Assessment of the Tension Between Israel and the
Arabs
(April 13, 1967)
This report assesses the tension between Israel and its Arab neightbors, noting that the Arabs and Israelis are no closer
to resolving their fundamental differencces than previously. The report
also discusses how the Soviet
Union is involved in the Middle East conflict, and which side the
country would support were a full-fledged war to occur.
THE ARAB-ISRAELI DISPUTE: CURRENT PHASE
The Problem
To estimate present attitudes and future trends in the Arab-Israeli
problem over the next two or three years.
Conclusions
A. The Arabs and Israelis are no closer to a solution of their fundamental
differences than they ever were.
B. Rivalries and disputes among the Arabs reduce their chances of doing
anything significant about their quarrel with Israel; these rivalries
also create some danger of precipitating crises from which large-scale
Arab-Israeli hostilities could develop.
C. The Israelis seem likely to continue existing policies, including
occasional retaliatory action; they would resort to force on a large
scale only if they felt their security seriously endangered.
D. The Soviet leaders almost certainly view the Arab-Israeli dispute
as promoting their interests. But they do not wish to see it develop
into armed conflict. While continuing to supply arms to their Arab friends,
they probably wish to keep the arms race from getting out of hand.
E. If and when the Arabs come to believe that the Israelis are at the
point of deploying strategic missiles,/2/ a phase of sharply increased
Arab-Israeli tensions will probably arise. This is likely to occur within
the next two to three years. In this event, the Egyptians would probably
press the Soviets for help.
/2/In the context of an Arab-Israeli conflict, strategic missiles would
be those capable of striking the major population centers or military
installations of the enemy, i.e., missiles with a range roughly between
100 and 500 miles. [Footnote in the source text.]
F. To such an appeal the Soviet leaders would probably feel that they
had to respond in some way. They would probably pledge to help Egypt
or other Arab states if attacked and would probably provide token technical
aid on the Egyptian missile program. They might go so far as to provide
a missile system, but we believe they would not supply nuclear warheads
or assist in the development of a nuclear weapons program.
G. Although periods of increased tension in the Arab-Israeli dispute
will occur from time to time, both sides appear to appreciate that large-scale
military action involves considerable risk and no assurance of leading
to a solution. In any event, the chances are good that the threat of
great power intervention will prevent an attempt by either side to resolve
the problem by military force.
Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-R01012A, ODDI Registry
of NIE and SNIE Files. Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to a note
on the cover sheet, the estimate was submitted by Director of Central
Intelligence Richard M. Helms, and concurred in by the U.S. Intelligence
Board on April 13. The Central Intelligence Agency, the intelligence
organizations of the Departments of State and Defense, and the NSA participated
in its preparation. The CIA, State, Defense, NSA, and AEC representatives
concurred; the FBI representative abstained, the subject being outside
his jurisdiction.
Sources: Foreign
Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, V. 18, Arab-Israeli
Dispute 1964-1967. DC: GPO,
2000. |