News Conferences & Interviews on the Middle East/Israel
(1979)
FEBRUARY 9, 1979
EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI PEACE NEGOTIATIONS
Q. Mr. President, a policy question with regard to
the upcoming Middle East talks, if I may. On the one hand, it's argued
that a separate Israel-Egyptian peace would generate irresistible psychological
momentum for a broader, comprehensive settlement, and such that explicit
linkage would not be required. The other hand, pragmatists say that
a separate peace would so tip the political and military balance in
Israel's favor that there would be very little likelihood of progress
in the future toward a comprehensive peace.
Which of these approaches would you press upon Israel
and Egypt when they come here?
THE PRESIDENT. The United States does not have a position
to put forward on a peace treaty. There's not a word or a phrase or
a sentence or a paragraph that I want to see put in a peace treaty between
Israel and Egypt. What we do is to encourage Israel and Egypt to put
forward their ideas.
In 95 percent of the total cases, they have now reached
agreement. In those remaining 5, we add our good offices to propose
to them, when a deadlock exists between Israel and Egypt, alternative
wording and substance, hoping that they'll accept some of our proposals.
If they don't, we go back to the drafting board.
But at Camp David, there was evolved a description
of a comprehensive peace settlement for Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon,
Syria, and the Palestinians who live on the West Bank and Gaza. That
was one document. The other document outlined the basic principles of
a peace treaty between Israel and Egypt unilaterally. But the Israel
and Egypt treaty terms were also mentioned very clearly within the comprehensive
settlement outline.
I think that the commitment of both Begin and Sadat
was to a comprehensive peace settlement. And I've heard Prime Minister
Begin say several times to President Sadat in my presence, when only
the three of us were there, "I am not looking for a separate peace
treaty with Egypt."
The way the negotiations have evolved, with the Palestinians
and the Jordanians unwilling to participate, this has of necessity led
to the bilateral discussions between Israel and Egypt. Egypt is very
insistent that Israel comply with the agreement at Camp David that a
comprehensive peace settlement be sought, and Israel, on the other hand,
is very insistent that the peace treaty that's being evolved between
Israel and Egypt not be abrogated because of factors beyond their control—for
instance, the refusal of the Palestinians to participate in future negotiations.
So, I think that's where the basic deadlock exists.
I, therefore, am very deeply committed to carrying out, if I can, the
principles of the Camp David accords, which encompass a comprehensive
settlement.
FEBRUARY 12, 1979
EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI PEACE NEGOTIATIONS
Q. Mr. President, do you anticipate that at some point
in time you're going to have to call a three-way meeting between yourself,
President Sadat, and Prime Minister Begin to get this Middle East peace
process locked up and that that might be a natural outcome of the Foreign
Ministers' meeting that's coming up?
THE PRESIDENT. I would say that the reality of having
a Mideast peace settlement is one of my fondest hopes and dreams and
my greatest commitment. I have probably spent more of my personal time
on trying to have peace in the Middle East than any other single issue.
We made tremendous strides forward at Camp David, as
you know, and we expected at that time to rapidly conclude the remaining
5 percent of the issues that had not then been resolved. That has not
proven to be as easy as we thought. I think an inevitable next step
is to have the Foreign Ministers of Israel and Egypt come here to meet
with Secretary Vance—I might visit with them briefly-in an attitude
of mutual commitment and flexibility and in a maximum state of isolation
from public statements or commitments, which quite often form a very
serious obstacle to progress.
If that hope is realized, there would be no need for
any further summit conference. But I would guess that in this case that
Mr. Khalil and Dayan would go back to Egypt and to Israel to report
progress and to seek confirmation of their negotiated positions from
their own government leaders, including President Sadat and Prime Minister
Begin.
If that effort is not completely successful and the
final peace treaty terms are not concluded, then if there's adequate
evidence of flexibility and desire on the part of President Sadat and
Prime Minister Begin, then I would certainly consider favorably having
them here for a summit meeting.
But our hope is that the Foreign Ministers can be successful,
provided they take advantage of our recommendation and routinely go
back to Israel and to Egypt to seek further guidance during the negotiations
themselves.
FEBRUARY 22, 1979
THE MIDDLE EAST
Q. Mr. President, my name is Croskery, from Cincinnati.
I'd like to know what we're going to do to ensure the stability of small
oil-producing states in the Middle East during this time of instability
in that part of the world?
THE PRESIDENT. I've just sent Secretary of Defense
Brown into that region, as you know, to meet with the leaders of four
nations: Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt, and Israel. We have the top officials
of Oman here consulting this last few days with Secretary Vance. And
in the Emirates, in Bahrain, and other small countries we've assured
them that our influence, our power as a nation will be used to preserve
the basic security of that region free from any outside political or
military power.
