U.S. Considers Strategy for Pursuing Johnson Plan
(September 22, 1962)
This memorandum reassess the U.S.'s interest in
going forward with the Johnson Plan, summarizes the perceived costs
to the nation if they were to withdraw their support of the plan, in
addition to outlining what the next move should be.
Let me register my strong conviction that (1) we
should not give up too soon on the Johnson Plan; and (2) even if we
do disengage, it will cost us heavily unless we do so slowly and cautiously,
letting the onus fall on the Arabs and Israelis, rather than appearing
to cave ourselves.
As I see it, Israel (having gotten its Hawks) is making
an all-out effort to sink the Johnson Plan. It is scared of the Plan
and worried about the political repercussions in Israel, where BG heads
an unstable coalition. In their concern over appearing to show weakness,
however, the Israelis are ignoring the fact that this is the best chance
in years for at least a start toward an overall Arab/Israeli settlement
(which is emphatically in their interest).
Mike Feldman buys the flat Israeli contention that
the Plan is "unacceptable"; I am not so sure. At a minimum
the Israelis are properly quite anxious that the onus for sinking it
not fall squarely on them. In fact, there is at least a chance they
might buy a version of the Plan, if we gave them specific (probably
written) assurances that carrying out the Plan would not be permitted
to imperil their security (e.g. upper limit on refugees, protection
of Israel against any UN contentions of non-compliance, etc.)
I further doubt that US determination to continue low-key
exploration of Johnson Plan possibilities (though without pressing the
Plan any further) will seriously complicate our relations with Israel
or adversely affect US Jewish opinion just before elections. The reason
is that Hawk offer will leak shortly; it is so pro-Israeli a move (and
will be so blasted by Arabs) that it will largely blanket Johnson Plan.
In any case, I see no reason why we should deprive
ourselves of any leverage with the Israelis by telling them now that
we're withdrawing US support of the Johnson Plan. If we do so, they
will want to tell the French and Turks, and then the word can easily
get out to the Arabs.
Let's have clearly in mind what this might cost us:
(1) US prestige is already committed to at least a
fair try at selling Johnson Plan. After all, JFK himself sent Mike to
tell BG and wrote Nasser and Hussein that we think Plan fair and practicable.
Our Ambassadors in key Arab states have put in initial plugs for Plan.
For it to get out now that we reneged so soon under Israeli pressure
will make us look a little sick.
(2) If we cave too precipitously under Israeli pressure
this time (especially after just offering Hawks), they'll think they
can lead us around by the nose.
(3) If Arabs find out (as they well might), they'll
simply say it proves again the US is exclusively pro-Israel (especially
coming right after Hawk deal).
(4) Hawks will cause enough Arab/Israeli furor; if
it gets out Israel and/or US also sank Johnson Plan, Arabs can have
a field day in UN. Having the Plan now, they could even introduce it
as their own. Or they could shift back to custodial resolution in UN
debate, forcing Israel to counter with Brazzaville "direct negotiation"
gambit. In any case, there'd be a donnybrook in UNGA.
(5) This fight will inevitably leave bitter taste affecting
far more serious battle next year when Israelis get ready to divert
Jordan waters.
(6) Joe Johnson, having been beat over head by Israelis,
might just throw up his hands and resign right now (after reporting
to PCC that Plan a non-starter because one of parties won't buy). Then
fat would be in fire. Rusk is lunching with Joe Sunday to dissuade him.
The hell of it is that initial Arab reactions suggest
they may buy the Plan; even the Syrians are divided in their counsel.
This makes it even more important we not cave now.
So we must get across to Israel that it too will lose
heavily if it incurs onus for sinking Plan. There are indications Israelis
are well aware of this, and we should drive it home to them.
Only sound strategy at this point is:
(1) to keep probing Israeli position to see if indeed
they might buy Plan with appropriate US assurances. We must do precisely
what Mac tells me President said last Wednesday;/3/ i.e. "We should
stick with the position which Mike explained in Israel and Israelis
should also stay where they were when Ben Gurion talked to Mike."
We simply cannot afford to accept their contention that Plan has been
changed since then; this means in effect that we are guilty of a breach
of faith!
(2) We must get across to Israelis that, whatever happens
to Plan, neither we nor Israel should let ourselves be maneuvered into
being chiefly responsible for failure. This means we must keep negotiating,
consulting, talking (Plan isn't even approved by PCC as yet, much less
Arabs or Israel), counting on Arab hotheads to begin reacting and thus
sharing the blame. By this means Plan can just be allowed to peter out
in welter of conflicting views, interpretations, etc., thus fuzzing
up the blame.
(3) Meanwhile neither US nor UN should move ahead on
any steps toward implementation. This stop order is already in.
Plan of Action. We've got to speak with one voice to
the Israelis, and that voice must be Rusk, speaking with authority from
President! We can't let them keep whipsawing us.
(1) Rusk should tell Harman Israel is being much too
precipitous in rejecting Johnson Plan, and should do nothing till Rusk
talks with Golda Meir Wednesday.
(2) He should tell Golda: (a) US not prepared see best
hope in years for movement toward Palestine settlement go down drain
so quickly; (b) on other hand, we stand by version of Plan Mike gave
BG regardless of later verbal changes; (c) we prepared talk out any
problems and to consider giving Israel any assurance to this effect
it needs; (d) in any event, neither Israel nor US can afford take onus
for sinking Plan, so imperative all parties keep talking. Longer we
talk, bigger the chance Arabs will blow thing up, especially once Hawk
offer leaks.
(3) If Rusk needs help to keep Johnson from resigning,
President should call Joe.
(4) Everybody should keep lip buttoned about Johnson
Plan. Let's not give Arabs a free ride.
Carl, I've reviewed the bidding at length because I
feel you should acquaint JFK with full flavor of problem. I've urged
that Rusk get in touch with President, but JFK is entitled to our two
cents worth too. This Johnson gambit has been very poorly handled tactically
(Joe should never have put so much on paper, or changed wording after
Mike talked to BG). But I'm convinced that if we cave now it will cost
US and Israel even more than if we play out hand further, and disengage
gradually if we must at all.
Bob Komer
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files,
Countries Series, Palestine Refugees, Vol. II, 8/62-9/62. Secret. This
memorandum was apparently forwarded to President Kennedy by Kaysen on
September 23 under cover of a note that reads: "Attached is Bob
Komer's review of the present state of our discussions with the Israelis
on the Johnson Plan. Phil Talbot takes the same view of the situation,
and he has asked Rusk to call you on it. Rusk will probably call today
(Sept 23). Since Komer finished the note, the Israeli Ambassador called
on Talbot to tell him that Israel cannot accept the Plan. This need
not be final, but we must act now if we are to avoid the blame for scuttling
the Plan and double-dealing with Nasser. Part of the problem is Mike
Feldman's tendency to take only the Israeli side of the problem into
account; hence the need for turning dealings with the Israelis over
to the Secretary of State for the time being." (Ibid., President's
Office Files, Countries Series, Israel)
/2/September 19. See Document 47.
Sources: Foreign
Relations of the United States, 1961-1963: Near East, 1962-1963,
V. XVIII. DC: GPO,
2000. |