Address on U.S. Policy for Peace in
the Middle East
(September 1, 1982)
My fellow Americans:
Today has been a day that should make us proud. It
marked the end of the successful evacuation of PLO from Beirut, Lebanon.
This peaceful step could never have been taken without the good offices
of the United States and especially the truly heroic work of a great
American diplomat, Ambassador Philip Habib.
Thanks to his efforts, I'm happy to announce that the
U.S. Marine contingent helping to supervise the evacuation has accomplished
its mission. Our young men should be out of Lebanon within 2 weeks.
They, too, have served the cause of peace with distinction, and we can
all be very proud of them.
But the situation in Lebanon is only part of the overall
problem of conflict in the Middle East. So, over the past 2 weeks, while
events in Beirut dominated the front page, America was engaged in a
quiet, behind-the-scenes effort to lay the groundwork for a broader
peace in the region. For once there were no premature leaks as U.S.
diplomatic missions traveled to Mideast capitals, and I met here at
home with a wide range of experts to map out an American peace initiative
for the long-suffering peoples of the Middle East—Arab and Israeli
alike.
It seemed to me that with the agreement in Lebanon
we had an opportunity for a more far-reaching peace effort in the region,
and I was determined to seize that moment. In the words of the scripture,
the time had come to "follow after the things which make for peace."
Tonight I want to report to you the steps we've taken and the prospects
they can open up for a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.
America has long been committed to bringing peace to
this troubled region. For more than a generation, successive United
States administrations have endeavored to develop a fair and workable
process that could lead to a true and lasting Arab-Israeli peace.
Our involvement in the search for Mideast peace is
not a matter of preference; it's a moral imperative. The strategic importance
of the region to the United States is well known, but our policy is
motivated by more than strategic interests. We also have an irreversible
commitment to the survival and territorial integrity of friendly states.
Nor can we ignore the fact that the well-being of much of the world's
economy is tied to stability in the strife-torn Middle East. Finally,
our traditional humanitarian concerns dictated a continuing effort to
peacefully resolve conflicts.
When our administration assumed office in January of
1981, I decided that the general framework for our Middle East policy
should follow the broad guidelines laid down by my predecessors. There
were two basic issues we had to address. First, there was the strategic
threat to the region posed by the Soviet Union and its surrogates, best
demonstrated by the brutal war in Afghanistan, and, second, the peace
process between Israel and its Arab neighbors.
With regard to the Soviet threat, we have strengthened
our efforts to develop with our friends and allies a joint policy to
deter the Soviets and their surrogates from further expansion in the
region and, if necessary, to defend against it.
With respect to the Arab-Israeli conflict, we've embraced
the Camp David framework as the only way to proceed. We have also recognized,
however, solving the Arab-Israeli conflict in and of itself cannot assure
peace throughout a region as vast and troubled as the Middle East.
Our first objective under the Camp David process was
to ensure the successful fulfillment of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty.
This was achieved with the peaceful return of the Sinai to Egypt in
April 1982. To accomplish this, we worked hard with our Egyptian and
Israeli friends and, eventually, with other friendly countries to create
the multinational force which now operates in the Sinai. Throughout
this period of difficult and time-consuming negotiations, we never lost
sight of the next step of Camp David—autonomy talks to pave the
way for permitting the Palestinian people to exercise their legitimate
rights. However, owing to the tragic assassination of President Sadat
and other crises in the area, it was not until January 1982 that we
were able to make a major effort to renew these talks.
Secretary of State Haig and Ambassador Fairbanks made
three visits to Israel and Egypt early this year to pursue the autonomy
talks. Considerable progress was made in developing the basic outline
of an American approach which was to be presented to Egypt and Israel
after April.
The successful completion of Israel's withdrawal from
Sinai and the courage shown on this occasion by Prime Minister Begin
and President Mubarak in living up to their agreements convinced me
the time had come for a new American policy to try to bridge the remaining
differences between Egypt and Israel on the autonomy process. So, in
May 1 called for specific measures and a timetable for consultations
with the Governments of Egypt and Israel on the next steps in the peace
process. However, before this effort could be launched, the conflict
in Lebanon preempted our efforts.
The autonomy talks were basically put on hold while
we sought to untangle the parties in Lebanon and still the guns of war.
The Lebanon war, tragic as it was, has left us with a new opportunity
for Middle East peace. We must seize it now and bring peace to this
troubled area so vital to world stability while there is still time.
