News Conferences & Interviews on the Middle East/Israel
(1982)
JANUARY 19, 1982
The Middle East
Q. Mr. President, now that Secretary Haig is back from
the Mideast, do you know of any new, concrete grounds for optimism about
reaching an agreement on the Palestinian autonomy issue? And do you
regard as crucial reaching some sort of agreement before April, when
the Israelis are scheduled to complete the withdrawal from the Sinai?
The President. Well, there's no question about that
being the toughest problem in a Middle East settlement. We won't set
a deadline of any kind on when that must be decided. The Secretary has
been on a fact-finding trip and will be there again, although no date
has been set for that.
We want to help if we can, if we can come up with some
ideas that might be helpful in the autonomy talks. That is the next
step under the Camp David process. And so, as I say, we won't set a
deadline, but we're most hopeful that we can be of help and that they
will at least by the Sinai time get down to, let's say, a kind of a
plan for proceeding.
FEBRUARY 18, 1982
Q. Do you plan to offer for sale the Hawk missiles
and the F-16 fighter planes to Jordan? And, if so, what additional offers
will you make to Israel to counter this sale?
The President. Contrary to what was portrayed and widely
heralded in these last few weeks, Secretary Weinberger came back without
any request having been voiced for any of those weapons. So, there's
no definite plan. If there's a request-comes, we'll treat with it.
But, again, I have reassured Prime Minister Begin,
because of the overblown way in which the whole two tours of the Secretary
and Secretary of State—they coordinated their activities. They
were in communication with each other on those trips; there is no difference
in policy between them. And I reassured Prime Minister Begin that there
is no change in our approach toward Israel and our dedication to the
welfare of Israel.
Q. To follow up
Q. I wanted to follow up, too, if I may. Isn't there
any effective way that you have to counter this continuing buildup of
arms in the Middle East?
The President. Yes, and that is to continue the policy
we're following, which is to try and carry on where Camp David left
off and bring about a peace in the Middle East. And then the only basis
for armaments in all of them would be against the external threat that
could be posed by someone such as the Soviet Union. So, this is what
we're trying to do in our Middle East policy is to try to persuade,
particularly the more moderate Arab states, to join in the peacemaking
process with Israel and to accept Israel's right to be a nation.
MARCH 23, 1982
The Middle East
Could we turn to international—this is an international
question; also, as you recognize, a New York question. How could you
assure the Jews of the city, this city, who came out very strongly for
you in the election, how could you assure the—that you haven't
abandoned them and Israel? You know, many of the Jews in this city feel
very hurt. And now maybe the lines are crossed, but that's the way we
hear it.
The President. I think they are, and we've tried to
meet with leaders of various groups and organizations in the Jewish
community to explain—particularly last year over the AWACS deal—what
it was that we were trying to do. And I can assure you—in fact,
it will be in my remarks tonight—that we remain, without qualification,
pledged to the security and the support of Israel.
Q. Then you do feel the lines have been somewhere crossed?
The President. Yes. Let me take the AWACS issue to
begin with.
Here is Israel, virtually one of the smallest of the
nations, outnumbered a hundred to one, basically by countries that—other
than Egypt—have still—well, until Saudi Arabia softened
its position—declaring that Israel does not have a right to exist
as a nation. So, Israel retains a military capacity that is backbreaking
for them.
The answer to Israel's security is longtime peace.
The United States is dedicated-and was before I ever got here, as witness
Camp David—to helping in this process. I think that one of the
only ways we can bring this about is if we can persuade, particularly
the more moderate Arab nations, to see this situation as Egypt did-and
Egypt was the one that was at war-and to bring them into where we can
sit down and they can recognize that we intend to be fair as an outsider
in here trying to help.
So, what we have been—this is one of the reasons
we have been trying to develop this relationship and let them know that
we want peace for everybody there.
Q. Is the thought, Mr. President, that previous to
that, that the American Government was so, to coin a phrase, "pathologically
tied into Israel," that even the moderate Arab countries felt they
were so threatened, not so much by Israel but by the so-called almighty
American arm and got scared into something and doing something that
they would not have normally done. And then by—what you're saying
is by balancing it, we both have a right hand and a left hand.
The President. Well, no, I don't think they were. I
think that you'll find among those same moderate nations that they have
much more of a concern of the threat of the Soviet Union in the Middle
East. And Egypt certainly did not. Sadat did not change because of any
pressure from us. You know, he had inherited the alliance with the Soviet
Union. And he finally had it up to here with them, and he kicked them
out, and then made that great overture that led to where we are today.
But, no, I believe it is a case of—and Prime
Minister Begin, when he visited Washington, I told him this and what
we were going to do, and I told him that we were allies and that in
my view it was a two-way street, that we derived benefit as well as
they did from the relationship, and that we were completely dedicated
to the preservation of the state of Israel. And this was the only, the
supposed arm-twisting and everything that took place in the AWACS thing.
