Conversation About Foreign Policy
(July 1, 1970)
Excerpt from the Conversation:
THE PRESIDENT. If I can turn to the Middle East briefly,
because I think we should spend a moment on it, if you other gentlemen
would like. I think, and I say this respectfully, that some of the columnists
and commentators-and I read them and listen to them both with respect--and
some of us in political life have a tendency to look at the Middle East
too much in terms of the Israeli-Arab struggle. We look at Israel, a
strong free nation in the Middle East, and we look at its neighbors,
its aggressive neighbors, the U.A.R. and Syria, and we see this struggle
and we say, "Are we going to give planes to Israel and are the
Russians going to give them to the U.A.R.? And how are we going to have
a settlement between Israel and the Arab states?"
If that is all there was to it, it would not be as
difficult a problem as I am going to put it. I think the Middle East
now is terribly dangerous. It is like the Balkans before World War I,
where the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, could
be drawn into a confrontation that neither of them wants because of
the differences there.
MR. SEVAREID. Mr. President, I believe the Russians
today at the U.N. are circulating some new ideas about approaching peace
negotiations in the Mideast. Is there anything you can tell us about
this?
THE PRESIDENT. I haven't had a chance to study them
yet, but I will say this, that any propositions that the Russians or
anybody else circulate that would offer a chance to cool it in the Middle
East would be helpful, because when you look at the Middle East, it
is not just a case of, as I say, Israel versus the Arab states, but
the Soviet Union is now moving into the Eastern Mediterranean.
The Mideast is important. We all know that 80 percent
of Europe's oil and 90 percent of Japan's oil comes from the Mideast.
We know that the Mideast, this area, this is the gateway to Africa;
it's the gateway to the Mediterranean; it's the hinge of NATO; and it
is also the gateway through the Suez Canal down into the Indian Ocean.
Now, under these circumstances, when we then look at
it in terms of Israelis versus Arabs, moderate Arabs versus radical
Arabs, and whoever would think that there would be somebody more radical
than the Syrians, within the radical Arab states, fedayeen that are
more radical, the super-radicals--when we think of all these factors,
we can see what a very difficult situation it is. Now what should U.S.
policy be? I'll summarize it in a word. One, our interest is peace and
the integrity of every country in the area.
Two, we recognize that Israel is not desirous of driving
any of the other countries into the sea. The other countries do want
to drive Israel into the sea.
Three, then, once the balance of power shifts where
Israel is weaker than its neighbors, there will be a war. Therefore,
it is in U.S. interests to maintain the balance of power, and we will
maintain that balance of power. That is why as the Soviet Union moves
in to support the U.A.R., it makes it necessary for the United States
to evaluate what the Soviet Union does, and once that balance of power
is upset, we will do what is necessary to maintain Israel's strength
vis-a-vis its neighbors, not because we want Israel to be in a position
to wage war--that is not it but because that is what will deter its
neighbors from attacking it.
And then we get to the diplomacy. The diplomacy is
terribly difficult, because Israel's neighbors, of course, have to recognize
Israel's right to exist.
Israel must withdraw to borders, borders that are defensible,
and when we consider all those factors and then put into the equation
the fact that the Russians seem to have an interest in moving into the
Mediterranean, it shows you why this subject is so complex and so difficult.
But we are going to continue to work on it, and I can
assure you the fact that we are in Vietnam does not mean that the United
States is not going to give every bit of its diplomatic and other energies
to this subject as well.
Sources: Public Papers of the President |