Rusk Memo To Kennedy On Arab Refugees
(March 28, 1963)
This is a memorandum from Secretary of State Rusk
to President Kennedy addressing
the status of the Palestinian
refugee issue and future U.S. courses of action.
1. The Situation
Our efforts to advance the Arab refugee problem toward solution have
now reached a crossroads: (a) the Arab governments, having objections
to the Johnson proposals and fearing their acceptance would constitute
tacit recognition of Israel, but not wishing to bear the onus of outright
rejection, have kept relatively quiet and are maintaining freedom of
maneuver; (b) the Arab refugees are reported by qualified observers
to be showing interest in the prospect of receiving compensation and
to be largely in favor of resettlement rather than opting to live under
a Jewish government; and (c) in private Israel has flatly rejected the
Johnson approach or anything deriving therefrom, has scorned the utility
of the Harman-Talbot talks that sought to find common ``building blocks"
for a refugee settlement, but has avoided clear public rejection of
the Johnson Plan.
In our discussions with the parties we have not directly supported
Johnson's proposals but have limited ourselves to describing their merits
as we see them and commending them to the careful attention of the Parties.
2. Objectives
a) Primary. Resolution of the Arab refugee problem over a period of
years on the basis of a reasonable amount of repatriation and a large
amount of resettlement with compensation.
b) Fall-back. Freedom to cease active support of Paragraph 11 of Resolution
194 as a result of rejection of the Johnson proposals by both the Arabs
and Israel or by the Arabs only and to move at a time of our choosing
toward disengagement from the Arab refugee issue.
3. Possible Course of Action
Two acceptable courses of action are available: (a) we can give up,
or (b) we can decide it to be in our interest to seek seriously to gain
the acquiescence of the Parties to a process roughly along the lines
charted by Johnson and our bilateral negotiations with Israel. The latter
course would require engaging our influence with both the Arabs and
Israel, but we would be obliged to "lean on" Israel particularly
hard because the process envisioned by Johnson cannot begin unless Israel
changes its position from rejection to acquiescence. Likewise, our fall-back
objective becomes more difficult of achievement if Israel does not acquiesce.
Whatever our decision, the principles of the Johnson approach should
be made public at some time so that they become a part of the Parties'
thinking in the future just as Eric Johnston's unsuccessful Jordan Valley
plan has been a determining element in projects for the development
of the Jordan waters.
4. Pro's and Con's of Giving Up
By giving up we would avoid fully engaging United States prestige in
a project which at best has only small chance of succeeding, and we
would avoid creating stresses in our relations with Israel and to a
lesser extent with the Arabs. If in the process of giving up we were
successful in achieving our fall-back objective we would be in a position
to disengage when and if circumstances permit.
But if we give up now, rising domestic pressures for disengagement
may rule out another major effort to find an equitable solution involving
repatriation of a reasonable number of refugees to Israel. In any event
a new major effort based on equity probably could not be cranked up
for five or six years (the last major effort was in 1955-56). In all
fairness, the Arabs should not be forced to resettle all the refugees
unless they have refused a reasonable proposition. If we stop our effort
now, the Arabs will know that Israel is blocking us. As a result (a)
our image of even-handedness as between Israel and the Arabs will be
tarnished, and (b) our effectiveness in dealing with the Arabs on other
Arab-Israel issues such as the Jordan waters will be impaired. Further,
if we give up now, we shall have greater difficulty in achieving our
fall-back objective without transparently forcing Arab rejection. Also,
by giving up we would clear the way for Israel to press its troublesome
direct negotiations resolution and for the Arabs to urge reconstitution
of the PCC and establishment of a custodian for Arab properties in Israel.
Finally, if Israel defeats us on this issue, Israel will be encouraged
to believe it can defeat us on other important issues such as improvement
in the effectiveness of UNTSO.