This was all that I said-Q. Arm-twisting. [Laughter]
The President. but this was all that I said to the
Senators. I told them that I believe that this was the most useful step
in the pursuit of peace. And many of them-they were—and I must
say, the Senators that I talked to were most sincere in their views,
even those that—their concern was the security of Israel. And
I got their votes when I was able to persuade them that it was equally
my concern.
MARCH 31, 1982
Palestinian Autonomy
Q. Mr. President, do you think the recent clashes between
the Israeli military and Palestinians on the West Bank will destroy
progress toward the Palestinian autonomy?
The President. I'm hopeful that it won't, because I
have the pledge of my friend Menachem Begin and of President Mubarak
that they are going forward—and within the framework of the Camp
David agreement-to resolve all these other problems. I'm hopeful that
we will see more progress on these talks after April 25th, when the
transfer of the Sinai comes.
Israel claims that some of the mayors that they are
ousting there are mayors that they themselves had appointed but that
they believe have now become a part of the more radical PLO wing. But
the Camp David agreement comes within the 242 and 338 of the United
Nations, those Resolutions. And they have, as I say, have pledged to
me that they're going to abide by that.
APRIL 14, 1982
Q. Mr. President, how concerned are you that Israel
will find some pretext or put some pressure on Menachem Begin to renege
on his pledge to return the Sinai to Egypt?
The President. All I can tell you is that I have his
pledge that the turnover is going to occur and that they're going forward
with the Camp David—in the framework of the Camp David talks.
And we have Secretary Stoessel over there talking to them about various
problems. And so I'm going to have confidence in that statement that
he's made to me.
Q. When are you going to stop the bloodshed—
The President. What's that?
Q.—the Israeli occupation against the Arab shooting
of children and women and
The President. Well, this is a tragic affair. Obviously,
the individual who perpetrated that horrible deed at the temple is deranged,
and now for this to lead to the great unrest, yes, it's a great tragedy.
MAY 13, 1982
The Middle East
Q. Mr. President, do you intend to reactivate the Memorandum
of Understanding with Israel, and do you believe Egypt should agree
to hold a meeting of the autonomy talks in Jerusalem?
The President. Well now, I'm not going to comment on
that last part of the question there, because we want to stand by and
be of help there, and this is one to be worked out between them. But
I do have faith that both President Mubarak and Prime Minister Begin
intend to pursue the talks in the framework of Camp David, the autonomy
talks, and we stand by ready to help them.
In the thing that you mentioned that has temporarily
been suspended, we regretted having to do that, and we look forward
to when that will be implemented again.
MAY 14, 1982
The Middle East
Q. In light of our country's participation in and
support of Camp David accords, how do you justify the projected sale
of extremely advanced jet fighters to Jordan and the hand-held heat-seeking
missiles?
The President. How do we justify selling weapons to
Jordan, high-level fighters and so forth at the same time in our agreement
with and our alliance with Israel. Well, first of all, there has been
no request as yet-there's been a lot of talk that I've read about it
also—there's been no formal request from Jordan. But, on the other
hand, it is—whatever is done, I want you to know what our policy
is and what we're trying to accomplish. And Prime Minister Begin knows
this.
Menachem and I exchange letters all the time on these
subjects. [Laughter] We think one of the—and, yes, we're on a
first-name basis now. [Laughter] That's kind of a shock to the striped-pants
fellows over in the State Department that we call each other by the
first name, but we do. And he knows that I meant it when I pledged to
him that we will never allow them to—their qualitative and quantitative
military advantage to be done away with, but that what we're trying
to do with the more moderate Arab States is persuade them to become
additional Egypts, to do as Egypt did.
The greatest thing that we can do for Israel is to
bring peace to the Middle East. And if we're to be a believable broker,
we can't impose that peace, of course. But if we are to be believable,
then those moderate Arab States—and I've met with King Hussein
and must say that I was greatly impressed by his whole approach and
his views toward the Middle East. If we can persuade them to acknowledge
the right of Israel to exist as a nation and enter into negotiations
in that Camp David framework as Egypt did, that will be the greatest
thing we can do. And in order to do that we have to show them that we're
willing to be a friend other than just talking about it.
But, as I say, the Prime Minister knows that we are
pledged and, I believe, morally bound in a commitment to the preservation
of the state of Israel, that it must continue to exist.
JUNE 1, 1982
The Middle East
Mr. Telmon. Mr. President, can you say something about
the Middle East? In this moment we know that you are going to have a
summit meeting with President Mubarak and Menachem, alias—
The President. Yes.
Mr. Telmon. Prime Minister Begin. At the same time,
there is this new—a couple of new alinements in the Middle East.
What is the position of the United States?
The President. Well, we have believed, there again,
that the answer to the problem of Israel and the Israeli-Arab conflict
must be the same type of thing that happened between Egypt and Israel,
that other, more moderate Arab States, to begin with, must acknowledge
the right of Israel to exist as a nation and then, bilaterally, make
their peace with Israel. And we've been trying-we can't impose a peace
structure on the countries of the Middle East—but we have been
trying to establish ourselves as wanting to be fair and wanting a just
and fair solution to the dispute between the Arab States and Israel
and that, therefore, we could be depended on as long as we're wanted
and our help is sought to try for a fair and just peace.
