Report to the Congress on United States
Foreign Policy
(February 25, 1971)
THE MIDDLE EAST
"The Middle East is a place today where local
rivalries are intense, where the vital interests of the United States
and the Soviet Union are both involved. Quite obviously, the primary
responsibility for achieving a peaceful settlement in the Middle East
rests on the nations there themselves. But in this region in particular,
it is imperative that the two major powers conduct themselves so as
to strengthen the forces of peace rather than to strengthen the forces
of war."
Address to the United Nations
General Assembly
October 23, 1970
Vietnam is our most anguishing problem. It is not,
however, the most dangerous. That grim distinction must go to the situation
in the Middle East with its vastly greater potential for drawing Soviet
policy and our own into a collision that could prove uncontrollable.
There are three distinct and serious aspects of the
Middle East problem, each by itself difficult enough to resolve. They
cannot, however, be treated in isolation. They have become enmeshed,
and each tends to exacerbate and make more intractable the others. The
Middle East crisis must be recognized as the product of these three
dimensions:
--The Arab-Israeli conflict, which for more than twenty
years has festered when it has not burned. It is the core problem of
the Middle East crisis, and its intensity today is undiminished.
--Intra-Arab differences, which focus primarily on
whether a negotiated settlement of the Israeli conflict is acceptable
or whether force is the only solution. There are also differences over
how Arab nations should be governed, which have led more than once to
civil conflict. And there are rivalries growing out of disagreement
about the relation of Arab states to each other in the quest for unity
in the Arab world.
--The conflict between the interests of the Soviet
Union and the United States, each of which is now more deeply than ever
engaged in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Events surrounding the hostilities
in Jordan in September showed how fragile are the barriers to direct
great power confrontation in the Middle East.
America's interest in the Middle East-and the world's
interest---is that the global structure of peace not be allowed to break
down there. But this objective has to be pursued in a situation in rapid
flux:
--The relationship between Middle East countries and
outside powers has changed. The system of outside control that characterized
the nineteenth and first half of the twentieth centuries is gone; the
peoples of the Near East have achieved national independence. There
is a continuing search for a new balance between the strong nationalisms
of the area and outside forces.
--The character of the outside influences has changed.
The nations of the Middle East must now come to terms on various levels
with the technological, capital, political, and military presence of
the United States; with a new projection of Soviet power; and with a
new Europe establishing economic association through the Common Market
with a number of nations in the area.
--The relationship among the outside powers has changed.
With lines between the U.S. and the Soviet Union firmly drawn in Europe,
their contest has spilled over to the south where no such lines exist
and where local conflict and rapid change draw them into new competition.
This takes place against a background of changes in their own global
strategic relationship and changes in their respective national postures
toward global involvement.
THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT
This protracted and bitter struggle lies at the heart
of the Middle East crisis. Its harmful potential is, to be sure, enhanced
by great power involvement. But the simple fact remains that the continuation
of this conflict grievously damages the interests of all concerned:
--It has drawn the Soviet Union and the United States
into close military association with the combatants, with all the danger
that poses to world peace.
--It has caused the disruption of normal U.S. relations with a number
of Arab countries. This, in turn, has increased the already excessive
Arab dependence on Soviet support, and therefore their dangerous vulnerability
to excessive Soviet influence.
--It has provided an issue which has been exploited
and manipulated by radical elements to undercut the internal stability
of the Arab nations.
--It has, for two decades, kept the 50 million people of Israel and
the adjoining Arab nations in a permanent state of hostilities, and
in constant fear of attack.
--It has forced both the Arab states and Israel to divert a tragically
disproportionate share of their resources to the instruments and activities
of war.
--It has condemned to squalor and to soul-searing hatred
the lives of the Palestinian refugees, who include not only those who
originally fled their homes upon the establishment of Israel, but a
whole generation born and reared in the hopelessness and frustration
of the refugee camps. They are the material from which history creates
the tragedies of the future.
That is the outline of the situation which prevails.
It is, and was when my Administration began, of deep concern to the
American people.
We faced a choice. We could have elected to stand aloof
from the problem, on the theory that our diplomatic intervention would
serve only to complicate further an already excessively complex problem.
We rejected that course. We did so for three reasons.
First, the stakes involved are too high for us to accept a passive role.
Second, we could see nothing resulting from our restraint but the steady
deterioration of the situation into open war. Third, it would have been
intolerable to subordinate our own hopes for global peace and a more
stable relationship with the Soviet Union to the local if severe-animosities
of the Middle East.
Therefore--with no illusions about the difficulty or
the risks--this Administration embarked upon a major and prolonged effort
to achieve a peaceful settlement of the Middle East crisis. In that
effort, we have encountered in full measure the difficulties we expected.
