Telegram on Johnson's Efforts in Lebanon
(April 27, 1962)
This telegram relates Johnson's difficulties in getting
to the heart of refugee
problem when meeting with certain Lebanese delegate.
From Johnson. For Talbot
and Cleveland. Johnson found problem of effective
communication with Lebanon officials/2/somewhat
greater than with Israelis. This due partly
to language difficulties but more to evident
unwillingness of Ministers to discuss in
depth ways that might suggest departure from
Arab League Riyadh resolution/3/ before being
specifically informed that Johnson had obtained "L'Accord
d'Israel sur l'execution integrale de cette decision".
Also partly due to fact that Takla's schedule
only permitted one talk with him (at which
Ammoun and Moe were present). Prime Minister
meeting alone with Johnson and Moe was heavily
lawyer-like and even less willing to examine
possibilities for progress than Foreign Minister.
While appearing to understand what Johnson
meant when he spoke of Israel concern about
Arab hostility, both men insisted paragraph
11/4/ is unconditional and Israeli argument
therefore irrelevant.
In opening remarks Johnson had good opportunity to make clear his understanding
and appreciation of the special problem of Lebanon and his awareness
of the need to take account thereof in any practical scheme that might
be developed.
Johnson unable to get across to his full satisfaction outline of ideas
embodied in his Working Paper Five though he did seem to convey notion
of beginning with small number (about 20,000). Perhaps most encouraging
note was that Takla remarked at one point that if 5,000 of such an initial
20,000 wished to return they must be entitled to do so.
Both Prime Minister and Foreign Minister rejected any idea of refugee
commitment to "live in peace with their neighbors" prior to
return, saying refugee conduct would depend after return on Israel treatment
of Arabs in country.
Takla stressed Lebanon's peaceful intent and did not appear to assume
Israel must be destroyed but Prime Minister used arguments which would
appear logically to lead to such a result, such as "95% of the
land belongs to the Arabs".
Moe in private talk with Ammoun was able to communicate considerably
more effectively, and this should prove helpful preparation for further
talk with Takla agreed for return visit after Amman before returning
to Israel.
Knight
/1/Source: Department of
State, Central Files, 325.84/4-2762. Confidential.
Repeated to Amman, Beirut, Cairo, Tel Aviv,
USUN, and Aleppo.
/2/Johnson was in Beirut
April 19-24. The Embassy in Beirut conveyed
a summary report on the visit in telegram
1025 from Beirut, April 24. (Ibid., 325.84/4-2462)
/3/The Arab League Council
met in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, March 31-April
4. Telegram 1025 from Beirut described the
essence of the Council's resolution as being
that everything depended upon Israeli willingness
to accept repatriation. (Ibid.)
/4/Reference is to paragraph
11 of U.N. General Assembly Resolution 194.
Sources: Foreign
Relations of the United States, 1961-1963: Near East, 1962-1963,
V. XVIII. DC: GPO,
2000. |