Discussion of Johnson Plan on Arab Refugees
(August 14, 1962)
These notes reflect the President's discussion with
other U.S. officials on the Johnson Plan, and the manner in which the
government believes they should handle the situation, bearing in mind
the likely Israeli-Arab responses.
SUBJECT
White House Conference on Johnson Plan, August 14, 1962
Secretary:/2/ The problem has been mounting, we should
not keep falling back on old line, but should seek new approach. Accordingly,
we have asked Dr. Johnson to look into the matter and he will now give
the highlights of his recommendations.
JJ:/3/ The proposals are a bare minimum or a margin
of what is possible. They are in low key and can be cut off at any time.
The emphasis is on finding out what the refugee wants. They require
the least commitment of governments to the fewest things; these may
let things proceed if they don't have to speak publicly.
1) If the refugees know what is involved, few will
choose to return.
2) The countries as sovereign powers have the final
decision on entry.
3) Land experts now know value and location of property,
and in two months can match names with property.
The propositions are the only likely way to carry out
Paragraph 11 or to do anything on the Palestine question. I am personally
convinced that movement on Palestine must begin with the refugees. No
total solution is possible. The chances of success are slim, but there
is some chance. If we don't try this, nothing will be done. We must
use the next few months or we'll be in trouble if we try to do something
later. The US, France and Turkey are on the hot spot; this is a means
to exercise their responsibilities. There is a real advantage in doing
something before the UNGA meets, for the GA could prove to be a donnybrook.
I would like to see someone in place since this may quiet the debate.
If the decision is taken to go ahead, we will need an intensive diplomatic
effort by the US with other states.
President: Why isn't the status quo more preferable
for both the Israelis and the Arabs? We pay the bill, and there is no
compromise of principle.
JJ: We may not continue to pay the bill for Congress
is restive. Israel has a sore spot on the borders, and it can't move
toward peace. An attempt to erode the problem, to dissolve it, is advantageous
to Israel even though it does not want to take the Arabs back.
Secretary: Would the Arabs acquiesce to this first
small movement?
JJ: There is some chance they might. The Arabs have
missed many trains. Now the fate of UNRWA is in question.
President: It would suit the Arabs to have all the
refugees go back to Israel. They would use propaganda to push them.
JJ: There will be propaganda.
President: We must be sure someone explains why they
would not like to go back.
JJ: It will be explained they can't go back to previous
homes and compensation will be offered.
President: What would the cost of compensation be to
all.
JJ: Just over $1 billion.
President: We would carry 60 to 70%?
Feldman: 38% get others. (?)/4/
President: Do we carry Israel too if Israel agrees
to compensation?
JJ: Yes.
Feldman: Israel also took Jewish refugees. Israel would
probably have to be against because it implies repatriation of all refugees,
but, privately, might go along. Publicly, the Arabs could go along with
repatriation and oppose resettlement, but they have something to gain.
President: When would the plan be launched?
JJ: Shortly. By Friday in the PCC to lay out Plan;
then 7 to 10 days for the PCC to endorse, then 3 or 4 weeks later we
would set up administrator in Jordan.
President: Wouldn't we say that we would run a trial
for a few rather than push the whole 1,100,000? To limit it might reassure
Israel. Otherwise, it will be hard to get Israel acquiescence fearing
that all would come. Trial might show only a few would come.
JJ: The countries would reject a trial run. The Arabs
would not accept at all.
President: Israel cannot accept free choice of return;
we only assume that few will go back.
JJ: This is "free preference", not "free
choice". We would in fact be doing a trial run without so calling
it. Administrative difficulties will mean it will move slowly at first.
Secretary: We would get a good reading with the first
thousand, either it will work or it will not. If it failed, it would
lead to a new start with a clean slate.
President: What are the problems?
Feldman: From the international point of view, if Israelis
refuse, don't try it; find out how far they will go. Domestically, if
there is a public statement, it would be reflected by the local community.
Part of the risk is removed if we can get private Israeli assurances.
We would like to delay until after November, but JJ says we can't.
JJ: I have talked to Jewish leaders and found them
receptive to trying to go ahead. I could renew contacts.
Feldman: If we could tie in the Hawk, it might work.
President: It might be stillborne if we have word out
of a big repatriation. People would stir up because of elections. We
should find out what Israel will do. I don't want to get into a costly
fight without getting something. I'm still living with residue of December
vote. Don't want to live with residue of another fight for years and
years.
