeditiously, would
prevent the peace treaty between Israel and Egypt.
OCTOBER 13, 1978
ARAB RESPONSE TO CAMP DAVID AGREEMENTS
Q. I'm with the Baltimore Jewish Times, and I was wondering
how you felt about Saudi Arabia's lack of cooperation in the peace talks,
especially in light of the arms sales and the leverage you should have
gained through them.
THE PRESIDENT. I have not been disappointed with the
Saudi Arabians' response to the peace talks. We obviously would like
for everyone in the world to endorse the Camp David agreements without
any caveats at all. But none of the Saudi Arabian leaders, nor has King
Hussein, condemned the talks or rejected them or closed the door for
future support and encouragement.
There are three elements that any Arab leader cannot,
in good conscience, endorse or avoid. One is the matter of sovereignty
over the West Bank, Gaza Strip. And of course, when I say "Arab
leaders," I'm including President Sadat. The other one is the question
of eastern Jerusalem and the control of the Moslem holy places by Moslems.
And the third one is the resolution of the Palestinian question.
We always use the phrase "in all its aspects."
And I think that this concern by the Saudis has been expressed in very
moderate terms. They have been complimentary about the progress that
might evolve from the Camp David talks, and I have not detected any
attitude on their part, even surreptitiously, to influence others to
condemn the talks or to work against them.
I have just completed today my own response to King
Hussein's questions. And after my response has gone through the State
Department and NSC, just so they can see what I've decided, that response
will be submitted to King Hussein. And I would guess that a copy of
my answers to his questions would go to the Saudi Arabians. But we've
not given up hope in getting further participation.
I might add one other thing, that is, that a conclusion
of an Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, I think, will remove a lot of the
opposition to the Camp David agreements that is presently predicated
on preventing such a peace treaty. I think there's a lot of posturing
going on by people who do not want to see a treaty between Israel and
Egypt. Once that treaty is concluded, I hope that some of the opposition
might dissipate. That's just a hope; I can't predict it yet.
NOVEMBER 9, 1978
THE MIDDLE EAST
Q. Mr. President, question on the Middle East. Do you
agree with President Sadat's view that the two agreements, the one on
the West Bank and the agreement now being negotiated for peace between
Israel and Egypt, have to be linked in some way?
THE PRESIDENT. Well, there's never been any doubt in
my mind, nor President Sadat's, nor Prime Minister Begin's, that one
of the premises for the Camp David negotiations was a comprehensive
peace settlement that includes not just an isolated peace treaty between
Israel and Egypt but includes a continuation of a solution for the West
Bank, Gaza Strip, and ultimately for the Golan Heights as well. There
is some difference of opinion between the two leaders about how specifically
it should be expressed in the Sinai treaty.
I personally favor the presently negotiated language,
which in the preamble does say that both nations commit themselves to
carry out the comprehensive peace agreement as was agreed at Camp David.
This is a matter for negotiation between the two leaders.
I have heard President (Prime Minister) 1 Begin say
in my presence that he did not desire a separate peace treaty with Egypt.
And, of course, this is also the opinion and strongly felt view of President
Sadat.
We've been negotiating on the Mideast peace agreement
for months. I have personally put hundreds of hours into it. We have
reached, on more than one occasion so far, agreement on the text between
the negotiators themselves. When they refer the text back to the leaders
at home in Egypt and Israel, sometimes the work that has been done is
partially undone. But I think that the present language as approved
by the negotiators is adequate, and our presumption is to adhere to
that language as our preference. But I would like to point out that
we are not trying to impose our will on the leaders themselves or on
those nations, and we hope that they will rapidly reach a conclusion.
There's no doubt in my mind that this kind of difference
in language and how a linkage is actually expressed is a matter for
negotiation. It does not violate the commitments made at Camp David,
no matter what the decision might be as reached jointly by Egypt and
Israel.
NOVEMBER 13, 1978
EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI NEGOTIATIONS
MR. MOVERS. What about the Middle East, Mr. President?
