Memorandum on Suggestion of Recommendations to Israel
(May 1, 1961)
This memorandum outlines suggestions that the United States Secretary
of State Rusk should make to Israeli Ambassador Harman regarding issues
such as the Arab refugees, water, stability in Jordan,
and military aid.
SUBJECT
Suggested Reply to Memorandum of Israeli Ambassador re Arab-Israel
Situation
Discussion:
You will recall that Ambassador Harman submitted to you a memorandum
(Tab A)/2/ setting out, at some length, an Israeli appraisal of the
present Near East situation with some suggested steps for its improvement.
The memorandum was prepared in response to a query on your part during
the Ambassador's introductory call. We have reviewed and analyzed this
in some detail and have prepared a response to significant points raised
in the memorandum. We believe it would not be advisable to attempt a
written reply to the Ambassador's memorandum and that the matter could
appropriately be handled by a discussion between myself and Ambassador
Harman in which I would inform him you had reviewed the points he had
put forward and had asked me to speak on your behalf. If you approve,
I would make to him the points listed below, which have been appropriately
cleared in other bureaus and in the Department of Defense, as a preliminary
to the Ben-Gurion visit.
/2/All tabs cited in the memorandum are attached to the source text.
Tab A, not printed, includes a February 27 covering memorandum from
Harman and a memorandum entitled "Some Aspects of the Arab-Israeli
Situation," under cover of a February 24 note. References to subsections
of Tab A refer to special tabs affixed to portions of the February 27
memorandum.
Ambassador Harman's memorandum is noteworthy in that it speaks favorably
of the present tranquillity in the Near East and eschews "frontal
and public" approaches to an Arab-Israel settlement. In this connection,
it is of interest that Ben-Gurion has publicly stated that an Arab-Israel
settlement cannot be imposed. While endorsing this general thesis, which
for the Israelis is somewhat of a departure from their previous thinking,
the Ambassador in his memo proceeds to set forth a set of proposals
which, for the most part, date back to days when the Israelis were not
so satisfied with the status quo. Throughout the memorandum there is
much emphasis of the theme that Nasser is the root of all evil. This
reflects current Israeli and Jewish sentiment which tends to portray
Nasser as some sort of new Pharaoh or new Hitler. It does not take into
account that anti-Israel feelings are even stronger in the Arab world
outside Egypt than in Cairo and that even were Nasser to disappear from
the scene Arab resentment of Israel would remain undiminished. A schematic
analysis of the Israeli memorandum setting out in skeletal form the
Israeli suggestions and the pros and cons pertaining thereto is attached
(Tab B)./3/
/3/Tab B, entitled "Analysis of Ambassador Harman's Proposal,"
is divided into 12 subsections.
Points to be Made to Ambassador Harman.
1. Quiet Diplomacy. We are pleased that the Israelis share our view
concerning the many "positive aspects" characterizing the
present climate of the Near East. As noted in previous exchanges between
us, we agree with the Israeli view that a "frontal and public attack"
on major outstanding issues would be likely to boomerang but we would
not, of course, be averse to steps which could be effective in advancing
an Arab-Israel settlement. We have been gratified to note that under
the relatively tranquil conditions prevailing during the past year Israel
has continued its phenomenal progress, e.g., exports up 25%, industrial
growth up 14% (highest in the world), GNP per capita above that of Netherlands
and Italy, foreign exchange reserve up over 65%, and even USG aid up
from $60 million to $82 million.
2. Security Assurances. We have serious doubts as to the advantages
either for the U.S. or Israel of a bilateral Defense Agreement and we
question the advisability of a new public statement on the part of the
U.S. Government supporting in explicit terms territorial integrity of
the Near East states. We do not believe either our allies or the Soviet
Union would join us in such a declaration. Such a statement would, in
fact, seem to constitute the kind of broadside effort regarding issues
in the area which would carry a greater risk of disturbing the existing
calm than it would carry promise of aiding progress towards solutions.
The Arabs would interpret such a gesture as an American attempt to coerce
them into making peace with Israel and as an abandonment of an impartial
attitude on the part of the United States. Existing U.S. ties with Israel,
our demonstrated opposition to armed aggression as reflected in the
Lebanon crisis and Israel's own military capabilities are significant
deterrents to aggressive intent on the part of Israel's neighbors (Tabs
A-1 and B-1).
3. Military Aid. With regard to the arms imbalance feared by the Israelis,
we continue to believe that steps which would in effect make the United
States the arsenal for Israel would heighten tension in the area and
would probably lead to a corresponding step-up of Soviet arms to the
UAR. Such an intensified arms race with its concomitant economic burdens
would be highly detrimental to the countries of the area and dangerous.
