Memorandum on Gazit Seeking Reaffirmation
of U.S. Policy Toward Israel
(April 30, 1962)
Memorandum relating to
concerns expressed by Israeli Minister
Gazit about U.S. policy toward Israel and Egypt.
Memorandum for the Record/1/
Luncheon with Israeli Minister Gazit
Gazit called me for lunch upon his return from Israel,
apparently to talk about a number of problems concerning his government.
He clearly felt unhappy about recent developments on Lake Tiberias and
about the signs of a shift in US policy toward Nasser, especially as
revealed during the Kaissouni visit (he was of course quite well-informed).
Gazit's main purpose seemed to be to float the idea
that the Israelis could live with US economic support of Syria and even
the UAR so long as they were adequately reassured with respect to US
guarantees to them. In his opinion, the Israelis were tired of being
told repeatedly by the US that Israel "was here to stay";
they needed some more tangible reassurance. For example, the President
might write a secret letter to Ben Gurion along the following lines:
(1) the US recognized Israel's security preoccupations; (2) Israel should
be reassured that in event of clear-cut Arab aggression the US would
take whatever steps were necessary to make sure that the attack could
not succeed; (3) along with such reassurances the US could also ask
that Israel pursue a policy of greater restraint with respect to incidents
on its frontiers and cooperate more effectively with UNTSO, etc. so
that ambiguous incidents would not arise. Gazit's point was that if
Israel had more in the way of a security commitment from the US, it
would not have to pursue such an activist policy. He further indicated
that while such an idea was a personal one of his and indeed "contrary
to his brief", he thought his government would be rather forthcoming
in such circumstances.
Gazit implied that the Israelis had some indication
that reassurances in some form for Israel were in the wind. But one
big difficulty was that the US tended to issue such reassurances without
any prior consultation with the Israelis. He felt that such consultations
could take place in full secrecy, and that it would be much more profitable
if they had a chance to discuss the matter with us. He complained bitterly
about the way in which the US patronizingly makes such moves without
any form of prior consultation.
Without discussing the merits of the issue, I pointed
out that in any case involving two adverse parties, to have a prior
consultation with one party made us their hostages if they should choose
to use these to their own political advantage. He argued that there
had been several communications between the US and Israel at Presidential
level which had never been revealed by the Israelis; we could rely upon
their keeping confidence.
Gazit indicated considerable knowledge of what was
discussed with Kaissouni (I neither confirmed nor denied) and presumed
that the next step after PL-480 and the stabilization program (he believed
the UAR would accept IMF terms) would be a consortium. He questioned
whether substantial development aid to the UAR would buy us much with
Nasser; he felt that Nasser's political behavior remained as basically
hostile as ever. He regarded the recent dispute in the Lake Tiberias
area as having been provoked by Cairo Radio's constant pressure on Syria
for not defending Arab interests against the Israelis, saying that Syria
and Jordan were merely looking for a compromise under the infamous Johnston
Plan for water take-off.
We briefly discussed the Shah's visit. He had heard
from a middle level source in the Iranian Embassy that the Shah thought
the visit had gone rather well, and had been pleased with the military
hardware offered.
Gazit and I had spent the first half of luncheon discussing
the events in Algeria and Morocco, including Ben Bella's remarks and
their later retraction by the PAG. He seemed to endorse our policy on
arms for Morocco and perhaps Algeria in competition with the Soviets;
we agreed that the French should shoulder the main burden here, and
might be more forthcoming in the light of the Algerian settlement. However,
Gazit then posed the question of whether we would give arms to Syria
on a similar basis of attempting to preclude Soviet aid or whether we
would prefer to have our European allies do so. I told him that I knew
of no plans for US arms sales to the Syrians and that these seemed to
be in quite a different category from those to Morocco or potentially
Algeria. I opined that if the French continued on the line of developing
cordial relationships with the new Algerian regime, its ties with Moscow
and Cairo might not develop too far.
R.W. Komer/2/
/1/Source: Kennedy Library,
National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda
Series, Staff Memoranda, Robert W. Komer.
No classification marking. Drafted by Komer.
/2/Printed from a copy that
bears this typed signature.
Sources: Foreign
Relations of the United States, 1961-1963: Near East, 1962-1963,
V. XVIII. DC: GPO,
2000. |