We are trying to bring them together in a spirit of
peace and harmony and a recognition that their own national independence
ought to be preserved by them and also preserved by us.
As I said in my brief remarks earlier, I am consulting
with the Congress now, based on the reports that Harold Brown brought
back, about how we might increase to some degree our military assistance
efforts for those small countries that feel insecure, so that through
their own strength they might feel better able to withstand any internal
and outside disturbances that are unwarranted.
There are some nations that provide major stabilizing
efforts. Egypt is a strong, powerful nation in the Arab world; Israel's
strength is part of our own security. Iran, we hope and pray, in the
future will still be a factor for stability in their region—in
a different character, obviously, than it was under the Shah, but we
hope will be independent and determined to maintain kind of a rock of
stability in that region, impervious to outside influence and attack.
So, I'd say, working with individual nations, working
collectively to reduce tensions among them and making sure they have
adequate military capabilities and using our own influence to prevent
some major outside power from having an inordinate influence—those
are some of the things that we can do.
The last one, obviously, is to try to bring some peace
between Israel and her own neighbors. I think if the Arab world, in
a united way, working with us, perhaps with Israel in a peaceful pursuit,
could face any outside disturbance rather than to focus their animosity,
as it has been in the past, on Israel, it would certainly be a very
stabilizing factor.
We derive great benefit from free access to oil from
that region. Some of our allies and friends in Europe and Japan rely
much more heavily, and we are trying to get them to use their own influence
to parallel ours in maintaining the independence of individual nations
and the stability therein.
There are a few instances in that region where economic
aid, either through direct grants, which are fairly rare, or through
guaranteed loans on a multilateral basis or through international lending
institutions can also help. That's kind of a gamut of things that we
explore and use with varying degrees of priority and emphasis.
Q. Mr. President, Secretary of Defense Brown has just
returned from the Middle East, and it's reported that Egyptian President
Anwar Sadat, concerned about the role of the Palestinians in Iran, is
interested in becoming the region's policeman-which is how some newspapers
are describing it—in return for heavy infusions of U.S. weapons.
What's the likelihood for this?
And, also, Sadat has said that he would not use the
equipment in conflict with Israel, but how can we be sure that if he's
called upon by his Arab brothers to fight Israel that he wouldn't use
it?
THE PRESIDENT. I think Sadat has demonstrated in a
very dramatic way, and also a consistent way in the last few years,
his peaceful intentions toward Israel. His trip to Jerusalem, his participation,
successfully, in the Camp David negotiations, I think, is proof of his
good intentions toward having peaceful relations with Israel.
As you probably know, Israel* is a very powerful element
in the Arab world, economically; their population is very great; their
military strength is great, compared to many other countries. And I
think they can be a legitimate stabilizing force. They now have five
divisions or more on the eastern side of the Suez confronting Israel.
Part of the Camp David accords, part of the negotiated points that have
already been concluded on the Sinai agreement would call for the withdrawal
of these forces. They would perhaps never be used. But at least any
entity that threatened to attack another country in the Mideast would
be faced with the prospect that those Egyptian forces might very well
be used to preserve the peace. I'm not predicting that this would happen,
but the potential would be there for Egypt to help to protect relatively
defenseless other Arab countries or to preserve peace in the Mideast.
I don't want to try to comment on any nation being
a policeman for the region nor for the world. I think that's a very
serious mistake.
There obviously have been requests made by many nations
around the world for military or economic assistance that is in excess
of what our Nation could provide. That situation might apply to the
request that President Sadat has recently made. But he certainly wouldn't
be unique in that respect.
As you know, the two nations that receive the most
aid from our country at this time, and for many years in the past, has
been Israel and Egypt. And I think that the greatest single step we
could take to preserving stability and peace in the Mideast, although
it might be unpopular with some other Arab countries, would be a peace
treaty between Israel and Egypt. That's our top priority, and we'll
continue with that pursuit.
EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI PEACE NEGOTIATIONS
Q. Mr. President, many observers of the Middle Eastern
situation believe that the failure of Egypt and Israel to sign the Camp
David agreements as originally conceived this fall, and, in fact, the
subsequent delays in signing any agreement, are directly related to
the lack of pressure by the United States not on Israel and Egypt, but
on Jordan and Saudi Arabia to join the talks or at least to lend support
to the negotiating process. Would you please comment on this?
THE PRESIDENT. Well, I think in a spirit of complete
candor we have approached our limit on legitimate influence, perhaps
even pressure in a proper way, on the countries in that entire region
to support the Camp David accords and to participate in future discussions.
We have sent delegations to Jordan, to Saudi Arabia,
even this past week, to encourage their tacit or public or active support
of these accords. And I've used my own personal influence to a maximum
degree within the bounds of propriety in the same pursuit.
