Johnson's Meeting in the United Arab Republic
(May 3, 1962)
Johnson discusses refugee
issue with Egyptian leaders, Fawzi, Nasser, Moe and Helmi.
For Talbot and Cleveland. Verbatim Text. Johnson during
his six days in Cairo saw Fawzi once (Moe and General Armin Helmi being
present); had nearly two hours alone with Nasser; and with Moe had one
long substantive talk with Helmi. Atmosphere uniformly friendly.
In all three conversations Johnson (1) stressed importance
making start on refugee question, (2) expressed conviction that 1962
may be kind of "watershed year", in that there evidence many
governments, notably US, wish to see progress on refugee question but
there are signs of growing impatience with Arab-Israel disputes and
with prospect of supporting refugees indefinitely in absence of any
evidence of Arab or Israeli willingness to change status quo; (3) set
forth his ideas along the line of his Working Paper Five; and (4) emphasized
his willingness to consider any suggestions UAR might give him for moving
forward, and his hope that he might receive such suggestions, expressing
his willingness to return to area later for this purpose if UAR Government
wished.
He received clear indications that first reaction to
the idea of beginning with 20,000 was negative and strong impression
that his idea would on consideration continue to be unacceptable, though
it was not flatly rejected. He also doubts that his request for the
UAR's own suggestions will be responded to although he believes from
Nasser's attitude that this possibility cannot be completely dismissed.
Specific points of significance were:
1. Nasser believes that major source of tension in
area remains Israel Government's emphasis on "a Jewish State",
and continued apparent belief of B.G./2/and Dayan that they can impose
"a settlement by force".
2. Nasser's evident concern over the arms race, together
with his skepticism, in response to a query, about external guarantees
(he made a bitter reference in this connection to the 1956 action of
two signers of the Tripartite Declaration).
3. Several assertions that war with Israel would be
folly and that it is "not on the agenda".
4. Evident appreciation of changed attitude of USA
toward the Middle East and especially UAR.
5. Nasser reiterated emphasis on the return of most
of the refugees (with a wry recognition that B.G. could not accept this),
coupled with his mention (not fully spelled out) of a Palestine in which
Jews and Arabs would have equal rights; all three men referred more
than once to "second-class citizenship" of Arabs in Israel.
6. Fawzi's insistence that choice given the refugees
should be so formulated as not to deliberately discourage their election
of return.
7. The discussion, almost inadvertently begun, by Helmi
of current activities of certain refugee spokesmen, in particular recent
talks in Amman. Helmi made it clear that some of these individuals had
told him beforehand of their ideas, saying they did not wish to go behind
the UAR's back but adding that they wished to create a means for speaking
for themselves and thus to attempt to remove themselves from the "cold
war" (Helmi's words) among the Arab states. Helmi said he had told
them he was not prepared to express UAR views, pending clarification
of their program and intentions.
Helmi, who throughout emphasized that he was speaking
personally and not officially, appeared to believe this might constitute
a factor of new significance although he clearly had reservations about
effectiveness of individuals involved. Johnson took opportunity not
only to say that this movement might have an adverse impact on his activities
but to argue that suggested parallel with Algeria was false and dangerous
for Palestinians themselves.
Anschuetz
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 325.84/5-362.
Confidential. Repeated to Damascus, Amman, Tel Aviv, Beirut, Jerusalem,
and USUN.
/2/David Ben Gurion, Israeli Prime Minister.
Sources: Foreign
Relations of the United States, 1961-1963: Near East, 1962-1963,
V. XVIII. DC: GPO,
2000. |