I recognize that there are some Arab States that are
not moderate and that will represent a problem. But I believe that even
most of those, if not all, would follow the lead if the more moderate
Arab States should accept Israel's right to exist and be willing to
do as Egypt did and seek a peace.
JUNE 30, 1982
Israeli Invasion of Lebanon
Q. Mr. President, there are some who say that by failing
to condemn the Israeli invasion of Lebanon and refusing to cut off arms
to the invading armies, the United States and Israeli policies have
become-and goals have become identical. If there's a difference, what
is it?
Also, is there a difference between the Soviet slaughter
of Afghans, which the United States has condemned so often, and the
killing of Lebanese and the displaced people of Palestine? If so, what's
the difference?
The President. Helen, you've asked a question that—or
several questions that I have to walk a very narrow line in answering.
There's no question but that we had hoped for a diplomatic
settlement and believed there could have been a diplomatic settlement
in the Middle East, in that situation. We were not warned or notified
of the invasion that was going to take place. On the other hand, there
had been a breaking of the cease-fire, which had held for about 11 months
in that area.
I think there are differences between some of these
things that are going on and things like just the outright invasion
of Afghanistan by a foreign power determined to impose its will on another
country. We have a situation in Lebanon in which there was a force,
the PLO, literally a government within a government and with its own
army. And they had pursued aggression themselves across a border by
way of rocket firing and artillery barrages. But the situation is so
complicated and the goals that we would like to pursue are what are
dictating our conduct right now.
We want the bloodshed to end; there's no question about
that. We didn't want it to start. But we've seen Lebanon for 7 years
now divided into several factions, each faction with its own militia,
not a government in control. We have seen, as I've said, this PLO, and
we've seen the invasion of other forces, the presence of the Syrians,
as well, in Lebanon.
Right now, our goals are—as for the first time
in 7 years the Lebanese seem to be trying to get together, and their
factions have come together seeking a way to have a central government
and have control of their own country and to have a single Lebanese
army. That is one of the goals we would like to see. The other goal
would be the guaranteeing of the southern border with Israel, that there
would be no longer a force in Lebanon that could, when it chose, create
acts of terror across that border. And the third goal is to get all
the foreign forces—Syrians, Israelis, and the armed PLO—out
of Lebanon. And we're—
Q. A lot of people have been displaced in Palestine.
The President. Yes, and I signed a bill this morning
for $50 million in aid for Lebanon there, where several hundred thousand
of those Palestinians are. I don't think they were all displaced from
one area, and they have been refugees now into ongoing generations.
I think—when I say PLO, one has to differentiate
between the PLO and the Palestinians. And out of this, also, we have
another goal—and it's been our goal for quite some time—and
that is to, once and for all, when these other things are accomplished-once
and for all, to deal with the problem of the Palestinians and settle
that problem within the proposals and the suggestions that were made
in the Camp David accords.
Q. Mr. President, what steps are you prepared to take
if Israel resumes fighting in Lebanon, moves in on the PLO and West
Beirut. And what is the United States prepared to do for the Palestinians,
whose legal rights you apparently told President Mubarak of Egypt the
U.S. supports?
The President. This is a question, again, where I have
to beg your tolerance of me. With the delicacy of the negotiations that
are going on in the—trying to achieve those three major points
that I mentioned-there's just no way that I can comment on or speculate
about what might happen, because I don't want anything that might in
any way affect those negotiations, all of which involve the very things
that you're asking about. And I just have to remain silent on those.
Q. Mr. President, many Arab States are saying that
if Israel invades Beirut—West Beirut, it can only be because you
have given Israel a green light to do so. Have you done so? Will you?
And what will be your attitude if Israel goes into West Beirut?
The President. Sam, again this is the type of question
in which, with the negotiations at the point they are, that I can't
answer.
I would like to say this: No, I've given no green light
whatsoever. And an impression that I know some of the neighboring states
there have had from the beginning is that somehow we were aware of this
and we gave permission or something. No, we were caught as much by surprise
as anyone, and we wanted a diplomatic solution and believe there could
have been one.
Q. But, sir, if I may, last week your Deputy Press
Secretary said that when Prime Minister Begin was here, he promised
you that Israel would go no further into Beirut.
The President. I think also—his not having heard
the conversation between Prime Minister Begin and myself—that
what he called a promise actually was in a discussion in which, to be
more accurate, the Prime Minister had said to me that they didn't want
to and that they had not wanted to from the beginning.
Q. Mr. President, some Israeli officials have acknowledged
in recent days the use of cluster bombs in the war in Lebanon. How much
does this concern you?
The President. It concerns me very much, as the whole
thing does. And, Judy, we have a review going now, as we must by law,
of the use of weapons and whether American weapons sold there were used
offensively and not defensively. And that situation is very ambiguous.
The only statement that we've heard so far with regard to the cluster
bomb was one military official—Israeli military official-has apparently
made that statement publicly, and we know no more about it than what
we ourselves have read in the press. But the review is going forward
and the review that would lead to what the law requires, that we must
inform the Congress as to whether we believe there was a question of
this being an offensive attack or whether it was in self-defense.
