Discussion of Israel's Intent to Divert the Jordan
Waterway
(February 24, 1962)
This memorandum discusses Israel's decision to divert the Jordanian
waterway, and the consequences that may arise
from already hostile surrounding nations.
SUBJECT
Jordan Waters
On February 21 Syrian Prime Minister Dawalibi handed Ambassador Knight
a note protesting Israel's intention to divert Jordan River water to
the Negev./2/ Similar notes were presented to the other three Security
Council members who have diplomatic missions in Damascus: the U.K.,
the USSR, and Rumania.
The Syrian note is the most recent development
in a flurry of speculation and concern on
this problem which has swept the area in
the past two weeks, centering on reports
that Israel will commence diversion of the
Jordan in the near future. We regard these
as without foundation, having no evidence
of any change in the timetable of Israel's
announced plans to commence limited diversion
in August or September 1963. We trace the
present flurry, rather, to two factors: (a)
Cairo's propaganda needling of Syria and
Jordan, following dissolution of the union
with Syria, for alleged acquiescence in Israel's "seizure of Arab water",
and (b) the desire of Syria and Jordan, in countering this, to prove
their "Arabism" by a show of belligerence.
This may have, for them, the added advantage
of screening two potentially constructive
moves: Jordan's request for IBRD assistance
in water development programs, particularly
construction of the Maqarin Dam on the Yarmuk
(in connection with which Sir William Iliff
and General Wheeler will visit the area in
mid-March), and the presumably related reactivation
of a Syria-Jordan joint commission to study
Yarmuk development.
Although aware of the probable motivation of the Syrian note and of
Jordan's bellicose statements during the recent visit to Amman of Arab
League Secretary-General Hassouna, we would not like to see these actions
lead us into a Security Council debate at this time. While scrupulously
avoiding a conspicuous public role, we would like to do what we can
to take some of the heat out of this issue at all points in the circuit.
With this objective, we have already undertaken or plan the following
steps:
1. We have suggested informally to the Israel Embassy that Israel might
think about ways in which, over a period of time, it might spread the
word in the press and in U.N. corridors as to the scheduling of its
water program, its intention to adhere to equitable (i.e., Johnston
Plan) allocations, its willingness to discuss unified development at
any time; its readiness to accept international observation (provided
the other riparians do), and the already great contribution which its
programs and research (Hula drainage, reduction in evaporation, salt
spring capping, etc.) are making to the Valley's water resources.
2. Ambassador Meyer has given the Lebanese strong advice regarding
the need for moderation.
3. Ambassador Macomber has by now received instructions to talk to
King Hussein and Foreign Minister Nuseibeh./3/
4. On February 26 we will talk to the Egyptian
Embassy in low-key, pointing out that Cairo's
continual needling of Syria and Jordan is
hardly consistent with the UAR's stated desire
to put the Palestine problem "in the icebox".
5. We are instructing Ambassador Knight (Tab A)/4/ to make oral reply
to the Syrian Prime Minister. We would rather not reply in writing but
may have to consider this later, depending, to some extent, on how the
Soviets handle their response.
6. We have informed the British Embassy here (Tab B)/5/ of the several
steps we have in mind. We have suggested the Foreign Office consider
holding off for a few days on any U.K. reply, oral or written, to the
Syrians. We think this delay would be helpful in keeping our collective
response as casual and quiet as possible.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central
Files, 684A.85322/2-2462. Confidential. Drafted
by Crawford and cleared by Sisco (IO/UNP).
A note attached to the source text on McGhee's
stationery reads: "Mr. McGhee commented:
'Very good. This is good preventive action.'"
/2/See footnote 2, Document 198.
/3/Reference is presumably to a February
12 letter from Strong to Macomber. Strong's
letter and Macomber's response of March 6
are in Department of State, NEA/IAI Files:
Lot 70 D 229, Jordan Waters Outgoing.
/4/Document 198.
/5/Document 199.
Sources: Foreign
Relations of the United States, 1961-1963: Near East, 1962-1963,
V. XVIII. DC: GPO,
2000. |