Feldman Comments on U.S policy Toward Israel
(August 10, 1962)
This is a memorandum from the President's Deputy Special Counsel Myer
Feldman to President Kennedy commenting on U.S. policy toward Israel and the Johnson Plan.
In your papers for the week end are two memoranda
from the State Department dealing with Near East problems. One memorandum
discusses Dr. Joseph Johnson's proposals on the Palestine refugee problem.
The other reviews United States policy toward Israel. We have a meeting
scheduled for Tuesday, August 14. The essential questions to be resolved
are as follows:
1. Whether we should support the Johnson proposal which has only a
slim possibility of acceptance by either the Arabs or the Israelis.
The proposal is consistent with your discussions with Prime Minister
Ben-Gurion and our frequently announced position to the Arab States.
It calls for giving the refugees the choice between repatriation to
Israel, resettlement in some other country, or compensation for loss
of property. The Israelis must object on the grounds that, one, there
are no numerical limitations; two, they have already effected an exchange
of population by taking in 500,000 Jewish refugees from Arab countries;
and, three, that they have already taken in 50,000 Arab refugees. The
Arabs will object because they take the stubborn position that all refugees
should return to Israel. This plan would cost the United States about
$30 million a year--if we are lucky.
2. The plan calls for letters to Nasser and Ben-Gurion. Since the most
violent opposition and the most difficult problem is presented by Ben-Gurion
both Mr. Johnson and the State Department now recommend that I carry
that letter and discuss it personally with Ben-Gurion. We might consider
having a personal emissary also discuss this with Nasser.
3. The only chance the plan has for success is to accompany it with
notice to Ben-Gurion that we will guarantee the security of Israel and
provide Hawk missiles. It is suggested that we give Nasser an opportunity
to agree to an arms limitation before making the final decision to provide
Israel with Hawks. I agree that this is desirable in terms of its possible
long-run impact but it is highly unlikely that Nasser would agree to
any such limitation. We should not, in the meantime, defer for too long
our offer to Ben-Gurion, for I should like to be in the position of
notifying him that we will provide Hawks at the time we request his
acquiescence in the Johnson plan.
4. A problem is presented as to how soon we can make Hawks available.
The Department of Defense has scheduled them through mid-1966. Obviously,
an offer to provide Hawks in 1966 would be worse than no offer at all.
I recommend that we make them available to Israel in one way or another
no later than mid-1964. This means that the training of crews and technicians
will have to begin in 1963.
5. Still unresolved is the issue of sovereignty over Lake Tiberias.
The memorandum from the State Department includes a proposal which will
not make the Israelis happy. I recommend that we simply continue negotiating
over the form of words to be used until we can get some acceptance of
the language.
Myer Feldman
Sources: Foreign
Relations of the United States, 1961-1963: Near East, 1962-1963,
V. XVIII. DC: GPO,
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