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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE

Central Intelligence Bulletin

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6 September 1972

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[REDACTED]
6 September 1972

Central Intelligence Bulletin

CONTENTS

[REDACTED]

ISRAEL-FEDAYEEN: Vengeance for Olympic attack
(Page 6)

[REDACTED]

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NOTES

ISRAEL-FEDAYEEN: Tel Aviv seems certain to avenge the murder of its Olympic participants last night. The Israelis could allow the feeling of outrage in the international community to suffice for the present, but domestic sentiment for a response is building and any reprisal action could be severe. Fedayeen installations in Lebanon and Syria are potential targets, particularly those sites known by the Israelis to be occupied by Fatah, which uses the Black September organization as a cover name for its terrorist actions. The Israelis could also choose to strike directly at their Arab neighbors as they regard them as the hosts of the commandos, and as such responsible for their actions. There are several thousand guerrillas harbored in southern Lebanon, the site of previous Israeli military reactions, and still other thousands residing near Dara in Syria. [REDACTED]

(continued)

6 Sep 72

Central Intelligence Bulletin

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
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Soviet Developments

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
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
7 September 1972

SOVIET DEVELOPMENTS

C O N T E N T S



West Germany - Olympic Games; Medals for
Some, Freedom for Others

4



~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

WEST GERMANY - OLYMPIC GAMES: Medals for Some,
Freedom for Others

The consulate in Munich has learned from German police that to date there have been over 100 defectors among East Europeans attending the Olympics. Apparently no athlete or functionary with Olympic documentation has defected.

The figure presumably includes 13 Czech tourists who refused to return home last week. So far this group defection has been the only one reported by the press. The lack of reporting, at least in the past few days, is undoubtedly because the tragedy that befell the Israeli team has completely overshadowed all other events. At least two Poles are also known to have defected.

Defections of East Germans would be particularly embarrassing at this time. Bonn and Pankow are conducting negotiations on a general political treaty that will supposedly include provisions for bilateral cooperation in the fields of justice, culture, and sports. The East German Government permitted approximately 1,000 carefully screened people to attend the games as spectators and has instituted very stringent measures to control their movement and behavior. Defections would detract badly from the favorable publicity East Germany hoped to derive from the considerable accomplishments of its team in competition (49 Olympic medals to date). [REDACTED]

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7 September 1972

Central Intelligence Bulletin

CONTENTS

[REDACTED]

WEST GERMANY: The Munich tragedy is a major blow to West Germany's self-esteem and could affect the coming elections. (Page 2)

[REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

WEST GERMANY: The Munich tragedy has dealt a major blow to West Germany's self-esteem and international prestige, and could affect the coming elections.

Chancellor Brandt had hoped that the Olympic Games, the first in Germany since 1936, would give him a sorely needed boost in the parliamentary elections this fall. Although he and his colleagues in Bonn performed creditably during the crisis, the fact of the tragedy and the inevitable questions about how it was handled will overshadow all other aspects of the games.

A public mood of dissatisfaction, shame, and even insecurity could harm Brandt's election chances if only because he is the incumbent. Public attention is likely to focus on the inability of security officials to anticipate or prevent the terrorist attack and, later, to rescue the Israeli hostages.

The Christian Democratic/Christian Social opposition will probably find it difficult to exploit the tragedy. Although both parties have hit hard on the "law and order" issue, the conservative Christian Social Union controls the Bavarian government and, in West Germany's federated police structure, would have to bear the onus for much criticism. Political leaders and security officials from all parties, moreover, joined forces on 5 September in reacting to the terrorist attack. The temptation to seek partisan political gain may also be offset by a greater desire to prevent further damage to West Germany's international image.

The extent and nature of foreign reaction could also have an impact in West Germany. German opinion will be most sensitive to any criticism from Israel, although Brandt appears to have coordinated West German actions with an Israeli Government minister who flew to Munich on 5 September.

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[REDACTED]
8 September 1972

Central Intelligence Bulletin

CONTENTS

[REDACTED]

ARAB STATES: King Husayn is the only major Arab leader to condemn the terror in Munich. (Page 4)

[REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

ARAB STATES: Jordan's King Husayn has expressed the sole official condemnation from the Arab world of the terrorists' acts in Munich.

While other Arab leaders remained silent, Husayn in harsh terms denounced the killing of the Israeli hostages as the work of "sick minds" and expressed condolences to the families of the victims. Most other Arab commentary, both from official sources and the media, avoided outright condemnation of the guerrilla tactics and some Egyptian and Iraqi editorials praised the "heroism" of the Black September Organization.

An official Egyptian spokesman, after disclaiming any involvement with the commando attack, placed the onus for the loss of life on the West German Government and asserted that German officials had badly handled the situation. The Egyptians have reacted with considerable sensitivity to West German charges that Cairo did not fully respond to Bonn's appeals for cooperation during the Munich incident. The Egyptian Government has summoned the German ambassador for clarification of Bonn's position and announced it would take "a firm decision" following the consultations.

A dominant theme in Arab reaction is the insistence on placing the deaths of Israelis at the Olympic Games in the context of Israel's "criminal" occupation of the Palestinian homeland. The Lebanese Government's statement, while expressing "deep regret," interpreted the tragedy as an outgrowth of the Palestinians' despair and their wish to prod the international community to redress their grievances.

The grim outcome of the Munich events severely shocked Saudi leaders who privately deplored the killings and allowed scant coverage in the local media of news deemed repellent to Saudi sensibilities. Meanwhile, Libyan "citizens," in a presumably officially inspired gesture of support for the fedayeen, have offered to transport the bodies of the slain guerrillas to Libya for burial. [REDACTED]

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WEEKLY REVIEW

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8 September 1972

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CONTENTS (8 September 1972)



[redacted]
2 Israelis Likely To Hit Back

ISRAELIS LIKELY TO HIT BACK

The fedayeen attack on the Israeli Olympic team in Munich on 5 September, which ended in the death of 11 Israelis, will remind Tel Aviv that its problems with the Arabs are far from solved and that such favorable factors as the departure of the Russians from Egypt and the relative quiet on the frontiers and in the occupied territories can quickly be overshadowed by the desperate actions of a few Palestinians. The Munich drama followed a three-month lull in such fedayeen activity; in early May, the same "Black September" organization responsible for the Munich action attempted unsuccessfully to hijack a Sabena jet liner. Black September is the terrorist front of Fatah.

The Israeli Government and public are particularly bitter over the latest outrage and will seek to avenge the death of the Israeli athletes. West Germany has already been the target of Israeli press criticism, and bitterness could well be voiced against the Meir government itself for not having taken sufficient security precautions. The

semi-official newspaper, *Davar*, has called for "war to the end against these murderous organizations, their members, and dispatchers, wherever they may be." *Davar* warned the Arab governments giving sanctuary to the fedayeen to "eliminate the terrorist bases within their borders, or Israel will undertake the task." The government itself expressed almost the exact sentiments in a communique issued after a cabinet meeting.

Israel is almost certain to strike against fedayeen installations and concentrations in southern Lebanon and in Syria. Fedayeen in Syria may indeed get extra "attention" from the Israelis since they have been harassing Israeli positions in the Golan Heights for several weeks and since the Syrians have termed the Munich fedayeen "martyrs." Although Tel Aviv may undertake some quick, dramatic retaliatory strikes in the near future, the Israelis may prefer a more carefully planned military operation in order to deal the fedayeen a very heavy blow.



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
CONTENTS

[REDACTED]

ISRAEL - ARAB STATES: The Israelis have struck fedayeen installations in Syria and Lebanon.
(Page 5)

[REDACTED]

ISRAELI AIR ATTACKS



ISRAEL - ARAB STATES: Fedayeen installations in both Syria and Lebanon have borne the brunt of the initial post-Munich reprisals from Tel Aviv.

Guerrilla "terrorist bases and commands" were struck by Israeli aircraft in two separate waves yesterday. The first wave, yesterday morning, made wide-ranging attacks on three locations in Lebanon and seven in Syria. The targets included commando headquarters, concentrations, training camps, supply and vehicle storage areas, and marine bases. An Israeli official claimed that Palestinian refugee camps were not targets, but some strikes were in the vicinity of such encampments.

Other strikes in the late afternoon and early evening were directed at targets in southern Syria, some of which had been previously hit. Damage and casualty figures are uncertain, but appear to be extensive. Further action, which could include the use of ground forces, is possible, and is expected by some fedayeen units. [REDACTED]

Israeli Foreign Minister Eban said in a press statement shortly before the raids that Israel would "take all necessary measures to strike at the perpetrators of the murders" and would "fight the terrorists wherever we find them." Additional Israeli statements reminded the countries hosting fedayeen of those nations' responsibility for commando action, suggesting that they themselves, especially Syria, could feel still more strikes. Syria may be singled out because some of the Munich participants are believed to have lived and/or trained there. [REDACTED]

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13 September 1972

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CONTENTS

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EGYPT - WEST GERMANY: Hopes for closer ties clouded
by Munich incident. (Page 4)

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EGYPT - WEST GERMANY: Cairo's hopes for broadening ties with Western Europe have been clouded by the Munich incident and resultant strains in Egyptian - West German relations.

