U.S. Scientists' Visit to Israel's Dimona Reactor
(May 26, 1961)
This memorandum refers to the U.S.'s initial reaction
to their visit to Dimona and outlines some of the key points the President
might want to be made aware of.
SUBJECT
U.S. Scientists' Visit to Israel's Dimona Reactor
Messrs. U.M. Staebler and J.W. Croach, the United States
scientists permitted to visit Israel's Dimona reactor responsive to
our suggestions that such a visit would be helpful in allaying international
concern, have returned from their visit. On Thursday, May 25, they discussed
their findings with officers of the Department of State.
Their written report will be available very soon./2/
In the meantime, it is of general interest that they were received with
cordiality and permitted to visit the several installations which are
engaged in nuclear research, including the reactor at Dimona. They report
themselves as satisfied that nothing was concealed from them and that
the reactor is of the scope and peaceful character previously described
to United States officials by representative of the Government of Israel.
The two scientists were informed that Israel's decision
to expand nuclear development beyond the laboratory research stage was
taken in 1957 with the appointment of a committee, which first considered
and then rejected because of its expense the establishment of two large
reactors for production of industrial power. Instead, it selected the
program which it is now pursuing, i.e., the construction of a research
reactor which can provide experience for scientific and technical personnel
in essentially all of the problems posed by a power reactor. The present
center was conceived as a means for gaining experience in construction
of a nuclear facility which would eventually prepare them for the production
of nuclear power. They have chosen natural uranium as fuel because of
a desire to be able to produce as much as possible of it from their
own vast potash resources. Ground was broken for the plant in 1959.
It might be desirable to bring the following tentative
conclusions and opinions of the scientists to the President's attention,
prior to his May 30 meeting with Prime Minister Ben-Gurion:
1. From the standpoint of keeping abreast of the reactor's
development and ascertaining that its purpose continues to be non-military,
a second visit would not be necessary before another year.
2. Israel's obsession with secrecy is regrettable,
but perhaps understandable in view of Israel's physical and political
circumstances. Israel's reasons for secrecy include: (a) a possible
boycott by the Arabs of manufacturers on whom Israel depends, (b) proximity
of the reactor to international borders with vulnerability to sabotage,
and (c) conviction that Arab awareness of Israel's scientific capability
would not be in Israel's national interest.
3. While, like others of its size and character, the
reactor eventually will produce small quantities of plutonium suitable
for weapons, there is no present evidence that the Israelis have weapon
production in mind.
4. The Israelis report the reactor will not be completed
before 1964, although this may be too conservative an estimate.
5. There is strong evidence of close French scientific
collaboration and support.
6. The reactor and its complex of laboratories, storehouses,
fuel dumps, water towers, general services, transient quarters for scientists,
etc., occupies a square 750 meters to a side. The surrounding fenced
security area, however, is much larger.
7. On United States scales, the reactor, when completed,
might represent a $15 million investment, with the supporting plant
another $20 million.
8. Even with the Great Power assistance they may have
had from France, Israel's Dimona project is a most creditable accomplishment
both in concept and execution.
Melvin L. Manfull/3/
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 884A.1901/5-2661.
Secret. Drafted by Hamilton and cleared by Furnas.
/2/Not found.
/3/Printed from a copy that indicates Manfull signed
the original above Battle's typed signature.
Sources: Foreign
Relations of the United States, 1961-1963: Near East, 1962-1963,
V. XVIII. DC: GPO,
2000. |