When I said "ambiguous," you must recall
that prior to this attack Soviet-built rockets and 180-millimeter cannon
were shelling villages across the border in Israel and causing civilian
casualties.
JULY 1, 1982
Israeli Invasion of Lebanon
Q. Mr. President, you said yesterday that Mr. Begin's
pledge to you that came during the meeting last week had been mistakenly
reported as a promise that Israel would not invade further into Lebanon,
that in fact he had said only that he hoped that Israel would not have
to invade further into Lebanon. If that is true, number one, how could
that have happened? And number two, why did the erroneous report—why
was it allowed to go uncorrected for so long?
The President. On the pledge idea? I didn't know—he
had several conversations with other people. And when I first heard
that he had made this promise, I was going to check with the State Department
to see had he said it there. It turned out that it-and how it could
happen was, I think, explainable. It was a case of the second hand repeating—maybe
even third hand—within the shop of the conversation that I had
had with him, which was a conversation just between the two of us and
which he had expressed the fact that he did not want to invade Lebanon.
And this had never been his intention—and how the cease-fires
kept being broken and so forth and it arrived to that threatening place.
And so, as soon as I realized that it was based on my conversation with
him, I corrected the fact that, no, he had not promised: He had said
that that had not been his intention, and he did not want to if he could
avoid it.
Q. Thank you, Mr. President. Jeanne Innerson from King
Television in Seattle. It was reported today the Egyptian foreign minister
said that your administration knew about Israel's pending invasion of
Lebanon and didn't do anything about it in return for Israeli promise
of support for Mr. Haig's Presidency in 1984. Could you comment on both
parts of that question? [Laughter]
The President. You say the Egyptian Ambassador said
that?
Q. No, it was said by the Egyptian Minister of State
for Foreign Affairs today. He also said that it's the widespread perception
among Arab countries.
The President. Oh. He needs to be talked to. [Laughter]
No, and we do know—and this is very troublesome; it's very difficult
for me to comment—and I've been grateful that there haven't been
more Lebanon questions, because the negotiations are so delicate right
now that, as I said last night in the press conference, there's very
little that I can answer. But this I can answer.
We know that the Arab States—and many of which
we've been trying to establish a bond with them so that we can bring
them into the peace-making process with Israel, and we've called it
"create more Egypts." This is the only way we're going to
settle that particular problem in the Middle East, is if we can get
more Arab nations that are willing to come forward as Egypt did and
establish a peace treaty, recognize the right of Israel to exist. And
we've been doing this.
We're terribly disturbed, because it has come to our
attention that for some reason they are convinced that we—if we
did not actually connive and give our consent, that we were aware of
it and did nothing about it. We were caught as much by surprise as anyone.
We've had Phil Habib 2 there who, as you know—and
God bless him, if there's ever a hero—Phil Habib, as you know,
created, when we first sent him there, and has kept alive for 11 months
until this latest tragedy the cease-fire in the Middle East. He's done
a superhuman job. And he's still there and negotiating. And that's why
I don't want to do anything to louse up his act.
But we knew that they had gone up to the border as
a threat. We knew they'd mobilized; the whole world knew that, and you
were all writing and talking about it. And it is true that the PLO from
across the border had shelled and rocket-attacked some of the villages
in Israel. But when they crossed the border—and presumably to
go only 40 kilometers and then form a line to protect their border against
these artillery attacks—that was a surprise. Then when they did
not stop—and they justified that on the basis that once they tried
to stop, they were under attack, and they had to keep pursuing the enemy—no,
this was not done with our approval or our consent.
And I will have to say on behalf of Al Haig: Number
one, I don't believe he has such ambitions, and, number two, believe
me, he's served his country too long to have done anything of that kind.
He never would have.
And we're continuing with everything we can do now.
We've been 5 days in the present cease-fire, and we're just hanging
on that—we can maintain and that the negotiations will be successful.
And as I said last night—I'll repeat them—the three goals
are: for Lebanon to create a stable government, which they haven't had
for 7 years-they've had several factions, each with its own militia—but
a single united Lebanese army and government controlling its own territory;
guaranteeing the border between Israel—because so far they've
had another government and army living within their midst, the PLO—changing
that; and then all the other countries getting out of Lebanon. And we're
working as hard as we can to that end.
But anything you can all do to convince the Arab States—we're
trying our best. But, no, we were not a party to that.
JULY 28, 1982
Situation in Lebanon
Q. Mr. President, I would like to stay with foreign
policy, but turn to the Middle East. And I wondered what effect you
believe the constant, day-after-day bombing by the Israelis and shelling
by the Israelis in Beirut is having on your efforts and your special
envoy, Mr. Habib's, efforts to try to bring some kind of a settlement?
And, secondly, Mr. Habib has been there nearly 7 weeks. And can you
give us some idea what progress, if any, he is making?
