Letter Certifying Conditions Met for Sale of AWACS Aircraft
to Saudi Arabia
(June 18, 1986)
Dear Mr. Speaker: (Dear Mr. President:)
By letter dated October 28, 1981, I assured then-Senate
Majority Leader Baker that the proposed transfer to Saudi
Arabia of AWACS aircraft would not occur until I had certified to
the Congress that specified conditions had been met. Subsequently, Section
131 of the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of
1985 (``ISDCA'') incorporated the text of that letter, with its conditions
for certification, into legislation.
I am pleased to inform you that all conditions set forth in my October
28 letter and repeated in Section 131 of the ISDCA have now been met
and that I herewith forward to you my certification to that effect.
Through the extensive efforts of the Defense and State Departments,
agreements and other actions necessary to fulfill these requirements
have been concluded.
I now wish to draw particular attention to the sixth condition that
I have certified. I remain convinced that, as I stated in 1981, the
sale of these AWACS aircraft to Saudi Arabia will contribute directly
to the stability and security of the area and enhance the atmosphere
and prospects for progress toward peace. I also believe that significant
progress toward peaceful resolution of disputes in the region has been
accomplished with the substantial assistance of Saudi Arabia. These
perceptions are strengthened by a review of events of the last five
years.
The current deployment of U.S. AWACS aircraft to Saudi Arabia has contributed
significantly to the stability and security of Saudi Arabia and the
region as a whole. The Royal Saudi Air Force's (RSAF) gradual assumption
of the role now performed by the U.S. AWACS aircraft will continue this
contribution. Over the past five years the U.S. AWACS aircraft have
demonstrated their ability to detect approaching Iranian aircraft well
before they would be detected by ground-based radar. This early detection,
coupled with the demonstrated resolve of the RSAF to deploy its F -
15s and engage aggressor aircraft, has deterred Iran from escalating
attacks against targets on land and in Gulf waters under the Saudi protective
umbrella. The Saudi commitment to a strong defense as evidenced by such
measures as the AWACS acquisition, past defensive military action, and
efforts to organize collective security among the member states of the
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), taken together with the Kingdom's obvious
lack of aggressive intent, have contributed and will continue to contribute
to the stability and security of the area. Our continued success in
helping to support regional stability will diminish prospects that U.S.
forces might be called upon to protect the governments, shipping lanes,
or vital petroleum resources of the region.
Saudi Arabia has firmly supported every significant diplomatic effort
to end the Iran-Iraq war. Mediation missions under the auspices of the
United Nations, the Organization of the Islamic Conference, and third
countries acting independently have received Saudi diplomatic and facilitative
assistance. In encouraging a negotiated settlement of the conflict,
the Saudis have made clear their preference that the war end without
concessions of sovereignty by either side.
Saudi efforts to advance the Arab-Israeli peace process have been substantial.
The Fahd Peace Plan and the Arab endorsement of the plan embodied in
the 1982 Fez Communique significantly and irreversibly modified the
Arab consensus of the three ``no's'' enunciated at the 1968 Khartoum
Summit, i.e., no recognition, no negotiation, and no conciliation with
Israel. The Fez Communique moved the formal Arab position from rejection
of peace to consideration of how to achieve peace with Israel. The plan's
statement that all states in the region should be able to live in peace
was an implicit acceptance of the right of Israel to a secure existence.
The concept of land for peace was a direct reflection of U.N. Resolution
242. While various elements of the Fez Plan differ from our views, the
Plan remains the single largest step toward peace on which the Arab
world has been able to agree. The existence of this consensus provided
a base from which King Hussein felt he could launch his initiative to
bring Israel, Jordan, and the Palestinians to the negotiating table
in 1984 - 85.
Saudi Arabia has signaled its tacit support for King Hussein's moves
to lay the foundation for peace negotiations by continuing substantial
financial assistance payments to Jordan following critical steps in
the process, i.e., after Jordan resumed diplomatic relations with Egypt
and again after the February 1985 agreement between Hussein and PLO
Chairman Arafat. Despite vocal Syrian opposition, the Saudis sent official
observers to the Amman Palestine National Council meeting in late 1984
where moderate Palestinians made a decision to break with the radicals
thereby opening the way for King Hussein to begin his peace initiative.
During the subsequent and continuing debate over how to make peace
with Israel, the Saudis have consistently lent support to moderate Arab
governments. Egypt's readmission to the Organization of the Islamic
Conference was significantly assisted by crucial Saudi support for a
procedural motion calling for a secret ballot on the readmission vote.
Following the police riots in Cairo in February of this year, the Saudi
Council of Ministers issued a statement supporting President Mubarak.