THE PRESIDENT. I have put hundreds of hours in both
preparation and direct negotiation with the leaders in the Middle East,
particularly Egypt and Israel. And Secretary Vance, even to the extent
of abandoning some of his other responsibilities in foreign affairs,
has tried to bring about a successful conclusion of the peace treaty
negotiations. There, again, we don't have any authority over anyone
else. We can't use pressure to make the Israelis and Egyptians come
to a peaceful settlement of the disputes that have divided them.
The Camp David framework, which was almost miraculous
in its conclusion-it seems more miraculous in retrospect than it did
at the time—is a sound basis for peace between Egypt and Israel.
There's no doubt that both nations would be highly benefited by peace.
MR. MOYERS. But yet the talks seem to be at an impasse
as of tonight.
THE PRESIDENT. The present disagreements, compared
to the benefits to be derived, are relatively insignificant. The benefits
are so overwhelming, in comparison with the differences, that I hope
that the Egyptians and Israelis will move toward peace.
MR. MOYERS. What's holding it up tonight?
THE PRESIDENT. At Camp David it was a framework, it
was an outline that had a lot of substance to it, but it required negotiation
of details and specifics. And there is no way that you could have a
peace treaty with all of the ends tied down and all of the detailed
agreements reached, the map drawn, the lines delineated, time schedules
agreed, without going far beyond what the Camp David outline required.
And so, both sides have demanded from the others additional
assurances far above and beyond what Camp David said specifically. This
is inherent in the process. And I think in some cases, in many cases,
the two governments have reached agreement fairly well.
Now I don't know what's going to happen. We hope that
they will continue to work in reaching agreement, to understand one
another, to balance the consequences of failure against the benefits
to be derived from the success, and be flexible on both sides.
These are ancient arguments, historical distrust not
easy to overcome. And the frustrating part about it is that we are involved
in the negotiations, but we can't make Israel accept the Egyptians'
demands, nor vice versa. We have to try to tone down those demands and
use our influence. I don't know what will happen about it. We just pray
that agreements will be reached.
MR. MOYERS. Are you asking both sides to make further
concessions?
THE PRESIDENT. Oh, yes—every day and night. We
ask both sides to please be constructive, to please not freeze your
position, to please to continue to negotiate, to please yield on this
proposal, to adopt this compromise. These have been and are our efforts
on a constant basis.
It would be horrible, I think, if we failed to reach
a peaceful agreement between Israel and Egypt—
MR. MOYERS. What would happen?
THE PRESIDENT. and then see our children, our grandchildren,
future generations look back and say these little tiny technicalities,
phrases, phrasing of ideas, legalisms, which at that time seemed to
be paramount in the eyes of the Egyptian and the Israeli agreements,
have absolutely no historical significance. And that's basically what
the problems are.
MR. MOYERS. Are you saying that the impasse as of today
is because of technicalities and not major principles?
THE PRESIDENT. Yes, compared to the principles that
have already been resolved and the overall scope of things, the disagreements
now, relatively, are insignificant.
MR. MOYERS. Egypt wants to tie the present negotiations,
I understand, to some future resolution of the Gaza Strip and the West
Bank. Israel is resisting that. Who's being more stubborn?
THE PRESIDENT. Well, I wouldn't want to start saying
who's being more stubborn. I think there's adequate stubbornness to
be allotted to both sides.
MR. MOYERS. You mentioned grandchildren, and I heard
you say after Camp David that at one critical moment that was resolved
because of somebody thinking about grandchildren. Would you tell me
about that?
THE PRESIDENT. It might be a mistake to attach too
much importance to it, but during the last few hours of negotiations
at Camp David, when it looked like everything was going to break down
then, Prime Minister Begin sent me over some photographs of me and him
and President Sadat and wanted me to autograph them. And the issue at
that time was Jerusalem, which was an almost insurmountable obstacle
that we later resolved by not including it at all in the framework.
And instead of just putting my signature on it, which President Sadat
had done, I sent my secretary, Susan Clough, over and got the names
from one of his aides of all his grandchildren.
So, I personally autographed it to his granddaughters
and grandsons and signed my name, and I carried it over to him in one
of the most tense moments and I handed it to him. And he started to
talk to me about the breakdown of the negotiations and he looked down
and saw that I had written all of his grandchildren's names on the individual
pictures and signed them, and he started telling inc about his favorite
grandchild and the characteristics of different ones. And he and I had
quite an emotional discussion about the benefits to my two grandchildren
and to his if we could reach peace. And I think it broke the tension
that existed there, that could have been an obstacle to any sort of
resolution at that time.