The President. John, there's nothing we would like
more than to see an end to the bloodshed and the shelling. But I must
remind you it has also been two-way. The PLO has been, and in some instances
has been the first to break the cease-fire. That we would like to see
ended, of course. And we still stay with our original purpose, that
we want the exodus of the armed PLO out of Beirut and out of Lebanon.
Mr. Habib has been making a tour of countries to see if we can get some
help in temporary staging areas for those people.
We want the central government of Lebanon to once again,
after several years of almost dissolution—to once again be the
authority with a military force, not several militias belonging to various
factions in Lebanon. And then we want the foreign forces, Israeli and
Syrian both, out of Lebanon.
Habib—Ambassador Habib has been doing a magnificent
job. I don't comment on specifics, because I know how sensitive these
negotiations are. And sometimes you lose some ground that you think
you'd gained, and sometimes you gain again. I still remain optimistic
that the solution is going to be found. As I say, he has returned from
that trip to other countries—some of the other Arab States and
to Tel Aviv.
Contrary to some reports or rumors today, there are
no deadlines that have been set of any kind. There is an unsubstantiated
report now that another cease-fire has gone into effect. Let's hope
it'll hold.
But he continues to believe it is worthwhile to continue
the negotiations, and I think he's entitled to our support.
Q. Sir, you said that you wanted the bombing stopped,
if I understood you correctly. Have you conveyed your feelings to Prime
Minister Begin?
The President. Well, when I say that, what I should
say is, we want the bloodshed and the conflict to stop. And I'm hesitant
to say anything further about where we are in those or who might be
providing the stumbling block, now, to the steps that I just outlined
that are necessary to bring peace there. So, I can't go beyond that
except to say that unless and until Ambassador Habib would tell me that
there's nothing more to be negotiated and he can't solve it, I'm going
to continue to be optimistic.
Q. Mr. President, you mentioned earlier the sensitivity
of the Lebanese negotiations. Did you consider it harmful to those diplomatic
efforts last week when several U.S. Congressmen met with PLO leader
Arafat? And do you feel Congressman McCloskey and the others were either
manipulated or used by Arafat to make it look like there was progress?
The President: Well now, I will be conscious of the
separation of powers and say it, of course, is the right of Congressmen
to go there if they so choose. I don't happen to believe that right
now it is a good time to do that or a good idea. But I believe that
the Congressmen themselves, that Representative McCloskey himself has
said that he now believes that the paper that was signed did not amount
to anything and so he's—
Secretary of the Interior Watt
Q. Mr. President, a question concerning a member of
your Cabinet, Secretary Watt. You recently had to disavow some comments
by him when he suggested that U.S. support for Israel might be curtailed
if American Jews do not support your energy policy. Now Mr. Watt in
a letter to Congress suggests that American troops might have to fight
in the Middle East if there's any interference with the vast new offshore
oil drilling. Is Secretary Watt reflecting your views? Is he reflecting
the foreign policy of the administration? Or, as Senator Moynihan suggests,
has he embarrassed your administration and is someone who should be
fired?
The President. No, Mike, he shouldn't be fired. And
as I say, the whole context of his letter and the opening statement
you made from that letter, or paraphrasing it, was the result of a conversation
with [Israeli] Ambassador Arens, a lengthy discussion of this subject
at a social gathering the night before. And as many of us do, you go
home and you think of a couple of points you hadn't made, and he made
them. What he was suggesting, with regard to the danger to Israel, was
our vulnerability as long as we are dependent on oil—energy from
insecure sources, and that if there should be, as we once had, an embargo
and if we should find ourselves without the energy needed to turn the
wheels in this country and the wheels of industry, we wouldn't be much
of an ally to our friends. And that would certainly include Israel.
And he was making it very plain that we are morally obligated to the
support of Israel.
Now, he has made a speech to a group in New York, I
believe it was B'nai B'rith, today, and I understand that in outlining
his whole position and where he stands, that his audience was most enthusiastic
and supportive of what he had to say.
His letter to the Congressmen—I think he was
only trying to make the example that some of those who had been the
most outspoken up there have also been the-had the most objections to
us trying to improve our energy situation. And what he was pointing
out is, where would the Western world be if someday our source of supply
was purely there in the Persian Gulf and it was denied to us? So, this
was his dramatic statement about the other.
Palestine Liberation Organization
Q. As you've said before and as your spokesmen have
been saying, PLO chief Arafat has not yet met the conditions that the
United States Government has set for direct talks with you. However,
do you think that Mr. Arafat is moving in that direction? And would
you welcome such a development?
The President. Well, I think it would be a step forward
in progress if the PLO would change the position it has had, and that
is that Israel must be destroyed or that it has no right to exist as
a nation. And what that would require is agreeing to abide by the U.N.
Resolutions 242 and 338, agreeing that Israel is a nation and does have
a right to exist. Then I would feel that the United States could enter
into discussions with the PLO.
Now, I'm not speaking for Israel. That's up to them,
and we could not speak for them. But we're not—we're there as
an intermediary, offering our services to try and help bring about peace
in the Middle East.
Q. Would you also, then, support an independent Palestinian
state, which is what the PLO wants?
The President. That again, I think, is up to the negotiators.
