First Guidance On U.S. Policy Toward the
PLO
(March 30, 1965)
This document may be the earliest U.S.
government reference to the PLO.
In it Rusk advises government officials not to recognize
the PLO, but at the same time not to ignore it. He feels
ignoring the group could do more harm than good. He feels
that by working with the PLO, the United States can try and
change some of the views of the Arabs on destroying Israel.
199. Circular Airgram From
the Department of State to Certain Posts/1/
SUBJECT: Guidance on U.S.
Contacts with the Palestine Liberation Organization
Recent press accounts indicate that the Palestine
Liberation Organization (PLO) plans shortly
to have offices in all Arab countries except
Saudi Arabia. Offices are also to be opened
in Great Britain, India, Indonesia and the
United States. An office has been opened in
Pakistan. As officers in these countries will
probably be exposed increasingly to contacts
with the PLO and its officials, the Department
wishes to set forth guidelines for these contacts.
There are of course fundamental differences
between the PLO's views of the Palestine problem
and our own. We are as a matter of national
policy committed to support the continued
existence of Israel; PLO officials repeatedly
have declared it is that organization's aim
to see the state of Israel destroyed. We are
committed to a peaceful solution of the whole
complex of Palestine issues; the PLO's declared
policies increasingly indicate it sees no
alternative to solving these problems than
by force of arms. Because of our role in Israel's
creation and our support of Israel, PLO statements
are almost invariably hostile to the United
States. We have made no public statements
regarding the PLO. We do not recognize it
as the sole or even as an official representative
of the Palestine people. It is the USG's view
that it has no official status whatever.
In spite of the chasm between the PLO and
ourselves, we do not wish to cut ourselves
off entirely and irrevocably from its members
and officials as individuals. We believe that
productive relations can be established between
PLO members and USG officers. We do not believe
that we should undertake any kind of broad-scale
campaign to establish such relations, but
neither should we ignore opportunities as
might present themselves. Such relations we
believe are another way of demonstrating to
the Palestinians and other Arabs our continuing
friendship for the Palestinian people. There
is of course the possibility of acquiring
useful intelligence. And finally the maintenance
of these contacts would be a useful hedge
against some unforeseen and fundamental change
in the Palestine problem and our relation
to it.
Accordingly the Department wishes to caution
the posts that they should take no action
that might be construed as official recognition
of the PLO. They may acknowledge mail from
individuals in the PLO but should not enter
into substantive correspondence with them
as PLO officials. Officers should not call
at PLO offices or encourage PLO calls at embassies
or consulates. If PLO officials wish to call
at USG offices they should be received at
a subordinate level. Officers should not attend
official PLO functions. There is no objection,
however, to US officers' attendance of small,
informal functions given by PLO officers or
ones at which the latter are present, even
as guests of honor.
Officers may where appropriate maintain unostentatious
personal contact with PLO officials. They
may attend official host country functions
at which PLO officials are present, though
not ones at which they are guests of honor.
For its part, the Department intends to receive
any PLO callers at the level of Office Director
or below. It is intended that any contacts
by Department officers with PLO officials
outside the Department be kept at a subordinate
level and be unostentatious and informal.
The Department welcomes continuing reporting
on the PLO and individuals connected with
it.
Rusk
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG
59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 3 PAL ENTITY. Confidential;
Air Pouch. Drafted by Stackhouse on March 12; cleared by Davies
and Director of the Office of South Asian Affairs Turner C.
Cameron, Jr., and in draft by Deputy Director of the Office
of Northern African Affairs James J. Blake and Stephen J. Campbell;
and approved by Talbot. Sent to Aden, Aleppo, Alexandria, Algiers,
Amman, Baghdad, Baida, Basra, Beirut, Benghazi, Cairo, Casablanca,
Constantine, Damascus, Djakarta, Jerusalem, Jidda, Khartoum,
Kuwait, London, New Delhi, Oran, Paris, Port Said, Rabat, Taiz,
Tripoli, Tunis, USUN, and Karachi.
Sources: U.S.
Department of State |