Statement on Returning From Camp David
(July 25, 2000)
Conclusion of the Middle East Peace Summit
After 14 days of intensive negotiations between Israelis
and Palestinians, I have concluded with regret that they will not be
able to reach an agreement at this time. As I explained on the eve of
the summit, success was far from guaranteed given the historical, religious,
political, and emotional dimensions of the conflict.
Still, because the parties were not making progress
on their own and the September deadline they set for themselves was
fast approaching, I thought we had no choice. We can't afford to leave
a single stone unturned in the search for a just, lasting, and comprehensive
peace.
Now, at Camp David, both sides engaged in comprehensive
discussions that were really unprecedented because they dealt with the
most sensitive issues dividing them, profound and complex questions
that long had been considered off limits.
Under the operating rules that nothing is agreed until
everything is agreed, they are, of course, not bound by any proposal
discussed at the summit. However, while we did not get an agreement
here, significant progress was made on the core issues. I want to express
my appreciation to Prime Minister Barak, Chairman Arafat, and their
delegations for the efforts they undertook to reach an agreement.
Prime Minister Barak showed particular courage, vision,
and an understanding of the historical importance of this moment. Chairman
Arafat made it clear that he, too, remains committed to the path of
peace. The trilateral statement we issued affirms both leaders' commitment
to avoid violence or unilateral actions which will make peace more difficult
and to keep the peace process going until it reaches a successful conclusion.
At the end of this summit, I am fully aware of the
deep disappointment that will be felt on both sides. But it was essential
for Israelis and Palestinians, finally, to begin to deal with the toughest
decisions in the peace process. Only they can make those decisions,
and they both pledged to make them, I say again, by mid-September.
Now, it's essential that they not lose hope, that they
keep working for peace, they avoid any unilateral actions that would
only make the hard task ahead more difficult. The statement the leaders
have made today is encouraging in that regard.
Israelis and Palestinians are destined to live side
by side, destined to have a common future. They have to decide what
kind of future it will be. Though the differences that remain are deep,
they have come a long way in the last 7 years, and notwithstanding the
failure to reach an agreement, they made real headway in the last 2
weeks.
Now the two parties must go home and reflect, both
on what happened at Camp David and on what did not happen. For the sake
of their children, they must rededicate themselves to the path of peace
and find a way to resume their negotiations in the next few weeks. They've
asked us to continue to help, and as always, we'll do our best. But
the parties themselves, both of them, must be prepared to resolve profound
questions of history, identity, and national faith as well as the future
of sites that are holy to religious people all over the world who are
part of the Islamic, Christian, and Judaic traditions.
The children of Abraham, the descendants of Isaac and
Ishmael, can only be reconciled through courageous compromise in the
spirit of those who have already given their lives for peace and all
Israelis, Palestinians, friends of peace in the Middle East and across
the world who long for peace and deserve a Holy Land that lives for
the values of Judaism, Islam, and Christianity.
Thank you.
Q. Was Jerusalem--Mr. President, was Jerusalem the
main stumbling block? And where do you go from here?
The President. It was the most difficult problem. And
I must tell you that we tried a lot of different approaches to it, and
we have not yet found a solution. But the good news is that there is
not a great deal of disagreement--and I want to emphasize this--it seemed
to me, anyway, there was not a great deal of disagreement in many of
these areas about what the facts on the ground would be after an agreement
was made--that is, how people would live.
For example, everyone conceded that Jerusalem is a
place that required everyone to have access to the holy sites, and the
kinds of things you've heard, and lot of other things in terms of how,
operationally, the Israelis and the Palestinians have worked together;
there was actually more agreement than I had thought there would be.
But obviously, the questions around Jerusalem go to
the core identity of both the Palestinians and the Israelis. There were
some very, as I said--it has been reported Prime Minister Barak took
some very bold decisions, but we were in the end unable to bridge the
gaps. I think they will be bridged, because I think the alternative
is unthinkable.
Tom [Thomas L. Friedman, New York Times].
Q. There is a striking contrast between the way you
described Prime Minister Barak's courageous and visionary approach to
this, and Mr. Arafat seemed to be still committed to the path of peace.
