Secretary Rusk Seeks Analysis of Israeli Politics
Toward Peace
(June 28, 1968)
This document relates Secretary of State Dean Rusk's
view that America should take a more active role in Israeli-Arab
peacemaking. It also talks about the complexites of making
peace.
193637. For Ambassador from Under Secretary.
1. As report of US-UK talks indicate
(State 188982) we will in days immediately ahead be
looking at possibility of more active US role in support
of Jarring Mission with view trying to move matters,
even slightly, towards a settlement of Arab-Israeli
dispute. It may be necessary to make direct efforts
to break present Jarring Mission impasse if drift in
area is to be stayed, opportunities for increased Soviet
penetration minimized, and detrimental and retrogressive
new Security Council round avoided. We assume Jarring
not likely to make significant progress in his current
trip. He is due to return to New York about July 15
and we will want to move promptly to help him before
we are thrown into SC on basis UAR idea of timetable.
2. We envisage effort of this sort
would involve carrying our substantive dialogue with
GOI further than we have to date to ascertain more clearly
Israeli ideas on a settlement to see whether we can
convince them to make some substantive or procedural
suggestions which would help break present impasse and
to see whether through intensive consultations we can
reach agreement on public or private approaches which
we or they can take in the interest of peace-ways of
achieving UAR agreement on Rhodes pattern; transmission
of ideas of substance through Jarring or through us;
etc.
3. Many factors would determine effectiveness
of such effort and hence would be critical in deciding
nature of any move on our part--e.g. situation in UN,
Arab (especially UAR) and Soviet positions, and status
of Jarring efforts. Central to any decision on approach
to GOI and on manner of such approach, however, would
be our assessment of Israeli domestic political situation
and impact thereon of US initiative with GOI.
4. We recognize difficulties of making
this assessment particularly when so many relevant factors
are unclear. We, nevertheless, need your best analysis
of political forces now at work in Israel, especially
as they would relate and react to such a US initiative
with Israel in first instance to facilitate settlement
with Arabs. Such initiative at outset would probably
need to focus on problem of getting substantive negotiating
process started and would most likely aim at getting
GOI to present some substantive ideas on a settlement
without first having obtained a categoric Arab commitment
to face-to-face negotiations and eventual peace treaty.
In taking such initiative with GOI we would take pains
to reassure Israelis that any explorations with them
are within framework of June 19, 1967 policy statement
and November SC resolution and we would try to make
dear depth and seriousness of US concern with present
situation for reason stated para. 1 above. Despite such
assurances and explanation, we assume that serious and
forceful USG effort in this direction would increase
tensions within GOI, perhaps to point of forcing Cabinet
crisis. Among questions which occur to us are following:
(a) What would such USG initiative with Israel do
to present alignment of forces within GOI?
(b) What should timing be--is present Eshkol-Dayan
dispute likely to make GOI more or less receptive
to USG initiative?
(c) Would US initiative help resolve Cabinet division
in favor of more flexible approach or in favor of
greater rigidity?
(d) How bound is Prime Minister by November 8, 1967
Cabinet position on direct negotiations and by subsequent
Knesset pronouncements on this subject?
(e) Would favorable decision on Israeli request for
F-4 Phantoms have any effect one way or other on GOI
position vis-a-vis negotiations and terms of settlement
with Arabs? Conversely would further delay in decision
have significant effect?
5. Other questions may occur to you
and we do not want to predetermine or limit framework
of your analysis and recommendations. Given timing considerations
set out para. 1 above, we would appreciate prompt reply,
in any event no later than July 1.
Rusk
Sources: Foreign
Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, V. 20, Arab-Israeli Dispute
1967-1968. DC: GPO,
2001. |