Israel’s Reply to U.S. Proposal on Refugees
(December 5, 1962)
This is a memorandum from Robert W. Komer of the
National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy discussing the Israeli reply to the package proposal on Arab
refugees and future U.N. courses of action.
Israel's reply to our package proposal on Arab refugees
confronts us with a basic decision as to whether the US ought to battle
uphill any farther on this issue. The Israelis say in effect they will
talk as long as we want about refugees but will not accept any plan
involving expression of refugee preferences (the heart of the Johnson
approach).
If we now temporize further with Israel (when they
know you personally signed off on the above proposal), the Israelis
will conclude we've in effect given up on our refugee approach. The
only way to forestall this conclusion is if in the UN and in your talk
with Golda Meir you make our stand crystal clear.
Before doing so, however, you'll have to be convinced
that pursuing a Johnson-type approach any further is worth the headaches
involved. Here is an initiative which at best rates only a 50-50 chance
of success. Even to get these odds the US would have to use forms of
pressure on Israel which would entail a real domestic backlash here.
And if we could deliver Israel, we have no assurance that the key Arabs
will agree. Finally, even if we got a refugee program started it could
easily get short-circuited by another Arab-Israeli flare-up.
If we decide to disengage from any such problematical
exercise, we ought to do so now (though in such a way as to make Arabs
and Israelis--not us--share the blame). Before we close the book, however,
let me argue the larger case. This issue has been presented to you too
much in terms of short run tactics instead of overall rationale.
In essence, the issue is whether the US should accept
the costs involved in a major attempt to move toward settlement of the
Arab-Israeli problem. Like Trieste, Kashmir, and so many others, here
is one of those intractable problems which are rarely ever solved by
the parties themselves. Nor do they fade away with time; instead they
tend to keep eating so at the parties that, in the absence of an external
catalyst, they often end up in war.
Arab-Israeli disputes have caused the US so many headaches
over the past 15 years, and are liable to cause so many more if not
moved toward settlement, that the difficulties of starting up the Johnson
Plan seem pale by comparison. There are few issues on which the US has
had to expend more capital, political and financial, over the years.
It is precisely because of our special interest in
Israel that any move which offers reasonable prospect of starting a
trend toward settlement seems worth a try. What is the alternative?
It is continued bickering between Israel and Arabs with periodical flare-ups
which put us squarely in the middle. We face another one next year over
the Jordan waters. Meanwhile, the refugee problem grows worse; a million
Arab refugees breed and agitate in their camps, kept in sullen order
only by a largely US dole.
Hence an Arab-Israeli settlement is as much in Israel's
interest as ours. How long does Israel want to live as a semi-garrison
state, surrounded by a million discontented refugees, and forced to
divert a high proportion of its assets (and our aid) to security needs?
The trouble is that the Israelis feel there is only
one way to achieve such a settlement, i.e. to keep bloodying the Arabs
every time they get mean. Israel has lived so long within a hostile
Arab ring that it is afraid to show weakness. It relies on time. But
time may be against it; its tough policy leads to repeated minor clashes
which only serve to feed Arab hostility, not lessen it.
More important, the secular trend in the Near East
is against Israel. In another decade Nasser and others may well acquire
at long last the resources to risk a war. Our threatened intervention
would still be a powerful deterrent, but such action might cost us a
lot at that juncture. We will also find ourselves giving a lot more
than Hawks to maintain a local deterrent balance.
If we want instead to move the Arab-Israeli dispute
toward settlement, the refugee issue is the only one of its many aspects
susceptible of movement toward solution at this point. And we have no
better lever to this end than the Johnson Plan.
It is no panacea, but is at least a carefully reasoned
scheme evolved from the long and painful history of past attempts to
deal with the refugee issue. One need only look at this history to conclude
that Johnson's indirect approach is about the only one with any chance
of success.
Israel itself would be delighted if such an approach
actually resulted in resettling nine-tenths of the refugees (with us
footing the bill). The Israelis are unwilling, however, to risk the
experiment. They fear that far more than one in ten refugees would opt
(at least initially) for repatriation, and that Israel, when it refused
them, would be arraigned before the UN. So they won't allow any expression
of preference; they insist instead that the Arab states agree beforehand
to a 10-1 ratio. But only a plan based on tacit Arab acquiescence, rather
than formal agreement, has a prayer.
We have told the Israelis we will stand by them if
the plan doesn't work. We have in effect offered to guarantee Israel's
security. But even on these terms Israel is unwilling to take the short-term
political risks involved in seeking even a major long-term gain. BG
boggles at the domestic political risk to his shaky coalition if he
tries to push such a plan through.
In their efforts to short circuit the Johnson Plan,
the Israelis have mounted a pressure campaign with which it is almost
impossible for State to cope. Since this is an issue where our foreign
policy goals must necessarily be formulated with an eye to our domestic
flank, they take full advantage of this fact. I can't blame them for
doing so, but in this case I believe they do themselves and us a disservice.
Your Administration has done more to satisfy Israeli
security preoccupations than any of its predecessors. We have promised
the Israelis Hawks, reassured them on the Jordan waters, given a higher
level of economic aid (to permit extensive arms), and given various
security assurances.
In return, we have gotten nothing from our efforts--both
in Israel's own interest--to improve the UN peace machinery and to move
forward on refugees. The score is 4-0. In fact, the Israelis have visibly
retreated from Ben Gurion's May 1961 statements to you and those to
Mike last August. They are unwilling even to talk about the Johnson
approach.
In my frank opinion, our tactical handling of the Plan
has been poor. We should not have launched it in August, nor have given
the Hawk assurances beforehand, nor have let Joe Johnson put out a detailed
plan before we had nailed down the basic principles. Be this as it may,
we may be making a mistake (and Israel an even bigger one) to let the
Johnson Plan die at this point.
If our long term interests (and Israel's) justify attempting
to move toward Arab-Israeli settlement, the refugee issue is where to
begin, and the Johnson approach the only viable one. While no one is
optimistic that this approach will work, no other plan has even its
chance of success. Hence, as on Kashmir and similar issues, there may
be fewer risks to us in pressing for solutions than in letting such
dangerous issues fester on and on.
Another reason for moving ahead is that for the first
time we may have leverage with the key Arab--Nasser. We also have a
new regime in Saudi Arabia and the Jordanians are our prisoners. Our
overall prestige in the Middle East is higher than it has been in years.
Thus circumstances have never been more propitious for a refugee initiative,
if only we could get the Israelis off the dime.
To do so, however, we have to do something we have
never done before, except briefly at Suez. We have to pressure Israel
to come around. According to State's Middle East experts, we have never
been in a better position to do so. We have just promised Israel Hawks,
it needs our support on the Jordan waters, and it might well be susceptible
to a combination of pressures and further reassurances on our part.
I would add, however, that Mike Feldman (who may know far better) flatly
disagrees.
Whether we push hard now or wait until after the GA
is irrelevant if we decide (and tell Israel so) that we are not giving
up. But unless we make a firm decision, we are only prolonging the agony.
A clear signal is needed one way or the other, and it is one only you
can give.
R.W. Komer
Sources: Foreign
Relations of the United States, 1961-1963: Near East, 1962-1963,
V. XVIII. DC: GPO,
2000. |