As you know, my own involvement in the Camp David negotiations
has been substantial. There is no other single item that has addressed
my attention as President, on which I've spent more time, more effort,
more study, more prayer, than to bring peace between Israel and her
neighbors. We believe the Camp David accords are a very firm and well-advised
foundation on which to predicate, first of all, an agreement between
Israel and Egypt, combined with a comprehensive settlement as part of
the same procedure that relates to Israel and her neighbors. And whatever
we can do—to use the word again—within the bounds of propriety,
recognizing the independence of other nations, we have done, are doing,
and will do to bring about peace between Israel and her neighbors.
FEBRUARY 27, 1979
EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI PEACE NEGOTIATIONS
THE PRESIDENT. In my 2 years as President, I've spent
more time and invested more of my own personal effort in the search
for peace in the Middle East than on any other international problem.
That investment of time and effort was and is appropriate because of
the great importance of peace in that region to our own country and
the vital importance of a peace agreement between Israel and Egypt to
those two countries.
Some progress was made in the talks at Camp David last
week, 4 1/2 days of talks. I do not share the opinion that the proposals
that we put forward were contrary to the Camp David agreements of last
September or that they would make an Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty meaningless.
Based upon the developments of last week and the recommendations
of all the parties involved, I had hoped to be able to convene without
delay negotiations at a level which would permit the early conclusion
of a peace treaty between Israel and Egypt, as a first step toward a
wider settlement for the entire Middle East.
I regret that such direct negotiations are not possible
at this time. I'm concerned about the impact of this development upon
the prospects for peace. However, it was the belief of all those at
Camp David—Secretary Vance and all the negotiators from Israel
and Egypt—that the conclusion of an Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty
is an urgent necessity. I share that view completely.
If we allow the prospects for peace that seemed so
bright last September when we came back from Camp David to continue
to dim and perhaps even to die, the future, at best, is unpredictable.
If we allow that hope to vanish, then the judgment of history and of
our own children will of necessity, and rightly, condemn us for an absence
of concerted effort.
For that reason, I spoke personally this afternoon
with Prime Minister Begin and with President Sadat. I've invited Prime
Minister Begin to join me as soon as possible for a frank discussion
of all the issues involved. I'm hopeful that these talks will lead to
an early resumption of direct negotiations.
Prime Minister Begin has accepted my invitation. He
will be arriving here Thursday evening for discussions with me.
I will then consider asking either Prime Minister Khalil
or President Sadat to join in further discussions. I recognize that
the public interest in this matter is intense. However, I have made
it clear in the past that any premature public discussions of these
very sensitive issues serve no useful purpose. For that reason, I will
have no further comments to make on the Mideast peace negotiations this
afternoon, but I will be happy to answer any further questions on other
matters of interest to the American public.
Q. Well, Mr. President, I really think you should answer
a couple of questions. One, are you saying that Camp David is back on
track or you are trying to get it on? And also, were you led to believe
by your own advisers or by the Israeli officials that Begin would come,
or did you labor under some false assumption on your part?
THE PRESIDENT. I won't have any other questions to
answer on that subject. I think I've covered it adequately. And Prime
Minister Begin is making a simultaneous announcement in Israel, and
I don't think it would be constructive for me to answer any questions
further.
ISRAELI ACCESS TO OIL
Q. Mr. President, in view of the fact that we have
some arrangement to support Israel in the event that they have oil shortages,
do you view Iran's lack of desire to supply oil to Israel as creating
problems for us in terms of our support for Israel in securing secondary
sources?
THE PRESIDENT. When the supply of Iranian oil to Israel
was interrupted, I immediately notified Prime Minister Begin and the
Israeli Government that we would honor our commitment to them. So far,
the Israelis have been able to acquire oil from other sources in the
Sinai, and also on the world markets from different countries.
We will honor that commitment. I think that the total
Israeli oil consumption is only about 1 percent of 'the consumption
in the United States. So, even if Israel should have to depend upon
us for a substantial portion of their oil, we would supply that oil
from our country or from sources in other nations without disruption
of the American economy.
MARCH 24, 1979
EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI PEACE TREATY
Q. Mr. President, I'm Jimmy Dillard, and I'd like to
know, how sound is the peace treaty, whose foundation is built with
5 billion inflated American tax dollars?
THE PRESIDENT. This peace treaty is a result of 30
years of war and the lessons which our Nation has learned from it. We
have two notable friends in the Middle East, among others—Israel
and Egypt. At this moment, they are in a state of declared war against
each other. Thousands of people in each country have lost their lives.
Our own interests are directly involved. We will provide part of the
cost of removing the armed forces from the Sinai Desert. This is a very
expensive proposition.
