Memorandum on American, Israeli and Arab Persepctives on the Johnson
Plan
(September 29, 1962)
This memorandum discusses both the Israeli and Arab
positions on the Johnson plan, and the necessity of the U.S. to continue
to stand by their plan, for at least a while longer, as to ensure the
nation's international strength.
Carl--
Rusk's second round with Golda Meir went fairly well./2/
At least we wound up with agreement to keep talking. But there was no
agreement as to whether these talks should be on Johnson Plan (however
modified or supplemented by US assurances) or on something else.
Golda showed Rusk another BG memo saying Johnson Plan
totally unacceptable./3/ She then began talking about what Israelis
would do, e.g. take a number of refugees in certain categories such
as reunion of families, agree to some repatriation if Arabs agreed simultaneously
to resettle majority of refugees, etc. All these were reversions to
pre-Johnson ideas and all, in State's opinion, are total non-starters.
The Israelis are clearly probing hard to get a clear
signal that we have abandoned Johnson. To pick up any of their ideas
at this point would be tantamount to admitting this, and shouldn't be
done yet. Reasons are:
1. Hawk offer has simply laid ghost that Administration
pursuing an anti-Israeli policy. We have room to maneuver now.
2. We've told Arabs we back the Plan. To start talking
now about less satisfactory alternatives will inevitably reveal that
we've caved to Israeli pressure.
3. Such an open capitulation at this point (on top
of Hawks) would risk a disastrous Arab reaction. We're already in plenty
of trouble with Iraq, Syria, Saudi Arabia, etc. Let's not give the Soviets
another free ride.
4. We've got to force Israelis to cooperate with us
more, not only on Plan but on Jordan Waters, border policy, etc. So
we can't afford at this juncture to let them conclude they can browbeat
us if they put enough pressure on.
Arab attitudes toward Johnson Plan are still unclear.
FonMin Fawzi told Rusk that UAR might just buy the Plan, but if UAR
does I'm half convinced Syrians, Iraqis, and Saudis will try and hang
Nasser for it. Yemen revolt will increase inter-Arab acrimony. Indeed
we have some reports Syrians already rejecting Plan (Saudis and Iraqis
probably don't know about it yet). Therefore, Nasser (plus Jordan and
Lebanon, which would also like to buy Plan) may find it politically
impossible to do so. At any rate, let's keep cool till Arab stand matures.
They may yet bail us out.
In sum, we've got to stand by Plan a while longer yet,
while displaying full willingness to protect Israelis against the risks.
We can't afford to let Israel or Arabs pin onus for Plan's failure on
US.
So whether or not Johnson Plan is a dead letter, I
think President will want to back State's play. If so, it remains imperative
that US not speak with two voices. /4/
R.W. Komer/5/
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files,
Countries Series, Palestine, Refugees, 8/62-9/62, Vol. II. Secret. A
handwritten note on the source text reads: "(Taken from Pres. week-end
reading dtd 9/29)"
/2/Secretary Rusk transmitted to the Department of
State an uncleared memorandum of his September 28 conversation with
Meir in Secto 50 from USUN, September 29. (Department of State, Central
Files, 325.84/9-2962) For text, see the Supplement, the compilation
on the Arab-Israeli dispute. A supplementary briefing memorandum from
Talbot and Cleveland was transmitted to Secretary Rusk in New York in
Tosec 51 to USUN, September 28. (Department of State, Central Files,
325.84/9-2862)
/3/Reference is to a September 17 letter from Ben Gurion
to Harman. A retyped copy of the text, bearing a typed signature, is
in the Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Countries Series,
Israel Security.
/4/On September 29, Rusk instructed the Department
of State as a followup to his conversation with Meir to initiate a dialogue
with Ambassador Harman in Washington. Rusk directed that correspondence
from and memoranda of conversations with Israeli officials be examined
to determine as many common elements of agreement as possible on the
refugee question. Rusk predicted that the outcome would be something
similar to the Johnson Plan, although it could not be called that, because
that plan was "anathema to Israelis." He also indicated that
conversations with Harman should focus on how to handle the situation
in the General Assembly and PCC so that onus for the lack of immediate
progress was not placed on Israel. (Secto 48 from USUN; Department of
State, Central Files, 325.84/9-2962)
/5/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
Sources: Foreign
Relations of the United States, 1961-1963: Near East, 1962-1963,
V. XVIII. DC: GPO,
2000. |