Memorandum on Israeli Opposition to the Johnson Plan
(September 20, 1962)
This is a memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of State for Near
Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Talbot, to Secretary of State, Rusk,
concerning Israeli Opposition to the Johnson Plan
For your information the following explains developments with Israel,
which is strongly opposing the Johnson Plan. The Arabs are continuing
to reserve their position and are avoiding publicity.
1. Arguments Used by Israel
On September 13 Israel reacted violently to the plan which Dr. Johnson
presented to Ambassador Comay in New York on September 10 as his personal
thinking only. The burden of Ambassador Harman's forceful remarks to
Mr. Feldman and to me is that Israel has been betrayed, that the plan
as presented in writing by Dr. Johnson bears no resemblance to the plan
as described by Mr. Feldman in Jerusalem, that the written plan is stacked
against Israel, that there is nothing in writing which protects Israel,
that in pushing the plan we have worsened Israel's position in the Near
East and have given the Arabs a club with which to beat Israel, and
that Israel would like to be informed that the United States Government
does not associate itself with the plan and will kill it in the PCC.
The ostensible basis for the Israeli attitude is the absence in the
plan and the accompanying explanation of language unqualifiedly reserving
to Israel ultimate decision how many refugees would be repatriated.
They also object that they had not been informed of other language such
as "impartial bodies to give advice on controversial matters",
which is objectionable to them because they interpret it to limit their
sovereignty and to remove their control over repatriation.
2. Language Change in the Plan
About two weeks before giving the plan to the parties Dr. Johnson decided
he must also hand them a written explanation, reversing a previous decision.
With a view to reducing to a minimum controversy over detail and to
achieve as even a balance as possible in dealing with Arab and Israel
concerns, he undertook a revision of the explanation. He presented most
of these drafting changes to the PCC members with an attitude of finality.
He did accept several counter changes made by the Department and USUN.
The more controversial points he planned to make orally. From the plan
itself he deleted the key sentence: "Governments would retain the
ultimate right to decide on the acceptance of refugees." It was
considered that there were sufficient explicit and implicit safeguards
for Israel in both the plan and the explanation, and the clear intent
of the plan would be stated orally to the parties. Dr. Johnson did inform
the Arabs on September 10 that Israel had the last word on repatriation
and the ensuing discussion made plain the Arab representatives understood
this.
3. Efforts to Persuade Israel
I have urged on Ambassador Harman that Israel seek clarification and
reassurance from Dr. Johnson, and I have affirmed the validity of the
guarantees which Mr. Feldman gave Israel in Jerusalem. When it became
apparent after several days that Israel had no intention of talking
with Dr. Johnson (it seemed ominous at the time that when receiving
the plan the Israeli representative wanted Dr. Johnson to know that
no matter what transpired the Israelis respected him), at our suggestion
Dr. Johnson saw Ambassador Comay September 19 to offer him a chance
to discuss Israeli concerns. Ambassador Comay made no substantive comment,
asked no significant questions, and remarked that Mrs. Meir would give
us the definitive Israeli position next week (presumably to you). Ambassador
Harman equally shows no interest in my affirmations of the guarantees
given by Mr. Feldman.
4. Estimate of the Israeli Position
We consider that Israel, undesirous of repatriating any refugees and
having finally been persuaded of a serious US intent to seek implementation
of the Johnson Plan, is making an all-out effort to scuttle the plan
while the US is still not fully committed to it and while there is a
possibility that the scuttling can be accomplished without public onus
for Israel. We believe that Israel is charging bad faith and is interpreting
the language of the plan and the explanation in the blackest light as
pretexts useful to achievement of its objective rather than as causes.
If the Israelis were sincere they would be willing to engage in serious
talk with Dr. Johnson. Perhaps having now received assurance of the
Hawk missile the Israelis feel free to take a hard line in the hope
of obtaining more benefits in the pre-election period. At least one
leak on the Johnson Plan has appeared in the Israeli press with an expression
of hostility to it.
Mention by Ambassador Harman of the absence of any guarantees for Israel
in writing and his rejection as worthless of a suggestion that Dr. Johnson's
letter of transmittal could include language explicitly safeguarding
Israel's interests leads us to think there is a possibility that Israel
has a fall-back position; i.e., a written guarantee by the US of the
safeguards Israel wants plus a written statement of the upper limit
of repatriation the US expects Israel to accept.
