Feldman's Meeting with Israeli
Officials on Refugees and Missiles
(August 21, 1962)
This is a telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in the
United Arab Republic informing the Embassy of Feldman's meeting with Israeli
officials
The two points raised by Israelis were 1) Nasser should agree resettle
those refugees who the Administrator directed should be resettled in the
UAR and 2) Nasser should agree not to direct propaganda to the refugees
urging repatriation but should permit them express preference without
danger of being considered a traitor.
Re (1) and (2) we informed Feldman Ben-Gurion's attempt to place conditions
on his acquiescence and to put us in position of seeking prior commitments
would be inconsistent with Johnson Plan and unacceptable to us.
Re (2) however we also informed Feldman that Johnson had refined his
letter of transmittal by inclusion of paragraph 27 (in text you have
with you) addressed specifically to this point. We felt this should
suffice meet Prime Minister's concern since it would enable operations
under the plan be halted if UAR were found to be conducting propaganda
pressing refugees into choosing repatriation. (Although we hope this
will have taken care of Ben-Gurion's concern we think that, without
distorting balance Ambassador Badeau's eventual presentation to Nasser,
this presentation should emphasize our conviction implementation of
plan would require all parties exercise restraints. Avoidance incitive
propaganda is one of most important of these.)
Feldman was scheduled meet Mrs. Meir August 20 and again, for concluding
session, morning August 21. We have as yet no further report from him
of these meetings but he is still under instructions trigger Cairo approach
at earliest possible opportunity and we are hopeful you will be hearing
from him and/or Department soonest.
Since talks in Israel have taken slightly longer than anticipated,
you should extend your deadline for departure from Cairo proportionately.
At August 19 meeting Feldman also informed Ben-Gurion of our willingness
provide Hawk missile. (In response urgent representations by UK he referred
to fact Great Britain might make a competitive offer of the Bloodhound
and emphasized that we recognized Israel's need of a ground-to-air missile
system in absence of arms limitation but were not deciding for Israel
whether it should seek US or British system.) Feldman told Ben-Gurion
we would inform Nasser of our decision hoping that escalation of weapons
in Near East could be prevented. Ben-Gurion replied that he would gladly
agree to no missiles at all if Nasser could agree to arms limitation
and controls. In fact, he said, he would like to exclude weapons of
every kind from the area.
In light of Ben-Gurion's remarks preceding paragraph your remarks should
clearly indicate that our readiness provide the Hawk to Israel is a
statement in principle in the absence of arms limitation. It is not
an undertaking for delivery at specific time of specific number of missiles.
It might well be that Israel will in the long run prefer purchase some
other missile system such as the British Bloodhound.
Rusk
Sources: Foreign
Relations of the United States, 1961-1963: Near East, 1962-1963,
V. XVIII. DC: GPO,
2000. |