Egypt's initial public reaction to the events in Munich was guarded, but Cairo was quick to react negatively to West German charges that it had not fully cooperated with Bonn.

The newly arrived German ambassador was summoned on 7 September for clarification of his government's position. Egyptian media also launched a hostile barrage against Bonn for making what Cairo considered false allegations about the Egyptian position and condemned West Germany for having set a trap for the fedayeen.

In spite of some attempts by both sides to reduce the strains in their relations, serious frictions have remained. A visit to Bonn by the Egyptian foreign minister scheduled for later this month has been postponed, and the presentation of the credentials of the West German ambassador in Cairo has been delayed for five days. Moreover, an Egyptian spokesman announced that Cairo had found Bonn's explanation of the Munich incident and its aftermath "unacceptable." (The meeting in Cairo yesterday of the West German ambassador and the Egyptian foreign minister, however, may have rectified some of the issues between the two countries. According to the influential newspaper, al-Ahram, Egypt hopes for improved relations with West Germany. The article indicates that both countries are making an effort to paper over the dispute.) The Egyptian cabinet is scheduled to discuss the situation today.

Before the Munich incident Cairo was clearly interested in strengthening relations with Western Europe, including Bonn. Egypt has looked to these countries as sources of economic aid, political support in the confrontation with Israel, and as potential suppliers of some military equipment. In particular, Cairo had hoped to rally West European

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support at the UN General Assembly session later this month. These considerations evidently have taken second place, however, to reacting against what the Egyptian leadership almost certainly sees as another Western assault on its "dignity." Egypt will not directly condemn the acts of the Palestinian groups, and it continues to lay the ultimate blame for the terrorism on Israel. [REDACTED]

13 Sep 72

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5

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CONTENTS (15 September 1972)



1 After Munich

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AFTER MUNICH

Israel's strikes at Arab terrorist bases three days after the Munich killings are probably only the beginning of an intensified Israeli effort to eradicate the fedayeen as an effective threat. No major ground action by Israeli forces into fedayeen sanctuaries has yet occurred, but this remains a definite possibility, given the obvious intention of the fedayeen to keep the pressure on Israel and focus international attention on the Palestinian cause.

FIRST REPRISALS

In wide-ranging air attacks, one almost reaching the Turkish border, Israeli aircraft on 8 September hit a total of 11 targets, three in Lebanon and eight in Syria. Israeli officials said the sites were all fedayeen installations—headquarters, guerrilla concentrations, training camps, storage areas, and new fedayeen marine bases. The extent of the damage and casualties is not certain, but some 80 aircraft took part, and the Israelis estimate they killed or wounded 100-200 persons. Some of the casualties were civilians, which, the Israelis claim, is unavoidable because the fedayeen place their installations inside or near Palestinian refugee camps. Israeli aircraft

struck southern Syria later on 8 September, and again the next day when they shot down three SU-7s and damaged a fourth. The Syrians had attacked the Golan Heights.

Tel Aviv, in effect, has declared open season on the fedayeen. Minister of Transport Peres spoke of not resting "until terrorism is eradicated." Minister of Commerce and Industry Bar-Lev said Israel should "crush them and annihilate them." Chief of staff General Elazar spoke of mounting a "continuous war," not one "started today and finished tomorrow." Elazar added that air attacks were not the only means of fighting the saboteurs and that Israel will use "many and various means" against them. Prime Minister Meir vowed before the Knesset on 12 September that Israel would strike at terrorism "everywhere our hand can reach it," and the Knesset affirmed this in a unanimous resolution.

In preparation for future action, the Israeli Defense Force has moved eight of its 175-mm. guns, with a range of about 20 miles, into the Golan Heights. Israeli officials have laid all blame and responsibility for the terrorism on the host Arab states and those supporting and encouraging

them, indicating that Arab government installations—especially in Syria—may come in for their share of Israeli attention.

The determination of the Israelis to end the threat of the fedayeen appears to be matched by the commandos' resolve to continue terrorism and sabotage. Spokesmen for the fedayeen have voiced their elation over the events in Munich and maintain that more attacks will occur sometime within the next two weeks. These attacks will probably be concentrated in the US and Europe.

In another fedayeen attack in Europe, an Israeli Embassy official in Brussels was entrapped on 10 September by an Arab assailant and seriously wounded. Along the Arab-Israeli cease-fire lines, fedayeen continued to engage in sporadic attacks on the Israelis in the Golan Heights and the West Bank. The fedayeen made exaggerated claims on the results, but their attacks have not yet resulted in significant damage or in any casualties.


THE ARAB VIEW

Jordan's King Husayn unequivocally condemned the terrorists' acts in Munich last week, thus isolating himself once again from the mainstream of Arab opinion. While other Arab leaders remained silent or justified the terrorist actions, Husayn in harsh terms denounced the killing of the Israeli hostages as the work of "sick minds" and expressed condolences to the families of the victims, a bold gesture for an Arab head of state. Moreover, the Jordanians apparently sought to avoid embroilment in the subsequent military clashes. There are no indications that Jordanian military units increased their state of readiness in reaction to retaliatory Israeli air strikes in Syria and Lebanon or to the engagements of Syrian and Israeli fighter aircraft.

Most Arab comment, both from official sources and the media, avoided condemnation of the guerrilla tactics. Arab news media turned squarely against the US for its veto of the Security Council resolution that called for an end to violence in the Middle East. The Cairo press accused the US of applying a double standard that deplored the deaths of members of the Israeli Olympic team while at the same time ignoring the victims of Israeli air strikes in Syria and Lebanon.

The Egyptians, anxious not to be associated with the "traitor Husayn," excused the guerrillas responsible for the Munich episode and placed the onus for the loss of life on the West German Government. Perhaps a bit on the defensive, an Egyptian spokesman reacted with considerable sensitivity to West German charges that Cairo did not fully respond to Bonn's appeals for cooperation during the Munich incident. Bitter words





have been exchanged, but Egypt, anxious for general West European support now that the Soviets have left, is trying to cut its losses.

Arab League foreign ministers, meeting in Cairo this week, voiced a theme dominant in almost all Arab reaction. The ministers insisted on blaming the deaths of the Israelis at the Olympic Games on Israel's "criminal" occupation of the Palestinian homeland.

The Lebanese Government while expressing "deep regret" over Munich, viewed the tragedy as an outgrowth of the Palestinians' despair and their wish to prod the international community to redress their grievances. The grim events in Munich severely shocked Saudi leaders, who privately deplored the killings and allowed scant coverage in the local media. In Algeria, early misgivings about the wisdom of the fedayeen operation gave way to gratification that the Palestinians have the capability to strike boldly and throw fear into the enemy.

The five guerrillas slain in Munich received a final tribute at a funeral on 12 September in Libya. Although the Libyan Government was not publicly involved, officials assisted the private citizens who ostensibly sponsored the funeral services. In view of Qadhafi's strong vocal and financial support of the fedayeen movement, the guerrillas no doubt consider internment in Libya as appropriate.

SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN VIEWS

The fedayeen action at Munich underscored Moscow's limited room for maneuver on Middle East matters. The tragedy came at a time when Soviet support was being seriously questioned by many Arabs. On the one hand, Moscow could not afford to treat the killings in a way that would suggest its support for the Palestine liberation movement was diminishing. On the other hand, the oft-repeated Soviet warning to Palestinian leaders that terrorist tactics are counter-productive was again ignored by the guerrillas.

driving home to Moscow its lack of control over most events affecting the Middle East.

Soviet media restricted their coverage of the attack to sparse, straightforward accounts. The tone was one of disapproval, but official Soviet expressions of regret have been limited to brief statements by sports representatives. Moscow's East European allies were more outspoken, and their first reaction was to condemn the attack sharply. Most bloc media, however, made an effort to dissociate the Arab governments from the acts of a "few fanatics."

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WEEKLY REVIEW

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22 September 1972

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CONTENTS (22 September 1972)



[redacted]
4 Israel: More of the Same
[redacted]

ISRAEL: MORE OF THE SAME

Tel Aviv intends to press on with its "war" against the Arab fedayeen in the wake of Munich. The Israelis followed up their 8 September air strikes into Syria and Lebanon with a 36-hour ground-air operation into southern Lebanon on 16-17 September. Damascus clearly sees itself as the target for the next Israeli attack, and there are indications that the Israelis are preparing for just such an action.