Secretary: How do we get a trial run? PCC has the responsibility
to see how the refugees feel about repatriation and resettlement; can
perhaps find a way to put this to the parties.
Feldman: Part of the plan is to limit to what BG has
agreed to--100,000.
JJ: I want nothing to do with numbers. Must be open
about finding out preferences.
President: There are hazards for us in the proposals
but there are also hazards for the Israelis and the Arabs. The difficulties
are numerous but this is the only hope. We should start with the Israelis
and thus avoid a bloody battle. Does JJ have trouble?
JJ: The Arabs say JJ and US are in Israel's pocket.
If word gets around that this is cleared with the Israelis, this will
kill the Plan.
President: JJ then should have nothing to do with this.
Secretary: What is the problem of getting at the proposals
more slowly?
JJ: UNRWA's future is unclear. It terminates 6/30/63.
If we postpone discussion we must postpone continuation of UNRWA. If
we postpone until 1963 we run into the tough problem of Jordan waters
over which the Arabs will be all steamed up. If postponed until after
November I can say there is not time to think enough, but the Arabs
are impatient--not uncontrollable.
Secretary: GA used to postponing item until after US
elections.
President: If postponed until after November, we could
find out from the Israelis. Does JJ object to this?
JJ: We should speak to Nasser at the same time (President
agrees). Reason proposals not submitted to parties earlier because it
would become a negotiation and be torn to pieces. If we do approach
Israel, don't negotiate details. Plan should stand or fall as is.
President: What threat do we have on Israelis and Arabs
to get them to accept? Withdraw our support?
JJ: The following are threats to the Arabs: 1) Congress
is restive. 2) Paragraph 11 would be dead.
MF:/5/ 3) Would be difficult handle Arabs.
President: The Arabs are more interested in repatriation.
They might buy it.
JJ: This is the carrot. Resettlement with money in
hand would lead to economic development much like Dag's earlier proposal./6/
MF: Apart from emotions, there are factors which favor
acceptance.
Secretary: The collapse of UNRWA would be more likely
to come from other contributors.
President: Envisions $700 million to Middle East over
next 10 years.
Secretary: Much could be local Israeli currency.
Barbour:/7/ Up to 200 million worth of Israeli pounds.
MF: Also Egyptian pounds.
President: If JJ has no objection to Israelis and Nasser
we can proceed.
JJ: Okeh. Our backing is necessary and it is up to
us to decide. Should approach to PCC come first?
Secretary: How much do they really know?
JJ: I gave general concepts and French and Turks know
I am seeing President.
Mac Bundy: French not very reliable.
President: JJ should delay seeing the PCC until we
talk to Israelis and Nasser directly. We should meet on what our approach
to Nasser and Israelis should be.
Secretary: We must prepare papers on talking points,
must tie into other matters.
MF: We should be prepared to tie in security guarantee
with Johnson Plan, but tell him (Ben-Gurion) ahead of time he gets the
Hawks.
President: We must talk to Nasser first on the Hawks.
All of this must be carried out with utmost secrecy.
President: We must get precise answers later on how
Feldman works. Problems--Hawks, reps to Nasser. MF to work on Israeli
side in White House.
Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86B/8-1562.
Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Robert C. Strong. The time of
the meeting is from the President's Appointment Book. (Kennedy Library)
The source text is attached to an August 15 memorandum from Dutton to
Talbot on the policy of direct negotiations between Israel and the Arabs.
An unsigned typed note, dated August 14, presumably prepared in advance
of this meeting, reads: "We'll have to march to get through them
all. 1. Should we back Johnson Plan (Joe Johnson will speak)? 2. Should
we make an effort to get tacit UAR/Israel arms limitations before selling
Hawks to Israel? Timing? 3. Should we sell Hawks to Israel if above
fails? If so, what timing? 4. Should we challenge Israel's claim to
sovereignty over Lake Tiberias? Privately or publicly? Timing? 5. Should
we send Presidential emissaries to Israel and UAR." (Ibid., National
Security Files, Countries Series, Israel, 8/10/62-8/16/62)
/2/Secretary of State Rusk.
/3/Joseph Johnson.
/4/As on the source text.
/5/Myer Feldman.
/6/Reference is presumably to a May 1959 report by
U.N. Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold.5
/7/Walworth Barbour.
Sources: Foreign
Relations of the United States, 1961-1963: Near East, 1962-1963,
V. XVIII. DC: GPO,
2000. |