5. US Position
We consider the substance and intent of the plan to have been unaffected
by the changes made in the language and we consider the Israeli reaction
and charges of bad faith to be unjustified and contrived.
We plan to provide you a talking paper on the Johnson Plan for your
meeting with Mrs. Meir on September 26. Tentatively we think it might
be worthwhile for you to arrange to explore with her the possibility
of an exchange of written undertakings. Also, since Mr. Feldman did
not raise with the Israelis the possibility of a more explicit security
assurance than that given by the President in an earlier letter to Prime
Minister Ben-Gurion, it might be worthwhile for you to explore this
possibility with Mrs. Meir. If these two attractions should fail, we
would not at present see other possibilities unless the Administration
is willing to tell Israel that continued intransigeance will force us
to reduce the priority we had planned to give Israel for training on
and delivery of the Hawk and to be "tough" in other ways.
6. Our Internal Problem
As a result of Israeli pressure on him Mr. Feldman has told me he considers
he has been "doublecrossed" by the fact that language was
changed, without his clearance, so that Israel received from him an
account not borne out by the documents. He says he thinks we have gone
further and faster on the plan than the President authorized (untrue),
and adds he understood us to tell the President our prestige was not
engaged (untrue), whereas now he hears from us that US prestige is engaged.
He had been informed that US and UN secretariat officials were working
together on administrative plans for the projected field operations,
and suggested that we cease to so involve ourselves. (Actually, no US
official has been so engaged. Last week Dr. Johnson and his immediate
staff commenced some contingency planning in order to be prepared in
the event of a decision to commence field operations soon. At our insistence,
this contingency planning was to be severely restricted within the UN
secretariat, and with regard to scope.) Mr. Feldman has proposed another
meeting with the President next Tuesday to assess where we are. On September
19 he apparently spoke with the President on the trouble we are having.
The President telephoned me to explore means of reassuring Israel, to
request that we not press forward urgently, and to explain that he does
not want to have trouble with American Jewry at this time. We have instructed
USUN not to participate in further planning and preparatory efforts
for the time being.
At our suggestion Dr. Johnson arranged to meet Mr. Feldman at 4:30
p.m. September 20 in New York. For his dinner with Mrs. Meir that evening
we have given Mr. Feldman the talking paper prepared for the use of
those of us talking with the Israelis here.
7. Conclusions
a. In light of the Israeli reaction we have carefully examined the
plan and the explanation and have determined to our satisfaction that
neither the substance nor the intent of the plan has been altered. Likewise,
the guarantees given Israel by Mr. Feldman remain valid: i) governments
would determine the admissibility and numbers of refugees to be admitted;
ii) the US would not permit the process to evolve in a manner dangerous
to Israel and would bring the implementing process to a halt if danger
signals developed; and iii) Israel would not have to bear an intolerable
financial burden. Both we and Dr. Johnson are stressing in our talks
with the Arabs, as requested by Israel, that the refugees must not be
subjected to pressures and propaganda. Therefore we cannot accept the
validity of Israeli arguments.
b. Obviously contrary to our earlier optimism we are now at an impasse
with Israel and time will be required to test out the depth of Israeli
resolve and whether, and at what price, Israel can be induced to fall
back from its principal objective. It seems unlikely that the issue
with Israel can be resolved before the election on November 6. If it
is to be kept out of the GA debate early decision thereafter will be
necessary. Meantime we must endeavor to find means to keep the issue
open with the Arabs.
c. Somehow it must be gotten across to Israel that it is essential
that Israel not be the one to cause the plan to fail. For Israel to
do so would allow the Arabs to say they had acquiesced and would probably
lead to Arab introduction of contentious resolutions in the GA, such
as expansion of the membership of the PCC, which would be more difficult
to defeat. It would render far harder our plan to begin to throw responsibility
for the refugees increasingly on the host governments and thus to commence
liquidation of the problems by other means if Paragraph 11 of Resolution
194 cannot be implemented. At the time the Jordan waters issue becomes
heated Israel would be in a much less favorable position and our defense
of Israel's water withdrawals would be more difficult. As a result of
failure of the plan caused by Israel new life might well be breathed
into proposals for a "Palestine entity" or competing Palestine
entities, and pressure would probably increase for "Algerianization"
of the Palestine problem. Finally, Dr. Johnson would be obliged to resign
as Special Representative and would be under compulsion to state the
reasons for his failure
Sources: Foreign
Relations of the United States, 1961-1963: Near East, 1962-1963,
V. XVIII. DC: GPO,
2000. |