Memorandum on Israel's Arms Capability
(May 1, 1967)
This memorandum discusses Israel's weapons and nuclear capabilities.
Under Secretary Katzenbach asserts that Israel should be continuously
monitored to ensure that further nuclear weapons development does not
occur. He concludes that the Arabs do not have equal capabilities as
the Israelis.
SUBJECT
The Arab-Israel Arms Race and Status of U.S. Arms Control Efforts
Conventional Forces. Israel has a safe margin of superiority
over any combination of Arab forces likely to attack it and can be expected
to maintain that position for at least the next five years. Arab numerical
force superiority is more than matched by Israel's superiority in training,
leadership, military doctrine and maintenance of equipment. Moreover,
the Arab states have made little progress in military coordination among
themselves. Recent border clashes have demonstrated that short of general
hostilities, or Israeli occupation of Arab territory, the Arab states
will not rush to one another's assistance. In practical terms, therefore,
Israel's security must be measured by its ability to maintain military
superiority over the UAR, the strongest single Arab state that can challenge
Israel.
Nuclear Weapons. Concerned that over the long run the
Arabs will achieve superiority in conventional forces, Israel is carefully
preserving its option to acquire sophisticated weapons, including, we
believe, nuclear weapons. We have no evidence that Israel is actually
making a bomb, but we believe Israel intends to keep itself in a position
to do so at reasonably short notice should the need arise. The Israeli
reactor at Dimona is capable of producing enough plutonium to make one
or two bombs a year, but thus far our periodic inspections of this facility
(most recently on April 22, 1967) have uncovered no evidence of weapons
activity. Our inspectors emphasize, however, that their visits cover
only the Dimona site and there can be no assurance that the Israelis
are not pursuing a clandestine weapons program elsewhere./2/ Our suspicions
that we do not know the full story have been heightened by the Israelis'
unwillingness to tell us what happened to 80-100 tons of unsafeguarded
uranium concentrate that they bought from Argentina 4 years ago. We
have also had reports that Israel has acquired a nuclear chemical separation
plant, which--if true--would be a significant step toward a weapons
capability. These reports are being urgently investigated.
/2/A "Preliminary Report of the Visit to Atomic
Energy Sites in Israel, April 20 to April 24, 1967: Summary and Conclusions
(Only)" is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Files
of Harold Saunders, Israel-Nuclear-Dimona-Desalting.
On the Arab side, no state is anywhere near a nuclear
weapons capability. The UAR has a small 2-megawatt research reactor
which cannot produce significant amounts of plutonium.
Both Eshkol and Nasser are on record as saying that
their countries will not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into
the area. Beyond this, however, neither the Egyptians nor the Israelis
have accepted IAEA safeguards over their entire nuclear programs, in
spite of our urging them to do so. The UAR's position is that so far
they have nothing that requires safeguarding whereas Israel does and
should therefore be the one that takes the first step. Israel's position
is more complex. Israelis have stressed to us their concern that information
obtained by IAEA inspectors, which might be available to the UAR, could
aid the latter in planning a military or sabotage operation against
Dimona. In terms of their long-range security the Israelis may also
have decided that they will not accept limitations upon their sophisticated
weapon option in the absence of Arab arms control undertakings in the
conventional field.
Ballistic Missiles. Israel has contracted with the
French firm of Dassault to purchase an unknown quantity of surface-to-surface
ballistic missiles. These missiles are capable of carrying nuclear warheads
and would not be militarily cost-effective unless so used. The missile
(designated the MD-620) is now being flight-tested by the French. None
have apparently been delivered to Israel as yet, but initial deliveries
could take place sometime in 1968. Latest evidence indicates that, despite
some difficulties with the guidance system, the MD-620 program is moving
forward. Israel is also pursuing an indigenous SSM R&D program.