It sounds like that at the end of the day, Prime Minister Barak was
ready to really step up to something that President Arafat wasn't yet
ready to step up to.
The President. Let me be more explicit. I will say
again, we made progress on all of the core issues. We made really significant
progress on many of them. The Palestinian teams worked hard on a lot
of these areas. But I think it is fair to say that at this moment in
time, maybe because they had been preparing for it longer, maybe because
they had thought through it more, that the Prime Minister moved forward
more from his initial position than Chairman Arafat, on--particularly
surrounding the questions of Jerusalem.
Now, these are hard questions. And as I said to both
of them, none of us, no outsider can judge for another person what is
at the core of his being, at the core of his sense of national essence.
But we cannot make an agreement here without a continuing effort of
both sides to compromise.
I do believe that--let me say this--and you will appreciate
this, Tom, because you've been covering this a long time--but I want
to give credit to both sides in the sense that they were really coming
to grips with things they had never seriously come to grips with before.
Oh, yes, there were always side papers--even going
back to 1993-- about how these final issues would be solved. There were
always speculation. There were always the odd conversation between Palestinians
and Israelis who were friends and part of the various--the different
government operations. But these folks really never had to come together
before, and in an official setting put themselves on the line. And it
is profoundly difficult.
So I said what I said, and my remarks should stand
for themselves, because--not so much as a criticism of Chairman Arafat,
because this is really hard and never been done before, but in praise
of Barak. He came there knowing that he was going to have to take bold
steps, and he did it. And I think you should look at it more as a positive
toward him than as a condemnation of the Palestinian side.
This is agonizing for them--both of them. And unless
you have lived there and lived with them and talked to them or lived
with this problem a long time, it is hard to appreciate it. But I do
think--I stand by the statement as written. I think they both remain
committed to peace. I think they will both find a way to get there if
they don't let time run away with them so that external events rob them
of their options. And that's why I decided to call the summit in the
first place.
I got worried that--this is like going to the dentist
without having your gums deadened, you know. I mean, this is not easy.
And I got worried that if we didn't do the summit and we didn't force
a process to begin, which would require people to come to grips with
this in a disciplined, organized way, as well as to face--look themselves
in the mirror and look into the abyss and think, "What can I do,
and what can't I do," that we would never get there. Now, I believe
because of the work that was done within both teams and what they did
with each other, we can still do it. Let me just make one other observation,
and then I'll answer your question.
You know, when we worked--I remember when we went to
Dayton over Bosnia, when we went to Paris over Bosnia. After the Kosovo
conflict-- and I went there and met with all the people who were going
to have to work on Kosovo's future--even when we first started the Irish
peace talks, we were dealing with people who would hardly speak to each
other. We were dealing with people who still often wouldn't shake hands.
We were dealing with people who thought they were from another planet
from one another, whose wounds were open.
Let me give you some good news. Of all the peace groups
I ever worked with, these people know each other. They know the names
of each other's children. They know how many grandchildren the grandparents
have. They know their life stories. They have a genuine respect and
understanding for each other. It is truly extraordinary and unique in
my experience in almost 8 years of dealing with it.
So I'm not trying to put a funny gloss on this. They
couldn't get there. That's the truth. They couldn't get there. But this
was the first time in an organized, disciplined way they had to work
through, both for themselves and then with each other, how they were
going to come to grips with issues that go to the core of their identity.
And I think, on balance, it was very much the right
thing to do, and it increases the chance of a successful agreement,
and it increases the chances of avoiding a disaster.
Now, I promised you, you could ask now.
Q. What is your assessment of whether Arafat's going
to go through with the threat to declare statehood unilaterally? Did
you get any sort of sense on whether he's going to go through with that?
Did you have any----
The President. Well, let me say this. One of the reasons
that I wanted to have this summit is that they're both under, will be
under conflicting pressures as we go forward. One of the things that
often happens in a very difficult peace process is that people, if they're
not careful, will gravitate to the intense position rather than the
position that will make peace. And it's very often that people know
that a superficially safe position is to say no, that you won't get
in trouble with whoever is dominating the debate back home, wherever
your home is, as long as you say no.
