Memorandum Rethinking U.S. Policy on
Johnson Plan
(September 14, 1962)
This memorandum is in reference
to the sentiments of some State Department
officials, in which they believe that the
U.S. should back down from the Johnson plan,
stating that the U.S. has committed itself
to too much and cannot follow through with
solving some of the problems it had initially
set out to.
McGB:
Have had several talks with Mike/2/ and State in attempt to keep Hawk/Johnson
Plan/Nasser dilemma from getting out of control. Since Mike has already
told Jewish leaders in confidence about Hawks (he urged no public comment
before 28 September but naturally feels it may leak sooner), next two
problems are (a) how to preserve at least fighting chance for Johnson
Plan; (b) how to keep US/UAR rapprochement from going off rails.
Mike is very goosy about Johnson Plan, thinks we have over-committed
our prestige to it, and would like to start disengaging. One thing upsetting
him is that he told Israelis they would have final word on admitting
any refugee. However, Johnson himself later altered final version of
Plan (para. 10) to call for UN impartial arbitration of any conflict
over admissibility. Israelis immediately hopped on this as derogation
of their sovereignty and Mike feels he's been put in difficult spot.
He doesn't see a prayer of Israelis buying Plan with this in it./3/
In any case, I argued vigorously to Mike that we ought to play out
hand on Johnson Plan, papering over above crack if possible. After all,
US prestige is already committed to Plan--JFK has written Ben Gurion,
Nasser, and Hussein about it and to retreat now would be a real loss
of face. Moreover, so what if US prestige is attached to a failure;
we discounted this in advance, arguing that it was to US advantage to
have made a real effort at solving refugee problem. This would permit
us subsequently to justify disengaging gradually from UNRWA and shifting
burden to area states themselves. State feels the same way; indeed there
are optimists who think Johnson chances slightly improved, largely as
result of UAR restraint to date.
As to some token that we still desire to improve our relations with
Nasser (which means giving Kaissouni something while he here for IMF
meeting), I think we should approve State suggestion of announcing $10
million final installment of stabilization contribution if Europeans
ready to match it), plus a private promise that we will sign multi-year
PL-480 as soon as Congress adjourns. Opposition to PL-480 announcement
is not that it would upset Israelis; Mike says he and JFK would have
no objections on these grounds. Problem arises from general stop-order
which aid bill managers have put on announcing any major agreements
until bill passed. Announcing a $400 million PL-480 deal with Nasser
could create enough of a stink that we should seek to avoid it.
1. Rusk has approved above, but don't you think we should at least
clue JFK on it in advance (I recall his annoyed reaction when he discovered
we gave a couple of hundred million in PL-480 last year). Also we need
authority to override stop-order on aid agreements./4/
2. Also urge that you emphasize to President that we should not disengage
too quickly from Johnson Plan. Let's let nature take its course--there's
still a slim chance plan might work. If not, let someone else torpedo
it. For us to torpedo our own brain-child is neither necessary nor becoming.
In fact I've suggested Mike plug same idea with Israelis. Why should
they get out in front on wrecking Johnson Plan; let Arabs take the onus.
Bob K.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library,
National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda
Series, Staff Memoranda, Robert Komer. Secret.
/2/Myer Feldman.
/3/On September 14, the
Office of United Nations Political Affairs
prepared a memorandum for Talbot that asserted
that language changes had been made to tone
down controversial points, but there was
no substantive difference between the Johnson
Plan approved by President Kennedy and what
Johnson presented to Israel. (Department
of State, IO/UNP Files: Lot 72 D 294, PCC--Johnson
Mission)
/4/A handwritten note by
Komer in the margin next to this paragraph
reads: "Rusk did not get chance to talk
with Pres. on this."
Sources: Foreign
Relations of the United States, 1961-1963: Near East, 1962-1963,
V. XVIII. DC: GPO,
2000. |