Memorandum Regarding Concern Over UN Debate
on Arab Refugees
(November 19, 1963)
This is a memorandum from Robert W. Komer
of the National Security Council Staff to
the President's Special Assistant for National
Security Affairs McGeorge Bundy reporting
on the debate in the United
Nations on Arab
Refugees.
McGB--
Another teapot tempest is upon us at the UN on annual Arab refugee
debate. Issue is over mentioning Para. 11 of UN
Resolution 194 (1948)
in annual compromise resolution we sponsor and get through (Para.11
calls for repatriation or compensation of refugees).
Through 1961 we referred directly to Para. 11. Last year under Israeli
pressure we fuzzed issue by referring mainly to Res. 1856, and mentioning
Para. 11 only in passing. Israelis took this as a big victory, claiming
it meant Para. 11 was mentioned in retroactive sense only. Arabs didn't
catch on.
This year, however, Arabs have made a big issue of whether US retreating
from Para. 11. They've introduced their own bad resolution, which we
think could win a 2/3 majority. Israelis have countered with usual "direct
negotiations" gambit.
Last Saturday we decided (Feldman, Schlesinger, myself concurring)
we simply can't afford to drop Para. 11 just now, without breaking faith
with Arabs and sustaining a defeat. Among other things, JFK's 1961 letter
to Arab leaders said we'd search for a refugee solution under Para.
11. Moreover, 1964 would be an Israeli year--on top of SC vote condemning
Syria and Gruening Amendment, we face problem of cutting UNRWA relief
rolls and then Jordan Waters, etc. So best course was to block bad Arab
resolution by agreeing to insert old reference to Para. 11 in ours.
They agreed (NY 2124), and also to drop any effort to amend our version
to include old property custodian para. However, Arabs want Israelis
to agree not to bring direct talks resolution to a vote either. We think
this a good deal, since it almost certainly can't win.
Israelis are wroth, however. Gazit says we're heading for a crisis
in US/Israeli relations. Israelis claim regime will be in trouble with
Knesset because it said this year's refugee talks were "without
preconditions", i.e. without Para. 11. So no further refugee talks
possible if US version goes through. Israelis say we can lick Arab Res.
if we fight all-out, but even so we'd have to abandon Para. 11 and eat
crow.
Despite the likely flak, our strategy seems to be working. With luck
we'll end up with both Arab and Israeli resolutions abandoned for our
own. Feldman seems chiefly concerned by proposed dropping of direct
negotiations resolution (but IO is a better judge than he of whether
it can win). Israelis themselves say their principal concern is that
our statement and if possible resolution don't base themselves solely
on Para.11, but include other less offensive resolutions. This should
be possible.
An alternative is to sidestep the issue, withdrawing our resolution
and abstaining on Arab and Israeli ones. But this lets Arabs win; so
we and Israelis would be even worse off.
State's proposal seems best way to stay evenhanded and minimize losses
on both sides. Rusk has the decision at moment, and I've urged he touch
base with JFK.
RW Komer
Sources: Foreign
Relations of the United States, 1961-1963: Near East, 1962-1963,
V. XVIII. DC: GPO,
2000. |