Strike Into Lebanon

At first light on 16 September, an Israeli armored force—estimated at about 2,000—crossed into southern Lebanon to "clean-out" fedayeen concentrations just below the Litani River—some 15 miles inside the border. The Israeli operation involved the flushing out of fedayeen in some 20 villages in the area, and an air strike at the town of Nabiteyah—some 25 miles from the border. Nabiteyah was reputed to be the fedayeen southern headquarters. Combined with this action were more air strikes against a dozen or so fedayeen bases in the Arqub area stretching into the country's most eastern corners. Israeli Chief of Staff Elazar said the Israeli action was not a reprisal for the killing of two Israeli soldiers in the Mt. Hermon area, but part of Israel's "war" against the fedayeen.

Some 200 Lebanese houses were blown up in the operation, a minimum of 60 fedayeen were killed, and two bridges over the Litani were destroyed. Elazar indicated that the army would have killed hundreds of fedayeen if they had not fled. Lebanese Army units were involved and lost 17 killed as well as some 44 wounded or missing. Figures on Lebanese civilian casualties are incomplete, but apparently were high. The Israelis lost three killed and had six wounded.

Although the Israelis killed relatively few fedayeen, Tel Aviv achieved another objective by pushing the Beirut government into renewed


efforts to curb fedayeen activity. Tel Aviv has consistently held the host government equally responsible for guerrilla actions, and the real and potential threat of an Israeli strike is designed to force the governments to act.

The Lebanese Response

In this case, the Lebanese responded with a government "ultimatum" issued on 16 September to the fedayeen to evacuate villages near the border. The army apparently hopes to enforce the order. If the army really cracks down on the fedayeen, the action could bring down the Lebanese Government or lead to civil disturbances since the country is sharply divided in attitude toward the fedayeen. Radical Sunni Muslims and leftists in parliament have called for complete freedom of action for the fedayeen. Prime Minister Salam, who denied that any ultimatum was sent, has met with Fatah chief Arafat to work out an accommodation. Arab League Secretary General Riad has also arrived in Beirut to mediate between the Lebanese Army and the fedayeen. He will be trying to soften the restriction of fedayeen activity, it being the position of both Egypt and Syria that the fedayeen should be encouraged to do their things but from some one else's territory. Any deal that does not remove the commandos from the south will risk further strikes from Israel.

Syria is Next

Syria is another target for further Israeli military action. Arab fedayeen—assisted by Syrian regulars—continue to shell Israeli settlements in the Golan Heights. Such actions have continued after the Israeli air strikes of 8 September and the Israeli thrust into Lebanon. The semi-official Israeli newspaper *Davar* has warned that the operations in Lebanon were just part of a campaign "with much broader aims." The paper said that there were "many more" terrorist bases in



Lebanon that had not been hit, and that there are "many terrorist bases in neighboring Syria as well," all within the reach of the Israeli defense forces.

Rooting the fedayeen out of Syria may pose a more difficult task than it is in Lebanon. The terrain is more difficult, the distances involved are greater, and the Syrian regulars appear ready to

put up a fight. Israel prefers operations that incur the fewest casualties, so Israeli military action against Syria will probably keep to the air as much as possible. Air strikes against fedayeen bases in Syria or perhaps some helicopter-commando operations as it used in Egypt may be in the cards. If the Israelis want to hurt Syria severely, they could strike at the ports of Latakia or Baniyas, or at the oil refinery at Homs.

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SEP 27 1972


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DIRECTORATE OF
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Soviet Developments



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22

27 September 1972



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
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
27 September 1972

SOVIET DEVELOPMENTS

C O N T E N T S

	<u>Page</u>
Gromyko's Speech at the UN	1



Gromyko's Speech at the UN

On Terrorism

The foreign minister's speech yesterday was notable for its flat condemnation of the fedayeen actions in Munich. It was much stronger and more authoritative than any of the comments that have been made by Soviet officials and media since the incident early this month (see 8 September *Soviet Developments*). Gromyko's language is all the more surprising in that only last Saturday the Soviets and their allies abstained en bloc as the General Assembly voted to accept the secretariat's request that the issue of terrorism be placed on the fall agenda.

Moscow must have decided that to duck the topic in this forum would have been counter-productive in terms of its over-all objectives at this session. Soviet hopes for widespread support for another UNGA resolution condemning Israeli occupation of Arab territories could hardly come to fruition without a clear statement for the record that Moscow does not condone terrorism. In any case, Gromyko's statement that terrorist actions are not part of the "just struggle" of the Palestinian people since they "served no positive ends and caused loss of human life," echoed the line taken privately by the Soviets with fedayeen leaders well before Munich. That the whole subject remains a most sensitive one for Moscow is made clear by the fact that both the Russian and English language TASS summaries of the speech avoid even an oblique reference to Gromyko's remarks on Munich.

His statements probably also reflect the deep concern Moscow has shown for the safety of its delegation in New York this fall. Gromyko made a point of noting that the USSR opposes as a "matter of principle" all acts that disrupt the diplomatic activity of states and the normal course of international contacts and meetings.

27 September 1972

On Vietnam

Gromyko's remarks yesterday on Indochina were somewhat harsher than the USSR's recent public pronouncements, but this was probably dictated by the forum and by the Soviet desire not to be outdone by the Chinese, who have not yet spoken. Gromyko condemned US bombing and the mining of North Vietnamese ports and disparaged the difference between US words and deeds on Indochina. He ended, however, with the usual plea for a negotiated settlement and reaffirmed "full" Soviet support for the "constructive" proposals put forth by the Vietnamese Communists.

The Soviets have not publicly acknowledged the promises of support reportedly given by Premier Kosygin and President Podgorny in their meetings with the North Vietnamese ambassador on Monday and Tuesday. Hanoi today published a fuller account of these meetings indicating that both men had promised to back North Vietnam "until complete victory." Podgorny reportedly added that the USSR "highly valued" recent South Vietnamese Communist victories and felt their new negotiating proposals were "very fair and reasonable." Soviet media have noted only that the two men had met with the ambassador and had a warm and friendly conversation. [REDACTED]

27 September 1972

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DIRECTORATE OF
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WEEKLY SUMMARY

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29 September 1972

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
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
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
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MIDDLE EAST
AFRICA

14 Middle East: On It Goes






MIDDLE EAST: ON AND ON IT GOES

Tel Aviv has not attacked the fedayeen or their Arab hosts since the ground operation into southern Lebanon on 16-17 September. Tel Aviv seems to be awaiting evidence that Beirut and Damascus took previous Israeli strikes to heart and will indeed put curbs on the fedayeen. As a matter of fact, no incidents were reported as originating from either country since last week-end, but this inactivity is unlikely to last.

Israeli officials at home and abroad continued to emphasize, however, that the terrorist problem is Tel Aviv's main preoccupation. It is clear that Israel will respond with swift counteraction if terrorism flares up and that the targets will be Israel's Arab neighbors. Israeli officials expressed unhappiness with what it called Lebanese back-sliding on its professed intention to curb the fedayeen and hinted strongly that if Israeli forces had to go back into Lebanon, they might stay there indefinitely.



In contrast to these statements on Lebanon, Tel Aviv has rather abruptly muted its hard line on Syrian responsibility for fedayeen actions and its threats of impending military reprisals. The reasons for this—perhaps temporary—shift may revolve around several factors. There have been no significant incidents and no Israeli casualties since shortly after Israeli forces began maneuvers on the Golan Heights. The problems of striking into Syria are more complicated and difficult than in Lebanon and are more likely to draw a military reaction. Always sensitive to Moscow's moves, Tel Aviv has noted no visible signs of increased Soviet support for Syria and may, therefore, be doing some reassessing.

Moscow and the Arabs

A destroyer and destroyer escort from the Soviet Mediterranean squadron, accompanied by three amphibious ships, apparently entered the Syrian harbor at Tartus on 27 September. An amphibious exercise may take place in the near future. This is the largest number of Soviet naval ships  in a Syrian port.

The Soviets and Egyptians are also taking steps to patch up their problems. A Soviet Foreign Ministry official has stated that a Soviet-Egyptian summit will probably take place in about two months.

Lebanon and the Fedayeen

Cairo radio announced on 25 September that a "complete understanding" had been reached between the Lebanese Government and the fedayeen. Despite this show of amity, the details are yet to be worked out. The army is controlling fedayeen movement in the south by means of roving patrols and many checkpoints, and a few fedayeen have been wounded when they refused to submit to army searches. Although the major fedayeen groups have acquiesced for the present to this control, splinter groups probably will not, and further incidents could occur.

The Soviets have also been busy in Lebanon. In addition to the "defense" package offered to President Franjiyah last week, the Soviets have flown emergency medical supplies to the Lebanese Red Cross and Palestinian Red Crescent, ostensibly for the use of Palestinians injured in the Israeli raids.