The Egyptians have five divisions on the Israeli side
of the Suez Canal. The Israelis have two divisions, two large airfields
built on Egyptian territory. Israel is very much in need of economic
stability. Their inflation rate last year, for instance, was more than
50 percent. We will help them bear the costs for these peacetime changes.
The cost will run a little more than a billion dollars a year for 3
or 4 years for both nations combined. Our Nation can well afford it.
It's an excellent investment, and I believe the American people are
strongly in support of this very modest cost for peace, when the cost
of war, even to our own Nation, to our own taxpayers, would be much,
much greater.
I believe it's a very good investment.
MARCH 25, 1979
EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI PEACE TREATY
Q. Mr. President, Bill Sims, Wycom Corporation, Laramie,
Wyoming. First of all, forgive me, sir, before my question, if you could
leave a little piece of paper with your name on it at the podium, a
big fan of yours would love to have it. [Laughter]
My question, sir: With sometimes conflicting reports
coming from the Middle East almost daily, how can the American public
be sure that the agreement you will sign this week is not just window
dressing? Sir, does this agreement really have meaningful significance
to the world?
THE PRESIDENT. I think perhaps a hundred years from
now, 50 years from now, what occurs tomorrow may be the most significant
occurrence during my own term of office as President. We are a nation
at peace. It's a notable achievement for a country as large as ours
to be at peace.
In the Mideast, war there not only afflicts the lives
of everyone involved, but it's a constant constraint on the quality
of life when the people in Egypt, people in Israel—who deeply
desire to live in harmony with their neighbors—have never been
able to do it since Israel was founded.
When I go back 8 or 9 months to assess what did exist
then and see where we stand now, it's almost unbelievable. Sadat said
when I was in Egypt recently that what we achieved at Camp David was
a miracle, that he never expected either Egypt or Israel to reach an
agreement when he went there.
I think that we now have a posture where our excellent
friends, the Israelis, and our excellent friends, the Egyptians, can
be friends with one another. We're going to have a short period of time—I
believe it will be short—with threats and posturing and possibly
some acts of terrorism mounted against [by] 1 those who oppose peace
in the Middle East.
But my belief is that if we can open those borders
and have thousands of students going back and forth between Cairo and
Jerusalem, and Tel Aviv and Alexandria, and tourists going to visit
the Pyramids and coming to see the Dead Sea Scrolls, and open trade
and commerce, that the people themselves will so deeply appreciate the
difference in their quality of life and their attitude toward life,
that no matter who the leaders might be in the future, this peace will
be permanent.
We're going to not stop here. We've got to address
the very difficult question of the Palestinian problem.
The Israelis are committed to this proposition, the
Egyptians are committed to this proposition, and so are we. But I think
as we let the other Arab entities-the PLO, Jordanians, Syrians, Lebanese,
Iraqis—see the tremendous benefits of the peace between Israel
and Egypt, it's going to be much easier to bring them in the process
and therefore achieve what I dream about—which may not come during
my own term of office, but I'll continue to work for—and that
is a comprehensive peace throughout the Middle East.
So, I think it is very significant, it is permanent,
it's a first step. But as Sadat says, it's a foundation for what we
all dream for—that comprehensive peace in the Middle East. I think
it's a very good step.
APRIL 6, 1979
U.S. PALESTINIAN POLICY
Q. Mr. President, I wondered if you could—I'm
changing the subject, but if you could redefine your Palestinian policy.
Exactly what is the current position?
THE PRESIDENT. Well, I wouldn't want to redefine it,
because it's been very consistent from the beginning. [Laughter] And
I wouldn't change one part of it.
As far as direct relations or consultations or negotiations
with the PLO is concerned, we will not do this unless the PLO endorses
the United Nations Resolution 242—the basis for all our discussions,
and a resolution that's been endorsed by all of the Arab countries,
as well as the Israelis-and also recognizes Israel's right to exist.
As long as the PLO and its constitution and commitment is dedicated
to the destruction of Israel, we will not negotiate with them.
As far as the Palestinian people themselves are concerned,
we are eager to see them join in the discussions and negotiations to
effectuate the agreements reached at Camp David and encompassed in the
recent Mideast treaty and all its ancillary documents.
My hope is that in a couple of months, when El Arish
is returned to Egypt and the borders between Israel and Egypt are open,
that the free travel of Palestinians and Egyptians, for instance, back
and forth between their homes, will alleviate the tension and let the
Palestinians escape from the unwarranted constraint of the threat of
terrorism against them if they negotiate to get full autonomy, to use
Mr. Begin's expression—full autonomy.
I think Sadat has done more for the Palestinians and
their cause than any other Arab leader. And now they are fearful of
the carrying out of threats of death by some of the more radical Arab
elements in the Mideast.
So, we're eager to see the Palestinian people participate,
to have full autonomy. And we will not deal with the PLO unless they
meet the requirements that I described.
