Memorandum on Concern With Potential Backlash
From Israel's Reprisal Raid on
Lake Tiberias
(March 20, 1962)
This memorandum relates
to Israeli-Syrian clashes, the grievous
impact the Israeli actions could have on
maintaining tranquility in the region,
and the U.S.'s hope to forestall further
tensions and/or a counterattack.
SUBJECT
Israel's Reprisal Raid on Syrian Positions Overlooking Lake Tiberias
PARTICIPANTS
Ambassador Avraham Harman of Israel
Mr. Shaul Bar-Haim, Counselor, Embassy of Israel
NEA--Assistant Secretary Phillips Talbot
NEA--Mr. James M. Ludlow, United Nations Adviser
NEA/NE--Acting Director Nicholas G. Thacher
NEA/NE--William L. Hamilton
Assistant Secretary Talbot told Ambassador Harman that we had watched
with increasing dismay the recent Israel-Syrian clashes on Lake Tiberias
culminating in Israel's retaliatory raid on Syrian gun positions March
16-17./2/ He reminded the Ambassador that in a recent conversation the
latter had asked Mr. Talbot what effect uneasiness and tensions in Syria
might have on the IBRD mission to Jordan and Dr. Joseph Johnson's forthcoming
visit to the Middle East as Special Representative of the PCC. He said
he is convinced that events of the past weekend have probably hurt the
prospects of the two missions a great deal more than anything that may
have gone before. While not yet informed of UNTSO findings in the conflict,
Mr. Talbot said, he is aware that the Israel Government considered itself
under considerable provocation. For the first time in several years
Israel has crossed international frontiers and applied force of much
greater magnitude than that directed against Israel. He said he is certain
the Israelis are aware that regardless of the provocation under which
Israel acted, the United States continues very much opposed to the employment
of such raids.
The raid might not chasten the Syrians. In view of the Syrian Government's
uncertainty as to its strength, it might react unpredictably in a very
violent manner. Hoping to forestall this possibility, the U.S. has already
spoken to the Syrians at the highest level, urging them to consider
the military phase of the dispute as closed, and to cooperate fully
with UNTSO.
Mr. Talbot said he did not want to over-emphasize the importance of
the situation, but nevertheless believes it has the seeds of very serious
disturbances. The modus vivendi of the past few years is threatened,
and it is difficult not to recall the tragedies of 1956 and 1958 and
the problems they created for all principles.
Ambassador Harman expressed gratitude for Mr. Talbot's views, but said
he wished to react immediately, which he did with vigor. He said that
at least ten days ago the Department had been apprised of the gravity
with which Israel regarded the worsening situation on the lake, which
he described as 100% in Israel's territory--the whole lake and its shore.
Mr. Ludlow interposed an objection, informing the Ambassador that the
United States does not accept this Israel assumption of unlimited sovereignty.
Remarking that he would return to this question later, Ambassador Harman
said the Syrians had broken the peace repeatedly from the beginning
of February molesting Israel fishermen pursuing their tasks on the lake.
Each time, he said, the Israelis had gone to UNTSO, suggesting that
it should arrange for additional U.N. observation posts in the troubled
area for better surveillance and control of the problem. He enumerated
a number of violations: February 1 and 7--rifle fire directed at Israel
fishermen; February 10--machine gun and rifle fire; February 15--machine
gun fire against fishermen; February 25--machine gun fire directed at
Israel police patrol; and February 27 and March 7--machine gun fire.
On March 8, according to the Ambassador, the Syrians made use for the
first time of recoilless rifles, bringing a turning point in Israel's
appraisal of its security problem. In any rational military establishment,
according to Ambassador Harman, a recoilless rifle is fired only on
order from a military command. The Israelis could only infer either
that anarchy prevails in the Syrian units situated above the lake or
the recoilless rifles were put into play by direction of the Government
of Syria. At that time, the Israelis summoned UNTSO representatives
and asked that they convey to the Syrian Government in Damascus Israel's
opinion that the Syrians were playing with fire.
Mr. Talbot suggested that instead of using UNTSO to send messages the
MAC machinery might have been brought into use.