The UAR's SSM program, though widely advertised for
many years, has reached a virtual standstill. Most of the West German
scientists who were assisting this effort have departed. Flight testing
of the UAR missiles has been suspended, and it is estimated that the
missile program, at its present level of activity, could not be successfully
completed within the next decade.
Soviet Policy. Although the Soviets have gained much
from their large sales of conventional weapons to certain Arab countries,
we believe it unlikely that they will help any Arab state toward a nuclear
weapons capability. There is similarly no hard evidence of Soviet assistance
on the UAR's missile program.
U.S. Initiatives. The coming months may well offer
our best opportunity in years to press for our arms control objectives
because of two possible forms of additional leverage--first, a non-proliferation
treaty, and second, U.S. willingness to finance desalting plants in
the area. We plan to pursue our objectives along the following lines.
1. Safeguards and the NPT. We hope the non-proliferation
treaty will prove to be a vehicle to help us get both Israel and the
UAR to accept safeguards over their nuclear programs. Much will depend
on whether the treaty emerges with a strong safeguards clause. As soon
as the U.S. is ready to table a draft treaty at the ENDC, we plan to
discuss it with the Israelis and the UAR. We are also exploring ways
of overcoming Israel's suspicions of the IAEA, including the possibility
of getting Israel a seat on the IAEA Board of Governors.
2. Ballistic Missiles. In May last year we raised with
Eshkol our concern over Israel's plans to acquire ballistic missiles.
Eshkol said Israel would not acquire SSM's "for two, maybe three
years." He indicated that if Nasser "abandoned" his missile
program, Israel would do likewise. Since the UAR's program has remained
inactive in the intervening year, we plan to raise this again with Eshkol
in the near future. Our objective is to try to achieve a tacit understanding
with the Israelis and Egyptians for mutual forebearance in the further
development of their SSM programs. If Eshkol is receptive, we are prepared
to approach Nasser.
3. Talks with the Soviets. Our probes of the Soviets
concerning arms control in the Arab-Israel context have elicited little
show of interest thus far. We do not expect that the Soviets will be
receptive to an approach on controlling the supply of conventional weapons.
However, depending on the course of U.S.-Soviet negotiations on the
nonproliferation treaty, we may have a renewed opportunity to take up
the problem of nuclear weapons and missiles in the Near East.
4. Put More Punch Into Our Arms Control Discussions
with the Israelis. We are disappointed not only in the lack of progress
of our arms control discussions with the Israelis but in the lack of
Israeli candor that has characterized them. There is a large area of
Israeli activity and planning that is a closed book to us. During the
coming year we would like to see arms control results linked more directly
to Israel's requests for military and economic aid.
Continuing Intelligence Surveillance. While our inspections
of Dimona can reassure us concerning activities there, they leave open
the possibility of Israeli weapons activity somewhere else in Israel.
For this reason continuing surveillance of Israel by every means at
our disposal must remain a high priority intelligence requirement. We
intend also to keep a watch on Israeli efforts to acquire in other countries
equipment and technology related to nuclear weapon and missile programs.
Nicholas deB. Katzenbach
Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country
File, Israel, Israeli Aid, 5/67. Secret; Exdis. Filed as an attachment
to Document 416. No drafting information appears on the memorandum,
but another copy indicates that it was drafted by Sterner and cleared
in draft by Rochlin, Deputy Assistant Director of ACDA for International
Relations Culver Gleysteen, Raymond L. Garthoff of G/PM, Vladimir Toumanoff
of SOV, Director of Atomic Energy Affairs in SCI Donovan Q. Zook, Edward
A. Padelford of NEA/RA, Director of INR/RNA Granville S. Austin, Bergus,
Battle, and Deputy Assistant Secretary in NEA Stuart W. Rockwell. (National
Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL
27 ARAB-ISR) An undated memorandum from Battle, forwarding the memorandum
for Katzenbach's signature, states that it was prepared at the request
of the White House staff. (Ibid.)
Sources: Foreign
Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, V. 18, Arab-Israeli
Dispute 1964-1967. DC: GPO,
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