Memorandum on Recommendations for U.S. Policy Toward Israel
(July 9, 1962)
This memorandum discusses how to proceed with improving U.S.-Israel relations, and encourages
a military relationship between the two countries, the Hawk Missile,
Jordan Waters and security concerns.
Discussion:
A. The current policy issues between the United States
and Israel are of two categories: (1) Israel's security concerns, and
(2) frictions in the conduct of our relations.
B. Israel's security interests have been expressed
to us as lying in 1) a close military relationship with the US, 2) a
security guarantee specifically for Israel from the US, 3) access to
a wider range of US military equipment including specifically the Hawk
Missile, and 4) assurance, through US support, that Israel's water diversion
program will be permitted to proceed without interference.
C. The frictions arising in US-Israel relations (other
than those relating to Israel's security interests) are found in 1)
Israel's policy of retaliatory raids, 2) Israel's uncooperativeness
with the UN and its peacekeeping machinery in the area, 3) Israel's
distrust of Dr. Johnson's mission on the refugee question, 4) questions
on the definition of sovereignty over Lake Tiberias, 5) Israel's objection
to US initiative toward persuading other states not to establish diplomatic
missions in Jerusalem, 6) Israel's pursuit of a "direct negotiations"
resolution in the UNGA, and 7) our policy of restraint on training of
third country nationals in Israel.
D. The juxtaposition of several unrelated occurrences
(U.S. opposition to an Israel-inspired direct peace negotiations resolution
at the General Assembly last fall, the Security Council censure of Israel
for recourse to a major retaliatory raid in March of this year, and
announcement of increased US aid for the UAR), together with the favorable
climate provided by the forthcoming US election have led Israel to greatly
step up the pace of its diplomatic activity here in recent months in
pursuit of the long-standing objectives described in B and C above.
E. The Ambassadors assembled in Athens June 12-15 concluded
that the Soviets appear to have been unable to capitalize in the past
several years on earlier successes in Egypt, Syria, and Yemen and that
the relatively high standing of the US in the area among the Arabs,
while still fragile, now provides us a minor degree of maneuvering room
in terms of adjustments with respect to Israel. However, they considered
it essential that the US avoid creation of too many issues with the
Arabs and exercise caution in undertaking new initiatives beyond the
Johnson Mission and Jordan waters. In their view, the security position
of Israel today probably is as satisfactory as in the past and an Arab
attack is not to be expected in the new future.
F. The exchange of letters between the President and
Prime Minister Ben-Gurion has already dealt with United States concern
for Israel's security and well-being, Israel's policy of retaliation,
strengthening of the UN peacekeeping machinery, and our support for
Israel's water diversion plan together with Israel's assurance that
its withdrawals of water will remain within the terms of the Unified
Plan. In addition, Ben-Gurion has made clear Israel's intention to press
the direct negotiations resolution.
G. Our considerations are 1) to review our relations
with Israel on an overall basis, rather than piecemeal, from the standpoint
of our national security interests including maintenance of reasonably
good relations with the bulk of the Arab states; 2) to provide adequately
for the security and well-being of Israel; and 3) to alleviate insofar
as possible the frictions between us. We believe that Israel is determined
to seek from the US the broadest concessions during the current pre-election
period and that Israel's fall-back position lies well short of its current
maximum demands. We consider our recommendations below to be well-balanced,
to be feasible, to duly safeguard US interests, and to meet Israel's
needs realistically.
Recommendations:
1. Military Relationship with Israel. In our view,
supported by the assembled ambassadors at Athens, it is essential to
avoid establishing a special military relationship with Israel. To create
what would in effect be a military alliance with Israel would destroy
the delicate balance we have so carefully maintained in our Near Eastern
relations and would bring insufficient compensatory advantages. (We
have prepared no paper on this subject.)
2. Security Guarantee. The President already having
given Israel an assurance of our continuing concern for the security
and well-being of Israel, we propose to take no further action for the
moment. At a suitable juncture we would wish to reactivate unilaterally
that portion of the Tripartite Declaration dealing with aggression,
perhaps in conjunction with our efforts with the Arabs to damp down
the Jordan waters controversy or to achieve an arms limitation arrangement.
If sale of the Hawk missile to Israel is delayed, we would propose an
early strengthening of our security assurances to Israel (via unilateral
reactivation of the Tripartite Declaration) in order to bolster Israel's
confidence. Our ambassadors at Athens supported this approach.
3. Hawk Missile. Provision of the Hawk would enable
Israel to reduce considerably its vulnerability to surprise air attack
by low-flying aircraft. Greater confidence in its defenses would enable
Israel the better to resist any temptation to engage in preemptive attack
against the UAR air strike capability. Conversely, significant reduction
of its vulnerability would remove one deterrent to Israeli preemptive
attack. Despite the justification found in a strictly military equation,
we cannot recommend at present sale of the Hawk to Israel for the following
reasons: a) existence of effective deterrents to UAR action and of UAR
vulnerabilities and limitations, and absence of conditions requiring
or favorable to UAR attack; b) cogent factors operating on the US such
as the undesirability of assuming responsibility for the initial introduction
of missiles into the Arab-Israel arms race, problems of production and
training schedules, and reactions from allies and friends; and c) a
strong preference first to seek Nasser's reaction to a proposal for
an arms limitation arrangement.