One of the reasons I called this summit is so that
we could set in motion a process that would give the Palestinians the
confidence that all of us--and most of all, the Israelis--really did
want to make peace, so that it would offset the pressure that will be
increasingly on Chairman Arafat as we approach the September 13th deadline.
Q. Are you implying that he should give up his claim
to East Jerusalem--the Palestinians should?
The President. No, I didn't say that.
Q. Or any kind of a foothold?
The President. I didn't say that. I didn't say that.
I didn't say that. And let me say, I presume, I am bound--I'm going
to honor my promise not to leak about what they talked about, but I
presume it will come out. No, I didn't say that. I said only this: I
said--I will say again--the Palestinians changed their position. They
moved forward. The Israelis moved more from the position they had. I
said what I said; I will say again: I was not condemning Arafat; I was
praising Barak. But I would be making a mistake not to praise Barak
because I think he took a big risk. And I think it sparked, already,
in Israel a real debate, which is moving Israeli public opinion toward
the conditions that will make peace. So I thought that was important,
and I think it deserves to be acknowledged.
But the overriding thing you need to know is that progress
was made on all fronts, that significant progress was made on some of
the core issues, that Jerusalem, as you all knew it would be, remains
the biggest problem for the reasons you know.
But what we have to find here, if there is going to
be an agreement--by definition, an agreement is one in which everybody
is a little disappointed and nobody is defeated, in which neither side
requires the other to say they have lost everything, and they find a
way to--a shared result.
And there's no place in the world like Jerusalem. There
is no other place in the world like Jerusalem, which is basically at
the core of the identity of all three monotheistic religions in the
world, at the core of the identity of what it means to be a Palestinian,
at the core of the identity of what it means to be an Israeli. There
is no other place like this in the world. So they have to find a way
to work through this.
And it shouldn't surprise you that when they first
come to grips with this in an official, disciplined way where somebody
has to actually say something instead of sort of be off in a corner
having a conversation over a cup of coffee that no one ever--that has
no--it just vanishes into air, that it's hard for them to do.
Q. But did they make enough progress, sir, to now go
back home, check with their people, and possibly come back during your
administration--next month or in September--to come back to Camp David
and try again?
The President. I don't know if they need to come back
to Camp David. I think that it rained up there so much, I'm not sure
I'll ever get them back there. [Laughter] But I think if you asked me,
did they make enough progress to get this done? Yes. But they've got
to go home and check; they've got to feel around. And what I want to
say to you is, the reason I tried to keep them there so long--and I
feel much better about this than I did when we almost lost it before--and
you remember, and I got them and we all agreed to stay--I didn't feel
that night like I feel today.
Today I feel that we have the elements here to keep
this process going. But it's important that the people who both leaders
represent, support their continuing involvement in this and stick with
them, and understand that this is a script that's never been written
before. They have to write a script, and they've got to keep working
at it.
But yes, I think it can happen----
Q. During your administration?
The President. Yes. Not because it's my administration;
that's irrelevant. They're operating on their timetable, not mine. It
has nothing to do with the fact that it's my administration. I think
it can happen because they set for themselves a September 13th deadline.
And if they go past it, every day they go past it will put more pressure
on the Palestinians to declare a Palestinian state unilaterally and
more pressure on the Israelis to have some greater edge in conflict
in their relations as a result of that.
Neither one of them want that; so I think they will
find a way to keep this going. And the only relevance of my being here
is that I've been working with them for 8 years, and I think they both
trust us and believe that Secretary Albright and Dennis and Sandy and
our whole team, that we will heave to to make peace.
Q. But, Mr. President, the Prime Minister came here
in quite a precarious position to begin with back home. And some of
the things you call bold and courageous, his critics back home have
called treason. Can he go home, and do you believe he will have the
political stability to come back at this, and did he voice any concerns
to you about that?
The President. First of all, this is not a weak man.