Although its efforts, like our own, met with limited success, Saudi
Arabia played a major and highly visible role in attempts to arrange
a lasting cease-fire in Lebanon. In the August 1983 efforts of Crown
Prince Abdullah and Prince Bandar to bring an end to fighting in the
Shuf mountains, and again through observers at the Geneva and Lausanne
Lebanese national reconciliation talks, Saudi Arabia sought to bring
peace to a moderate Arab nation and establish the framework for stable
government. The Saudis also proved supportive of Lebanese efforts to
negotiate directly with Israel conditions for Israeli withdrawal from
southern Lebanon. In this regard, the Saudis supported Lebanese efforts
to win Syrian consent to compromises necessary to reach agreement.
Saudi Arabia has provided crucial support for Sudan during that country's
transition to a democratic form of government. Furthermore, it has established
a significant record in working for regional stability and settlement
of regional disputes in countries beyond its immediate neighborhood.
Saudi aid has been crucial to the Afghan cause and significant to Pakistan,
Morocco, and Tunisia. Despite limitations imposed by concern for its
own security, the depth of regional animosities, and the need to establish
and work within an Arab consensus, Saudi Arabia has assisted substantially
the significant progress that has been made in the peaceful resolution
of disputes in the region.
Saudi Arabia has publicly condemned terrorism and terrorist actions,
having itself been a victim of terrorism. More important, it has taken
practical actions to oppose terrorism regardless of its origins.
I am convinced that the assurances I made in my letter to Senator Baker
have been amply fulfilled. A firm foundation has been laid for close
and continued U.S.-Saudi cooperation in operating the Saudi AWACS and
in building an air defense system for Saudi Arabia and the GCC. By contributing
to the self-defense of these countries, we are diminishing the likelihood
of direct intervention by U.S. forces in defense of vital Western interests.
At the same time, we are encouraging forces of moderation which, if
they prevail, will bring lasting peace to a turbulent region.
Sincerely,
Ronald
Reagan
Certification of Conditions Requisite To Transfer of AWACS Aircraft
to Saudi Arabia
In accordance with Section 131 of the International Security and Development
Cooperation Act of 1985, P.L. 99 - 83, I hereby certify that the conditions
set forth in my communication of October 28, 1981, to the Senate with
respect to the transfer to Saudi Arabia of five E - 3A airborne warning
and control system (AWACS) aircraft have been met, specifically:
1. Security of Technology
A. That a detailed plan for the security of equipment, technology,
information, and supporting documentation has been agreed to by the
United States and Saudi Arabia and is in place; and
B. The security provisions for Saudi AWACS aircraft are no less stringent
than measures employed by the United States for protection and control
of its equipment of like kind outside the continental United States;
and
C. The United States has the right of continual on-site inspection
and surveillance by U.S. personnel of security arrangements for all
operations during the useful life of the AWACS. It is further provided
that security arrangements will be supplemented by additional U.S. personnel
if it is deemed necessary by the two parties; and
D. Saudi Arabia will not permit citizens of third nations either to
perform maintenance on the AWACS or to modify any such equipment without
prior, explicit mutual consent of the two governments; and
E. Computer software, as designated by the United States Government,
will remain the property of the United States Government.
2. Access to Information
That Saudi Arabia has agreed to share with the United States continuously
and completely the information that it acquires from use of the AWACS.
3. Control Over Third-Country Participation
A. That Saudi Arabia has agreed not to share access to AWACS equipment,
technology, documentation, or any information developed from such equipment
or technology with any nation other than the United States without the
prior, explicit mutual consent of both governments; and
B. There are in place adequate and effective procedures requiring the
screening and security clearance of citizens of Saudi Arabia and only
cleared Saudi citizens and cleared U.S. nationals will have access to
AWACS equipment, technology, or documentation, or information derived
therefrom, without the prior, explicit mutual consent of the two governments.
4. AWACS Flight Operations
That the Saudi AWACS will be operated solely within the boundaries
of Saudi Arabia, except with the prior, explicit mutual consent of the
two governments, and solely for defensive purposes as defined by the
United States, in order to maintain security and regional stability.
5. Command Structure
That agreements as they concern organizational command and control
structure for the operation of AWACS are of such a nature to guarantee
that the commitments above will be honored.
6. Regional Peace and Security
That the sale contributes directly to the stability and security of
the area and enhances the atmosphere and prospects for progress toward
peace. Significant progress toward the peaceful resolution of disputes
in the region has been accomplished with the substantial assistance
of Saudi Arabia.
I will provide separately to the Congress, under appropriate procedures,
those contracts and agreements pertinent to this sale and certification,
including those whose confidentiality must be preserved.
Sources: Public Papers of the President |