It was with this strong conviction that over a month ago, before the
present negotiations in Beirut had been completed, I directed Secretary
of State Shultz to again review our policy and to consult a wide range
of outstanding Americans on the best ways to strengthen chances for
peace in the Middle East.
We have consulted with many of the officials who were
historically involved in the process, with Members of the Congress,
and with individuals from the private sector. And I have held extensive
consultations with my own advisers on the principles that I will outline
to you tonight.
The evacuation of the PLO from Beirut is now complete,
and we can now help the Lebanese to rebuild their war-torn country.
We owe it to ourselves and to posterity to move quickly to build upon
this achievement. A stable and revived Lebanon is essential to all our
hopes for peace in the region. The people of Lebanon deserve the best
efforts of the international community to turn the nightmares of the
past several years into a new dawn of hope. But the opportunities for
peace in the Middle East do not begin and end in Lebanon. As we help
Lebanon rebuild, we must also move to resolve the root causes of conflict
between Arabs and Israelis.
The war in Lebanon has demonstrated many things, but
two consequences are key to the peace process.' First; the military
losses of the PLO have not diminished the yearning of the Palestinian
people for a just solution of their claims; and, second, while Israel's
military successes in Lebanon have demonstrated that its armed forces
are second to none in the region, they alone cannot bring just and lasting
peace to Israel and her neighbors.
The question now is how to reconcile Israel's legitimate
security concerns with the legitimate rights of the Palestinians. And
that answer can only come at the negotiating table. Each party must
recognize that the outcome must be acceptable to all and that true peace
will require compromises by all.
So, tonight I'm calling for a fresh start. This is
the moment for all those directly concerned to get involved—or
lend their support—to a workable basis for peace. The Camp David
agreement remains the foundation of our policy. Its language provides
all parties with the leeway they need for successful negotiations.
I call on Israel to make clear that the security for
which she yearns can only be achieved through genuine peace, a peace
requiring magnanimity, vision, and courage.
I call on the Palestinian people to recognize that
their own political aspirations are inextricably bound to recognition
of Israel's right to a secure future.
And I call on the Arab States to accept the reality
of Israel—and the reality that peace and justice are to be gained
only through hard, fair, direct negotiation.
In making these calls upon others, I recognize that
the United States has a special responsibility. No other nation is in
a position to deal with the key parties to the conflict on the basis
of trust and reliability.
The time has come for a new realism on the part of
all the peoples of the Middle East. The State of Israel is an accomplished
fact; it deserves unchallenged legitimacy within the community of nations.
But Israel's legitimacy has thus far been recognized by too few countries
and has been denied by every Arab State except Egypt. Israel exists;
it has a right to exist in peace behind secure and defensible borders;
and it has a right to demand of its neighbors that they recognize those
facts.
I have personally followed and supported Israel's heroic
struggle for survival, ever since the founding of the State of Israel
34 years ago. In the pre-1967 borders Israel was barely 10 miles wide
at its narrowest point. The bulk of Israel's population lived within
artillery range of hostile Arab armies. I am not about to ask Israel
to live that way again.
The war in Lebanon has demonstrated another reality
in the region. The departure of the Palestinians from Beirut dramatizes
more than ever the homelessness of the Palestinian people. Palestinians
feel strongly that their cause is more than a question of refugees.
I agree. The Camp David agreement recognized that fact when it spoke
of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and their just requirements.
For peace to endure it must involve all those who have
been most deeply affected by the conflict. Only through broader participation
in the peace process, most immediately by Jordan and by the Palestinians,
will Israel be able to rest confident in the knowledge that its security
and integrity will be respected by its neighbors. Only through the process
of negotiation can all the nations of the Middle East achieve a secure
peace.
These, then, are our general goals. What are the specific
new American positions, and why are we taking them? In the Camp David
talks thus far, both Israel and Egypt have felt free to express openly
their views as to what the outcome should be. Understandably their views
have differed on many points. The United States has thus far sought
to play the role of mediator. We have avoided public comment on the
key issues. We have always recognized and continue to recognize that
only the voluntary agreement of those parties most directly involved
in the conflict can provide an enduring solution. But it's become evident
to me that some clearer sense of America's position on the key issues
is necessary to encourage wider support for the peace process.
First, as outlined in the Camp David accords, there
must be a period of time during which the Palestinian inhabitants of
the West Bank and Gaza will have full autonomy over their own affairs.
Due consideration must be given to the principle of self-government
by the inhabitants of the territories and to the legitimate security
concerns of the parties involved. The purpose of the 5-year period of
transition which would begin after free elections for a self-governing
Palestinian authority is to prove to the Palestinians that they can
run their own affairs and that such Palestinian autonomy poses no threat
to Israel's security.
