CIA Memorandum on Consequences of Israel Acquiring
a Nuclear Capability
(March 6, 1963)
This is a memorandum from the CIA Board
of National Estimates addressing
the consequences of the Israeli acquisition
of nuclear capability.
The most general consequence would be substantial damage to the US and
Western position in the Arab world. However much the US expressed disapproval
of Israel's achievement, it would be difficult to avoid an increased tendency
for the political confrontation in the Middle East to take the form of
the Bloc and the Arabs against Israel and its friends in the West.
Implications for Israeli Policy
1. Even though Israel already enjoys a clear military superiority over
its Arab adversaries, singly or combined, acquisition of a nuclear capability
would greatly enhance Israel's sense of security. In this circumstance,
some Israelis might be inclined to adopt a moderate and conciliatory
posture in order to allay as far as possible the world-wide concern
arising from the further proliferation of nuclear weapons. A few might
even hope to reach a settlement of the long controversy with the Arabs,
by negotiating magnanimously from their new position of strength.
2. We believe it much more likely, however, that Israel's policy toward
its neighbors would become more rather than less tough. This is not
to say that Israel would forthwith make war on the Arabs; we think this
extremely unlikely. It would, however, seek to exploit the psychological
advantages of its nuclear capability to intimidate the Arabs and to
prevent them from making trouble on the frontiers. It would probably
feel freer than it does now to take vigorous retaliatory action against
border harassments when they did occur. And it would probably make propaganda
underlining the impotence of the principal Arab governments in the face
of Israeli power, and would thereby seek to compound Arab frustrations
and to promote disunity in the Arab world.
3. In dealing with the US, Israel would make the most of the almost
inevitable Arab tendency to look to the Bloc for assistance against
the added Israeli threat, arguing that in terms of both strength and
reliability Israel clearly was the only worthwhile friend of the US
in the area. It would use all the means at its command to persuade the
US to acquiesce in, and even to support, its possession of nuclear capability.
Israel could be expected to use the argument that this possession entitled
it to participate in all international negotiations respecting nuclear
questions and disarmament.
Reaction of the Arabs
4. Arab reaction to the revelation of an Israeli nuclear capability
would be one of profound dismay and frustration. Responsible Arab leaders
might appreciate the political factors that would work against actual
Israeli use of its nuclear weapons, but such considerations would not
greatly impress even the more sophisticated, and in most circles would
mean nothing at all. There would probably be a period of highly emotional
outbursts--of inflammatory speeches and writings, local disturbances,
riots and acts of violence directed against the real or presumed friends
and accessories of Israel, and attempts to bring about some sort of
international action tending to redress the situation. The Arabs are
united in their hatred of Israel, and would share a common fear of any
Israeli nuclear capability. We do not believe, however, that they would
prove able to act in any more unified or coordinated fashion than in
the past.
5. Among the principal targets of Arab resentment would be the US.
At present many Arab governments consider the US as the one power which
could, if it chose, prevent the development of an Israeli nuclear capability;
this consideration probably plays some part in forming Arab attitudes
and policies toward the US. Once the Israeli nuclear capability became
a fact, a few Arab leaders might still argue that since the US could
restrain Israel from using the weapons it therefore ought not to be
antagonized. But we think that this counsel would be far outweighed
by feelings of resentment and betrayal. In view of past US statements
and positions, charges of US complicity in the Israeli achievement would
be widely made and widely believed in the Arab world. The anti-US sentiments
implicit in certain Arab nationalist doctrines would be strengthened.
US influence with the Arabs, limited at best, would be drastically reduced.
6. It is possible, though we do not think it very likely, that Arab
resentment against the US would lead to the confiscation of important
US properties in the area, or to their destruction by local acts of
violence. Arab leaders would probably be against such acts for economic
reasons, and would probably be able to prevent them. It might be, however,
that the intensity of public demand for some considerable retaliatory
action would be so great that the leaders could not overrule it. Many
Arabs would not stop to inquire whether the opportunities for retaliation
which presented themselves were likely to be profitable.
7. Yet with all this outcry the Arabs would be basically frustrated.
No really satisfactory course of action would be open to them to counter
the Israeli achievement. Nasser might be tempted to strike at Dimona,
but would probably be deterred by the fear that Israeli retaliation
would destroy him before international peace-keeping machinery could
intervene to suppress the conflict. The nationalist leaders would doubtless
try to work up a high degree of international pressure to restrain Israel
from aggressive action. They would probably attempt to persuade the
great powers to force Israel to submit its nuclear capability to international
control--an attempt which would almost certainly be unsuccessful. Nasser
would contemplate, and might embark upon, a nuclear weapons program
of his own, with what technical help he could beg or hire from abroad;
but this would at best be a lengthy and expensive enterprise, highly
provocative to Israel. The principal advantage in the short term would
be to give Nasser something to make speeches about. In his efforts to
restore Arab morale, Nasser might claim to have nonnuclear weapons of
mass destruction--chemical or biological--and might even make an effort
to develop some capability along these lines.
8. The obvious recourse of the Arabs would be to turn to the Bloc for
assistance or assurance against the new Israeli threat. We think it
virtually certain that Nasser and other Arab nationalists would take
this course, yet it would be distasteful and unsatisfactory to them.
On the one hand, they would be apprehensive of compromising their independence
or their neutrality by submitting themselves too much to the Soviets;
on the other, for reasons set forth in the next section, they would
almost certainly be disappointed in the response which the Soviets would
make.
Soviet Reactions
9. Arab pressures for Bloc help would present a number of opportunities
to the Soviets, together with some problems. We do not believe that
the USSR would be willing to provide Arab governments with nuclear weapons,
if only because of the difficulty of extending to such regimes what
it is unwilling to give to its own satellites. We doubt also that the
USSR would give the Arabs any substantial assistance in developing nuclear
weapons of their own; the Soviets would almost certainly prefer to exploit
the situation to increase Arab dependence on them, rather than to create
an independent Arab nuclear capability.
10. It is conceivable that the Soviets might place nuclear weapons
on Arab territory, retaining them under Soviet control. This might involve
no more than a few bombs which could be dropped by Egyptian aircraft,
but we think that the Soviets would see some risk and no particular
advantage in a program of this scale. Or, it might go so far as the
establishment of missile bases, with an extensive Soviet military presence.
Such a course we believe to be extremely unlikely, both because it would
offer no particular military advantage to the Soviets, and because the
Arabs themselves would almost certainly not want foreign bases in their
territory, even in the circumstances postulated.
11. The Soviets would, however, see plenty of opportunity for winning
political advantage. According to their habit, they would seek to please
the Arabs with resounding declarations of sympathy and support, and
with dire threats against Israel or any other power that might dare
to use military force against an Arab state. Experience from the time
of the Suez affair suggests that these manifestations would indeed win
friends and influence in the Arab world. If the Israelis refrained from
attacking the Arabs with major military force (as we believe they would),
the Soviets might even persuade many Arabs that they had in fact been
protected from destruction solely by the exercise of Soviet power. In
such fashion, without involving themselves in dangerous commitments,
the Soviets would substantially enhance their influence and position
throughout the Middle East, and perhaps find the basis for a firmer
Bloc-Arab alignment against the West than they have so far been able
to achieve.
For the Board of National Estimates:
Sherman Kent
Chairman
Sources: Foreign
Relations of the United States, 1961-1963: Near East, 1962-1963,
V. XVIII. DC: GPO,
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