MR. MOYERS. What does that say to you about the nature
of these problems and their resolution?
THE PRESIDENT. Well, you know, when you put the problems
in the focus of how they affect people, little children, families, the
loss of life, the agreements and the need for agreement becomes paramount.
When you put the focus in the bands of international lawyers and get
it down to technicalities—is a certain event going to take place
in 9 months or 8 1/2 months or 10 months; is this going to happen before
that; is this demarcation line going to go around this hill or through
the hill, on the other side of the hill; can the observation towers
be 150 feet high, 200 feet high, 125 feet high—the human dimension
of it becomes obviously paramount. But when the negotiators sit around
a table and start talking, the human dimension tends to fade away, and
you get bogged down in the legalisms and the language and the exact
time schedule, when from a historic perspective they have no significance.
Another problem has been—and this has been one
of the most serious problems-at Camp David we didn't have daily press
briefings, and this was the agreement when we started here in Washington,
that neither side would make a direct statement to the press. As you
know, this has not been honored at all, and it's created enormous additional
and unnecessary problems for us.
MR. MOYERS. You mean leaks from both governments are
THE PRESIDENT. Not just leaks. I mean, almost every
day I see interviews in the national television of at least one of the
sides in the dispute.
And also at Camp David I was working directly with
the heads of state. Here we work with the negotiators, and the negotiators
then refer their decision back to the head of state or the cabinet.
The cabinet reverses themselves, reverses the negotiators on a language
change or one word, and in effect you get the most radical members of
the governments who have a major input into the negotiating process,
rather than having the heads of state there 100 yards away so that they
can resolve those issues once and for all.
So, I think the followup to Camp David has been much
more time-consuming and much more frustrating than it was when the three
of us were primarily leading the discussions.
NOVEMBER 16, 1978
EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI PEACE NEGOTIATIONS
Q. Mr. President, on the Middle East, sir, do you think
a time might come when another summit might be necessary to untangle
all the apparently serious problems that are cropping up?
THE PRESIDENT. I really hope not. And this is not something
that we are contemplating.
There are two serious problems that we have now that
we did not have at Camp David. One is the lack of authority, final authority,
granted to the negotiators. Three weeks ago—I think it was 3 weeks
ago, 3 1/2 weeks ago—I spent almost all weekend, including late
at night, early in the morning, meeting with the Egyptian and Israeli
negotiators. We arrived at an agreement on a treaty text. This text
was then submitted back to the national leaders and cabinets and others,
and was rejected because of what I consider to be minor differences.
They were important to the negotiating nations: And at Camp David, on
the contrary, I could walk 50 yards or in 2 minutes have a private conversation
in my own cabin with either Begin or Sadat; sometimes, if necessary,
both together.
That's been one of the most frustrating things. We've
had to negotiate a treaty or a settlement several times already; each
time someone has rejected the final conclusion.
I would say equally as serious, perhaps even more serious,
is that the negotiations have been conducted and are being conducted
through the news media. At Camp David, the imposition of a news embargo,
where no statements were made unless all three nations—ourselves
and the two negotiating nations—agreed, was a very constructive
thing. And I think even the press analysis has agreed with that in retrospect—even
at the time, even, perhaps. Now that's one of my most serious concerns.
When a text is presented to the Israelis, there is
a series of statements made by them that such and such a portion of
the text is unacceptable and that we will never change our position
on this. And then the same thing happens in a mirror image in Egypt,
where public demands are made by different voices there. And it hardens
positions, and it makes it almost impossible to present to both nations
an accomplished document which they have to either accept or reject
in its totality.
You can find in any piece of legislation the Congress
passes one paragraph or one phrase or one section to which I, as President,
would strenuously object. But still when I look at the totality of the
document, I quite often, most often, can sign it. And these two problems
are very, very serious.
I will be meeting in a few minutes, right after this
meeting, with the Vice President of Egypt. And I met early this week
with Defense Minister Weizman. We're trying now to find some resolution
of existing differences. But I don't have any intention at this point
of going to another summit meeting. And I hope and pray and expect that
it will not be necessary.