We have had disappointments as well as a limited degree of success.
Because this problem is so important, and because our role is central
to the chances for settlement, I wish to discuss in detail our assessment
of the problem, and our efforts to resolve it.
The interests of all concerned require a settlement.
The purpose of the United States has been to help the parties work out
among themselves a peace agreement that each would have a stake in maintaining.
We have proceeded with a sense of compassion for their concerns.
The Israelis seek recognition as a nation by their
neighbors in secure circumstances. In any settlement they will seek
more than simple declarations of peace and of Israel's legitimacy. They
also seek physical security. For Israel, peace must be something more
than a paper peace.
The Arab governments seek the recovery of territories
lost during the June war, justice for those who have lost lands and
homes through more than twenty years of conflict, and a sense of dignity
and security that will permit them to feel no longer vulnerable to attack.
Peace for them must also be real.
If these concerns are to be reconciled, three conditions
must be met:
--Judgment on each side that the other is willing to make and live up
to commitments that could produce a just and lasting peace.
--Judgment on each side that the other will be able to keep its commitments.
--Judgment on each side that the world community can provide realistic
supplementary guarantees of whatever agreements may be reached.
The United States Initiative. Throughout 1969, the
United States sought a framework for an agreed settlement through bilateral
talks with the Soviet Union and in the multilateral channel of the Four
Powers talks, as well as through continuing consultation with Israel,
Jordan, and the UAR. We sought to work out common guidelines which Ambassador
Gunnar Jarring, the UN Secretary General's Special Representative, could
use as a catalyst for talks between the parties.
By May of 1970 these efforts were stalled. And while
they had proceeded, the intensity of the conflict had again reached
the critical level. Fighting was taking place daily along the Suez Canal.
In retaliation, Israeli air power had reached deep into Egypt. Fedayeen
attacks had provoked serious incidents on the cease-fire lines between
Israel and Jordan, Lebanon and Syria. The Soviet Union had taken steps
to alter the military balance in the UAR's favor. Forces opposed to
any kind of settlement were increasingly assertive in many Arab countries.
Obviously, the situation was once again about to go
out of control. A new approach in the search for a settlement was urgently
required.
Our experience over the past year had convinced us
that no serious movement toward peace was possible unless the parties
to the conflict themselves came to grips with the issues between them.
On June 19, therefore, the United States launched an
initiative to get both sides to:
--re-establish the cease-fire.
--observe a military standstill in an agreed zone on both sides of the
Israel-UAR cease fire line.
--agree on a set of principles as the basic starting point for Arab-Israeli
talks under the auspices of Ambassador Jarring.
The essence of this proposal was described by Secretary
Rogers publicly on June 25 as a major political initiative "to
encourage the parties to stop shooting and start talking." The
UAR, Jordan, and Israel accepted the proposal, as did the Soviet Union.
Our initiative produced significant results:
--It halted the bloodshed along the cease-fire line,
and thereby helped reduce national passions to a level more conducive
to sober consideration of a political settlement.
--It obtained, for the first time, agreement by Israel,
Jordan, and the UAR to seek "a just and lasting peace between them
based on (1) mutual acknowledgment by the United Arab Republic, Jordan
and Israel of each other's sovereignty, territorial integrity and political
independence, and (2) Israeli withdrawal from territories occupied in
the 1967 conflict, both in accordance with" the UN Security Council
Resolution of November 22, 1967.
However, the ultimate goal of our initiative, a serious
peace negotiation, did not follow immediately. For the Soviet and Egyptian
buildup of military forces along the Suez Canal continued after the
cease-fire went into effect on August 7, in violation of the agreement
for a military standstill. The fragile opening toward peace was further
endangered in early September by the actions of Palestinian groups which
attempted to force the Government of Jordan to withdraw from the effort
to reach a settlement.
The situation in Jordan deteriorated into open conflict,
and the subsequent intervention of armored forces from Syria created
the gravest threat to world peace since this Administration came into
office.
More was at stake than Jordanian policy. As always
with dangers avoided, it is not easy in retrospect to demonstrate how
close to greater dangers the world really came. But the prospect which
threatened can be described: If Jordan had succumbed to either internal
subversion or external aggression, the danger of another full-scale
Middle East war would have been at hand. With the Soviet Union so deeply
involved in the military operations of the UAR, and with firm U.S. support
for the survival of Israel, the risk of great-power confrontation would
have been real indeed.
The United States had no responsible choice but to
prevent events from running away with the ability to control them. We
took a firm stand against the Syrian intervention. We acted to stabilize
but not to threaten, to discourage irresponsibility without accelerating
the momentum of crisis.