APRIL 10, 1979
MIDDLE EAST
Q. Within the last few hours, Mr. President, a terrorist
bomb was exploded in Tel Aviv, and Israel has bombed Lebanon. Isn't
there likely to be even more violence in the Middle East than there
was before the treaty, and what can you do about it? And would you be
willing to stop arms sales, all arms sales to the Mideast?
THE PRESIDENT. First, I would not be willing to stop
all arms sales to the Middle East, because I think the countries there
must have an adequate means of defending themselves—Israel, Egypt,
and others.
Secondly, I believe that the terrorist bombing is a
longstanding problem. It's not something that just has arisen because
the treaty has been signed. I think the terrorism threats are counterproductive.
My own hope is that the best way to alleviate this constant dependence
on death and hatred and destruction and terrorism is to prove the viability
and the advantages of the peace process.
I would like to see, as early as possible, but by the
end of next month, all the borders open between Israel and Egypt, a
free passage of students and tradesmen, diplomats, tourists, and for
the demonstrated advantages to Israel and Egypt to be very apparent
to the citizens of Jordan and Syria and Lebanon and to the Palestinians,
wherever they live, hoping to convince them that that's the best approach
to achieve their own purposes and goals-that is, peace and a realization
of the right to control their own future.
But I don't think there's any doubt that terrorism
will continue in the coming months. I hope it will wane as it's proven
that the peace treaty is permanent and that it is going to work.
An immediate step that will tend to convince everyone
that it is permanent and cannot be disrupted by terrorist acts will
be the quick ratification of the treaty by the Egyptian Parliament and
the exchange of the documents themselves. And then the return of El
Arish and the first part of the Sinai to Egypt—I think that will
be a step in the right direction.
APRIL 25, 1979
MIDDLE EAST PEACE NEGOTIATIONS
Q. Hello, Mr. President. My name is Vickie Hinesly,
and I'm from York, Maine. And I'd like to welcome you from the people
of Maine. First, I'd like to congratulate you on your peace treaty with
the Middle East. First, I'd like to ask you, now that we have a partial
peace with the Middle East, what are your plans to secure peace in the
rest of the Middle East and to secure the flow of oil through the U.S.?
THE PRESIDENT. Good. Yesterday, as you may have noticed
in the news, I appointed Robert Strauss to be our new negotiator and
talked to both Prime Minister Begin and to President Sadat on the phone
yesterday afternoon. Their new relationship has been very exciting to
me since the peace treaty was signed. And I can tell you in complete
confidence if you won't relay it to anyone else—. [laughter] -that
sometimes those two men were not completely compatible with one another.
[Laughter]
Q. I'll bet.
THE PRESIDENT. Since the peace treaty was signed, I
honestly believe that they have learned to know and to like and to respect
one another. President Sadat yesterday said, "Prime Minister Begin,"
he said, "that man has really changed," he said, "changed
for the better." And he said, "We are now talking to each
other on the phone, not just when a crisis develops but on a routine
basis whenever a question arises that concerns our two countries."
Next month, almost exactly a month from now, the first
part of the Sinai will be returned from Israel to Egypt—El Arish.
They will met there together. They will fly together to Beersheba and
will appear before the student body at the Ben Gurion University and
then will open direct flights between Israel and Egypt for the first
time in anyone's memory. I'm very thankful for that.
At this time, however, the other neighbors of Israel
are trying to create every possible obstacle to the carrying out of
the peace treaty terms. I don't want to criticize them, although I wish
they would eliminate terrorism and murder as an element of their effort.
The best way to change their attitude—that is, Jordan, Iraq, Syria,
Lebanon, and others—is to demonstrate in the coming negotiations
that the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people will be honored
and that the terms of the Camp David agreement will indeed be carried
out.
We have a good relationship with almost all the countries
that produce and sell us oil. We have maintained that firm relationship.
One thing that I would like to do, however, in addition to keeping that
friendship with them, is to develop more independence by increasing
the production of American oil and by shifting to things like I've already
described: increased use of coal, increased use of small dams, increased
use of wood, and also conservation.
So, I would say the Mideast peace negotiation is on
track. I've been very pleased since the treaty was signed. We have a
good relationship with the oil supplying nations, but we want to become
less and less dependent on them in the future.
APRIL 30, 1979
ISRAELI SETTLEMENT POLICY
Q. Mr. President, the Israeli Cabinet has recently
approved two new settlements on the West Bank. In light of the enormous
cost to the United States of implementing the Egyptian-Israeli peace
treaty, isn't it reasonable to expect the Israelis to cease from settlement
policy which violates international law? And secondly, why should the
American people pay for policies of the Israelis that undermine the
peace process and run counter to American foreign policy?