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WEEKLY SUMMARY

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3 November 1972

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CONTENTS (3 November 1972)

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**MIDDLE EAST
AFRICA**

12 Israel-Fedayeen: Retaliation

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**Israel-Fedayeen
PRE-EMPTIVE RETALIATION**

Israeli aircraft on 30 October bombed four Arab guerrilla bases close to Damascus, the first such action since the bombings of 15 October and Tel Aviv's enunciation of a pre-emptive strike policy vis-a-vis the fedayeen. The raid came less than 12 hours after the West German Government had acceded to the demands of two Black September hijackers of a Lufthansa 727 and released the three Arab terrorists involved in the Munich slayings.

An Israeli spokesman denied the action was directly connected with the prisoner release. The government and public were incensed over what they called Bonn's "hasty capitulation" to the hijackers, however, and the strikes seemed designed to demonstrate that, while other countries might be soft on terrorists, Israel was not. Tel Aviv recalled its ambassador from Bonn and the Israeli parliament passed a resolution calling for "no submission" in dealing with the fedayeen "criminals and murderers."

Subsequently, the Israelis struck again, this time at a Syrian military camp near the northern

Lebanon-Syrian border. This was in retaliation for a Syrian artillery barrage against the Golan Heights, which Damascus had undertaken in response to the Israeli air strikes on 30 October. On 31 October, the Israelis moved more troops, armor, and heavy artillery into the heights, apparently to reinforce troops there and to indicate to Damascus they were ready for any contingency.



These Israeli actions reflect some frustration in dealing with the new Palestinian terrorist tactics, particularly in regard to bringing other countries to act. Israel can readily cope with terrorism along its cease-fire lines, in the occupied Arab territories, and within Israel itself. The problem is with terrorist activities abroad. Last week, for example, Dutch authorities released a Palestinian found to be carrying an arsenal of explosive letter bombs and weapons as well as a half-dozen passports, including an Algerian diplomatic one. Tel Aviv cannot understand such action by the Dutch or Bonn's "surrender" of the Munich prisoners. The Israelis, as a result, see the task of controlling the terrorists as devolving more and more upon themselves, and this reinforces Israel's determination to hit the fedayeen and their Arab hosts wherever and whenever it can.

Israel's selection of Syria over Lebanon as a target is somewhat curious, as the hijackers had organized themselves at Beirut and boarded the aircraft there.

Meanwhile, Libya's lionizing of the hijackers and Munich slayers has drawn special attention in the semi-official Israeli newspaper *Davar*. The day after the prisoner release, *Davar* stated, "the country of destination of the Munich murderers



Three Arab terrorists put aboard jet bound for Zagreb at Munich Airport.



which will give them shelter... shall in the eyes of Israel become a partner to the Munich murders and as such can expect any punishment." Israel has the capability to strike fedayeen bases in Libya. [REDACTED]

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Weekly Situation Report
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The Weekly Situation Report on International Terrorism will not be published the week of Christmas. The next issue will be published 31 December 1974.

17 December 1974

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WEEKLY SITUATION REPORT

CONTENTS

17 December 1974

Articles:

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1.5(c)
1.6(d)(1)

New Series of Israeli-Fedayeen Terrorist Incidents
(Page 2)

Relocation of Terrorist Leader Sabri al-Banna from Iraq
to Libya (Page 4)

Notes:

Possible Package Bomb at British Consulate in Buenos
Aires (Page 5)

Private Plane Hijacked from Florida to Cuba (Page 5)

TAB A - Chronology of Significant International Terrorist Acts

TAB B - Terrorist Threats and Plans

- I. Terrorist Threats and Plans: Western Hemisphere,
Including United States
- II. Terrorist Threats and Plans: Europe
- III. Terrorist Threats and Plans: Middle East
- IV. Terrorist Threats and Plans: Africa
- V. Terrorist Threats and Plans: Far East

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VI. Terrorist Threats and Plans: Worldwide

TAB C - Potential Terrorist Targets in the U.S. and Abroad

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New Series of Israeli-Fedayeen Terrorist Incidents

[REDACTED]

1.5(c)
1.6(d)(1)

On 11 December a terrorist exploded handmade grenades in a downtown Tel Aviv theater, killing himself and two others and wounding 67 persons.

[REDACTED]

1.5(c)
1.6(d)(1)

The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine claimed responsibility for the Tel Aviv cinema attack and said the operation was in retaliation for the rocket attack against the PLO centers in Beirut. The PFLP added that the terrorist was the leader of a four-man team which was positioned inside Israel.

[REDACTED]

1.5(c)
1.6(d)(1)

[REDACTED]

1.5(c)
1.6(d)(1)

(Comment: If the PFLP claim that four other persons were involved is true, the terrorist could have received the explosives inside Israel.)

Fatah/PLO leader Yasir Arafat issued a press statement supporting the attack and threatening further retaliation if Israel carried out another operation. [REDACTED]

1.5(c)
1.6(d)(1)

[REDACTED] although the PFLP has rejected PLO leadership, Arafat apparently found it expedient to associate himself with the attack in the wake of the Beirut rocket attack.

On 12 December, less than 24 hours after the Tel Aviv theater attack, four Israeli planes, apparently targeted against a Sa'iqa training area, bombed and strafed two Palestinian refugee camps in Beirut, killing one person and wounding 10 others and heavily damaging some installations. Most of the Palestinian population in the camps had been evacuated beforehand in anticipation of an Israeli reprisal attack. The Lebanese Defense Ministry said one of the Israeli planes was shot down, but the Israeli military command said all the planes returned safely.

The U.S. Embassy in Tel Aviv does not believe that the incidents were linked as a series of reprisal attacks, since each operation appeared to involve considerable advance preparation, but were more likely elements of psychological warfare in which each side reassured its own public and threatened the enemy. The Embassy believes that fedayeen organizations might have terrorists inside Israel ready for an immediate strike in response to an Israeli attack, but there is no confirmation of this. [REDACTED]

1.5(c)
1.6(d)(1)

[REDACTED] The Embassy in Beirut believes the PFLP Tel Aviv attack was mounted primarily to pressure Arafat and the PLO to adhere more closely to a "revolutionary line" and probably reduced the prospect of interfedayeen clashes. The Beirut Embassy also thinks the Israeli raid will increase fedayeen terrorist provocations against Israel. (~~SECRET~~)

Relocation of Terrorist Leader Sabri al-Banna from Iraq to Libya

Sabri al-Banna (Abu Nidal), dissident Fatah terrorist leader who is a primary organizer of the Arab Rejection Front, has transferred his base of operations from Iraq to Libya, [REDACTED] (Banna was responsible for the seizure of the Saudi Arabian Embassy in Paris in September 1973 and for the hijacking of a British Airways jetliner at Dubai in November 1974. See the 19 September 1973 issue for a profile on Banna.) Banna, who received official Iraqi assistance in traveling to Libya, reportedly will reorganize the Libyan-based terrorist group of Ahmad Abd-al-Ghaffur, who was assassinated in Beirut in September, for the purpose of mounting operations from Libya into Europe and the Middle East. Iraq has relocated Banna in an endeavor to placate the moderate leaders and move closer to the Arab mainstream.

1.5(e)
1.6(d)(1)

[REDACTED] On the one hand, the Libyans are assisting Fatah/PLO leader Yasir Arafat and the PLO with considerable financial aid, with the intention of eventually directing the PLO to operate actively against Saudi King Faysal and Egyptian President Sadat. On the other hand, Libya is actively encouraging the Arab Rejection Front groups, particularly Banna and the remnants of Abd-al-Ghaffur's group, as a counterforce to both the PLO and a peaceful settlement. (SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD THIS INFORMATION IS NOT TO BE INCLUDED IN ANY OTHER DOCUMENT PUBLICATION)

1.5(e)
1.6(d)(1)

NOTES

Possible Package Bomb at British Consulate in Buenos Aires

On 10 December a suspicious package was discovered at the office of the British Consul in Buenos Aires. The acting Consul noticed that the package was mailed with a postage meter strip from Beirut but the strip was not canceled and lacked customs stamps, and that the package was addressed to the Consulate's former address. The police bomb squad placed the package, along with a detonating charge, in a metal detonation box and then set off the charge. The resulting explosion damaged the offices and broke two windows. Fragments revealed that the package contained several books, entitled Kim Il Sung, which are readily available in Buenos Aires.

It is still not certain whether the package contained explosives or whether the damage was caused by the detonating charge. The police are being asked to continue their examination. (~~SECRET~~)

Private Plane Hijacked from Florida to Cuba

A lone gunman hijacked a twin-engine Piper Seneca plane in Tampa the night of 14 December and forced the pilot to fly him to Cuba, according to press stories. The plane landed in Havana at about 10:30 p.m. The hijacker, a middle-aged man using the name Robin Harrison, had chartered a single-engine aircraft from the Tampa Flying Service, but when he arrived at the airport he pulled a pistol and demanded the larger plane. The pilot, who returned to Miami on 16 December, said Cuban authorities took the hijacker into custody. They treated the pilot well, but the Tampa Flying Service was required to pay \$500.00 to the Cuban government before the pilot was permitted to leave. This is the first hijacking to Cuba since the signing of a treaty in February 1973 which requires Cuba to return U.S. hijackers or put them on trial. (UNCLASSIFIED)

~~SECRET~~

No Foreign Dissem/No Dissem Abroad/Controlled Dissem

CHRONOLOGY OF SIGNIFICANT INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST ACTS

TAB A—Chronology of Significant
International Terrorist Acts

Date: 15 December 1974

Place: Florida, Miami

Bahamian Offices Bombed.