Q. Mr. President, to follow up on that, through these
long weeks and months of the negotiations where you had such a role
yourself, how can we expect that if there is agreement between Egypt
and Israel—if it was engineered so much by an outside party, yourself,
without a continuing commitment and initiative by the principals, how
can we expect that to stand?
THE PRESIDENT. Well, I want to make clear that we've
not imposed our will on the other leaders as reluctant negotiators.
Everything that has been agreed to at Camp David was not only accepted
but-I think you could see during the ceremonies here—accepted
with enthusiasm, even with celebration. There was, I think, a justified
euphoria there of appreciation to one another for having reached an
agreement.
It wasn't something that we demanded that the others
accept. We don't have any authority to do that and don't want any. We've
tried to serve as an avenue of communication and add our good will when
we can. This would continue in the future. I think the issues that were
established at Camp David and resolved are the basis for a 'historical
breakthrough. And to use King Hassan's language, "You can't make
the stream flow backwards." We've made progress that's irreversible,
in my opinion.
Now, the differences, compared to what was agreed,
are minor, but important, politically and symbolically. Neither side
completely trusts the other. This is based on ancient animosities, frequent
wars, losses that quite often bubble up to the surface when you are
in private talks with either leader. And I think that their mutual trust
of me and our country is an important ingredient. If the Egyptians distrust
the Israelis' commitment to move forward with self-government and autonomous
authority in the West Bank, Gaza, we say, "We trust the Israelis
to move, President Sadat. You and we together can use our influence
in the future to ensure compliance with the agreement." If the
Israelis distrust President Sadat's peaceful intentions, then I can
tell Prime Minister Begin, "To the extent that you trust us, you
and I will work together to alleviate your concerns about Sadat in the
future."
I think these kinds of problems can be partially alleviated
by our presence. But there's got to be some building of mutual trust
between the two.
It is disappointing to me. I anticipated after Camp
David that in just a few days the agreement could be reached. But those
ancient distrusts and disputes continually arise. And I think now, next
year, maybe years in the future, a moderating, constructive influence
by the United States might be necessary, as mutually requested by both
parties. I think both the Israelis and Egyptians see that without our
presence now, future progress will be much more difficult. Even with
our presence, progress is difficult.
Q. May I follow on that?
THE PRESIDENT. You can, yes.
Q. If we do get the agreement and dare look over the
horizon, how much do you think that will do to defuse the potential
for continued violence by other causes in the Middle East and continued
threats against American oil supplies? Would it be—take us a great
leap forward away from that?
THE PRESIDENT. Yes, I think it would be a tremendous
leap forward, even as it affects nations who presently are adamantly
opposed to the peace agreements between Egypt and Israel. Yes, it would
alleviate tension. It would help to let the moderate Arab countries,
ourselves, and Israel act in concert to engender peace, open ways for
economic development that still have not been adequately analyzed. I
think that is the key factor in having a stable and a prosperous Middle
East.
Q. Mr. President, when you outlined those problems,
I've never heard you speak of why you think that those problems have
developed. Is it in your view that these things are happening in spite
of the good intentions of both sides? Or is there a suggestion there
that maybe one side or the other or both have decided that maybe they
just can't go along with what was agreed to at Camp David-maybe that
Sadat thinks he can't get along with the rest of the Arab world on this,
or the Israelis think that somehow they could get a treaty with Egypt
and wind up keeping the land on the West Bank?
THE PRESIDENT. I think both sides are acting in good
faith. They obviously want to interpret the agreements as much as proper
to their own advantage. We have an inevitable problem in that Camp David,
even though it was quite substantive—the texts were quite substantive-had
to be embellished or elaborated with specific time schedules, exact
drawing of lines between Israel and Egypt, interim withdrawal terms,
the make-up of the Egyptian forces on the east bank of the Suez, the
time to commence negotiations on the establishment of self-government
in the Gaza Strip and West Bank. These kinds of things had to be negotiated
in the final peace treaty.
In a few cases it might be necessary to modify the
Camp David accords if both sides agree. If both sides don't agree, then
our adamant position will be the Camp David accords cannot be abrogated,
because this is just as solemn an agreement between those two nations
as a future peace treaty will be. And unless both sides agree to modify
the Camp David accords, we will insist that those accords be honored
meticulously.
