State Department Opposes Security
Guarantee for Israel
(August 22, 1963)
This is a memorandum from the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
for International Security Affairs, Sloan, to the Deputy Assistant Secretay
of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Grant, discussing the
question of a U.S. security guarantee for Israel.
Dear Jim: Enclosed are the comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on your
letter of 15 July. We generally concur in these comments.
Our evaluation is that the true desire of the Israelis is for more
public and open alignment and support from the U.S. rather than a great
interest in advanced weaponry or purely military planning. It is further
our feeling that there is little or no advantage to the U.S. in going
beyond the type of public assurances contained in the President's May
8th statement.
While we might advise them that we are willing to increase the amount
of training in the U.S. available to them, or engage in some completely
confidential exchanges of military views, it is most unlikely that such
low key responses would either satisfy their desire for more open support,
or really meet a true Israeli military need.
Because of the size of the territory and the nature of the threat,
joint planning would have little military value. The Joint Chiefs of
Staff have current unilateral contingency plans covering the rapid application
of varying degrees of force and have developed military studies with
the British permitting coordinated bilateral US-UK military actions,
if considered appropriate. These contingency plans and studies give
the United States the capacity to put military teeth into our existing
protective attitude toward Israel and are considered adequate to foreseeable
U.S. military requirements in the event of Arab-Israeli hostilities.
In short, it is the political value of open military support which the
Israelis desire, and which we do not recommend.
Without unnecessary repetition of the Joint Chiefs comments, we see
no good reason for alteration of our present Middle East arms policy.
We say this not only because we are skeptical that it is pinching the
Israelis noticeably, but also because it seems plain that we will respond
affirmatively to their valid requests for purchase of appropriate defensive
weapons when needed to help maintain the arms balance in the area.
I trust this letter together with the Joint Chiefs memorandum is responsive
to the question raised in your letter.
Sincerely yours,
Frank
Sources: Foreign
Relations of the United States, 1961-1963: Near East, 1962-1963,
V. XVIII. DC: GPO,
2000. |