Telegram on Feldman's Meeting with Israeli Officials
(August 20, 1962)
This is a telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel commenting on Feldman's meeting with Israeli officials.
Re two points on which Ben-Gurion appeared hesitant you may wish add the
following to arguments you have undoubtedly used with Israelis:
1) Seeking Nasser's prior agreement resettle those refugees who the
Administrator directs should be resettled in the UAR would be contrary
to basic approach of Johnson Plan which is to begin a procedure in which
it is hoped the parties will cooperate in good faith but without prior
specific commitment. Ben-Gurion will realize there is no prior agreement
being sought from Israel that it will repatriate those who opt for repatriation.
It is asked only to examine such repatriation applications in good faith.
The proviso that the Administrator shall from time to time report on
the degree of cooperation received from states in implementing preferences
would focus international attention on UAR lack of cooperation and resettlement
if this occurred.
2) Since your departure, Johnson has refined his letter of transmittal
which you will recall was in draft when you left. Revised text now contains
following paragraph which we believe will meet the Prime Minister's
concern, since it would enable operations under the Plan to be brought
to halt if UAR were found to be conducting propaganda designed pressure
refugees into choosing repatriation.
"One of the problems that gave me the most concern was that of
how to formulate proposals that would enable the refugees to indicate
their preferences freely, uninfluenced by external pressures. Unless
they can do this, and have reason to believe that they can do it, the
plan will not work. This is what underlies the emphasis on the confidential
nature of the questionnaire and subsequent consultation with the refugees.
Neither this nor any other safeguard will be adequate taken by itself.
If the refugees are really to make the uninfluenced decision envisaged
by paragraph 11, the governments concerned must exercise great restraint
and counsel others to show similar restraint."
If despite the existence of this safeguarding paragraph you still feel
we should talk more specifically to this point in forthcoming review
with Nasser we would be willing so instruct Cairo. This would not, of
course, be with object obtaining commitment from Nasser for relay to
Israelis, contrary to essential approach of plan, but would be designed
emphasize our conviction implementation of plan would require all parties
exercise restraints. Avoidance incitive propaganda is one of most important
of these.
I hardly need stress that it would be most unfortunate if Israelis
were to end up with the Hawks and strengthened security assurances while
being responsible for derailing the Johnson Plan before it could even
be given a good try.
Rusk
Sources: Foreign
Relations of the United States, 1961-1963: Near East, 1962-1963,
V. XVIII. DC: GPO,
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