Memorandum on Kennedy's View on the Johnson Plan
(September 25, 1962)
This memorandum states the direction that the President
would like to see the U.S. take in handling the Johnson Plan and in
attempting to gain Israeli support.
The President's view on the Johnson Plan, as I understood it, was as follows:
1. Rusk should try to shake Golda Meir's opposition
to the plan, pointing out that whatever Israelis think the plan means
we stand foursquare behind the assurances given by Mike Feldman.
2. If Mrs. Meir remains adamant, Rusk should propose
a strictly controlled experiment with 10-20,000 refugees. If this pilot
project works we can go further.
3. If this too is rejected, we tell Israelis we recognize
plan is a non-starter, but insist that they and we so handle its demise
that onus for its rejection can be laid at least partly at Arab door.
US does not propose to assume primary responsibility for plan's failure.
4. US should then seek to gin up a negative Arab reaction
as quickly as possible (this is going to take some doing, in order not
to be too transparent).
I suggest that we show this to the President to make
sure that it fairly reflects his thinking.
Bob K
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files,
Countries Series, Palestine, Refugees, Vol. II, 8/62-9/62. Secret. Komer
forwarded this memorandum to Kaysen on September 25 under cover of a
note that reads: "Attached is my summary of President's views.
I suggest that you show it to him. I also urge you show him Rusk's briefing
memo as evidence that State's judgment on Israeli position is much different
from Mike's. In any case I don't see how we lose, even domestically,
by holding firm a little longer. We've got to consider cost to our whole
effort with Arabs if on top of Hawk deal we back out on Johnson Plan
without being able to avoid the blame. State and Joe Johnson sure handled
tactics on this one poorly (they couldn't have picked a worse time).
I'm damn sorry that I was off keeping VP honest while this went on."
Komer added a handwritten note: "Ball thinks Dept's. position is
'protected' and will call Rusk in morning. I don't think George realizes
what's at issue." (Ibid.)
Sources: Foreign
Relations of the United States, 1961-1963: Near East, 1962-1963,
V. XVIII. DC: GPO,
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