A bomb exploded in the Bahama Cruise Line offices, causing moderate damage but no injuries, according to the Miami police. The police believe an anti-Castro organization was responsible for the bombing. The Bahamas recently established diplomatic relations with Cuba. (See Section B-I.) (UNCLASSIFIED)

~~SECRET~~

No Foreign Dissem/No Dissem Abroad/Controlled Dissem

I. Terrorist Threats and Plans:

Western Hemisphere, Including the United States

<u>Target:</u>	Various Latin American Installations	A group identifying itself as "Young Nationalist Cuba" has sent identical threatening letters, dated 25 November, to the consulates of El Salvador, Colombia and Mexico in Miami, Florida, and to the Dominican Republic and Honduran representatives to the United Nations in New York. (See 3 December issue, page B-I-2.) (CONFIDENTIAL)
<u>Place:</u>	United States, Miami New York	
<u>Date:</u>	Current	
<u>Target:</u>	Various Latin American Countries	* The FLNC is planning operations against the twelve countries that recently voted to lift sanctions against Cuba, and against the Bahamas, which established diplomatic relations with Cuba. (See 10 December issue, page B-I-1.) The 15 December explosion at the Bahama Cruise Line office in Miami may be connected with this threat. (See Tab A.) (CONFIDENTIAL)
<u>Place:</u>	United States, Miami Bahama Islands, Nassau	
<u>Date:</u>	Current	
<u>Target:</u>	Possibly Foreign-Owned Mining Companies	A dissident group in the Dominican Popular Movement is planning a terrorist campaign in

** Indicates a new threat reported for the first time.

* Indicates a revision of a threat reported in previous issues.

Place: Dominican Republic

Date: Christmas Season

the Cibao region of the Dominican Republic to take place during the Christmas season. Targets may include foreign-owned mining companies. (See 3 December issue, page B-I-4.)
(~~SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~)

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

1.5(e)
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(~~SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/CONTROLLED DISSEM~~)
THIS INFORMATION IS NOT TO BE INCLUDED IN ANY OTHER DOCUMENT OR PUBLICATION

B-I-2

II. Terrorist Threats and Plans: Europe

Target: Aircraft
Transporting
Jewish Emigres

Place: Austria, Vienna

Date: February or March
1975

** An unidentified fedayeen group is planning an operation to shoot down a jumbo aircraft departing Vienna with Jewish emigrants to Israel. [REDACTED] The operation allegedly is scheduled for February or March 1975 and is aimed at discouraging emigration to Israel. (SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

1.5(c)
1.6(d)(1)

Target: Unspecified,
Possibly Jewish
Emigre Center

Place: Austria, Vienna

Date: Current

Salah Khalaf, head of the BSO, is planning to organize a series of international terrorist operations. The first incident reportedly will be an explosion in Vienna, using a bus, to protest continued Austrian assistance to Soviet Jewish emigres. (See 10 December issue, page B-II-1.) (SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/CONTROLLED DISSEM/THIS INFORMATION IS NOT TO BE INCLUDED IN ANY OTHER DOCUMENT OR PUBLICATION)

Target: Unknown

Place: Possibly West
Germany

Date: Current

The Fatah leadership expects that the PFLP may mount a terrorist operation in West Germany. (See 3 December issue, page B-II-2.) (SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM)

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

1.5(c)
1.6(d)(1)

(SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM
NO DISSEM ABROAD/CONTROLLED
DISSEM)

Target: U.S. SECRETARY
OF STATE HENRY
KISSINGER

The Cypriot EOKA-B resistance organization is planning to attack U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. (See 10 December issue, page B-II-1.)
(SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

Place: Unknown

Date: Unknown

B-II-2

III. Terrorist Threats and Plans: Middle East

<p><u>Target:</u> Hotel</p> <p><u>Place:</u> Israel</p> <p><u>Date:</u> Late December 1974 Early January 1975</p>	<p>The PDFLP is planning to take over a hotel in Israel in December or January and hold guests, presumably wealthy foreigners, as hostages. (See 26 November issue, page B-III-1.) (SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM)</p>
<p><u>Target:</u> USIS BUILDING</p> <p>Jordanian Post Office</p> <p><u>Place:</u> Jordan, Amman</p> <p><u>Date:</u> Current</p>	<p>Fatah is planning to plant bombs in the USIS building and the Central Post Office building, both in Amman, in the near future. (See 10 December issue, page B-III-1.) (SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM)</p>
<p><u>Target:</u> U.S. AIRCRAFT, CITIZENS AND INSTALLATIONS</p> <p>Israeli Aircraft, Citizens and Installations</p> <p><u>Place:</u> Unspecified</p> <p><u>Date:</u> Unknown</p>	<p>The hijackers of the BA jetliner from Dubai told their Tunisian interrogators that Sabri al-Banna's fedayeen group will probably undertake more hijackings, with U.S. and Israeli aircraft as targets. (See 10 December issue, page B-III-1.) (SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM)</p>

B-III-1

IV. Terrorist Threats and Plans: Africa

Target: Foreign Diplomatic Personnel and Installations

Place: Ethiopia, Addis Ababa

Date: Current

The dean of the Diplomatic Corps in Addis Ababa received a telephone call from an unidentified caller threatening to kidnap several ambassadors and to blow up several embassies. The U.S. and British embassies have also received threatening letters, signed "Zapatistas" National Liberation Front. (See 10 December issue, page B-IV-1.) (~~CONFIDENTIAL~~)

V. Terrorist Threats and Plans: Far East

No terrorist threats were reported in the Far East during 11-17 December 1974

11-17-74
11-17-74

VI. Terrorist Threats and Plans: Worldwide

Target: GONP Courier Flight

Place: Unspecified

Date: 24-25 December 1974

** A new organization of uncertain makeup, using the name "Group of the Martyr Ebenezer Scrooge," plans to sabotage the annual courier flight of the Government of the North Pole. Prime Minister and Chief Courier S. Claus has been notified and security precautions are being coordinated worldwide by the CCCT Working Group. (CONFIDENTIAL)

POTENTIAL TERRORIST TARGETS IN THE U.S. AND ABROAD

This is a list of persons and events, arranged chronologically, which might attract terrorist attack. The following symbols are used when applicable: ** Reported for the first time.
* Revision of report in previous issue.

<u>Target:</u> Former Prime Minister of Israel, Mrs. Golda Meir	Mrs. Golda Meir, former Prime Minister of Israel, is visiting New York City; Newark, New Jersey; and Montreal and Toronto, Canada. The Secret Service has protective responsibility. (CONFIDENTIAL)
<u>Place:</u> United States, New York, New Jersey	
	Canada
<u>Date:</u> December 1974 and early January 1975	
<u>Target:</u> Hajj Pilgrims	The Hajj season, now underway, with many Moslems making a pilgrimage to Mecca, could be the occasion for terrorist acts, given the current high degree of dissension within the fedayeen movement. (UNCLASSIFIED)
<u>Place:</u> Saudi Arabia, Mecca	
<u>Date:</u> Through Late December 1974	

TAB C-Potential Terrorist Targets

Distribution: Ambassador Lewis B. Hoffacker
Special Assistant to the Secretary
Department of State

General Benjamin O. Davis, Jr.
Assistant Secretary for Safety and Consumer
Affairs
Department of Transportation

Mr. Robert F. Ellsworth
Assistant Secretary of Defense
International Security Affairs

Mr. James M. Frey
Deputy Associate Director for International
Affairs
Office of Management and Budget

Colonel Richard T. Kennedy
National Security Council Staff

Mr. David R. Macdonald
Assistant Secretary of Treasury for
Enforcement, Tariff and Trade Affairs,
and Operations

Mr. Kevin T. Maroney
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Department of Justice

Mr. Herbert K. Reis
Legal Advisor
United States Mission to the United Nations

Mr. Geoff C. Shepard
Associate Director of the Domestic Council

Mr. W. Raymond Wannall
Assistant Director Intelligence Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation


Central Intelligence Agency

1.5(c)
1.6(d)(1)

~~Warning Notice~~
Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved

~~NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION~~
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions

~~PREPARED FOR THE CABINET COMMITTEE TO COMBAT
TERRORISM AND ITS WORKING GROUP~~

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~~Information for this publication is based on contributions from certain agencies represented on the Working Group of the Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism. The Working Group is composed of representatives from the Departments of State, Defense, Justice, Transportation and Treasury; the Domestic Council Staff; the Federal Bureau of Investigation; the National Security Council Staff; the Office of Management and Budget; the United States Mission to the United Nations and the Central Intelligence Agency.~~

~~Classified by [REDACTED]
Exempt from General Declassification Schedule
of E.O. 13526, exemption category:
1.5(1), (2), and (3)
Automatically declassified on:
Date impossible to determine~~

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~~SECRET~~

No Foreign Dissem/No Dissem Abroad/Controlled Dissem

TAB B - Terrorist Threats and Plans

CHARTS: Incidence of New Threats of Terrorist Activity
in Weekly Situation Reports - 1974
Total (Page B1)
U.S. Targets Worldwide (Page B2)
Regional Totals (See first pages of
Sections I-VI below)

- I. Terrorist Threats and Plans: Western Hemisphere
Including United States
- II. Terrorist Threats and Plans: Europe
- III. Terrorist Threats and Plans: Middle East
- IV. Terrorist Threats and Plans: Africa
- V. Terrorist Threats and Plans: Far East
- VI. Terrorist Threats and Plans: Worldwide

TAB C - Potential Terrorist Targets in the U.S. and Abroad

~~SECRET~~

No Foreign Dissem/No Dissem Abroad/Controlled Dissem

ARTICLES

Attempted Hijack in London by an Unknown Gunman

A lone gunman, wearing an Arab headdress and armed with a gun and a hand grenade, seized a British Airways BAC 111 when it landed at London's Heathrow Airport on an internal flight from Manchester on 7 January. After the 46 passengers had disembarked, the hijacker held a stewardess hostage and demanded to be flown to Paris. A crew of five--pilot, copilot, steward and two stewardesses--was still on board. The plane was refueled and a longer-range Trident jet was prepared in case the gunman wanted to go to the Middle East, but he insisted on remaining aboard the plane he had arrived on.

According to later news reports, the man demanded \$230,000 and a parachute and threatened to blow up the plane unless his demands were met. The French government announced that it would refuse the plane permission to land in France. Guns were issued to the normally unarmed airport police who surrounded the aircraft with vehicles and tried to talk the hijacker into surrendering. The pilot warned that the hijacker looked mentally unstable. Several passengers, who did not realize the plane was being hijacked until it landed, said the gunman was in his mid-30's, wore dark glasses and had a scar on his chin. There was no immediate indication of his nationality.

Comment: The modus operandi of this hijacking attempt does not correspond with hijackings mounted by fedayeen organizations. The Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman, which has never engaged in international terrorism, reportedly planned to hijack a British aircraft or a plane carrying British passengers in early January. (See the 30 December issue, page B-III-3.) There is no indication, however, that this hijacker is connected with the PFLO. (~~SECRET~~)

~~SECRET~~

No Foreign Dissem/No Dissem Abroad/Controlled Dissem

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

1.5(c)
1.6(d)(1)

[REDACTED]

1.5(c)
1.6(d)(1)

[REDACTED]

1.5(c)
1.6(d)(1)

(~~SECRET~~/NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

~~SECRET~~

No Foreign Dissem/No Dissem Abroad/Controlled Dissem

U.S. Ambassador May Have Been Target of Nicaraguan Terrorists

As more information becomes available [redacted] it is increasingly apparent that U.S. Ambassador Shelton was probably a target of the Sandinist National Liberation Front (FSLN) group who forcibly seized the home of the former Nicaraguan Minister of Agriculture on 27 December. There are conflicting reports on this aspect, however.

1.5(e)
1.6(d)(1)

[redacted] Further, U.S. officials on the scene theorize that the presence of Shelton's four armed guards may have been a deterrent.

[redacted]

1.5(e)
1.6(d)(1)

The Ambassador left the party at 10:10 p.m.

In addition, a declaration published by the FSLN on 31 December seems to indicate that the original purpose of the operation was to seize diplomats. Since news of Castillo's party in honor of Ambassador Shelton was publicized in a local paper five days earlier, the party would have presented the terrorists with a convenient target of opportunity. Finally, a 2 January Agence France Presse dispatch from Havana quotes an FSLN leader in Cuba as saying Shelton "escaped us because he was lucky," and the FSLN still hopes to capture him. (SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM)

[REDACTED]

1.5(c)
1.6(d)(1)

(~~SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/THIS INFORMATION IS NOT TO BE INCLUDED IN ANY OTHER DOCUMENT OR PUBLICATION~~)

Japanese Red Army Ties to Fedayeen Weakened; Status of Hague Terrorists

[REDACTED] the PLO does not maintain close ties with the Japanese Red Army (JRA). [REDACTED] PLO leaders do not understand the JRA's concept of simultaneous worldwide revolution and instead are concerned with recovering their homeland from the Israelis. They welcome outside assistance if it is related to this objective and is under the control of the PLO leadership. [REDACTED] however, [REDACTED]

1.5(c)
1.6(d)(1)

[REDACTED] the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) no longer supports the JRA. (Comment: [REDACTED] probably referring to the September 1974 incident in which three JRA terrorists, apparently acting without the concurrence of the PFLP, seized the French Ambassador in The Hague in order to secure the release of an imprisoned comrade (see the issue of 18 September).

1.5(c)
1.6(d)(1)

[REDACTED] JRA leader Shigenobu Fusako and the younger sister of Okamoto Kozo are currently living in Beirut. (Okamoto Kozo, the only surviving terrorist from the May 1972 Lod Airport attack, is currently in prison in Israel.)

1.5(c)
1.6(d)(1)

The Japanese Ambassador in Damascus informed the U.S. Embassy that the four JRA terrorists who seized the French Embassy in The Hague are still under detention at the same military camp where they were taken upon their arrival in Damascus. The U.S. Embassy speculated that the Syrian government is anxious to expel the four men, but has not found another government willing to receive them. The Embassy also commented that Syria has not yet returned to the Dutch the \$300,000 ransom paid to the terrorists.

[REDACTED]

1.5(c)
1.6(d)(1)



1.5(e)
1.6(d)(1)

(~~SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/CONTROLLED DISSEM/~~
THIS INFORMATION IS NOT TO BE INCLUDED IN ANY OTHER DOCUMENT
OR PUBLICATION)

NOTES

Tupamaro National Convention Moved From Havana to Buenos Aires

A reliable source reports that the third national convention of the Uruguayan Tupamaros will be held in January 1975 in Buenos Aires, instead of Havana as previously believed. The Cuban government does not wish to give additional ammunition to unfriendly Latin American governments before the March meeting of the Hemisphere Foreign Ministers in Buenos Aires. The national convention will consider the future orientation of the Tupamaros and is expected to result in increased emphasis on political activity. At the present time, according to the above source, some 40 Tupamaro leaders are living in Havana and form the single most important and influential Tupamaro group in exile. (~~SECRET~~/~~FOREIGN DISSEM~~)

Air India Hijacker Remains in Italian Custody

Italian authorities believe that Jozef Homola (previously reported as Homolov), the Canadian citizen who hijacked an Air India jetliner on 25 December, is mentally ill, according to the U.S. Embassy in Rome. (See the issue of 30 December.) Homola was delirious and appeared to be having hallucinations when he was taken into custody following the hijacking. Nevertheless he was imprisoned rather than hospitalized.

Homola has been officially charged with kidnapping, possession of arms, and the importation of counterfeit Canadian currency. His case is being handled as a welfare and protection problem by the Canadian Embassy in Rome. (~~CONFIDENTIAL~~)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]


1.5(e)
1.6(d)(1)

This information has not been confirmed by other reporting, and to date there is no evidence that the conference actually took place. (~~SECRET~~)

~~SECRET~~

NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/CONTROLLED DISSEM

INCIDENCE OF SIGNIFICANT INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST ACTS AS LISTED IN WEEKLY SITUATION REPORTS-1974



NOTE: THIS GRAPH DOES NOT REFLECT ALL INCIDENTS RECORDED IN TAB A DURING THE ABOVE PERIOD, AS THOSE WHICH PROVED NOT TO HAVE INTERNATIONAL SCOPE HAVE BEEN OMITTED.