It's not for nothing that he's the most decorated soldier in the history
of Israel. He didn't come over here to play safe with his political
future. He came over here to do what he thought was right for the people
of Israel, and I think that he--he knows that he would never do anything
to put the security of Israel at risk, and that the only long-term guarantee
of Israel's security is a constructive peace that's fair with her neighbors--all
of them--starting with the Palestinians.
So I think the people of Israel should be very proud
of him. He did nothing to compromise Israel's security, and he did everything
he possibly could within the limits that he thought he had, all the
kinds of constraints that operate on people in these circumstances,
to reach a just peace. So I would hope the people of Israel will support
him and let this thing percolate, not overreact, and say, "Keep
trying."
I want the people on both sides to tell their leaders
to keep trying--to keep trying. You know, that's the only real answer
here--is just to bear down and go on.
Q. Mr. President, couldn't you have gotten a partial
agreement and left Jerusalem for later? Was that a possibility at all?
The President. That possibility was explored and rejected.
Q. Why?
The President. I can't talk about it. If they want
to talk about it, that's their business, but I can't.
Q. Have you done all you can do, sir, or would you
be making more proposals?
The President. Oh, I think--well, first of all, we
all agreed to reassess here. So the first thing we're going do to is,
we're going to let each side go home and try to get a little sleep.
I mean, we've all been sort of-- we're kind of--nobody knows what time
it is, I don't think, on either team.
Last night we quit at 3; the night before, we went
all night long. And so, we've been working very hard at this. So what
I'm going to do is let them take a deep breath and then our side, Madeleine
and Sandy and all of our team and I and Dennis, we'll try to think what
we think we ought to do. Then we'll ask them what they want to do, and
then we'll figure out what we're going to do.
We don't have a lot of time, and I wouldn't rule out
the possibility that all of us will be coming up with new ideas here.
I wouldn't rule anything out. The clock is still working against us.
The bad news is, we don't have a deal. The good news is, they are fully
and completely and comprehensively engaged in an official way for the
first time on these fundamental issues.
Keep in mind, when the Oslo agreement was drafted,
these things were put down as final status issues because the people
that drafted them knew it would be hard. And they took a gamble. And
their gamble was that if the Israelis and the Palestinians worked together
over a 7-year period and they began to share security cooperation, for
example, they began to--we had some land transfers, and we saw how they
would work in a different geographical way, and if they kept making
other specific agreements, that by the time we got to the end of the
road, there would be enough knowledge and trust and understanding of
each other's positions that these huge, epochal issues could be resolved.
Now, we started the process, and we've got to finish.
And so, and again I say, the thing I hope most of all is that the people
in the Middle East will appreciate the fact that a lot was done here,
and we'll support their leaders in coming back and finishing the job.
The venue is not important. The mechanisms aren't important. But we
know what the state of play is now, and if we'll keep at it, I still
think we can get it done.
Q. Can you describe what type of U.S. role was discussed
in sealing the agreement financially and otherwise?
The President. Let me say, first of all, anything that
would require our participation, other than financial, was not finalized.
But there were a lot of ideas floated around. None of it amounted to
large numbers of people. But they were potentially significant in terms
of the psychology of the situation. But there was no decision made about
that.
On the money, basically, you know, I think that the
United States should be prepared to make a significant contribution
to resolving the refugee problem. You've got refugees that have to be
resettled. You've got some compensation which has to be given. And there
are lots of issues in that refugee pot that cost money. And then there's
the whole question of working out the economic future of the Palestinians,
and the whole question of working out what the security relationships
will be and the security needs will be for Israel and in this new partnership
that they will have--the Palestinians. How is that going to work, and
what should we do?
I also, when I went to the G-8, I gave a briefing to
the G-8, and I asked the people who were there to help pay, too. I said,
you know, this is going to have to be a worldwide financial responsibility,
but because of the United States' historic involvement, which goes back
many decades in the Middle East--we were the first country under President
Truman to recognize Israel; we've had Republicans and Democrats alike
up to their ears in the Middle East peace process for a long time--and
because we have such a lot of strategic interest over there, if there
could be an agreement, I think we ought to lead the way in financial
contributions, but the others who are able to do so should play their
part as well.
Thank you.
Sources: Public Papers of the President |