In addition to that, though, the progress from Camp
David brings up hundreds of detailed decisions. We've put forward our
own compromise proposals and our own documents as the original bargaining
position. I spread out in my study upstairs, immediately above us, an
enormous map of the Sinai—it was probably 10 or 12 feet long and
6 or 8 feet wide—and personally approved the drawing of the interim
withdrawal lines and the final borders, even before the Israeli and
Egyptian negotiators came here. And that was put forward to the military
negotiators, who in effect have adopted what we proposed.
But I think that both sides are acting in good faith.
They have political pressures at home. President Sadat legitimately
wants to retain his good ties as a political and military leader of
the Arab world. The Israelis have to be sure that their security is
certain in years ahead. They want to retain an option of the final status
of the West Bank and Gaza. This is all included in the Camp David accords.
But I think that it would certainly be obvious that
both sides want peace, and I think that's the main hope that we have
in spite of these differences.
When you balance the enormous benefits with peace,
compared to the horrible consequences of failure, and then look at the
tiny differences that exist between them now—on wording and language,
linkage, schedules, hilltops, valleys, security outposts—these
things are really minuscule in comparison with the advantages of peace.
And their common desire for peace is the hope of all three of us, that
we'll be successful.
NOVEMBER 30, 1978
EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI PEACE NEGOTIATIONS
Q. Mr. President, where do we stand on a Middle East
accord between Egypt and Israel, and what can you or are you doing to
try to bring the two parties together?
THE PRESIDENT. Well, we are negotiating and communicating
with both the leaders of Israel and Egypt on a constant and sustained
basis. I have been dissatisfied and disappointed at the length of time
required to bring about a peace treaty that was signed by both Israel
and Egypt. I've already outlined in the past my assessment of why this
delay has taken place, as contrasted with Camp David. I'm not dealing
directly with the principals simultaneously, and a lot of the negotiation
has, unfortunately, been conducted through the press because of political
reasons, domestically speaking, or other reasons.
Although I'm somewhat discouraged, we are certainly
not going to give up on the effort. Tomorrow, I will be meeting with
the Prime Minister of Egypt, Mr. Khalil, who's coming, I understand,
with a personal message to me from President Sadat.
We have a need, obviously, to get a treaty text pinned
down and approved by both governments, and to resolve the very difficult
question of the so-called linkage, whether or not certain acts in the
West Bank, Gaza Strip have to be taking place at the same time the Sinai
agreement is consummated.
But regardless of temporary disappointments and setbacks
that we've experienced since Camp David, they are no more serious nor
of any greater concern than some that I experienced at Camp David. And
we will continue to pursue our efforts to bring about a peace treaty
there.
My reason for what optimism I keep is that I know for
certain that both President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin want a peace
treaty. I know that their people want a peace treaty. And I think as
long as this determination on their part is extant, that our own good
offices are very likely to be fruitful. So, I will continue the effort,
no matter how difficult it might be in the future.
DECEMBER 1, 1978
Q. Following up on the Middle East statement you made,
what is your personal reaction to President Sadat's statement that he
will not go to Oslo to accept the Nobel Peace Prize? Are you personally
disappointed by that, and what implications does that have to the peace
process?
THE PRESIDENT. I'm not surprised that President Sadat
will not go to Oslo. I think had the peace treaty been signed prior
to December 10, or whatever the date is, that he would have gone. He
will send a representative to receive the prize for him. But I don't
think it has any particular extra connotation, other than the obvious
one, that to receive the peace prize for bringing about a treaty between
Israel and Egypt, absent a conclusion of the treaty, he considers to
be inappropriate.
I don't think it has any far-reaching connotations
that further aggravate the already difficult situation.
Q. Do you think the two can maybe get together again
to resolve this?
THE PRESIDENT. That's always an ultimate possibility.
I think they both see that there must be some substantive prospect of
success before they get together again. We did not have that substantive
prospect of success when they met at Camp David. But I think it was
an absolutely hopeless case before we decided to go to Camp David. I
don't think it's in that degree of extremity now.