~~SECRET~~

NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/CONTROLLED DISSEM

CHRONOLOGY OF SIGNIFICANT INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST ACTS

Date: 31 December 1974 Parcel Bomb Explodes.
Place: South Africa, A bomb concealed in a book
Johannesburg exploded in the Johannesburg
post office, injuring an
employee. It was addressed
to a family of Jewish origin,
according to the police.
Police have not said where
the parcel was posted.
(UNCLASSIFIED)

Date: 3 January 1975 Egyptian and Jordanian
Place: Syria, Damascus Embassies in Damascus Bombed.
Bombs exploded in the Egyptian
and Jordanian embassies in
Damascus, severely damaging
the Jordanian offices. The
bomb at the Egyptian Embassy
was apparently placed outside
a door and caused damage
primarily to windows and doors.
Judging from the damage, the
bombs appear to have been
similar in size to those used
in previous bombings of U.S.
installations in Syria.
Selection of these two Arab
embassies and of the 3 January
date, which coincided with the
opening of the Quadripartite
Conference in Cairo, suggests
these bombings may have been
perpetrated by the Palestinian
"Rejection Front" with possible
Iraqi backing, according to
the U.S. Embassy. It is also
possible that they were the
work of the so-called Arab
Communist Organization, al-
though that group usually has
publicly acknowledged its
bombings. (CONFIDENTIAL)

~~SECRET~~

Date: 7 January 1975
Place: England,
Heathrow Airport

British Airways Jetliner Hijacked.
An armed man in an Arab head-dress commandeered a British Airways jetliner as it landed at Heathrow Airport and said he would blow it up with himself and five crew members unless he could take off for Paris with \$230,000 and a parachute. It is unclear whether the man was acting from personal or political motives. He apparently has no accomplices. (See Articles.) (UNCLASSIFIED)

100 A-3--Chronology of Significant International Terrorist Acts


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NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/CONTROLLED DISSEM

TOTAL
INCIDENCE OF NEW THREATS OF TERRORIST ACTIVITY
IN WEEKLY SITUATION REPORTS- 1974



B-1

~~SECRET~~


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NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/CONTROLLED DISSEM

U. S. TARGETS-WORLDWIDE INCIDENCE OF NEW THREATS OF TERRORIST ACTIVITY IN WEEKLY SITUATION REPORTS- 1974



B-2

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
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NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/CONTROLLED DISSEM

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

INCIDENCE OF NEW THREATS OF TERRORIST ACTIVITY
IN WEEKLY SITUATION REPORTS-1974



B-I-1

~~SECRET~~

NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/CONTROLLED DISSEM

to be calling on behalf of certain organizations which he refused to identify.
(UNCLASSIFIED)

Target: Prominent Personality
Place: Argentina
Date: 12 January 1975

Unidentified terrorists may kidnap or assassinate a prominent personality at the Grand Prix of Argentina scheduled for 12 January. (See 30 December issue, page B-I-2.)
(CONFIDENTIAL)

Target: U.S. OFFICIAL
Place: Argentina, Buenos Aires
Date: Current

** The director of USIS in Buenos Aires may be the target of terrorist action, according to a mid-December Embassy report. An unidentified woman carrying a package was chased away from the director's garage on 8 December. She ran to a car in which companions were waiting. The federal police speculated that the woman might have been trying to place an explosive device. Security has been increased at the residence.
(CONFIDENTIAL)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

1.5(c)
1.6(d)(1)

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GLOBAL RESEARCH GROUP

~~(See 17 December issue, page B-I-2.) (SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/CONTROLLED DISSEM/THIS INFORMATION IS NOT TO BE USED IN ANY OTHER DOCUMENT OR PUBLICATION)~~

1.5(c)
1.6(d)(1)

Target: U.S. AMBASSADOR
Place: Nicaragua, Managua
Date: Current


** The Sandinist National Liberation Front (FSLN) is planning to kidnap the U.S. Ambassador to Nicaragua and presently has him under surveillance, according to a press report from Cuba, of unknown reliability. (Comment: The FSLN recently negotiated \$1 million ransom, the release of 14 guerrillas, and a flight to Cuba in exchange for 14 prisoners they held. See Articles.)
(UNCLASSIFIED)

~~SECRET~~

NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/CONTROLLED DISSEM

EUROPE

INCIDENCE OF NEW THREATS OF TERRORIST ACTIVITY
IN WEEKLY SITUATION REPORTS—1974



B-II-1

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NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/CONTROLLED DISSEM


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NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/CONTROLLED DISSEM

MIDDLE EAST

INCIDENCE OF NEW THREATS OF TERRORIST ACTIVITY
IN WEEKLY SITUATION REPORTS-1974



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
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NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/CONTROLLED DISSEM

AFRICA

INCIDENCE OF NEW THREATS OF TERRORIST ACTIVITY
IN WEEKLY SITUATION REPORTS—1974



B-IV-1

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NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/CONTROLLED DISSEM

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~~SECRET~~

No Foreign Dissem/No Dissem Abroad/Controlled Dissem

IV. Terrorist Threats and Plans: Africa

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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(~~SECRET~~)

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

1.5(c)
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(~~SECRET~~) (FOR-
EIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/
CONTROLLED DISSEM/THIS INFO
MATION IS NOT TO BE INCLUDED
IN ANY OTHER DOCUMENT OR
PUBLICATION)

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
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NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/CONTROLLED DISSEM

FAR EAST

INCIDENCE OF NEW THREATS OF TERRORIST ACTIVITY
IN WEEKLY SITUATION REPORTS—1974



B-V-1

~~SECRET~~

NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/CONTROLLED DISSEM

V. Terrorist Threats and Plans: Far East

Target: USIS BUILDING

Place: Taiwan, Taipei

Date: Current

** An unidentified male Mandarin speaker telephoned the USIS switchboard operator in Taipei and warned that his friend was going to place a time bomb there. No explosives were found in a search of the building, but security has been increased in case someone may attempt to place a bomb there. (CONFIDENTIAL)


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~~SECRET~~

NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/CONTROLLED DISSEM

WORLDWIDE

INCIDENCE OF NEW THREATS OF TERRORIST ACTIVITY IN WEEKLY SITUATION REPORTS-1974



B-VI-1

~~SECRET~~

NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/CONTROLLED DISSEM

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~~SECRET~~

No Foreign Dissem/No Dissem Abroad/Controlled Dissem

VI. Terrorist Threats and Plans: Worldwide

No terrorist threats worldwide were reported
during 31 December 1974 - 7 January 1975

B-VI-2

~~SECRET~~

No Foreign Dissem/No Dissem Abroad/Controlled Dissem

~~SECRET~~

POTENTIAL TERRORIST TARGETS IN THE U.S. AND ABROAD

This is a list of persons and events, arranged chronologically, which might attract terrorist attack. The following symbols are used when applicable: ** Reported for the first time.
* Revision of report in previous issue.

Target: Israeli Foreign Minister ** Israeli Foreign Minister Yigal Allon will visit Washington, D.C., among other cities the week beginning 12 January. State Department has protective custody. (UNCLASSIFIED)
Place: United States, Washington, D.C.
Date: Week of 12 January

Target: U.S. Diplomatic Community ** The political situation in Ethiopia is deteriorating and there is a growing anti-American mood, with a number of minor harassment incidents reported and the anticipation of more attacks against U.S. citizens as the situation worsens. [REDACTED] the insurgent fighting around Asmara, while not directed against U.S. citizens, could result in injury to them coincidentally. (SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM)
Place: Ethiopia, Addis Ababa, Asmara
Date: Current

1.5(c)
1.6(d)(1)

TAB C-Potential Terrorist Targets

Target: Various Latin American Countries ** Various Latin American countries that favor lifting sanctions against or establishing diplomatic relations with Cuba continue to be possible targets for terrorist acts by anti-Castro groups. (CONFIDENTIAL)
Place: United States
Date: Current

~~SECRET~~

Photocopy from Central File (100-100000)

Target: U.S. Personnel

Place: Uruguay,
Montevideo

Date: Current

U.S. Embassy personnel in Uruguay could become the target of terrorists because of internal conflicts between the military and extremists resulting from the assassination of the Uruguayan military attache in Paris. The Embassy has increased its security precautions. (CONFIDENTIAL)

- Distribution:** Ambassador Lewis B. Hoffacker
Special Assistant to the Secretary
Department of State
- General Benjamin O. Davis, Jr.
Assistant Secretary for Safety and Consumer
Affairs
Department of Transportation
- Mr. Robert F. Ellsworth
Assistant Secretary of Defense
International Security Affairs
- Mr. James M. Frey
Deputy Associate Director for International
Affairs
Office of Management and Budget
- Colonel Richard T. Kennedy
National Security Council Staff
- Mr. David R. Macdonald
Assistant Secretary of Treasury for
Enforcement, Tariff and Trade Affairs,
and Operations
- Mr. Kevin T. Maroney
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Department of Justice
- Mr. Herbert K. Reis
Legal Advisor
United States Mission to the United Nations
- Mr. Geoff C. Shepard
Associate Director of the Domestic Council
- Mr. W. Raymond Wannall
Assistant Director Intelligence Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation

~~████████████████████~~
Central Intelligence Agency

1.5(c)
1.6(d)(1)

PROCESSED
BY
CLASSIFIED BY: [unclear]



Washington, D.C. 20505

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

3 December 1984

Libya: Supplying Terrorist Weapons [REDACTED]

Summary

Libya provides a wide variety of weapons to groups which commit acts of international terrorism. These weapons include conventional pistols, assault rifles, and submachineguns of both Western and Bloc origin, as well as more sophisticated or terrorist-specific ordnance such as man-portable anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons, silenced and concealed pistols, and explosive devices.

