Report on Negotiations Related to Arms for Jordan
(February 6, 1968)
This report from the Secretaries of State and Defense
to the President outlines the pressure Jordan placed on the United States to recieve arms. As was commonplace
during this time period, Jordan used the threat of allying
itself with the USSR to gain bargaining leverage from
the U.S. The memorandum describes the Jordanian demands,
an acceptable U.S. counteroffer and the domestic politics
surrounding the issue.
SUBJECT
Recommended Arms Package
for Jordan as a Result of the Khammash Negotiations
General Khammash, Chief of Staff of the Jordan Arab
Army, arrived in Washington on January 17 as a result of our decision
to resume arms deliveries in Jordan.
Since the June Arab-Israeli hostilities the Jordanians
have pressed us to resume arms shipments to make up at least part of
the losses they suffered in June. We were not responsive until January
7. You will recall that in December in an oral message to you King Hussein
agreed that he would not purchase arms from the Soviet Union if the
United States would meet his legitimate defensive arms requirements.
Not having heard from us, the King decided that the pressure for arms
from his army was such that he could no longer resist persistent Soviet
offers of military equipment. As a result of our Ambassador's intervention,
Hussein postponed his decision until General Khammash could determine
in Washington what we are willing to do. Unless we can convince the
King that we are willing to resume our previous role of arms supplier
to Jordan, there is little doubt that, in his present critical situation,
he will turn to the Soviets for arms.
Upon his arrival, General Khammash presented us with
a list of military requirements totalling approximately $200 million.
(The details are outlined in Tab A.) (3) We have met with him periodically
during the last two weeks to discuss his requirements and we have explained
to him our very serious problems in meeting them. He admitted that his
requests were the maximum. Because of the critical situation in which
Jordan now finds itself he maintains this list, which in fact exceeds
Jordan's losses by a substantial amount, is necessary to restore the
morale of the armed forces. It is apparent that he will stand on his
original request until we make a counter proposal.
Khammash argues strongly that he must go back with
explicit assurances of resumed US support for the Jordan armed forces;
that he Khammash, has continually assured his officers and men (based
on discussions with us last summer) that American help was coming, but
that his assurances are wearing dangerously thin: and that pressures
on the King to meet arms needs" even from the USSR if necessary, a mounting.
Our Ambassador confirms this assessment. We have also had disturbing
reports of a deterioration in the internal security situation in Jordan.
It is clear that the very modest arms package we recommended
to you in December will not meet the political objectives we have set
ourselves, namely, (1) to shut off any further temptation on the part
of the King to accept Russian arms; (2) to increase the morale of the
armed forces and their loyalty to the King; (3) to increase his prestige
and stature with respect to his Arab neighbors; and (4) to strengthen
Hussein so that he can better carry out his role as principal proponent
of a settlement with Israel.
The principal problems presented by the Khammash list,
in addition to its size, are his requests for tanks and aircraft. Khammash
wishes to pursue his pre-war plan of standardizing on American tanks
and phasing out his British Centurions. He has asked for 200 M-48 A-4s
with diesel engines and 105mm guns. He has also asked for 36 "multipurpose,
versatile jet aircraft."
Both the tanks and the aircraft are troublesome because
of their high cost and relatively large numbers, and because we would
then be almost the sole supplier of major equipment items for Jordan.
The problem with Israel would be increased if we agreed to supply Jordan
with tanks with 105mm guns as opposed to the 90mrn guns with which their
present tanks are equipped.
Recommendations
We have put together a counter proposal which we recommend
that our negotiator offer to Khammash. The details of this proposal
are at Tab B. In essence, we would: (a) Agree to deliver ground force
items suspended after the war. These are a combination of cash sales
and prior year grant MAP items totalling about $10 million. There are
no major items of consequence included. (b) Make up Jordan's war losses
not included in (a) with the exception of heavy artillery and some of
the tanks. (c) Offer 88 M-48s instead of 200-and without the larger
105mm gun, and (d) Agree to go ahead with our F-104 contract by selling
18 F-104s now and, subject to certain conditions, consider a second
18 aircraft at some point in the future. We would plan deliveries and
financing over two and a half fiscal years; actual deliveries after
1968 would be subject to an annual review of Jordan's military requirements,
taking into consideration the political and economic situation then
prevailing and particularly progress towards an Arab-Israeli settlement
and progress of efforts towards arms limitations in the area. The considerations
which would be the subject of the annual reviews are at Tab D.