DECEMBER 7, 1978
EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI PEACE NEGOTIATIONS
Q. Mr. President, how important is it, do you feel,
for Israel to accept a definite target date—by the end of next
year, for example—for the transfer to Palestinian autonomy; how
important to accept a target date, as opposed to a more general commitment
that we will try to bring autonomy as soon as possible; how important
in terms of bringing Palestinians into the process, bringing King Hussein
of Jordan into the process? How critical do you feel is the issue of
persuading the Israelis to accept a definite target date for transfer
to autonomy?
THE PRESIDENT. I should make clear that the United
States does not have a unilateral position that we try to force or even
encourage the Egyptians and Israelis to adopt. Any mutually acceptable
agreement which could be concluded between the Egyptians and the Israelis
would be satisfactory to us.
My concern, however, is that we would like to see the
Camp David accords carried out, first of all, completely. I think any
violation of the Camp David accords would set a very serious precedent
which would cast doubt upon the present treaty which is being negotiated.
We would also like to see the Camp 1)avid accords carried
out, not grudgingly, but enthusiastically, in the same spirit that we
saw exemplified in the White House when the accords were signed. This
has not been the case during the negotiations. There have been unwarranted
delays, quibbling over what seems to us to be insignificant language
differences, and excessive public statements on both sides that have
made the negotiating process excessively difficult.
We have made a proposal to the Israelis and Egyptians
of a peace treaty text plus a separate letter which would endorse a
definite timetable on the establishment of the self-government in the
West Bank and Gaza Strip. The Israelis adopted the peace treaty text
after they had previously rejected some of its component parts, and
did not adopt the crucial and integral additional letter with few features
in it, the most significant being the timetable. The Egyptians consider
that the timetable is a mandatory element of a future Success.
I'd like to add one other thing: If the Egyptians and
Israelis violate the 3-month limit on negotiating this treaty, it will
be a very serious matter to us and, I think, to them. That's why I am
sending Cy Vance to Egypt, and perhaps then to Israel. If, because of
mutual lack of agreement, we go past December 17, it would cast doubt
on whether the Egyptians and Israelis would carry out the difficult
terms of the upcoming peace treaty, and it would set a precedent that
would have far-reaching, adverse effect.
So, we consider the December 17th date to be very,
very important, perhaps at this point more important than Prime Minister
Begin or President Sadat. I'm going to make that clear to both leaders
during Secretary Vance's trip.
But, to summarize by repeating my first statement,
we don't have an independent position. Any mutual agreement between
the two nations that leads to peace and a peace treaty would be satisfactory
to us
Q. May I just follow that up, sir?
THE PRESIDENT. Yes.
Q. Would you consider the establishment of four new
settlements on the West Bank to be a violation of the Camp David agreements?
THE PRESIDENT. Yes, I would.
My interpretation of the Camp David agreements—and,
as you know, Prime Minister Begin disagrees with this interpretation-is
that there was a moratorium on the establishment of new settlements
until the agreements had been reached on how to establish the autonomous
government in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. I had never connected in
my own mind or in my conversations with either leader the cessation
of settlement construction as it related to an Egyptian-Israeli peace
treaty concerning the Sinai. It was always connected in my mind and
in the original versions and text of the proposals to be connected with
the conclusion of discussions on how to establish the modalities and
procedures of establishing the elections, self-government in West Bank,
Gaza.
I might say I don't want that to be an obstacle to
the Egyptian and Israeli progress. But that's my own personal opinion,
and that's my recollection of what occurred at Camp David. It's the
only extant difference, and it's already been explored in the press.
DECEMBER 12, 1978
EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI PEACE NEGOTIATIONS
Q. Mr. President, the other day you took a very serious
view of Israel and Egypt going past the 17th of this month without concluding
a treaty—that's the date they themselves set for it. Now, with
5 days left, what's your belief, or hunch, as to whether they'll meet
that deadline? And do you still think it's sort of a "now or never"
proposition?
THE PRESIDENT. I don't think it's now or never. And
you very accurately described this deadline date as one established
by Israel and Egypt in the most solemn commitment at Camp David.
Secretary Vance reports to me, from Cairo, good progress
having been between him and President Sadat. He has not begun further
negotiations with the Israelis yet because of Mrs. Meir's funeral.