THE PRESIDENT. Well, the position of the United States
historically has been consistent, and my own position on settlements
in the West Bank, Gaza area and on the Golan Heights, and in the Sinai
have my position has been consistent. The Israeli Government knows perfectly
well, after hours of discussion on this issue, what my position is.
We do consider the creation of Israeli settlements
in these areas as being inconsistent with international law, and, as
I've said many times, they are an obstacle to peace. Knowing that, the
Israeli Government still on occasion authorizes new settlements. They
interpret the law differently from myself.
I hope that the Israeli Government will severely restrain
any inclination, either approved by the Knesset or done without legal
sanction, in establishing new settlements. But there is a limit to what
we can do to impose our will on a sovereign nation.
MAY 4, 1979
AMERICAN PRISONER IN ISRAEL
Q. Mr. President, you were recently instrumental in
securing the release of several Russian dissidents. In similar terms
of humanity, would you be willing to exert influence on the Israeli
Government to secure the release of a young American woman? Her name
is Terre Fleener of San Antonio, and she is wasting away in Israeli
jails. 1
1 Terre Fleener was convicted of giving information
on Israeli security arrangements to members of the Palestine Liberation
Organization. She was released from prison on June 30, 1979, after serving
20 months of a 5-year sentence.
THE PRESIDENT. I'm not familiar with the case, but
before this day is over, I will contact the Secretary of State and ask
him to initiate an investigation and seek her release, if it's considered
to be advisable.
MAY 18, 1979
PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION
Q. Hal Rosen of Chicago. Earlier this week, on Monday,
Joseph Sisco,1 speaking before the Chicago Foreign Relations Council,
said that while it's official U.S. policy that we don't recognize—or
make contact, rather, with the PLO unless they recognize 242, that he
sees modification in this in the future. While he's not an official
Government spokesman, obviously, does his view reflect any change in
our policy?
1 Former Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs.
THE PRESIDENT. NO, there's been no change. I don't
contemplate any change. Our Nation is pledged, again, on its word of
honor, which I have corroborated since I've been in office, that we
will not deal with the PLO until they accept U.N. Resolution 242 as
a basis for negotiations, which all the other Arab entities have done,
and until they recognize the right of Israel to exist.
And I think that any such meeting as that, on any kind
of an official basis, would be counterproductive. And we're not doing
it surreptitiously. We're not cheating on our commitment. Obviously,
as is well known by Israel, there are members* of the PLO, individual
members* who are mayors of major cities, for instance, on the West Bank
and in the Gaza Strip, and both we and the Israelis deal with them as
Palestinians, not, however, in their capacity as members* of the PLO.
So, there has been and will 'be no change in this policy.
MAY 29, 1979
THE MIDDLE EAST
Q. Mr. President, on the Middle East, sir, is it feasible
in your view to expect the Palestinians and other Arab nations to join
the peace process as long as the United States does not put forward
some of its own ideas in greater detail about what autonomy is going
to look like on the West Bank and Gaza?
In other words, as long as the Israelis are continuing
to say there will be no Palestinian homeland, there will be no entity
linked or unlinked to Jordan, there will be no Palestinian state, is
it not incumbent on the United States, again in this peace process,
to come forward with some ideas of its own in order to encourage the
Palestinians to join in?
THE PRESIDENT. We've never been reticent about putting
forward our ideas both to the Israelis and the Egyptians and to others
about what ought to be done in the West Bank, Gaza area. We've never
espoused an independent Palestinian state. I think that would be a destabilizing
factor there.
I believe the next step ought to be the exchange of
views during the negotiations between Israel and Egypt. We will observe
the different proposals that are inevitably going to be made; some of
them have been described publicly. Then later on, after the negotiations
proceed as far as they can do with any degree of momentum, we will reserve
the right—requested, I might say, by both Israel and Egypt—
to put forward United States proposals to break a deadlock or to provide
a compromise solution.
We have been involved in that kind of process both
at Camp David and when I went to the Middle East. I think that's one
of the reasons that we've been as successful as we have so far.
But for us to preempt the negotiations by putting forward,
to begin with, an American proposal, I think, would be counterproductive,
and it would remove some of the reasonable responsibility that ought
to be directly on the shoulders of Prime Minister Begin and his government
and President Sadat and his government.
I might say that this past weekend, I talked personally
to President Sadat and to Prime Minister Begin and, this morning, to
Secretary Vance. And they were all very pleased and very excited not
only at the progress made in El Arish and Beersheba but also at the
attitude on both sides toward a constructive resolution of these very
difficult issues.
So, at this point, I feel very hopeful that both sides
are negotiating in good faith. We'll be there to help them when they
need our help.