The installation for the first fiscal year would cost
approximately $32 million in cash sales for both ground and air force
items. Of this amount, $10 million has already been paid under the previously
concluded F-104 contract. The installment for the second fiscal year
would cost approximately $36.3 million while the third would be $10.3
million. The estimated cost of the total program would be approximately
$49 million for ground force items and $33 million for air force items,
a total of $82 million inclusive of shipping and related charges-a substantial
reduction from the cost of his request. About $3.8 million of this would
be in prior year grant MAP and the balance in cash sales. Jordan can
pay cash for the 1968 tranche; neither we nor they can promise anything
definite about availability of funds thereafter. We believe cash sales
will cause less opposition in Congress than credit sales. (See financial
summary at Tab C.)
We propose the F-104 aircraft for the following reasons:
(a) By resuming arms shipments to Jordan we are in effect placing it
in the category of countries for whom we selectively lifted our arms
suspension on 23 October. The suspension for Jordan specifically included
the F-104's, and we would thus be doing for Jordan now what we did for
the other "moderates" last October. (b) Jordan has on deposit $10 million
against the F-104 contract. Spares, ground support and other equipment
were shipped to Jordan prior to June. Twelve aircraft are currently
in storage awaiting delivery. Some Jordanian pilots and technicians
have been trained and others are now in training, and (c) the delivery
time for the F-104 is almost immediate. If the morale of the armed forces
is the key political factor in our aid to Jordan, they should have on
their airfields some US planes as soon as possible.
We could put to Khammash a counter proposal which included
18 F-104's but excludes any tanks, making him meet his tank requirements
in Great Britain. We consulted the British last week and they could
make available their Centurion tank at a price comparable to our M48AL
in quantities of up to 200, with deliveries beginning in six months.
They could, in about two years, upgun these Centurions to 105mm.
This proposal is not, however, likely to meet Jordan's
minimum requirements; Jordan would want at least a partial fulfillment
off its tank needs from American sources. Part of their reasoning is
military: they now have a mixture of American and British tanks, but
very few of the latter are in operable condition. It would be less expensive
and more efficient to standardize, at least for their two armored brigades,
on American tanks. An offer of about 88 US M48AI tanks would permit
them to equip their two brigades with American tanks. (Their total inventory
of American tanks would then be 181, 64 less than prewar. T he more
important reason is political. Tanks are the important element of their
ground forces and consequently they want them to be American, as evidence
of our continued support.
The King's mood is one of increasing frustration. In
spite of his efforts, there has been no significant progress towards
a settlement. His army is the only one in the area which has not been
substantially reequipped since the June war. The King wants the assurance
of continued American support which our supply of major military items
would imply. Given our traditional close relationship with Jordan, Hussein's
demise or his acceptance of Soviet arms would be a serious blow to US
prestige and interests in the area and would be interpreted as a Significant
Soviet victory.
In the circumstances, we recommend that you approve
the recommendation below. If you approve, the Secretary of Defense will
present this proposal to General Khammash.
Recommendation: That you authorize us to negotiate
on the basis of the arms package outlined in Tab B on the understanding
that we would first try to persuade the Jordanians to accept British
tanks. We would plan deliveries and financing over two and a half fiscal
years; actual deliveries after FY 1968 would be subject to an annual
review of Jordan's military requirements, taking into consideration
the political and economic situation then prevailing. If you approve,
we would consult with members of Congress. Should they raise strong
objections, we would return to YOU.(4)
Dean Rusk
Robert S. McNamara
Sources: Foreign
Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, V. 20, Arab-Israeli Dispute
1967-1968. DC: GPO,
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