Review of Johnson's Visit to the Near East
(September 29, 1961)
Washington, September 29, 1961.
SUBJECT
Dr. Johnson's Mission to the Middle East/2/
PARTICIPANTS
Dr. Joseph E. Johnson, President, Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace and Special Representative of the Palestine Conciliation Commission
IO--Assistant Secretary Harlan Cleveland
NEA--Assistant Secretary Phillips Talbot
Dr. Johnson said he assumed the Department has received
a report from USUN of his interim, oral report to the Palestine Conciliation
Commission on September 26./3/ On the surface, there has been no change
in public attitudes toward the refugee problem on the part of host governments
or Israel. The Arabs insist on repatriation as the sine qua non of any
movement; the Israelis insist there can be no repatriation without a
change in basic Arab attitudes toward Israel. In effect, each side says
action depends on the other. At the same time, there does appear a real
possibility--"not a great possibility and certainly not a probability"--that
an individual working over a period of several months, exploring, needling,
making the parties aware of UN and US concern, might achieve some progress.
Even so, a hard core of refugees will remain for at least 15 years,
requiring a continuation of UNRWA or its equivalent. A substitute in
the form of contributions to governments to enable them to care for
the refugees is simply not practical.
Mr. Cleveland remarked that we are very cautious about a hasty extension
of UNRWA's mandate. It is the only leverage we have with the Arabs.
Dr. Johnson said he recognized this to be the case,
although he cannot feel our financial support of UNRWA is a very effective
lever.
Dr. Johnson said he had not, at first, been convinced
of the desirability of appointing an American as Special Representative
of the PCC. His trip had convinced him that the job must be undertaken
by an American. Any movement toward solution must at some point involve
United States Government action or the parties will have no faith in
US willingness to follow through. Dr. Johnson said he believes his own
degree of association with the U.S. Government has perhaps been ideal.
It is known that he is acquainted with officers in the Department, yet
his connection is neither too close nor too visible. Dr. Johnson commented
that he believes the decision not to send a Department officer with
him as escort was entirely right. The presence of such an officer would
have identified him with this Government to an undesirable degree. As
it was, Mr. Moe of the UNRWA staff had been a most helpful and well-informed
companion. The efficiency of UN and UNRWA administrative support had
been extremely gratifying. American diplomatic representatives had also
been most helpful and demonstrated a sympathetic understanding of the
Special Representative's need to protect his identity as a UN emissary.
Responding to questions from those present, Dr. Johnson
said it was clear to him that the Arabs had not coordinated their positions
in advance of his arrival. Obviously, Lebanese suggestions that "resettlement"
means settlement only within the confines of former Palestine were motivated
by special domestic considerations. Jordan showed itself the country
most anxious to resolve the refugee problem on realistic terms. Perhaps
the least rewarding of the conversations which had taken place was that
with UAR Foreign Minister Fawzi. The talk with Prime Minister Ben-Gurion
was the "roughest". So harsh did Ben-Gurion become that at
one point Dr. Johnson said he had considered walking out, if only for
tactical purposes. Interestingly enough, Ben-Gurion had sent a note
of apology: apparently an unusual step for him.
Compensation of refugees, per se, constitutes no problem
in the minds of people of the area, either Israeli or Arab, since they
are convinced the US will foot the bill. It is equally clear that compensation
is not enough. It will help only a very small number of the refugees.
Something will have to be done for the others to make them feel that
they are being "compensated" and that they are receiving something
with which to make a new start.
In terms of specifics, the "hunch" is that
Israel might accept somewhere up to 10,000 refugees per year for an
initial period of 2 or 3 years provided there were some movement on
the Arab side as well. The refugees must be given a meaningful choice,
not just an alternative between remaining in the camps or going to Israel.
They must be given a chance to see what Israel has become. When they
have the opportunity of meaningful choice, their true wishes must be
ascertained, perhaps by something along the lines of the Upper Silesia
referendum. In the end, of course, any solution may be rejected by the
Arabs on political grounds, as was Eric Johnston's Jordan waters plan;
"still, the effort is worth a try".
Dr. Johnson said he had informed the Secretary, in
confidence, that he intends to frame his report to the PCC as if he
were discontinuing his connection with the refugee problem. It would
genuinely be very difficult to disregard his responsibilities to the
Carnegie Endowment if, despite the nature of his report, there should
be a request that he continue to engage himself in the problem after
the Assembly session.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 325.84/9-2961. Confidential;
Limit Distribution. Drafted by Crawford (NEA/NE) on October 5.
/2/Between September 1 and 17, Johnson visited the following Near Eastern
cities: Beirut September 1-3, for talks with UNRWA Director Davis; Amman
September 4-7, for talks with Jordanian Foreign Minister Talhouni; Beirut
September 8-10, for talks with Lebanese Foreign Minister Takla; Cairo
September 10-13, for talks with UAR Foreign Minister Fawzi; Israel September
13-16, for talks with Israeli leaders; Amman September 16-17, for talks
with Jordanian Prime Minister Talhouni. Additional documentation on
Johnson's trip is ibid., 325.84. See also Supplement, the compilation
on the Arab-Israeli dispute.
/3/Johnson reported to Secretary Rusk on his mission
during a meeting at USUN in New York on September 26. The memorandum
of conversation is in Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of
Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. Telegram 918 from USUN, September 26, contained
a summary of Johnson's interim report. (Ibid., Central Files, 825.84/9-2661)
For text, see Supplement, the compilation on the Arab-Israeli dispute.
Johnson submitted his final report to the General Assembly on November
24. (U.N. doc. A/4921/Add.1) See Document 140.
Sources: Foreign
Relations of the United States, 1961-1963: Near East, 1962-1963,
V. XVIII. DC: GPO,
2000. |