Memorandum Assuring France There Are No Nuclear
Weapons In Israel
(March 23, 1965)
France is concerned that Israel might be making nuclear weapons with their
Dimona reactor. The United States assures
France that this is not happening, but does
admit that Israel might have the ability to
do so in the near future. Rusk expects open
communication between France and the United
States on this issue.
196. Telegram From the Department
of State of the Embassy in France/1/
4902. Paris for Ambassador.
You should convey following oral message to
FonMin from Secretary:
I understand that during your recent visit
to Washington you mentioned Israel's Dimona
reactor to Mr. Ball. In this connection, you
may have seen the article in the March 14
issue of the NYTimes on nuclear developments
in Israel. The article is generally accurate
with the important exception, however, that
visits by American scientists to Israel's
facilities have been at the invitation of
the Government of Israel and were not in the
nature of inspections.
The visits to Dimona were part of regular
exchanges of visits by scientific experts
in connection with both U.S. installations
and those of Israel. Our experts have seen
enough to draw what appears to be a reasonable
conclusion that the Dimona reactor is not
being used to produce materials for nuclear
weapons. Nevertheless, they also concluded
that, should the Israeli Government decide
to produce such materials and weapons from
them, there is an increasing Israeli capability
to do so.
Under these circumstances, the United States
believes it is highly desirable that Israel
accept IAEA safeguards on all of its facilities.
Since the U.A.R. has no nuclear weapons capability
for the foreseeable future, we think Israeli
acceptance of IAEA safeguards might induce
President Nasser to accept similar controls.
Extension of IAEA safeguards to all nuclear
facilities in the Near East would be a major
step toward abating the area arms race.
The United States continues to follow this
situation with concern and would hope for
close consultations between our two governments
regarding any evidence of the introduction
of nuclear weapons into that area./2/
Rusk
/1/Source: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66,
AE 11-2 ISR. Confidential. Drafted by Russell
and Richard G. Long in EUR/WE; cleared by
Davies, Talbot, Brown in INR, Officer in Charge
of Atomic Energy Affairs in SCI Charles W.
Thomas, and Deputy Assistant Secretary of
State for European Affairs Robert C. Creel;
and approved by Ball. Repeated to Tel Aviv.
/2/Ambassador Bohlen reported in telegram
5448 from Paris, March 26, that he had that
day conveyed the oral message to Foreign Minister
Couve de Murville, who expressed doubt that
Israel would accept the IAEA safeguards. He
said that although according to French information,
there was no evidence of any attempt by Israel
to produce materials for nuclear weapons,
he thought Israel would prefer to keep that
possibility open. (Ibid.)
Sources: U.S.
Department of State |