We wouldn't impose anything on them. But Egypt and Israel, under the
Camp David agreement, they are supposed to enter into now an area of
talking of autonomy for the Palestinians. And that, again, is something
that has been delayed because of this tragedy in Lebanon. But I think
that is up to them as to how that autonomy develops and what they see
as a proper solution to the Palestinian problem.
AUGUST 13, 1982
Situation in Lebanon
Q. Mr. President, why didn't you take the kind of highly
publicized, public action to stop the bombing in Beirut before you did
yesterday? Perhaps hundreds of thousands could—or thousands anyway—could
have been saved. Why not be—why not go public, no matter what
you may have said in private, sir?
The President. Well, much of what we said—and
we weren't silent or idle in all this time that Habib 1 has been working-but
the sensitivity of the negotiations were such that I avoided, as you
know, anything that might interfere with those negotiations or in some
way injure what Ambassador Habib was trying to accomplish.
However, yesterday the situation was that the negotiations
were down—we had general agreement by all parties finally to the
arrangement, and the negotiations were down to the logistics, the technicalities
of getting the people—well, getting the PLO moving and so forth.
And those negotiations, literal]y, were broken off by the extent of
that bombing and shelling. The delegates couldn't even get to the negotiation
meetings. And I have to be fair and say that, in my first call, I was
informed then by Prime Minister Begin that he had ordered a cessation
of the aerial bombing, and so, we discussed the artillery shelling from
then on.
Q. Mr. President, why don't you tell us a little bit
of how you felt in these 9 weeks with people being bombarded and your
continuing to send weapons to inflict this horror on them? I mean, what
has been your personal feeling?
The President. As I say, this was a matter of great
concern, and we were trying to get an end to it. On the other hand,
I think that perhaps the image has been rather one-sided, because of
the Israeli capability at replying, but in many instances—in fact,
most of them—the cease-fire was broken by PLO attacking those
Israeli forces.
Q. Well, they were the invaders, were they not?
The President. Are they the invaders or is the PLO
the invaders? Lebanon is the country—
Q. As of June 6th.
The President. —but, on the other hand, if we
look now at the stories that are beginning to come out and that some
have been public, the PLO was literally a government and an armed force
in another nation and beholden in no way to that other nation, which
was one of the reasons why you didn't hear more protest from the Lebanese
Government about the Israeli presence.
Q. Mr. President, you said that yesterday you did have
a general agreement, and then there was this firing. Are we back on
track today? Do we still have a general agreement? And would you go
along with some forecasts that say the PLO evacuation will begin sometime
next week?
The President. I'm reasonably optimistic. Now, see,
I didn't say "cautiously." I'm reasonably optimistic about
this, because I believe that this time the cease-fire is going to hold,
and, as I say, the negotiations now are not the case of trying to persuade
agreement on the part of the various parties. The negotiations are on
the technicalities, the logistical move that must be made in getting
them out. And so, I think there's reason for, great reason for hope.
Q. The PLO—would the evacuation start next week?
As early as that?
The President. I can't—again, I don't want to
speculate on that, because I'm not there at the negotiating table.
Here, and then I've got to get back there into those
back lines there.
Q. Mr. President, has the Israeli action in Lebanon,
often against U.S. wishes—the massive retaliation for violations
of the cease-fire by the PLO, has that changed in any way the special
relationship between Israel and the United States? And has it changed
your own personal views toward Israel?
The President. No, I think—and I was concerned
also that—the reason for the call, that it could endanger that—the
manner in which it's being portrayed, there's been less emphasis on
the provocation and more emphasis on the response. And, yes, I did and
have voiced the opinion that the response many times was out of proportion
to the provocation. But we can't deny that the Israelis have been taking
casualties from those cease-fire violations themselves. I think the
figure now is 326 dead of their own military from being attacked in
the breaking of the cease-fire.
Q. Has it changed your own attitude?
The President. What?
Q. Has it changed your own attitude toward Israel?
The President. I still believe that this country has
an obligation to pursue the peace process that was started in Camp David
and that this country has an obligation to ensure Israel's survival
as a nation.
SEPTEMBER 28, 1982
Situation in Lebanon
Q. Mr. President, when the Palestinian fighters were
forced to leave Beirut, they said that they had America's word of honor
that those they left behind would not be harmed. Now comes U.N. Ambassador
Jeane Kirkpatrick, who says that America must share in the blame for
these massacres. My question to you is, do you agree with that judgment?
And I'd like to follow up.
The President. Helen, I think the manner in which Jeane
said that—and she's talked to me about it—was one about
the responsibility of all of us back over a period of time with regard
to the separation and divisions in Lebanon, the whole matter of the
Middle East, and not doing more to bring about the peace that we're
trying so hard now to get.
I don't think that specifically there could be assigned
as a responsibility on our part for withdrawing our troops. They were
sent in there with one understanding. They were there to oversee and
make sure that the PLO left Lebanon. And that mission was completed,
virtually without incident, and they left. Then, who could have foreseen
the assassination of the President-elect that led to the other violence
and so forth.
