Account of the Lake Tiberias
Incident and the U.S.'s Involvement
(April 18, 1962)
This is a memorandum is
from the Deptrtment of State to the President's
Special Assisatnt for National Security,
regarding Israel's use of force against Syria
and the Syrian government's complaints in
relation to the Lake Tiberias incident.
Memorandum From the
Department of State Executive Secretary (Battle)
to the President's Special Assistant for
National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/
SUBJECT
Security Council Consideration of the Lake Tiberias Incidents
Mr. Feldman requested Assistant Secretary Cleveland
to provide the White House with a recapitulation of the recent Security
Council consideration of the Israeli-Syrian controversy, with appropriate
material which could be drawn upon in response to complaints and inquiries.
Nature of the Complaints
The Syrian complaint centered on an Israeli raid in
force, launched from within the Demilitarized Zone on the night of March
16/17. Israel counter-claimed a) that Israeli fishermen and police patrol
boats on Lake Tiberias had been fired upon by the Syrians and b) that
Israel's political independence had been threatened in statements by
high officials of the Syrian Government.
Background
The Lake Tiberias region is a particularly sensitive
one because: a) Syria has traditionally been particularly and vigorously
anti-Israeli and is determined to resist Israeli encroachments in the
Demilitarized Zone and b) the Arabs are agitated about Israel's plan
to withdraw Jordan Basin waters from Lake Tiberias in late 1963. Israel
alleges absolute sovereignty over the entire lake. In response to Mr.
Feldman's request, the Legal Advisor is preparing and will shortly transmit
a thorough legal exposition of the position of the U.S. Government on
this question of sovereignty./2/The Israelis continue to be acutely
sensitive regarding anything which might conceivably be construed as
derogating from their claim of absolute sovereignty over the Southern
Demilitarized Zone and the lake. Thus, they have rejected proposals
for the stationing of an UNTSO patrol boat on the lake and have refused
since 1951 to participate in the Mixed Armistice Commission which was
set up under the General Armistice Agreement (Tab A) to cope with complaints
regarding breaches of the Agreement.
Israel had been called before the Council four times
previously for making retaliatory raids. Israel was specifically condemned
by the Council for a similar Tiberias raid in 1956 (Tab B).
The Formulation of the U.S. Position
Our major aim during this exercise was to strengthen
the U.N. peacekeeping machinery in the field and to encourage the parties
to cooperate more fully with it so as to render the recurrence of such
hostilities unlikely. In order to prevent the Soviets and/or the UAR
from pre-empting the situation and to give us the maximum degree of
control over the outcome, we and the British decided to sponsor a reasonable,
balanced, and constructive resolution.
The Secretary sent to the President on March 28 a memorandum
outlining the projected U.S. position (Tab C). A proposed resolution
was enclosed. On the basis of the von Horn report (Tab D), reports from
our posts in the area, and consultations with the Israelis, friendly
Council members and Dr. Bunche, USUN drafted the preliminary U.S. statement,
which was cleared in the Department and delivered by Ambassador Stevenson
on March 28 (Tab E). Mr. Cleveland was informed by you that we should
proceed along the lines of the memorandum, and USUN was authorized to
proceed accordingly (Tab F).
In keeping with the Council's previous stand on retaliatory
raids, in our original draft resolution the Israeli attack of March
16/17 was explicitly condemned. However, adequate balance was provided
by a paragraph which would have held "that the hostile actions
from Syrian territory of March 8" were clearly violations of the
cease-fire. Although the presumption is that Syrian provocation took
place, UNTSO was unable conclusively to determine where the responsibility
lay for initiating the several fire exchanges which occurred prior to
the Israeli raid. In response to questions put by members of the Council
General von Horn made further observations on April 4 (Tab G). A major
reason for the fragmentary nature of UNTSO's information was the denial
by both parties of sufficient observational facilities and freedom of
movement to the UN observers.
The Israelis made energetic representations at all
levels, including a call by their Ambassador on the Secretary on April
2 to persuade us to desist from supporting a condemnatory resolution
(Tab H). Consultations with the Israelis in New York, Tel Aviv and Washington
were frequent and frank throughout.
Despite the fact that we had urged the Israelis not
to bring into the Council debate the contentious question of sovereignty
over Lake Tiberias their representative explicitly reaffirmed their
assertion of sovereignty in two statements before the Council. It was
determined by USUN that it would be tactically undesirable for us publicly
to take issue with Israel on this aspect of the problem in the Security
Council debate.