He will return to Egypt, try to his discussions with
President Sadat, and then go back to Israel for discussions with the
Israelis.
I consider the deadline date to be quite important.
If the Egyptians and Israelis cannot keep a commitment on a 3-month
conclusion of a peace treaty when they themselves are the only two nations
involved, serving as a mediator in the process, then I think it would
be very difficult for them to expect the terms of the treaty they are
negotiating to be carried out with assurance. It sets a very bad precedent
for Israel and Egypt not to reach a conclusion.
I think the differences that presently divide Israel
and Egypt are minor, certainly compared to the resolution of major differences
in the past. And ! believe that President Sadat has reconfirmed his
intention, his commitment, to Secretary Vance to conclude the negotiations
without further delay. My hope is and my expectation is that the Israelis
will have the same attitude.
Q. Mr. President, to follow up the earlier question
on the Middle East, you said last week that if Prime Minister Begin
and President Sadat had been able to negotiate together on some of these
questions over the past few weeks, that there would not have been some
of the problems that have arisen. My question is, if all else fails,
would you consider calling the two leaders back to Camp David or some
other place to negotiate directly with you to resolve this matter?
THE PRESIDENT. Well, let me say that I don't have any
present plans to do that. If all else failed and I felt that we could
get together again, I would not hesitate to do so. But I don't envision
that taking place.
DECEMBER 14, 1978
EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI PEACE NEGOTIATIONS
Mr. President, Mrs. Carter, may we turn our attention
to foreign policy and start with the Middle East, which continues to
be a situation that is unsettled.
It does not look now as if the December 17th deadline
is going to be met for the peace agreement between Israel and Egypt.
What now, Mr. President?
THE PRESIDENT. Well, I'm not giving up on the 17th
deadline.
Ms. WALTERS. Really?
THE PRESIDENT. The decision is primarily in the hands
now of the Israeli Cabinet. We have worked out with Sadat as approval
by him of the treaty text, and the remaining issues involved how rapidly
and under what circumstances the provisions of the Camp David accords
shall be implemented.
One of the major issues is whether or not a goal should
be set, not a fixed, definite requirement that the West Bank, Gaza self-government
should be established by the end of 1979. I personally don't see how
this could be difficult for the Israelis, since it's not mandatory,
but just a goal to be sought. But the decision now is primarily in the
hands of the Israelis. Secretary Vance has had thorough discussions
with both Sadat and Begin and their other government officials. We don't
know what will happen.
I consider the December 17th date to be quite significant.
But if we don't succeed in getting an agreement by then-it's certainly
a strong possibility—then we will continue tenaciously to pursue
the peace prospects and to try to reach an agreement between Israel
and Egypt at a later date.
Ms. WALTERS. How? Summit, maybe? What?
THE PRESIDENT. That's always a possibility. But that
would not be my preference. I would certainly have no objection, and
would encourage at any time President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin
getting together themselves. But I think for them to plan on coming
over here anytime in the future would probably be a mistake, because
I've got other pressing international problems. And we've really put
an extraordinary amount of time and effort in the Mideast, and I just
cannot neglect other problems in order to accomplish this goal.
Ms. WALTERS. We've said that Secretary Vance was coming
back to put pressure on the Israelis. Other reports said no, it was
urgent business. What's the urgent business, if that's it?
THE PRESIDENT. We have got a broad range of things
that are now coming to a head. We've got problems between Chile and
Argentina concerning territory down there that could erupt into a conflict.
We're trying to reach a conclusion on the Nicaraguan question.
I think that the SALT negotiations are coming to a
head. Cy will be going to Europe to meet with Gromyko, on the 21st of
December, perhaps to plan for a summit meeting between myself and President
Brezhnev earlier next year. And there are just such a broad gamut of
things that I need Secretary Vance back here. And he and I agreed in
a telephone conversation that his work in the Mideast was primarily
completed.
The proposition that has been worked out with Egypt
is presented clearly to the Israelis. And now it's up to the Israelis
to either accept it or reject it.
Ms. WALTERS. You talked of President Sadat being generous
in accepting some of the proposals. You didn't mention Prime Minister
Begin. This was last night that you said this. Do you consider Mr. Begin
to be intransigent?