Q. Well, why did you give orders to our Representative
at the U.N. to vote against an inquiry to find out how it happened,
and why?
The President. As I understand it, there were things
additional in that inquiry, things that we have never voted for and
will not hold still for, such things as sanctions and such things as
voting Israel out of the U.N. Now, I can't recall exactly now what it
was that caused our vote to be negative on that. But the Lebanese and
the Israelis are apparently going forward with such an inquiry.
Q. Mr. President, you've told us that you're sending
marines to Lebanon for a limited amount of time, and yet you haven't
told us what the limit is. Can you give us a general idea of how long
you expect them to stay there and tell us precisely what you would like
to see them accomplish before they withdraw?
The President. I can't tell you what the time element
would be. I can tell you what it is that they should accomplish, and
I hope sooner rather than later.
One, they're there along with our allies, the French
and the Italians, to give a kind of support and stability while the
Lebanese Government seeks to reunite its people-which have been divided
for several years now into several factions, each one of them with its
own army—and bring about a unified Lebanon with a Lebanese Army
that will then be able to preserve order in its own country. And during
this time, while that's taking place, the withdrawal, as quickly as
possible, to their own borders of the Israelis and the Syrians.
Now, there we've had declarations from both countries
that they want to do that. So, I am reasonably optimistic about that.
I had no way to judge about when the Lebanese Government—the Lebanese
Government will be the ones that tell us when they feel that they're
in charge and they can go home.
Q. Are you then saying that they will remain there
until all foreign forces are withdrawn?
The President. Yes, because I think that's going to
come rapidly; I think we're going to see the withdrawal. Our marines
will go in tomorrow morning, as said, because the Israelis have agreed
to withdraw to that line south of the airport.
Middle East Peace Negotiations
Q. Mr. President, it has been reported that you believe
that Israel is sabotaging your peace initiative and also that you now
believe that Israel has become the Goliath in the Middle East and that
the other countries, the Arab countries, are the Davids. Did you say
that? Do you believe that?
The President. I didn't say it exactly that way. In
fact, I didn't say that I thought they were the Goliath. I said that
one of the things, as the negotiations approach and we proceed with
this peacemaking business, that Israel should understand, as we've come
to understand from talking to other Arab States, that where from the
very beginning, all of us, including Israel, have thought of them as
the tiny country fighting for its life, surrounded by larger states
and hostile states that want to see it destroyed, that their military
power has become such that there are Arab States that now voice a fear
that they're expansionist, that they may be expansionist and they have
the military power. So, all I was referring to was that.
The first part of your statement there, though, about
Israel and trying to undermine—no, I don't believe that. I think
that both sides have voiced things that they feel very strongly about,
and contrary to what I had suggested in my proposal and having been
a long-time union negotiator, I happen to think that some of that might
be each side staking out its position so as to be in a better position
when it comes time to negotiate.
Q. That's very kind of you. I just wanted to ask you,
since you said you didn't think that Israel was trying to undermine
your peace initiative, whether you are less optimistic about its chances
since the massacre and the tragedy in Beirut?
The President. No, I'm not less optimistic. I'm also
not deluding myself that it's going to be easy. Basically what we have,
I think, in this peace proposal is a situation where on one side territory
is the goal and on the other side security. And what has to be negotiated
out is a kind of exchange of territory for security. And I meant what
I said when I proposed this plan, and that is, this country will never
stand by and see any settlement that does not guarantee the security
of Israel.
Arms Sales to Israel
Q. Mr. President, shortly before the Israeli invasion
of Lebanon, the administration informally notified Congress that it
was planning to send more F-16's to Israel. There's been no formal notification
since then. Is the delay linked to difficulties in relations with Israel?
When do you think formal notification will go up, and under what conditions?
The President. They're still on tap, and we haven't
sent the formal notification up. And, very frankly, it was simply because
in the climate of things that were going on, we didn't think it was
the time to do it. However, there has been no interruption of those
things that are in the pipeline, spare parts, ammunition, things of
that kind. The only thing that we have actually withheld after the controversy
that came on in Lebanon was the artillery shell, the so-called cluster
shell.
Relations With Israel
Q. Mr. President, I seem to get the impression from
what you are saying about our relationships with Israel that nothing
has really changed in the wake of the massacre in Beirut or the temporary
rejection, anyway, of your peace plan. Is that correct? Is there no
change at all?
The President. There's no change in the sense that
we're still going with everything we can. We're going to try and persuade
the Arab neighbors of Israel to do as Egypt once did, and Israel, to
negotiate out a permanent peace solution, in which Israel will no longer
have to remain an armed camp, which is making their life economically
unbearable. And at the same time, an answer must be found that is just
and fair for the Palestinians. And I don't think anything has happened
to change that, if I understood your question correctly. Nothing has
changed in our feeling of obligation to bring about, if we can, such
a result.
Q. Sir, I really meant our relationship with the Begin
government. Is it as cordial and friendly? Is it now tense? Is it—what
is the situation?