In light of the consultations conducted with regard
to the resolution, the Department reconsidered its original draft. Ambassador
Stevenson was given discretion to negotiate within a range between a
strong version and a milder one (Tab I). He decided to use the milder
version as the basis for further negotiations and so informed you and
Mr. Schlesinger.
The Israelis, who were obviously acquainted with our
first draft, should have been pleased that we decided to pursue a milder
resolution. Meanwhile, however, more background information became available,
publicly and privately, from General von Horn, who had come to New York
at our suggestion, and from sources in the field. Inter alia, this information
strengthened doubts about who had really provoked whom in the fire exchanges
prior to the Israeli raid. USUN came to the conclusion, with which the
Department concurred, that a factual justification for charges that
the Syrians bore exclusive responsibility for initiating the hostile
exchanges simply could not be made. Consequently the resolution took
on a less "balanced" if more objective cast, in order to reflect
more accurately the ascertainable facts and accordingly to make it more
viable in the Council. Naturally, the Israelis were disappointed about
these last changes. You will note that in our major statement (Tab J)
we took the Syrians seriously to task for raising the level of fire
in the March 8 exchange.
Moreover, we were as responsive to Israeli suggestions
about the resolution as the facts of the situation warranted. For example:
(a) the resolution does not newly and directly condemn Israel, but rather
reaffirms the Council's position on retaliatory raids; (b) in response
to Israel's second complaint, an operative paragraph calling upon both
Governments to refrain from the threat as well as the use of force was
added to our original draft and later the phraseology of this paragraph
was changed to make it even more satisfactory to the Israelis; (c) we
eliminated a direct call upon the Governments to exclude their armed
forces from the Demilitarized Zone and reduce their forces in the Defensive
Area; and (d) we changed another paragraph so that the emphasis would
not be solely on the reactivation of the Mixed Armistice Commission,
but also on the Armistice machinery. Points (a) and (d) were major changes.
At the last minute, we also made a "technical" change at Israeli
request by deleting reference to the Demilitarized Zone as the "Syrian-Israeli"
DZ. In retrospect it seems fair to say that despite its allegations
of great unhappiness about the outcome, Israel got more of the changes
it wanted in the resolution than it had good reason to expect. (Tab
J(1))
The Council Action
The US-UK resolution as approved by a vote of 10 to
0 with France abstaining constitutes, in our view, an evenhanded approach
to the March incident and a constructive directive for future action
by UNTSO and the two parties. The vote was a convincing demonstration
of the value of our taking the initiative in such cases. The completely
one-sided Syrian draft resolution (Tab K) was not even pressed to a
vote.
We regarded it as very important that the Council adopt
a reasonable resolution. If the Council had failed to pass a resolution,
which was the outcome the Israelis indicated they would have welcomed,
the Council would have: 1) failed to exercise any restraining influence;
2) in effect condoned Israel's deliberate policy of retaliatory raids;
and 3) failed to support and strengthen the United Nations machinery
on the ground. The net result would have been to increase the risk of
renewed hostilities.
Boilerplate
Attached as Tab L is material which you may wish to
draw upon in replying to inquiries about the United States position
in the Lake Tiberias dispute.
A.E. Breisky/3/
/1/Source: Department of
State, Central Files, 683.84A/4-1862. Confidential.
Drafted by Palmer and cleared by Cleveland,
Talbot, Strong in draft, Buffum, and Ludlow.
None of the tabs cited in this memorandum
are attached to the source text. Copies of
tabs A, K, and L are ibid., NEA/IAI Files:
Lot 70 D 229, POL 32-1/3 Territories and
Boundary April 1962.
/2/A paper entitled "United
States Government Position Concerning Sovereignty
Over Lake Tiberias and the Withdrawal of
Water Therefrom," drafted by Hewitt
on April 16, is ibid., Central Files, 683.84A/4-1662.
It indicates: "The United States Government
considers that while Israel presently possesses
exclusive rights of jurisdiction and control
over Lake Tiberias, sovereignty over the
lake has not yet been finally established." A
subsequent draft by Hewitt of April 23, entitled "Sovereignty
Over Lake Tiberias," which reaches the
same conclusion, is ibid., L/NEA Files: Lot
72 D 199, Palestine-Tiberias 1962.
/3/Breisky signed for Battle
above Battle's typed signature.
Sources: Foreign
Relations of the United States, 1961-1963: Near East, 1962-1963,
V. XVIII. DC: GPO,
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