Memorandum on Discussion of Situation
in Jordan
(April 27, 1963)
This is a memorandum of conversation from a Ball-Harman meeting discussing
the situation in Jordan and possibly
Israeli action.
Ambassador Harman of Israel
Mr. Mordechai Gazit, Minister of Israel
NEA--Acting Assistant Secretary James P. Grant
U--Mr. George S. Springsteen
NEA:NE--William R. Crawford, Jr.
Ambassador Harman called at the Acting Secretary's request.
The Acting Secretary said he wished to express deepest regret regarding
the death of President Ben-Zvi.
Regarding Prime Minister Ben-Gurion's April 26 letter to the President,
this had been discussed with the President and we hope to be able to
reply within a few days. The Prime Minister's letter raises some difficult
problems, but we are glad to have been informed of Israel's concerns.
We ourselves are studying the situation with intensity.
The Acting Secretary said we have asked the Ambassador to call because
there have been indications something might happen in Jordan. Our information
is fragmentary; it is hard to assess the form a movement might take,
its timing, and its chances of success or failure; but there is the
chance of something happening within a few hours or days. On the basis
of present intelligence, it is hard to sort out whether the movement
is entirely indigenous or whether Cairo has an interest in it, and whether
the end result would be a government devoted to Jordan's independence
or one which would seek to bring Jordan under the UAR umbrella. We have
impressed strongly on President Nasser that any move toward Jordan would
be of very serious concern to the US Government, with possible gravest
repercussions for the Middle East and the world. It is a matter of concern
to us that if something should happen Israel would not act precipitously
or until the nature of what emerges has become clearer. If Israel were
to move militarily, it is doubtful that the UAR could sit still and
in the end we might find that the Soviets had become involved also.
We will take every reasonable measure to prevent a deterioration in
Jordan or a UAR movement. If possible, we will try to keep the Hussein
government in control.
Ambassador Harman said he would convey this message to his government.
The Ambassador said that from recent conversations the US is well aware
of Israel's special concerns regarding a possible change in Jordan,
which are two:
1. If there were UAR inspiration. There are some indications of this
in the vicious official and clandestine radio propaganda against Hussein
from Cairo, which is being chorused in Damascus and Baghdad.
2. If a situation should develop in Jordan which could be exploited
by the UAR on the Yemen pattern.
Ambassador Harman said that in either of the two foregoing situations,
"there could be no question at all of the view Israel would have
to take or the gravity with which it would see the situation."
This is not a question of precipitousness. It is gratifying that the
US seems determined to help Hussein hang on. Israel has the same objective.
Mr. Grant commented there is always a measure of UAR pressure. Do the
Ambassador's remarks, therefore, encompass any change of government
in Jordan?
Ambassador Harman replied that the "mood of any move" in
Jordan now would be clear from the nature of the demonstrations which
have taken place, from the use of the four-starred UAR flag, etc.
Mr. Grant said it is far from clear to the US that if there were a
change it would necessarily or even probably be subordinate to Nasser.
We have before us the recent examples of coups in Damascus and Baghdad.
These do not represent undiluted extension of Nasser's control.
The Ambassador said that at the time of the recent Ba'th coups in Iraq
and Syria the United States had expressed its view of these as a potential
counterpoise to the attractions of Nasserism. We have seen what happened
between February 8 and April 17. It is clear what Nasser's forces are
trying to do.
Mr. Grant pointed out that there are also other forces at work.
Ambassador Harman said he would like to hear further particulars about
the Jordan situation.
The Acting Secretary replied that our information is fragmentary but
in the next few hours or days there may be an attempt against Hussein,
with some backing from the Jordanian military. Our assumption is that
Cairo is aware of but not directing the movement. Our information has
been conveyed to King Hussein. We will do what we prudently can to help
him. We have made our views clear to Mr. Nasser.
In response to the Ambassador's further question as to US intentions,
the Acting Secretary said it would be very difficult to take action
beyond that which has already occurred if the movement is indigenous.
Hussein is still in control and has not sought our assistance. If he
did, we would have to consider the request in light of all the facts
available to us.
Ambassador Harman recalled that in 1958 the US had acted swiftly to
protect the situation in Lebanon and Jordan. Any change in Jordan now
would open Pandora's box. Hussein's is the legitimate regime and he
has the support of the people. Opposition elements are "plotters"
who do not express the free will of the Jordanians.
The Acting Secretary agreed that we do not favor any change.
Mr. Grant commented that a substantial portion of the population in
Jordan is caught up in the spirit of Arab unity and the attraction of
current union developments. This has affected the youth of the country
and perhaps some of the army. If the new federation does not work, the
attraction will pale. Therefore, the critical period is in the months
that lie ahead.
Ambassador Harman said the Ba'this shared this notion, but Nasser's
influence has been used against the Ba'th and now it is boxed in. This
has clear implications for Jordan and is the framework in which Israel
would have to view any change. Any successor regime in Jordan which
held out against union after an uprising would have the April 17 agreement
cited against it.
Mr. Grant said we have a less certain evaluation. Israel has reason
to be concerned by the April 17 declaration, but for those in Baghdad
the declaration has bought some time.
Ambassador Harman said that the line must be held. Any kind of temporizing
or efforts to buy time will only create greater problems for Hussein.
He would not like to leave the Secretary with any misapprehensions as
to the framework in which Israel would approach any change of government
in Jordan. This goes to the heart of Israel's security. There is no
reason for a change. If Hussein goes, conversely the Ba'th in Iraq and
Syria will be weakened. Therefore, Jordan is decisive, not just for
the security of Israel but for the future of the area. It would be gratifying
to be able to report to Jerusalem that the US will take very definite
action to protect the situation.
The Acting Secretary said that if the Ambassador is referring to military
action, we cannot say now what we would do. Nothing at all may happen.
The Middle East has heard of many coups which never took place. Even
if there is a change, we do not see the threat in the same time frame
as Israel. It would be, at minimum, many months before Israel's considerable
deterrent advantage could be jeopardized. Therefore, Israel can afford
to see what emerges.
Mr. Grant pointed out that precipitous Israel action might well coalesce
the very centralized, unified state which Israel fears. Left to themselves,
the Arabs have a very considerable capacity to decentralize and neutralize
themselves.
At the conclusion of the meeting, it was agreed that in dealing with
press inquiries it would be said that Mr. Ball had asked the Ambassador
to call to express personal condolences for President Ben-Zvi's death
and that, since Mr. Ball is now taking over for a considerable period
as Acting Secretary, he felt that a tour d'horizon would be useful.
Sources: Foreign
Relations of the United States, 1961-1963: Near East, 1962-1963,
V. XVIII. DC: GPO,
2000. |