The President. I can tell you one thing it isn't. It
isn't what some of you have said or written, that we are deliberately
trying to undermine or overthrow the Begin government. We have never
interfered in the internal government of a country and have no intention
of doing so, never have had any thought of that kind. And we expect
to be doing business with the Government of Israel and with Prime Minister
Begin, if that's the decision of the Israeli people. I think that Frank
Reynolds [ABC News] last night voiced something that we believe, and
that is that the Israeli people are proving with their reaction to the
massacre that there's no change in the spirit of Israel. They are our
ally, we feel morally obligated to the preservation of Israel, and we're
going to continue to be that way.
OCTOBER 14, 1982
The Middle East
Representative Hiler. Mr. President? This is John Hiler
from South Bend, Indiana. I want to compliment you on a very fine speech
last evening.
The question I have, Mr. President, is what are the
prospects for real peace in the Middle East?
The President. Well, Jack, I think the prospects are
good. I'm optimistic about the Middle East and what's going on there.
As you know, we've had our good man, Ambassador Habib, over there negotiating
again, the man who brought about the cease-fire. And he is assisted
by another one, his companion, Ambassador Draper. But what we're trying
to do is, first, help the newly elected President over there, with our
multinational force, establish stability in Lebanon. They've been, for
several years, divided up into factions, each faction with its own militia.
But I think progress is being made there. We've heard statements recently
that both Israel and Syria have expressed their willingness to leave.
They, I think, would like to do it simultaneously.
And so I think progress is being made. And then we've
been in contact with the Arab nations, as well as with our friends and
allies in Israel. And it will take negotiations under the Camp David
pattern to bring about a just solution for the Palestinian refugees
and at the same time have the other Arab States do what Egypt did first,
and that is recognize the right of Israel to exist as a nation and have
peace treaties with them. And I think that we have a very good chance
of succeeding.
NOVEMBER 11, 1982
Israel
Q. Mr. President, Israel continues to ignore your call
for a freeze of settlements on the West Bank. How damaging is Israel's
ignoring of that freeze to the peace process, and what are you prepared
to do about it?
The President. Well, Prime Minister Begin is coming
here, and I'm sure that he and I will have some talks on that, as well
as other subjects. We do think that it is a hindrance to what we're
trying to accomplish in the peace movement.
Obviously the solution to the Middle East must be what
we outlined earlier, and that is to bring the Arab States and Arab leaders
and the Israelis together at a negotiating table to resolve the differences
between them. And that begins with them recognizing Israel's right to
exist as a nation.
So, I am still optimistic, and that's why Phil Habib
is going back there. Now—wait
Q. If I may follow up. Are you prepared to do more
than just talk with Prime Minister Begin? Are you prepared to consider
any sanctions to force a change in Israeli policy?
The President. Well, I don't think that it would be
good diplomacy to be threatening or anything, and I don't believe that's
necessary. I think that all of us realize that peace is the ultimate
goal there.
Q. Mr. President, I'd like to try it again on Israel
and possible sanctions. Is it possible that the United States might
cut back on aid to Israel in direct proportion to the cost to that country
of establishing new settlements on the West Bank, all this as a means
of achieving the freeze that you're seeking?
The President. To answer that question one way or the
other, I don't think would be helpful in the situation that we're in
today, where we have made so much progress with the Arab States, the
unusual, the unique thing of the representatives of the Arab League
being here to meet with me as they were just some days ago; the need
now for Israel to itself recognize that they too must play a part in
making it possible for negotiations; the part that must be played and
recognized and that one of President Gemayel's problems now is reconciling
Muslim groups within his own' country. I don't think to start talking
about whether I should or should not make threats of some kind or other
is going to be fruitful at all
Q. [Inaudible]—got a request here for some factual
information. Is it true that the Begin government now is spending about
a hundred million dollars a year to subsidize, settlements on the West
Bank?
The President. I don't know that figure. I imagine
I could find that out very easily.
DECEMBER 18, 1982
The Middle East
Q. Mr. President, you have King Hussein of Jordan coming
in here next week. He's been described as the linchpin in your Middle
East peace initiative, because of your proposal for the Palestinian
entity. What do you think are the prospects of bringing him on board
the Camp David process at this point?
The President. King Hussein is not only a very intelligent
and responsible leader, but I think that he is very sensitive to all
of the problems that are involved and very sincerely desirous of peace
in the Middle East and a resolution of this problem. And I think that
he will be cooperative. And I think we can count on him for that. But
the main thing right now that we have Ambassadors Habib and Draper working
on in the Middle East is to get what now constitute armies of occupation—the
PLO, the Syrians, and the Israelis—out of Lebanon, and let the
Gemayel government have the sovereignty of their own country.
I call them armies of occupation, because there was
a time in which Lebanon, with all of its troubles and its divisions,
did have to welcome them in in an effort to create order. But now that
government has had enough confidence to ask them to leave. For them
to continue to stay against the will of Lebanon makes them, technically,
armies of occupation. And we're working on that. That is the first step.
And then we move to the peace process, involving the Palestinian problem,
Israel, and guaranteeing the security of Israel's borders.
Sources: Public Papers of the President |