5. Pro's and Con's of Leaning on Israel to Acquiesce
Your Administration is pledged actively to seek progress in ending
the Arab-Israel conflict. The present PCC initiative, which is a step
in this direction, was undertaken at the instance of the United States
Government and was launched by despatch of your letters of May 11, 1961,
to six Arab leaders and your talk with Ben-Gurion on May 30, 1961. Given
the central role of the refugee problem in the Arab-Israel conflict,
there is merit in mounting a full-scale effort to resolve it. The problem
becomes more pressing each year with the growth in the number of refugees
and their discontent, and the rising impatience of contributor nations
to get out from under the financial burdens of supporting the refugees.
Ben-Gurion agreed with you that a solution on the twin bases of resettlement
with compensation and repatriation was "worth a try". Yet
Israel so far has refused to acquiesce in proposals which would enable
a try to be made despite our far-reaching efforts to meet Israel's vital
concerns. (In this connection, I recommend you read Enclosure 1.0/)
There is general consensus, including domestic Jewish leaders, that
Israel can accept 100,000 Arab refugees without endangering its security.
If Israel acquiesces, any failure to achieve progress will clearly be
attributable to the Arabs and will open the door to United States and
United Nations disengagement.
Generation of influence strong enough to move Israel from a position
of rejection to one of acquiescence will create stresses in our relations
with Israel, with a reflection of these stresses in the attitude of
the domestic supporters of Israel toward the Administration. Creation
of the stresses may bring no immediate benefits in terms of progress
on the refugee issue (but would facilitate achievement at least of our
fall-back position).
If we do decide to "lean on" Israel, we would propose also
to exert on the Arabs, to encourage their acquiescence, those limited
pressures available to us, such as hinting at a change in our attitude
toward the direct negotiations resolution, reduction of financial support
for UNRWA, and movement toward disengagement from the refugee issue.
6. Consequences of Failure
a) Failure of a strong line with Israel. If you take the decision to
"lean on" Israel but Israel does not cooperate despite the
pressures and the present favorable conjunction of circumstances, our
ability to induce Israel's cooperation in other courses of action we
consider useful would be correspondingly reduced.
b) Failure of a strong line with the Arabs. We believe that failure
to obtain Arab acquiescence need not result in any marked change in
the nature of our relations with the Arab states.
c) Failure of a strong line to achieve progress. We believe that engagement
of United States prestige in an effort that eventually fails to solve
the Arab refugee problem will not be damaging to the United States.
To the contrary, the international community is likely to applaud our
attempt and will be more likely to go along with the withdrawal of our
support from Paragraph 11.
7. Conclusion
Your decision is required whether it is in the over-all United States
interest to pursue seriously the PCC initiative on the Arab refugee
problem understanding that (a) there is only a limited possibility of
achieving our primary objective; (b) it will be necessary to "lean
on" both parties--Israel probably harder than the Arabs--to gain
acquiescence; but (c) if no progress is made, we would at least be able
to achieve our fall-back objective under which it would be possible
in due course to disengage from or modify our existing commitments on
the refugee issue.
If you decide that the United States should throw added weight behind
the PCC initiative, we recommend that you (a) inform Mrs. Meir of this
fact and request that Israel take no public action either in the coming
General Assembly debate or elsewhere which would embarrass the United
States or Johnson, (b) make clear to her that following the General
Assembly debate the United States will expect there to be meaningful
consultations under the aegis of the PCC on the refugee issue, using
the conceptual framework which Johnson's work has established, and (c)
advise her that you are displeased at Israel's lack of reciprocity on
a matter of major importance despite the numerous benefits received
from the United States.
If you decide, however, that we should give up the PCC initiative,
we recommend that you (a) inform Mrs. Meir only that we look to Israel
to do nothing in the General Assembly debate that would embarrass either
the United States or Johnson, (b) state our expectation that Israel
will honor its commitment not to introduce the direct negotiations resolution,
and (c) express to her your dissatisfaction with Israel's attitude in
dealing with us on this matter.
Whatever decision you take, we recommend you receive Dr. Johnson prior
to initiation of the General Assembly debate on the refugee item.
Dean Rusk
Sources: Foreign
Relations of the United States, 1961-1963: Near East, 1962-1963,
V. XVIII. DC: GPO,
2000. |