We are confident that Israel's military needs can best be served: a)
by procurement of its heavy and advanced arms from traditional European
suppliers; b) by the occasional sale of modest amounts of defensive
arms from the United States; c) by accepting our offer for some $15,000,000
worth of advanced electronics equipment (early warning); d) by military
training of Israeli officers in the United States at about the present
levels; e) by the continued availability to Israel of surplus U.S. matériel;
and, f) by continued beneficial contacts with our military attachés
in Israel. In this connection, we are gratified by the high regard which
our military officers hold for Israel's military prowess and their confidence
that the Israel defense forces will more than match Arab military capabilities
for the foreseeable future (Tabs A-2 and B-2).
4. Regional Disarmament. The U.S. is very much in sympathy with the
Israeli objective for reducing arms burdens in the Near East but we
fear that there is at the moment not much hope of finding a basis for
agreement for disarmament or agreed upon arms control in the Near East
region. We intend, however, to keep this matter under scrutiny. Prospects
for any initiatives would, of course, be enhanced by preservation of
the existing calm and by a cooperative attitude on the part of all the
nations which are supplying significant quantities of arms to the Near
East countries (Tabs A-3 and B-3).
5. Arab Refugees. The United States finds the position of the Israel
Government on the Palestine refugee problem somewhat disappointing.
At the Lausanne Conference in 1949 Israel spoke in terms of the repatriation
of a substantial number of refugees--up to 150,000. Thus, it seems that
Israel's stance on repatriation has retrogressed considerably. The U.S.
remains deeply concerned with the refugee problem. There is mounting
Congressional impatience with continuance of massive U.S. financial
contributions unrewarded by significant progress towards solution. It
is also a subject on which Israel and its friends are extremely vulnerable
in the annual debates on the UNRWA item at the UN General Assembly.
We do not expect either Israel or the Arabs to sacrifice vital national
interest to make progress. However, there is required a willingness
on both sides to undertake concessions which seem of significance to
the other.
The choice of compensation or repatriation has perennially been endorsed
by the UNGA. This principle is supported by the U.S. It is difficult
to envision real progress until Israel has found some means for dealing
effectively with this concept. In recent years Israel has indicated
willingness to compensate the refugees, but has done so in the context
of rejecting the principle of repatriation. Lacking this element, the
sum impression of the Israel position is that the present unhappy situation
should endure for a very long time, with the U.S. continuing to bear
the brunt politically and economically. For its part the United States
would not view as acceptable any arrangement which would disrupt Israel's
economy or prove to be a significant threat to Israel's security (Tabs
A-5 and B-5).
6. Palestine Entity. The Arab concept of a "Palestine Entity",
with the implied thought of establishment of a "Palestine Government
in exile", is regarded by the U.S. as a retrogressive development
in Arab-Israel relations. The Arabs so far have been notoriously unable
to develop any agreed course of action for implementation of the Palestine
entity idea and a frontal attack by the U.S. on the entity concept is
only likely to give it more life (Tabs A-4 and B-4).
7. Jordan Waters. The U.S. continues to believe that an internationally
agreed unified program along the lines of the Johnston Plan promises
the most satisfactory resolution of the Jordan waters problem. Meanwhile,
it is imperative in our view that Israel in its water development program
abide by the terms of the Johnston Plan. Because of intense Arab antagonism
and threats of hostilities when Israel diverts water out of the Jordan
basin, we are on a continual alert for possible indications that a unified
development plan can be negotiated by one agency or another with the
parties directly concerned (Tabs A-7 and B-7).
8. Aid to Jordan. The U.S. concurs in the Israeli view that continued
stability and economic growth in Jordan are important for stability
in the area. Our attitude is reflected in the substantial assistance
we annually provide to Jordan.
Recommendation:
That you approve my conveying the foregoing orally to Ambassador Harman./4/
/4/Rusk initialed his approval of the recommendation on May 1. Talbot
met with Harman on May 5 and covered orally the points made in this
memorandum. The memorandum of that conversation is in Department of
State, Central Files, 784A.00/5-561.
Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86B/5-161. Secret.
Drafted by Meyer, Thacher, and Palmer on April 25 and concurred in by
Haydn Williams (DOD/ISA).
Sources: Foreign
Relations of the United States, 1961-1963: Near East, 1962-1963,
V. XVIII. DC: GPO,
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