The Syrians withdrew, the Government of Jordan reestablished
order, and a fragile agreement was reached on the future role of the
organized Palestinians.
This sobering experience should demonstrate to all
the parties involved the extreme volatility of the present state of
affairs. The entire world has seen how precarious is the balance and
how great the danger in the Middle East.
The Shape of Peace in the Middle East. It is not for
the United States to attempt to set the precise terms of a Middle East
peace settlement. That can be done only by the parties directly in conflict,
and only by a process of negotiation with each other.
However, some of the principles and elements that must
be included if a settlement is to be reached are clear and evident:
--The Arab Governments will not accept a settlement
which does not provide for recovery of territories lost in the 1967
War. Without such acceptance, no settlement can have the essential quality
of assured permanence.
--Israel will not agree to withdraw from occupied Arab
territories, which she sees as enhancing her physical security, unless
she has confidence in the permanence of the peace settlement. She also
believes that the final borders to which she will withdraw must be negotiated
and agreed in a binding peace settlement. She must, therefore, have
confidence that no attack is forthcoming, and confidence in her acceptance
by her neighbors and in other assurances.
--The lack of mutual confidence between Israel and
the Arab countries is so deep that supplementary major power guarantees
could add an element of assurance. Such guarantees, coupled in time
with a reduction of the armed strength of both sides, can give the agreement
permanence.
--No lasting settlement can be achieved in the Middle
East without addressing the legitimate aspirations of the Palestinian
people. For over two decades they have been the victims of conditions
that command sympathy. Peace requires fruitful lives for them and their
children, and a just settlement of their claims.
The immediate task is to help the belligerents construct
an agreement that will achieve a workable balance between the security
and recognition that Israel seeks and a just resolution, which the Arab
states seek, of the territorial and Palestinian issues. Only in such
a balance can peace be found.
GREAT POWER CONTEST
For over a century the Middle East has been an area
of great concern to the major powers. To NATO and Europe its independence
is vital, militarily and economically. Similarly the Soviet Union has
important interests which we recognize.
Despite the depth of these interests-perhaps to some
extent because of them-the major powers have not established a pattern
of relationships with the Middle East which accommodates the interests
of all. The concern caused by that fact is magnified by the instability
and volatility of the region.
Any effort by any major power to secure a dominant
position could exacerbate local disputes, affect Europe's security,
and increase the danger to world peace. We seek no such position; we
cannot allow others to establish one.
We believe that the stability of the Middle East requires
establishing a balance in the activities of the various outside powers
involved there. Each must be free to pursue its own legitimate interests,
but within the limits imposed by respect for the legitimate interests
of others and the sovereignty of the nations of the area.
On this basis, the United States sought in 1969 and
1970 to enter into discussions with the Soviet Union on the Middle East
question which would have global significance for us and them, and would
also contribute to making constructive peace negotiations between the
Arabs and Israelis possible.
We repeatedly made clear to the Soviet leaders our
desire to limit the arms race in the Middle East on a reciprocal basis:
--On February 4, 1970, I proposed to Chairman Kosygin
that the United States and the Soviet Union discuss the question of
limiting the arms which our two countries provide to the Middle East.
The Soviets rejected this proposal as they had done similar proposals
in the past.
--On March 23, Secretary Rogers announced that we would
hold in abeyance a decision on Israel's request for additional aircraft,
pointing out that: "Restraint will be required on the part of other
major suppliers to the Middle East. No nation can pursue a policy of
seeking unilateral advantage in the area if peace is to be achieved."
The Soviet Union responded by stepping up the shipment
of air-defense missiles and aircraft, manned by Soviet combat crews
to Egypt--the first time that Soviet combat crews have been moved to
a nation outside the Communist orbit.
While indicating that the U.S. preferred restraint
in the shipment of arms, I have also repeatedly stated that the military
balance between the Arab states and Israel must be maintained:
--In my February 4 letter to Chairman Kosygin, I made
clear that the United States would not hesitate to provide arms to Israel
if they were required in order to maintain that balance.
--On July 31, I said publicly: "It is an integral
part of our cease-fire proposal that neither side is to use the cease-fire
period to improve its military position in the area of the cease-fire
lines. All would have to refrain from . . . undertaking a military buildup
of any kind in such an area."
The Soviet Union's disregard for this essential foundation
for peace talks raised serious doubts about its readiness to cooperate
in the effort to achieve peace. Against this background, the United
States had no choice but to take further steps to help maintain the
military balance.
Throughout most of 1969 we had attempted to engage
the Soviet Union in developing a basis for Arab-Israeli negotiations.