The United States will not support the use of any additional
land for the purpose of settlements during the transitional period.
Indeed, the immediate adoption of a settlement freeze by Israel, more
than any other action, could create the confidence needed for wider
participation in these talks. Further settlement activity is in no way
necessary for the security of Israel and only diminishes the confidence
of the Arabs that a final outcome can be freely and fairly negotiated.
I want to make the American position well understood.
The purpose of this transitional period is the peaceful and orderly
transfer of authority from Israel to the Palestinian inhabitants of
the West Bank and Gaza. At the same time, such a transfer must not interfere
with Israel's security requirements.
Beyond the transition period, as we look to the future
of the West Bank and Gaza, it is clear to me that peace cannot be achieved
by the formation of an independent Palestinian state in those territories,
nor is it achievable on the basis of Israeli sovereignty or permanent
control over the West Bank and Gaza. So, the United States will not
support the establishment of an independent Palestinian state in the
West Bank and Gaza, and we will not support annexation or permanent
control by Israel.
There is, however, another way to peace. The final
status of these lands must, of course, be reached through the give and
take of negotiations. But it is the firm view of the United States that
self-government by the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza in association
with Jordan offers the best chance for a durable, just, and lasting
peace. We base our approach squarely on the principle that the Arab—Israeli
conflict should be resolved through negotiations involving an exchange
of territory for peace.
This exchange is enshrined in United Nations Security
Council Resolution 242, which is, in turn, incorporated in all its parts
in the Camp David agreements. U.N. Resolution 242 remains wholly valid
as the foundation stone of America's Middle East peace effort. It is
the United States position that, in return for peace, the withdrawal
provision of Resolution 242 applies to all fronts, including the West
Bank and Gaza. When the border is negotiated between Jordan and Israel,
our view on the extent to which Israel should be asked to give up territory
will be heavily affected by the extent of true peace and normalization,
and the security arrangements offered in return.
Finally, we remain convinced that Jerusalem must remain
undivided, but its final status should be decided through negotiation.
In the course of the negotiations to come, the United
States will support positions that seem to us fair and reasonable compromises
and likely to promote a sound agreement. We will also put forward our
own detailed proposals when we believe they can be helpful. And, make
no mistake, the United States will oppose any proposal from any party
and at any point in the negotiating process that threatens the security
of Israel. America's commitment to the security of Israel is ironclad,
and, I might add, so is mine.
During the past few days, our Ambassadors in Israel,
Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia have presented to their host governments
the proposals, in full detail, that I have outlined here today. Now
I'm convinced that these proposals can bring justice, bring security,
and bring durability to an Arab-Israeli peace. The United States will
stand by these principles with total dedication. They are fully consistent
with Israel's security requirements and the aspirations of the Palestinians.
We will work hard to broaden participation at the peace
table as envisaged by the Camp David accords. And I fervently hope that
the Palestinians and Jordan, with the support of their Arab colleagues,
will accept this opportunity.
Tragic turmoil in the Middle East runs back to the
dawn of history. In our modern day, conflict after conflict has taken
its brutal toll there. In an age of nuclear challenge and economic interdependence,
such conflicts are a threat to all the people of the world, not just
the Middle East itself. It's time for us all—in the Middle East
and around the world—to call a halt to conflict, hatred, and prejudice.
It's time for us all to launch a common effort for reconstruction, peace,
and progress.
It has often been said—and, regrettably, too
often been true—that the story of the search for peace and justice
in the Middle East is a tragedy of opportunities missed. In the aftermath
of the settlement in Lebanon, we now face an opportunity for a broader
peace. This time we must not let it slip from our grasp. We must look
beyond the difficulties and obstacles of the present and move with a
fairness and resolve toward a brighter future. We owe it to ourselves-and
to posterity—to do no less. For if we miss this chance to make
a fresh start, we may look back on this moment from some later vantage
point and realize how much that failure cost us all.
These, then, are the principles upon which American
policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict will be based. I have made a
personal commitment to see that they endure and, God willing, that they
will come to be seen by all reasonable, compassionate people as fair,
achievable, and in the interests of all who wish to see peace in the
Middle East.
Tonight, on the eve of what can be a dawning of new
hope for the people of the troubled Middle East—and for all the
world's people who dream of a just and peaceful future—I ask you,
my fellow Americans, for your support and your prayers in this great
undertaking.
Thank you, and God bless you.
Sources: Public Papers of the President |