Memorandum on U.S. Policy in Light of Leak of Johnson Plan
(October 2, 1962)
This memorandum is written after the leak of the
Johnson Plan to the public, and addresses the two points of view the
U.S. administration could publicly stand by: their support of the plan
or their non-commitment to the plan.
With the leak of the Johnson Plan, there is now bound
to be discussion in the public prints. This is probably an adverse development
so far as the Plan's prospects are concerned, because all parties will
be more reluctant to accept publicly what they might have acquiesced
in privately (an essential element in the Plan).
By the same token the leak may make it easier to let
the Plan die in a welter of conflicting criticism.
In any event, the US will now be under public pressure
to indicate its attitude toward the Plan. What we say, coming after
the Hawk offer (and Yemen), could greatly affect our relations with
Arabs and Israel. We have essentially two options:
(1) Say boldly that we consider the Plan a fair and
equitable basis for discussion. If we didn't, we wouldn't (as a PCC
member) have authorized its submission to the parties. Of course we
can add that the Plan is still a working draft, that it has been definitively
approved by nobody (not even the PCC), and that it should be further
explored by the parties. Saying any less than this might create trouble
with the Arabs. After all, we have written Hussein (and our Ambassadors
have told the UAR, Syria, Lebanon) that we regard the Plan as a fair
and equitable approach.
However, Israelis have passed word three ways that
if we say anything favorable about the Johnson Plan, Israel will feel
compelled to come out and oppose it. Indeed, Golda Meir threatens that
if asked Israel's attitude she'll say flatly it's no good. This would
inevitably lead to a public hassle we'd hate to get into just before
our elections. Moreover, the Arabs would be smart enough to sit back
and let us argue. On the other hand, would the Israelis risk this if
they knew we'd stand firm? Would they want to see us publicly linked
with the Arabs against Israel? Would the Hawk deal effectively blanket
any contention the US was pursuing an anti-Israeli policy? Even so,
once the Israelis publicly opposed the Johnson Plan all chance of selling
it would be gone.
(2) Try and damp down public discussion of the Plan
by adopting a non-committal attitude toward it, arguing that it is improper
for the US to comment on proposals just submitted to the various parties,
and to which Johnson is even now soliciting their reactions. We don't
think it appropriate to comment on the Plan until all parties have had
a chance to explore its meaning. The risk here is that such equivocation
might be taken by the Arabs as a sign of capitulation to Israel; after
all, we've told the Arabs we like the Plan. Therefore, to sustain a
publicly non-committal attitude we ought to tell the Arabs privately
that we haven't changed our views, but want to avoid forcing them or
the Israelis to react publicly. We must tell the Israelis the same thing,
so they won't leak that we've abandoned the Plan.
The first alternative tends to kill the Plan by enhancing
the likelihood of public debate; it also creates a US/Israeli issue
just before elections, though it will gain caste with the Arabs. The
non-committal approach buys us more time to work on Israel, and to let
Arab reactions generate (which may be hostile in any case, thus spreading
the blame). It may at any rate get us through the elections. But it
will require, in my view, some sort of assurances to Arabs (and warnings
to Israelis) that we're not giving up on Johnson Plan. We'll have to
stand firm if we're going to ride this one through.
To give a clear signal to the town on Johnson Plan,
I urge that you approve the following plan of action:
1. We privately stick with the Johnson Plan, while
showing willingness to discuss modifications which might be mutually
acceptable or assurances needed to meet Israeli concerns.
2. We adopt publicly a non-committal attitude along
lines discussed above.
3. We press Israelis not to surface their objections
but to sit back and let Arab reactions mature. We warn Israelis that
if they publicly denounce Plan we'll let them take the full onus.
4. If Israelis lobby against Plan in UN corridors,
Congress, or Jewish Community, State counters with appropriate explanations.
I do not believe that the above course will save the
Johnson Plan. It is in effect dead unless we put great pressure on the
Israelis to buy it. By this time I'm convinced State misreads the Israeli
attitude.
But I do believe that the above course is best suited
to US interests--it preserves our good faith and integrity with both
sides; it neither shows weakness by caving to the Israelis nor permits
the Arabs to accuse us of reneging on our own creation. It buys time
to let the naturally contradictory attitudes of Arabs and Israelis,
plus inter-Arab bickering, generate a petering out of the exercise under
circumstances where we can say we tried.
True, US prestige turns out to be semi-committed to
a non-viable proposition. But our prestige is already committed, and
the loss to us is less if others make the exercise a non-starter than
if we abandon it ourselves./2/
/2/An October 5 report from Kaysen to Bundy contains
the following regarding the situation in the UAR: "This is mainly
the Johnson Plan. If you look at Komer's memoranda you will get a fair
feeling for the state of the play. It is fairly clear that the whole
thing has blown up and that we have been taken for a ride by the Israelis.
At the moment Mike Feldman has been withdrawn from the discussion by
the President. Talks are going to continue between Harman and Talbot
on what can be done on the refugee issue, but it is understood that
the Johnson Plan as such is dead. The only open question is what we
say about it. State is to produce a memo today. The President this morning
approved the line laid down on page 2 of Komer's last memo, October
2, transmitted October 4 [option 2 in the memorandum printed here],
however, we have heard that the Syrians have rejected the plan. If this
is so, the issue may become moot." (Ibid., Meetings and Memoranda
Series, Staff Memoranda, Carl Kaysen)
R.W. Komer
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series,
Palestine, Refugees, Vol. II, 10/62-11/62. Secret. Kaysen forwarded
this memorandum to the President under cover of a note that reads: "You
may be getting a memorandum from the Secretary of State requesting guidance
on what probable position we should take on the Johnson Plan. The attached
from Bob Komer summarizes the situation, which hasn't changed in the
last few days."
Sources: Foreign
Relations of the United States, 1961-1963: Near East, 1962-1963,
V. XVIII. DC: GPO,
2000. |