However, if US intelligence positively confirms that
the UAR has in fact obtained or is in the process of obtaining comparable
missiles from the USSR, we would recommend that after consultation with
the British and discussion with the UAR we offer the Hawk to Israel
in absence of real prospects for arms limitation. The ambassadors at
Athens supported the foregoing..
4. Arms Limitation. Athens telegram No. 1337, concurred
in by the assembled ambassadors, deals with this problem, assuming that
meetings by the President with Ben-Gurion and Nasser would be necessary
initially. Inevitably many months of delay would be entailed in this
approach. Therefore, we would suggest that Ambassador Badeau be instructed
by the President to talk with Nasser, explaining our considerations
and seeking a reaction from Nasser. While we are not sanguine, we believe
the attempt should be made. A similar approach would be made to Ben-Gurion
if Nasser's response so warranted.
5. Jordan Waters. The President has already given a
written assurance to Israel and has received a reciprocal assurance.
At Athens the ambassadors to Arab countries neighboring Israel agreed
that whenever circumstances required we should seek to discourage Arab
action against Israel's water scheme, reactivating the aggression portion
of the Tripartite Declaration in conjunction therewith, but in the meantime
we should encourage from behind the scenes Jordanian-Syrian development
of the Yarmouk (recently we have had an indication from an important
UAR official that the UAR has decided not to embarrass Jordan and Syria
over their Yarmouk Plan).
6. Retaliatory Raids. Ben-Gurion has given the President
a vague assurance that means other than the retaliatory raid will now
be employed in an attempt to prevent serious trouble on Israel's frontiers.
At the first suitable opportunity we propose to inform Israel that we
interpret Ben-Gurion's letter as a pledge to abandon the retaliatory
policy. On the other hand, we plan to continue to use our influence
to the best of our ability to seek restraint by the Arabs in line with
your discussion with Ambassador Harman.
7. Strengthening of UNTSO. A good deal of preparatory
work has been done to determine measures both feasible and practical
to improve the effectiveness of the UN machinery in the area. Ben-Gurion
has informed the President of Israel's willingness to cooperate more
fully.
8. Dr. Johnson's Mission. We have discussed next steps
with Dr. Johnson and, in line with the view of the ambassadors at Athens,
have agreed with him that he should endeavor to have his project for
a poll of the refugees launched at least on a small scale prior to UNGA
debate of the UNRWA item. At some point prior to the debate it will
be necessary to reach a private agreement with Israel on the maximum
number of refugees Israel would be required to take and on financial
arrangements. Likewise, prior to the private agreement, it will be necessary
to obtain Presidential consent for financial support of the whole project,
together with the concurrence in principle of key Congressional leaders.
9. Sovereignty over Lake Tiberias. We have the choice
of letting the issue lie dormant, of stating our position publicly,
or of informing Israel privately of our views. In order that we may
have our position clearly on the record, we favor an aide-memoire to
Israel stating the position set forth in the first portion of Tab H./15/
Informally the Israelis have led us to believe our language will be
acceptable to them, though we do not rule out further Israeli attempts
to persuade us to a view more favorable to them.
10. Diplomatic Missions in Israel. In line with Ambassador
Barbour's recommendation, and with the concurrence of the ambassadors
to the Arab countries, we propose to cease taking the initiative to
persuade other countries not to establish missions at Jerusalem. However,
we would retain the right to respond to queries from other states. We
would give the Embassy in Tel Aviv greater latitude in conducting business
and accepting social engagements in Jerusalem. This should serve to
meet the current Israeli complaint.
11. Direct Negotiations Resolution. In mid-June Mr.
Feldman informed Ambassador Harman that we expected to be consulted
before Israel undertook to campaign for a new direct negotiations resolution
in the next UNGA. Ben-Gurion, however, in his reply to the President,
appeared to stress the importance Israel attached to the direct negotiations
principle, thus indicating that we may have difficulty in persuading
Israel to desist. In the view of the ambassadors at Athens the direct
negotiations issue holds danger for the US. Our first preference is
to dissuade Israel and other countries from pursuing it. Our second
choice is to vote against such a resolution if introduced, provided
Dr. Johnson has made some progress and provided it is necessary at the
time in support of our tactical position in the debate. Otherwise we
believe we could live with an abstention. In our view our foreign policy
interests clearly would not be served by a vote in favor.
12. Training of Third Country Nationals in Israel.
In the past we have been willing to sponsor the training of nationals
of a number of third countries in Israel in accordance with the third
country training program of the aid program. However, as a matter of
practice in the past year we have tightened up considerably. Following
a review of the issue with the ambassadors assembled at Athens we believe
that we should within reason permit training of third country nationals
in Israel in conjunction with our aid programs a) provided Israel's
training facilities best meet our needs and b) provided we do not become
engaged in the Arab-Israel cold war in Africa. Hence we propose to give
field missions outside of Africa authority to make such arrangements
subject to provision of notice to Washington but to require missions
in Africa to refer all such proposals to the Department for approval.
13. Upon receipt of your views we would prepare a comprehensive
memorandum for the President if you so wish.
Sources: Foreign
Relations of the United States, 1961-1963: Near East, 1962-1963,
V. XVIII. DC: GPO,
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