Our talks with the Soviets focussed particularly on three points:
--The need for an Arab commitment to accept specific
obligations in a peace agreement with Israel.
--The need for an Israeli commitment to withdraw from occupied territories
as part of a binding peace which establishes recognized and secure boundaries.
--The need for both sides to enter a genuine negotiating
process to work out the detailed terms of a peace settlement between
them.
The Soviets have persistently called for an Israeli
commitment to total withdrawal from all occupied territories. The Soviets
have also called for a refugee settlement which inadequately reflects
the practical human and security problems involved on both sides. The
United States has recognized that any changes in prewar borders should
be insubstantial, but we insist that any agreement to fix final borders
must be directly linked in a peace agreement to mutually agreed practical
arrangements that would make these secure. These are matters for negotiation
between the parties. The Soviets have insisted, however, that the major
powers make these judgments and, in effect, impose them on the parties.
In June 1970, the USSR offered further formulations
on some of the obligations that all parties would undertake for preventing
hostile acts from their soil and on the precise time when peace would
come into effect in relation to the withdrawal of troops to final borders.
But these formulations, which were modifications of earlier Soviet proposals,
came belatedly and still failed to take into account the need for a
negotiating process engaging the parties themselves.
The U.S. continues to welcome Soviet suggestions for
a settlement. But to be serious, they must meet the legitimate concerns
of not one but both sides.
NATIONALISM IN THE AREA
Apart from the Arab-Israeli conflict, a strong Arab
nationalism has grown in reaction to an era of outside political control
which has now ended. It is nurtured by a persistent yearning for unity
among Arab nations. But traditional and ideological rivalries make it
difficult for Arabs to agree on the form their unity should take. The
attempts to fashion unity, therefore, sharpen tensions.
At the heart of these disputes is a fundamental ideological
disagreement on how Arab society should respond to pressures for rapid
modernization. As a consequence, some of the more militant forces exploit
issues of anti-imperialism and Arab nationalism, even where these are
not the real issues. For their own nationalist or ideological reasons,
they seek to reduce the U.S. position. The ironic result of their action
if they succeeded--would be to make the area once again more vulnerable
to outside domination.
Thus some political currents in the area make it more
difficult for the U.S. to maintain, as we would wish to do, productive
relations with nations on both sides of inter-Arab disputes. We will
continue to maintain friendly relations with all the countries of the
area which welcome our friendship. We can make a significant contribution,
as we have in the past, to the development of the Arab world in the
fields of education and technical training, business management, and
investment. The value of the contribution we can make, and wish to make,
creates a common interest in the maintenance of decent relationships
which may offset pressures to disrupt them.
ISSUES FOR THE FUTURE
The search for peace---especially an Arab-Israeli settlement--and
the quest for a stable U.S.-Soviet relationship that will help preserve
the independence and integrity of each nation in this area will remain
our top priorities. Our aim is to see an epoch begin in which strong
independent nations in this area in association with each other as they
choose-relate freely and constructively with the world outside. The
U.S. is prepared to consider new and fresh ways to assist in the development
of the region to the benefit of both Arabs and Israelis once a real
peace agreement is achieved.
In pursuing those goals, the United States will face
these principal issues in the months ahead:
First, if the United States is to play a major role--as
we have promised to do-in helping to bring about an Arab-Israeli settlement
and provide supplementary guarantees, what should be the nature and
extent of our diplomatic involvement? As I pointed out at the United
Nations last October, the primary responsibility for peace rests on
the nations of the Middle East. What is the proper relation between
the efforts of the international community to encourage a settlement
and the responsibility of the negotiating parties themselves?
Second, our bilateral relations with Arab nations are
in flux. With some, formal diplomatic relations have been suspended.
In others, attitudes toward the U.S. and the West are undergoing reassessment.
The changing relationships in the Persian Gulf necessarily raise new
issues for American policy. How do we best encourage and assist the
constructive forces in the area to build a regional system of stable
relationships?
Finally, there is a range of broader worldwide issues
that form the background to Middle East politics. Limiting the external
supply of arms to the area is one such issue. The U.S.-Soviet military
relationship in the Mediterranean area is another. Beyond this, what
is our policy toward the broadening commercial association which the
European Common Market is establishing with nations in the area? How
can we help assure the access of Western Europe and Japan to the supply
of oil, and also help assure that the producing states receive fair
revenues for their oil?
On some of these issues, our work is already well advanced.
With others we are coming to grips for the first time. Our purpose is
to resolve them in a way that helps us and every nation involved in
the Middle East, including above all the states of the area, to build
and strengthen the relationships--at every level--that will hold together
the structure of peace.
Sources: Public Papers of the President |