Circular Telegram on U.S.-Israeli Talks On Security
Threats
(November 13, 1963)
This is a circular telegram from the Department of State to certain
posts providing information on the November 12-13, 1963 U.S.-Israeli talks
on Israeli security concerns and the UAR military threat.
Talks with Israeli representatives on UAR military threat involved two
three-hour sessions under chairmanship Talbot November 12-13. First session
devoted to Israeli presentation consisted half hour general intelligence
assessment UAR order of battle and one-hour discussion UAR missile and
sophisticated weapon capability. Balance on over-all UAR military threat
concentrated heavily upon talks and conventional weapons. UAR missile
threat characterized useless for military targets but capable disrupting
Israeli mobilization effort by strikes upon heavily populated areas. Also
possession missiles might encourage over-confidence in UAR offensive capability
precipitating general conventional and non-conventional attack. Only comment
to query on status Israeli missile program was certain preparatory studies
made, but still need much money, knowledge, and know-how to get into business.
Second session comprised military critique Israeli presentation stressing
1) exaggeration UAR tank and naval threat and 2) US doubts about UAR
missile and sophisticated weapon capabilities. Following discussion
period Talbot made summation:
1. Both sides appear agree UAR missile capability limited.
2. Acquisition missiles by Israel would cause intense UAR effort obtain
Soviet missiles, thus enhancing rather than reducing threat war in Near
East.
3. Resulting cold war polarization in area would cause more difficulties
for Israeli security than does present UAR missile capability.
4. Secretary and President concerned about escalation arms race in
Near East.
5. Any suggestions on how to effect arms limitation welcome.
6. Nasser well aware UAR could not attack Israel without sparking seriously
damaging non-Israeli reaction.
7. Israel has assurances given both publicly and in bilateral official
communications of deep US concern for Israeli security and intent to
safeguard it.
8. If in pursuit this goal US should choose course of aligning itself
with Israel through security guarantee, joint planning and arms buildup,
Arabs would react by seeking similar arrangements with USSR.
9. Resulting cold war polarization detrimental to US security interests
as well as to Israel's.
10. We perceive tacit but growing Arab acceptance of Israel and desire
avoid steps that would reverse this trend.
11. Would hope Israel in addition to military preparedness would see
value in pressing forward toward accommodation with Arabs.
12. US appreciates frank expression Israeli views and would be glad
receive through military attaché channels further pertinent information
Israeli reps indicated they wished supply in response some questions
raised in our critique.
Ambassador Harman responded he appreciated discussion and US concern
for Israel security and would like take away from conference areas of
agreement:
1. There is minimum margin safety below which Israel defense capabilities
must not be permitted to drop.
2. Minimum margin safety for tanks ratio one Israeli to two or three
Arab.
3. Based upon this minimum margin, necessary replace with new tanks
300 out-moded Sherman tanks and acquire additional 200 to meet anticipated
UAR tank build up by 1965.
4. Principle minimum margin safety also applies to Israeli naval defense
requirements.
5. No great difference over facts on UAR missile capability. UAR has
missile, corps experts and working improve weapons in inventory. Economic
cost production unimportant to UAR.
6. Israel fears possession missiles plus military build up in other
areas could trigger UAR offensive.
7. UAR has missiles in production and far more advanced in this field
than Israel.
8. Israel supports concept total disarmament coupled with mutual inspection
but no indication readiness any form disarmament on other side.
9. Israel looks forward to continuous association along lines present
discussion.
Talbot concluded purpose talks not reach agreed conclusions but merely
exchange views on Israeli intelligence presented.
You should disabuse Israeli officials regarding conclusion any agreements
on UAR military capabilities, Israel's needs, or any intent that November
12-13 talks should be base for future discussions.
More detailed report after study transcript talks.
Rusk
Sources: Foreign
Relations of the United States, 1961-1963: Near East, 1962-1963,
V. XVIII. DC: GPO,
2000. |