AUGUST 10, 1979
PALESTINIAN POLICY
Q. Mr. President, so much has been said in the last
few weeks about your position regarding the Palestinians, PLO, Israel,
and so on and so forth. Most of the answers have been coming through
the Secretary of State. I wonder if you could tell us in your own words
what your position is on the creation of a separate Palestinian state—
THE PRESIDENT. I'm against it.
Q. —your position on the PLO, et cetera.
THE PRESIDENT. I'm against any creation of a separate
Palestinian state. I don't think it would be good for the Palestinians.
I don't think it would be good for Israel. I don't think it would be
good for the Arab neighbors of such a state.
I do believe that we must address and resolve the Palestinian
question in all its aspects, as was agreed to by Prime Minister Begin
and President Sadat and myself in writing at Camp David.
I do believe that the Palestinians should have a right
to a voice in the determination of their own future, which is also specified
and agreed to by Begin, Sadat, and by me at Camp David in writing.
I will not deal with the PLO unless they do two things:
accept the right of Israel to exist, which they've not yet been willing
to acknowledge, and accept the fact that U.N. Resolution 242 is a document
binding on them. They've got to accept 242, accept the right of Israel
to exist. This is a commitment we've made. We've never deviated from
it. We're not going to deviate from it.
AUGUST 30, 1979
PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION
Q. Mr. President, if we can turn the conversation to
a lighter topic. [Laughter] This business of not talking to the PLO
is not your policy, and yet you are following it. We have seen that
that policy has caused the departure of one of your most devoted and
apparently an official to whom you are most devoted.
THE PRESIDENT. Yes.
Q. How long are you going to continue observing this
policy, and does it make any sense in a country which prides itself
on open discussion of all issues with all parties that you are continuing
to ban from negotiation with the PLO?
THE PRESIDENT. Our commitment, made by Secretary Kissinger,
as you know, to the Israelis at the time they were negotiating Israeli
withdrawal from Egypt, was that we would not recognize nor negotiate
with the PLO until they did two things. One was to acknowledge Israel's
right to exist and secondly to espouse U.N. Resolution 242. We will
stick to that commitment. It was made when Nixon was President. Ford,
when he was in office, reconfirmed our national commitment to the Israelis,
and when I became President, I also committed our Nation to adhere to
this commitment.
I have met with the leaders of Jordan, Syria, Saudi
Arabia, Egypt, and in every instance when I have met with them, at least
on my initial meeting with them, I have asked them to induce the PLO
to recognize Israel's right to exist and to recognize 242. In most instances
those Arab leaders said they thought they could accomplish that. They
have not been able to.
So, we will not negotiate with nor recognize the PLO
until after they recognize Israel's right to exist and the efficability
of U.N. 242.
Q. This is not your policy, but you apparently think
it is a proper policy.
THE. PRESIDENT. It was not my policy. I have endorsed
the policy, and I will carry it out.
SEPTEMBER 25, 1979
ISRAELI SECURITY AND DEFENSE
Q. Good evening, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT. Good evening.
Q. My name is Zahava Teitelbaum, and I'm a housewife
and I work for a program for new immigrants. I just came back last week
from a trip to Jerusalem, the beautiful and divided capital of the Israeli
Government.
My question is, I know the United States would never
tolerate terrorist attacks from Cuba, and I wanted to know why the President
opposes Israel's right to defend itself on its northern borders against
the PLO terrorist incursions into Israel.
THE PRESIDENT. I don't. I think any nation has a right
to defend itself; obviously, including Israel. Let me recapitulate just
for a moment what has happened.
Two years ago, I met with Prime Minister Rabin and
then with Prime Minister Begin and also with President Sadat and others.
There was a conviction in their minds that never in their lifetime would
they have direct communication with one another and no chance to negotiate
a peace treaty between them.
A year ago, almost exactly, we went to Camp David and
came down with the Camp David accords, which set out not only a basis
for peace between Israel and Egypt but also a basis for a comprehensive
peace settlement for the entire Middle East, including all of Israel's
neighbors.
Six months ago, we concluded the Mideast peace treaty.
And a lot of people say, you know, "What have you done lately?"
Well, the fact is that now we are looking to President Sadat and Prime
Minister Begin to negotiate directly. They have developed a very good
respect for one another. And it was a thrilling thing for me to see
Sadat sail into the Haifa Harbor recently in an Egyptian yacht, escorted
by American and Israeli warships and American and Israeli airplanes,
and see him received so well in Haifa.
A basis of the Camp David accords was the right of
Israel to defend itself, a right of Israel to be secure. And along with
that was a commitment made by President Sadat and myself and Prime Minister
Begin that the Palestinian question in all its aspects would be resolved,
that the Palestinian people have a right to a voice in the determination
of their own future. But, at the same time, Sadat agreed on behalf of
many Arabs that Israel would have a right to defend itself. And I have
never questioned Israel's right to defend herself against terrorism
from the north or against her neighbors from the east or from the south.