Ambassador Harman said that for weeks the Israelis had watched the
Syrians strengthening their positions overlooking Tiberias. The situation
remained very serious. United States concern is shared by the Government
of Israel. A special meeting of the cabinet "this morning"
had considered the implications of another artillery attack on an Israel
police boat 1,000 meters out on the lake in which two policemen had
been wounded.
Turning to the defense of Israel's use of reprisal raids, Ambassador
Harman said that in quality and implication there is no difference between
shooting or walking across a border. Israel can only regard gunfire
as an act of aggression or war, and its defense against such acts is
dictated by the military logic of Israel's situation. Israel's repeated
appeals to the United Nations and the Secretary General have not produced
a solution. Israel is as reluctant as anyone else to see the circumstances
of 1956 reproduced, but for Israel to have its citizens and settlements
under fire is an intolerable situation which the United Nations had
been unable to correct.
Mr. Talbot commented that corrective efforts had been begun. The United
States has been in close touch with the United Nations and had appealed
to the Syrians to make full use of MAC facilities, which are in the
locality for the express purpose of correcting violations of the Armistice
Agreements. The United States is very much afraid that the Near East
may be trembling on the brink of a return to 1956 and the misfortune
which it brought to all parties.
Mr. Talbot added that the Israelis undoubtedly have labored under serious
provocations. However, experience does not establish that this kind
of reprisal is the way to deal with the problem. Similar efforts in
the past have not always turned out as planned. Violence invites violent
responses and greater violence still.
Ambassador Harman said that if Israel is put into a situation in which
it is obliged to deal directly with a threat to its security, the problems
of defense become objective and technical. Syrian guns commanded the
entire lake and adjoining settlements. When it was decided to clean
them out, the troops could not be sent out without the tools required.
Mr. Talbot asked rhetorically if the Israelis, should the shooting
continue, be tempted to take and occupy the high ground, which might
produce a united Arab reaction?
Ambassador Harman said all that is necessary is for the Syrians to
stop shooting. He attempted to draw an analogy between Israel's retaliation
and U.S. involvement in South Viet-Nam, where the U.S. is steadily "escalating"
its involvement. Mr. Talbot pointed out there is considerable difference
in the two controversies. No frontiers have been crossed in Viet-Nam.
As in Malaya, it is a matter of subduing guerrillas within a state.
Nevertheless, according to Ambassador Harman, the Syrians have got
to be persuaded to stop shooting. The Israelis can live with threats
and taunts and also can live with the fact that Arab doctrine still
considers that a state of war prevails. Israel has long ceased to hope
for an early relaxation of Arab attitudes but it is not prepared to
tolerate being made a target.
Mr. Talbot agreed that the fighting must be brought to a stop, but
he could not accept Israel's use of retaliatory raids.
The conversation concluded with Ambassador Harman repeating that he
would report the Department's views to his Government but make clear
he did not accept the Department's thesis, nor expect his Government
to./3/
/1/Source: Department of
State, Central Files, 683.84A/3-2062. Confidential.
Drafted by Hamilton on March 21.
/2/For a report on the raid,
see Document 226. Reports from the Embassies
in Tel Aviv and Damascus concerning the incidents
are in Department of State, Central File
683.84A. On March 17, the Department of State
instructed the Embassy in Damascus (telegram
383) and the Embassy in Tel Aviv (telegram
547) to seek a meeting at the ministerial-level
to counsel restraint and urge full cooperation
with the UNTSO. (Ibid., 324.84/3-1762)
/3/The Department of State
transmitted a summary of this conversation
to the Embassies in Tel Aviv, Damascus, and
several other Near Eastern and European posts
in circular telegram 1594, March 20. The
Department instructed the Embassy in Tel
Aviv to seek another meeting with Foreign
Minister Meir, "stressing in particular: Our deep concern at revival
hostilities in Tiberias area and our conviction Israel's interests best
served by determined effort make maximum use UN machinery. USG has been
and remains strongly opposed to concept of heavy retaliatory raids.
US suggests, for example, Israel position might be materially improved
by meeting ISMAC. Decisions latter represent moral deterrent as well
as important point reference in case issue eventually given SC consideration."
(Ibid., 683.84A/3-2062)
Sources: Foreign
Relations of the United States, 1961-1963: Near East, 1962-1963,
V. XVIII. DC: GPO,
2000. |