THE PRESIDENT. Well, we don't know what the Israeli
response will be.
Ms. WALTERS. I spoke with Israel this morning, with
some key members in Foreign Minister Dayan's office, with his spokesman.
And without going through each detail, what they are saying is that
they were willing to sign the original agreement, but that President
Sadat is now adding new conditions which they consider open up and change
the treaty. And, particularly, they object to the fact that the Egyptians
are not going to agree to normalization of relations and exchange of
ambassadors until 1 year after Palestinian autonomy. And they say that
this is not what was originally agreed to, all these new conditions.
THE PRESIDENT. That's not accurate. The way I understand
the recent negotiations, at the time the Israelis complete the interim
withdrawal, diplomatic relations would be established between Egypt
and Israel. The embargo against Israel would be removed, and then when
the self-government is established-within a month, not a year—ambassadors
themselves would be exchanged.
The original proposal was that Israel would withdraw
from El'Arish and from the central part of the Sinai in the interim
withdrawal, much earlier than the Camp David accords required, in 2
months and 4 months. Based on that commitment by Israel negotiators,
Sadat said he would exchange ambassadors at that time, a month later.
Later Israel's Cabinet withdrew their proposal and therefore relieved
President Sadat of the obligation to exchange ambassadors early.
But I think that that's a reasonable schedule. Diplomatic
relations would be established with Israel immediately, as soon as they
made their first interim withdrawal. It's only the exchange of ambassadors
themselves that would be delayed.
Ms. WALTERS. Mr. President, if the Middle East talks
fail and if you feel that Israel is not forthcoming, might there be
a reassessment of the United States policy in Israel?
THE PRESIDENT. No. Our policy with Israel is—and
with the Middle East—is that the security of Israel is paramount;
the continued existence of Israel, their ability to protect themselves
adequately, and the ability of the Israeli people to live in peace is
paramount above anything else that relates to the Mideast.
Ms. WALTERS. In that regard, Israel was reported to
be very upset when hearing that Senate Majority Leader Byrd had said
that if Israel builds future settlements, the Senate may not increase
its foreign aid to Israel. The Israelis said that Senator Byrd came
to Israel recently, describing himself as your emissary. And one wonders
if the Senator's statement reflects your point of view.
THE PRESIDENT. [Laughing] I have never attempted to
control Senator Byrd's statements. And I think Senator Byrd speaks from
the perspective of the Congress and as the Democratic leader of the
Senate.
We have always, so far as I know, adopted as an official
American position, with which I agree, that the settlements in the occupied
territories are illegal and that they are a genuine obstacle to peace.
And whenever the Israelis publicize with varied voices that there will
be $35 million spent on new settlements or a billion dollars spent on
new settlements or another new settlement's going to be created, it
really puts a dampener on cooperation from the Jordanians, from the
Palestinians who live in the West Bank, and even from the Egyptians
in carrying out the spirit of Camp David.
I know it's a very sensitive issue with Israel. I'm
not saying this in a critical way, but I can say with assurance that
the Majority Leader was speaking for himself.
Ms. WALTERS. That does not represent your viewpoint?
THE PRESIDENT. Not necessarily. The attitude of the
Congress is, I think, not something that I ought to comment upon. I
can't say whether I agree or disagree that the majority leader speaks
accurately for the Congress.
Ms. WALTERS. What now, Mr. President? Do you plan perhaps
to call or have you already telephoned either Prime Minister Begin or
President Sadat? Tomorrow there's a Cabinet meeting. What's going to
happen maybe to get something either by this Sunday or soon after?
THE PRESIDENT. Well, it's hard for me to answer that
question. I've not received any report from Secretary Vance, except
very brief dispatch messages. And he will be back in the United States
tomorrow afternoon. Of course, as soon as he returns, he'll come and
give me a thorough report. But we've done all we could and will continue
to do all we can in spite of setbacks and disappointments and frustrations
and delays.
We are very deeply committed to carrying out both the
letter and the spirit of Camp David. It was a major step forward. We
will never give up, no matter how difficult the circumstances, on searching
for a peace treaty between Israel and Egypt, to be followed by peace
between Israel and all her neighbors.
Sources: Public Papers of the President |