[REDACTED]

FBI
FBI
(S)

[REDACTED]

GI M 84-1022 1L
December 1984

CL BY [REDACTED]
DECL OADR
DERIVED FROM COL 1-82

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED

Libya: Supplying Terrorist Weapons [REDACTED]

Introduction

Libya's ability to procure arms directly from other governments and indirectly on the international gray arms market ensures Tripoli a wide range of ordnance for use by Libyan as well as foreign terrorist groups. As a result of Tripoli's access to weapons, Libyan hit teams as well as diverse Libyan-supported foreign terrorist groups now possess the weapons necessary to attack:

- o Low flying commercial or military aircraft using man-portable SA-7 surface-to-air missiles.
- o Hardened vehicles--such as armored limousines--using RPG-7 anti-tank weapons.
- o Diplomatic, military, industrial and commercial installations using rocket-launched ordnance and improvised explosive devices.
- o Individuals using a variety of pistols, submachineguns, and assault and sniper rifles.

Given the wide range of terrorist organizations that receive arms from Libya, some of these weapons have been and will continue to be used against American targets. [REDACTED]

Small Arms

Conventional Firearms. Weapons traceable to Libya have turned up in the possession of a wide variety of terrorists throughout Europe and the Middle East. [REDACTED]

GI M 84-1022 1L
December 1984

CL BY [REDACTED]
DECL OADR
DERIVED FROM COL 1-82

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] Libya provided these arms directly to the Pakistani terrorists, who admitted having undergone small arms training in Libya and India, but claim to have received their weapons from an as yet unidentified party in Rome.

[REDACTED]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)
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Similar Libyan-bought Italian and Belgian weapons also have been discovered in the possession of other terrorist groups:

- o [REDACTED]
- o [REDACTED]
- o [REDACTED]

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
[REDACTED]

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This policy stands in sharp contrast with the elaborate means by which Libya seeks to dissociate itself from the weapons it provides to its own terrorists for attacks on Libyan dissidents abroad. These weapons are often acquired through a circuitous network involving one or more gray market arms brokers




or firms. The use of such front firms--with no demonstrable link to Libya--suggests that arms procured in this fashion are intended for politically sensitive terrorist actions in countries where they might be recovered




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Libya has also acquired US-made weapons via the gray arms market.




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Fb(1)
Fb(3)
(S)




Commercial versus Military Firearms. Although Libya frequently provides military weapons--such as Beretta submachineguns and Browning assault rifles and large caliber pistols--to foreign terrorists, Tripoli seems to prefer non-military, commercially available weapons for its own operatives.



Silenced Weapons. Tripoli also procures specially equipped firearms that by their very nature appear to be intended for use in terrorist operations.



Tripoli also supplies silenced weapons to foreign terrorist groups. A generally reliable source reported, for example, that in 1983 Tripoli supplied at least 30 silenced pistols to anti-Arafat Fatah rebels.

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Special Firearms. Libya also procures other types of exotic firearms on the gray arms market. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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F(b)(3)
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Libyan terrorists may have attempted to kill at least one high ranking foreign leader with similar concealed weapons.

[REDACTED]

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Although details are lacking, it appears likely that Tripoli has acquired other exotic firearms designed for terrorist use.

[REDACTED]

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Special Ammunition. In addition to special weapons, Libya has also sought to acquire special purpose metal-piercing ammunition on the gray arms market. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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Other Ordnance

[REDACTED] In addition to small arms, Libya provides more sophisticated weapons to its own overseas operatives as well as to foreign terrorists. Most of this ordnance--such as man-portable anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons, and explosive devices--are ideally suited for terrorist use and clearly not intended for "defensive" purposes. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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Anti-Tank Weapons. Another potent weapon frequently provided by Libya to foreign terrorist groups is the Soviet-style RPG-7 rocket-launcher. This man-portable, percussion-fired weapon weighs only 2.25 kilograms (loaded) and fires a high explosive armor-piercing grenade capable of defeating up to 330mm of rolled homogeneous steel plate at zero degrees obliquity. It has a practical range of between 300 to 500 meters and is ideally suited for use by terrorists in attacking hardened vehicles such as the armored limousines used in VIP protection. We believe that Libya has provided this weapon to diverse terrorist and insurgent groups throughout Africa, the Middle East, Latin America, and probably Europe.


[REDACTED]

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Libya may also have been the source of many of the weapons used by the Provisional Irish Republican Army, which conducted

[REDACTED]

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the greatest number of its RPG-7 attacks on British targets--over one hundred--during 1972-1974. Press reports indicate, for example, that Irish authorities confiscated 5 tons of weapons and arrested several PIRA terrorists aboard a ship discovered in early 1973 off the Irish coast. This vessel--the S.S. Claudia--was owned by two West German gray market arms dealers and had sailed from Tripoli, Libya. [REDACTED]

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Crew-Served and Artillery Weapons. Libyan support for international terrorists also includes other items of heavy ordnance. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] Libya supplied Palestinian guerrillas with North Korean 107mm and 122mm Katyusha rockets. [REDACTED]

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
[REDACTED] Palestinian groups use Katyusha rockets in attacks on Israeli settlements near the Lebanese, Syrian, and Jordanian borders. [REDACTED]

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Libya has continued supplying large quantities of heavy weapons to Palestinian groups even after their 1982 withdrawal from Beirut. Most of this materiel is of Soviet design and probably supplied from Libya's own stockpiles of weapons purchased directly from the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and North Korea. [REDACTED]




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
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Handgrenades and Explosives. As with firearms, much of the explosive ordnance supplied by Tripoli to foreign terrorists can be [redacted] Libya.



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In addition to standard military high explosive ordnance, Libya provides terrorists with the components necessary to fabricate their own improvised explosive devices. [redacted]



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Fb(1)
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(S)

Some of the more advanced bomb components supplied to terrorists by Libya are of US origin. [redacted] [redacted] in December 1983 Turkish security officials discovered an improvised explosive device in a suitcase about to



be loaded on a plane in Istanbul.⁵

[REDACTED]

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Tripoli may also have begun supplying foreign terrorists with extremely sophisticated, remote-controlled improvised explosive devices. One such device--believed to have been supplied by Libya--has recently been [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] is unlike any device used in the past by terrorist organizations.

[REDACTED]

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Fb(3)
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⁵Although no group has claimed this unsuccessful attack, we believe that the anti-Turkish Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) may have been responsible.

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Fb(1)
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⁷This Czech-made explosive has been used by various terrorist organizations since 1972, when it first appeared in Black September Organization letter bombs. It has also been used by various Armenian terrorist groups and was found [REDACTED] in several of the improvised explosive devices used during the 1981 Libyan-backed bombing campaign in the Central African Republic and the Sudan.

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Prospects and Implications

We believe that Libya will continue to acquire large quantities of weapons and to supply some of this ordnance to groups which commit acts of international terrorism. As a recognized government, Libya can purchase most of these arms directly from other nations. We estimate that this year alone Tripoli received nearly one half billion dollars worth of armaments from the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, China and North Korea. Although we do not know if Moscow and other communist governments use Libya and other patron state supporters of terrorism to funnel arms to specific terrorist groups, we believe that these governments are fully aware that Tripoli provides large quantities of ordnance to such organizations. [REDACTED]

F(b)(1)
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Moreover, despite its reputation as a supporter of international terrorism, Tripoli is still able to purchase large quantities of small arms from Western nations. Press reports indicate that during the first half of 1984, for example, Libya purchased over 2200 tons of small arms and ammunition from Spain. Similarly, in mid-1984 the Brazilian government approved the sale of 20,000 9mm Taurus MT-12A submachineguns to Libya.⁸ Even if such official, government-to-government sales could be halted, Tripoli would still enjoy easy access to a variety of ordnance--including silenced pistols and man-portable anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons--through private arms dealers and brokers on the international gray arms market. [REDACTED]

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Unconfirmed information also suggests that Tripoli may eventually be able to manufacture a wide range of weapons itself. [REDACTED]

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Besides the immediate threat of Libya arming international terrorists, the problem is compounded by the longevity of modern small arms, which, when properly cared for, can be cached for long periods or traded from one terrorist group to another. Thus, weapons already supplied by Libya to Palestinian

⁸This weapon is a Brazilian-made copy of the Italian Beretta M-12 submachinegun. [REDACTED]

F(b)(1)
F(b)(3)
(C)



terrorists, for example, may turn up years from now in the possession of a violently anti-American group in Western Europe. As a result, we believe that Libyan arms acquisitions to date already ensure the availability of terrorist weapons for the remainder of the century. [REDACTED]

FCI(1)
(U)