U.S. Aims to Achieve a Balanced Middle East Foreign
Policy
(May 31, 1962)
This memorandum raises the issue of the U.S. establishing
a more balanced foreign policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict.
Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security
Council Staff to the President's Deputy Special Counsel (Feldman)/1/
Washington, May 31, 1962.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda
Series, Staff Memoranda, Robert W. Komer. Secret. Copies were sent to
Bundy and Kaysen. A June 1 note attached to the source text from Komer
to Bundy reads: "Mike is certainly beating on State these days
with a drumfire of 'queries.' I'm not sure he realizes that our long-term
ability to promote steps toward an A-I settlement depends largely on
a sufficiently even-handed attitude toward Arab and Israeli to give
us leverage with Arabs. As you know, I agree that pendulum has swung
sufficiently that compensatory gestures toward Israel desirable, but
I believe that: (1) what Israelis really need and want is reaffirmation
of our security guarantee; (2) we should use this prospect to get certain
concessions from them."
Mike--
My reaction to State's 29 May report/2/ is that we ought to pursue
a rather more active, though still "quiet", diplomacy on Arab-Israeli
issues. I'm disturbed by the trend toward hotting up of A-I problem:
(1) in anticipation of Israeli diversion of Jordan waters; (2) as part
of the recurrent efforts by one Arab state or another to score points
on yet other Arab countries for being soft on Israel. Recently the Syrians
and Iraqis and now the Saudis and Jordanians are taking this line, aimed
obviously at Nasser. No doubt one aim is to force Nasser into a more
actively anti-Israeli policy and thus queer his relations with us. Then
too all Arabs love to use the Palestine issue as a popular diversion
from their own domestic failings.
/2/See footnote 3, Document 280.
We ought to ask State to include in its 1 July report less of an apologia
for past actions (or inaction) and more of an action program of future
moves aimed at forestalling a new rise in A-I frictions (especially
over Jordan waters) and perhaps laying the groundwork for moves toward
ultimate settlement. As you know, the general consensus that this is
a well-nigh intractable problem which only time (if that) will cure
has led to a certain feeling in State that there's not much we can do.
For my part, however, I'd like to see the following explored:
1. Measures to sustain a balance between Arabs and Israel (e.g. some
form of new security guarantee, perhaps Hawk air defense missiles, the
proposed exchange of assurances on Jordan waters). Such measures will
also signal clearly to the Arab states that our new policies do not
betoken any lessened interest in Israel's security.
2. Possibilities of talking Nasser into holding back his Soviet arms
purchases if we keep lid on Israelis (this at least will serve to justify
our stand if we later sell Hawks to Israelis).
3. More active effort to get Jordan and Saudis to tone down their current
noisemaking. I can't understand why, when we're subsidizing Jordan so
heavily, we don't tell them to lay off this silly new Palestine plan
of theirs.
4. A stronger push behind Joe Johnson's refugee efforts (though this
might be counter-productive).
5. A tough line with Israelis not to rock the boat, and to collaborate
more effectively with UNEF and UNTSO.
6. A set of quiet but persistent diplomatic and other initiatives designed
to remind Arabs that a third round against Israel is futile. We're too
cautious about telling Arabs the score.
None of above are new, and all have their disadvantages. But my basic
point is that we ought to be forehanded in anticipating new trouble
in the Near East, not just sit back and wait for it.
R.W. Komer/3/
/3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
Sources: Foreign
Relations of the United States, 1961-1963: Near East, 1962-1963,
V. XVIII. DC: GPO,
2000. |