Letter to Congress for U.S. Participation in the Early
Warning System in the Sinai
(September 30, 1975)
Over the past two years, our Government has played
an essential role in helping defuse the tensions in the Middle East.
We have chosen this course because we recognized, as has every American
Administration over the past 30 years, that the issues involved in that
troubled area are central to the American national interest.
The September 4 agreement, like the two preceding disengagement
agreements, was negotiated with the assistance of the United States.
The parties themselves have described it as a significant step towards
peace in the Middle East. It will reduce the risks of war, create new
opportunities for negotiating peace, and help provide a stable environment
in which global economic dislocations can be avoided. This Agreement
is in the overall national interest of the United States.
There would have been no Agreement without provision
for American participation in the Early Warning System. That System
is designed to reduce the danger of surprise attack, and the parties
to the Agreement were able to agree to entrust the System only to the
United States. The special American role was the only one in which both
sides had adequate confidence.
I want to be certain that the leaders of the Congress
fully understand the consequences of further delay in acting on this
important matter.
The first step in the implementation of the basic Agreement
under the timetable negotiated and agreed to by Egypt and Israel in
Geneva on September 22 is scheduled to be taken October 5. This process
will not begin, however, until the Congress has acted on the proposed
United States role in the Early Warning System. Delay in Congressional
action will, therefore, delay implementation of the basic Agreement.
It will risk causing the lengthy and difficult negotiations on the entire
five-month implementing timetable to be reopened. It will prevent a
lessening of the risks of war. If for any reason the agreement should
fail, the responsibility would be heavy indeed.
The issue before the Congress now is whether the Congress
will approve acceptance by the United States of the role that has been
proposed for it. There are other issues which the Congress must eventually
consider in connection with our continuing relations, policies, and
programs in the Middle East-particularly our programs of military and
economic assistance there. The Congress will want to consider those
carefully at the appropriate time, but they are not integral to the
implementation of the Agreement between Egypt and Israel. Voting in
favor of the U.S. role in the Early Warning System will not commit anyone
to take a position one way or another on these issues.
In summary, I met with the leadership three weeks ago
to describe what was involved in the new Agreement between Egypt and
Israel and to request urgent approval of U.S. participation in its implementation.
This question has been under intensive discussion in the Congress for
nearly three weeks. All relevant papers and all U.S. commitments related
to the Agreement have been submitted to the appropriate committees of
the Congress. If action is not completed in the coming week, the United
States will be in the position of holding up implementation of an Agreement
which two key Middle Eastern countries have signed as a significant
step towards peace. The Middle East is an area where American policy
has long had broad bipartisan support. The issue presently before the
Congress offers an opportunity to reaffirm that tradition and to demonstrate
how the Executive and Legislative branches can work together on a foreign
policy matter of high importance to the national interest and for the
benefit of world peace. I, therefore, urge strongly that action be completed
as early as possible and no later than Friday, October 3.
Sincerely,
GERALD R. FORD
Sources: Public Papers of the President |