The second thing I'd like to say is that we give Israel—as
a good investment for our own security, because we derive great benefits
from Israel being strong and free and at peace—great aid, the
most aid we give any other nation on Earth, because we believe in Israel
having the ability to defend itself. In addition to that, as a result
of the Camp David accords and the Mideast peace treaty, I advocated
to the Congress, and the Congress agreed to increase that aid by $3
billion. And we're now working out with Defense Minister Weizman, who
was in Washington in my office last week, how to spend that money to
give Israel the means by which they can defend themselves.
But this Government and this President will never abandon
Israel. We will always support Israel, and we will always make sure
that Israel has the means by which to defend themselves.
I want to say one more thing, and then I'll close this
answer. Israel's got one sure friend, and that's the United States of
America. And I look with great concern and disgust at a growing clamor
around the world, even making the ridiculous charge that Zionism is
the same as racism. That's an outrage and a disgrace to human beings.
And I'm not asking you—Miss Teitelbaum, right?—I'm
not asking you to give me your support or to approve everything I do.
But let me say this: It's important for Israel, for a President like
me, to have your support in carrying out the agreements made at Camp
David and with the treaty. I need your help and I need your support.
God knows that politics is secondary to me when it
comes to the defense and the strengthening and the peace and the security
of Israel. But I think that our Government, which has already done so
much—working with Sadat and Begin and others to make this major
move toward peace—really needs the unity and the support and the
understanding of making further progress. Condemnations and criticisms
during these transient times, I don't believe help Israel. I don't want
you to approve everything I do, but I need your support and your prayers
that my future efforts, along with those of the Israelis and Egyptians,
will be as successful as they have been in the last 12 months.
OCTOBER 10, 1979
U.S. POLICY TOWARDS ISRAEL
Q. Mr. President, Simon Weber, Jewish Daily Forward,
New York. As an ethnic newspaper, we have a special interest in Israel
-
THE PRESIDENT. So do I.
Q. —and of course we are concerned with all the
problems of the United States. But there is a feeling in the Jewish
community your administration is kind of pressing hard on Israel, in
the case of Lebanon, in the case of the Palestinians. Would you explain
that?
THE PRESIDENT. Yes, I will. I think I would prefer
to let Foreign Minister Dayan speak for me. I'm sure you're familiar
with the comment that he made.
Q. Yes.
THE PRESIDENT. And he has a good clear insight into
the relationships, both public and in the private negotiations between
Israel and the United States. I could not have said it better. Neither
could Jody Powell have said it better.
We have opened up public discussion and public debate
and private negotiation on matters that were previously avoided because
they are controversial. But I think it's well to remember that about
a year ago, we had the Camp David accords signed, not just by me, not
just by President Sadat, but by me, Begin, and Sadat. And then about
6 months ago, we had the Mideast peace treaty signed and approved by
all three of us. The progress has been sometimes faltering, sometimes
epitomized by dispute, sometimes by allegations that the United States
has been unfair to Israel or unfair to the Arab countries or unfair
to Egypt or unfair to the Palestinians or unfair to Lebanon.
I think we've had a well-balanced approach. We have,
as a primary concern-primary concern—the security of Israel, the
existence of Israel, leading toward peace for the people who live in
Israel with not just Egypt but all their neighbors. That's our first
concern. And along with that, of course, is to seek for a comprehensive
agreement between Israel and all her neighbors. I think we've had good
progress so far.
We believe that there can be no permanent peace without
a resolution of the Palestinian question in all its aspects, to use
the language that Prime Minister Begin himself adopted in the Camp David
accords. And I think as far as Lebanon is concerned, we deplore violence
in the northern part of Israel and the southern part of Lebanon, no
matter where it originates. We abhor the use of terrorism by some of
the Palestinians to effectuate their cause. We think this is a sad and
deplorable mistake. And we hope to see a relationship between Israel
and the people of Lebanon, including Palestinians, which would lead
to a peaceful relationship.
But we don't put any pressure on Israel. It would be
counterproductive if we did. And I believe that Prime Minister Begin
would join in with Foreign Minister Dayan in certifying that our approach
has been responsible and fair.
I can't deny that there have been occasions when the
Israelis have felt that we took a biased position, and I can't deny
either that there have been times when the Arab countries feel that
our position is biased toward Israel. But I describe to you the same
order of priorities that I would describe to Sadat: first of all, the
existence and security of Israel; secondly, the effectuation of peace
between Israel and her neighbors, all her neighbors; and third, a recognition
that a resolution of the Palestinian question has to be a prerequisite
to a permanent peace in the Mideast.
Sources: Public Papers of the President |