Israel's Response to U.S. Proposals Regarding Refugee
Debate at UN
(December 4, 1962)
This is a memorandum from the Assistant Secretary
of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Talbot, to Secretary
of State Rusk addressing the Israeli response to U.S. proposals regarding
the refugee debate in
the U.N. General Assembly.
As you know, Harlan Cleveland, Mike Feldman and I met Israeli Ambassador
Harman on December 4 to hear Israel's reaction to our proposals. On
two uncertain points, I telephoned Ambassador Harman after reporting
orally to you. The following sets forth the Israeli replies on the points
sought by the U.S.:
1. Israel will not introduce or support a direct negotiation resolution
for the next two years:
The resolution will be introduced. It will not be pressed to a vote.
Israel is confident of control. Israel cannot commit itself regarding
next year. However, it would undertake to be in close touch with us.
(In my subsequent telephone conversation, I tried out the formula that
"Israel will not put the resolution forward next year unless the
U.S. and Israel find this mutually advantageous." In response,
Harman said he "would not like to make a blanket commitment for
next year in view of the uncertainties of the situation.")
2. Israel will be free to maintain its present private rejection of
the Johnson Plan, but will not attack it publicly, including in GA debate:
Israel has no desire to mention the proposals or any element of them.
"If the development of debate is such as to make this tenable,
this is Israel's position."
3. Israel will resume discussions with the U.S. shortly after the GA
to consider how progress can be made on the refugee question with an
acceptable mixture of repatriation and resettlement. This will include
consideration of any ideas Israel has, of the twelve principles developed
in the Harman-Talbot talks, and of possible ways to resolve the refugee
question bilaterally, i.e., Jordan:
"Within the framework of U.S.-Israel agreement on this package,
and the clarification sought by Israel, Israel accepts this suggestion
and is ready for discussions on the refugee question. The U.S. is well
aware of Israel's attitude toward the preference poll and Paragraph
11. It would be our assumption that these would not be the basis of
discussion. What the Prime Minister told President Kennedy stands, and
this would be the basis. Any agreement between the U.S. and Israel would
also have to be the basis of agreement with the Arabs." (In the
later telephone conversation I said "we foresee these talks as
being without preconditions. Particularly, we understand that there
would not be certain topics excluded from discussions." Harman
replied that he would like to be confident of U.S. understanding that
"Israel has rejected these devices and has the attitude it does
regarding Paragraph 11.")
4. Israel will commit itself to continue to avoid actions along the
border, and to support effective use and improvement of UN instrumentalities
in the area:
"The U.S. has expressed satisfaction at Israel's cooperation on
the border. What Prime Minister Ben Gurion wrote to President Kennedy
on June 24 stands, and is the basis of Israel's approach. (See attached
copy of Ben Gurion's letter.)/3/ The Prime Minister's letter is a clear
indication of the spirit in which Israel shall approach this."
In the meeting with Harman we made clear that, depending on the consideration
of Israel's response by the highest levels of this government, we would
be prepared to do the following. Harman sought the "clarifications"
indicated.
1. We would urge Johnson to submit as non-substantive a report as possible
to the PCC.
2. We would support a PCC report that does not endorse the Johnson
Plan. (Harman sought clarification that the report would not endorse
or refer to the Johnson Plan or Johnson elements. He also sought to
persuade us that the Johnson report regardless of its nature, should
not be transmitted by the PCC or made public. We replied that, if the
report takes the form we hope, it will not matter whether it is or is
not conveyed by the PCC.)
3. We would sponsor a GA resolution commending the PCC for its work
carried out pursuant to Paragraph 11; direct the PCC to continue its
endeavors; and extend UNRWA for one year. (Harman sought to persuade
us that there should be no mention of Paragraph 11. We said we consider
the citation of Paragraph 11 unavoidable. We will try to keep the citation
in its present innocuous form (i.e., unrelated to the mention of future
PCC activity), but cannot guarantee this since consultation regarding
our draft will necessarily be a multilateral process.
4. We would also maintain our past position against recognition of
a Palestine entity, reconstitution of the PCC, and the Arab custodian
proposal.
By way of further clarification Harman sought assurance that U.S. statements
in debate would not refer to the Johnson Plan or elements thereof. We
said our statements would necessarily be "derivative" from
what had gone before.
Sources: Foreign
Relations of the United States, 1961-1963: Near East, 1962-1963,
V. XVIII. DC: GPO,
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